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SUMMARY
Trade marks are among the most valuable commodities of the modern business world.
Adequate protection for trade marks to prevent the misappropriation of their incredible
marketing power is therefore important.
The aim of this dissertation is to make recommendations regarding the further
development of existing South African law regarding the protection of registered trade
marks against dilution, particularly by the courts. Current statutory protection is
examined and compared with trade-mark law in the United States and the European
Union.
Although the concept of dilution originated in Germany, most of its development took
place in the United States, starting in 1927 with an article by Frank Schechter. Dilution
occurs when the awareness that a specific mark signifies a single product from a single
source changes to an unmistakable awareness that the same mark signifies various things
from various sources. The primary theories as to how dilution occurs are blurring and
tarnishment. Although the dilution concept is widely recognised, there is still a debate
amongst legal scholars on whether trade marks deserve protection against dilution.
The extent of protection that the law gives to trade marks largely depends on the socio-
economic functions that a trade mark is perceived to fulfil. The original source or origin
function is protected by the traditional infringement provisions. The identification or
distinguishing function, quality function and advertising function subsequently gained
recognition. The advertising function is statutorily recognised in various jurisdictions,
which prevents trade-mark dilution.
Statutory recognition of dilution in the United States first occurred in State law from
1947 onwards. Protection is generally given to distinctive or strong trade marks where a
similar mark is used on dissimilar goods in the absence of confusion in such a way that
there is a likelihood that the reputation of the senior mark will be injured. The
parameters of the concept were developed and refined mainly through case law. Federal
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The dissertation concludes with recommendations to aid South African courts in the
future interpretation and application of the dilution provisions. Amendments to the
legislation are also proposed to promote greater clarity.
protection against dilution was only introduced in 1995. The new Act, although widely
welcomed, also brought some unpredictability and interpretation problems.
The first statutory dilution protection for trade marks in Europe is found in the Uniform
Benelux Trade Marks Act. In 1989 the European Union adopted the Trademark
Directive, with the aim of harmonising the legal protection afforded to trade marks. Its
"dilution" provisions were incorporated into the United Kingdom's Trade Marks Act of
1994. The sometimes conflicting interpretations of these provisions by the English courts
and the Court of Justice of the European Communities are discussed.
The South African Act shows a substantial degree of harmony with legislation in the
United Kingdom and other European countries. Aspects of the wording of the dilution
provisions are however open to interpretation by the courts. Until the end of 2003 there
was only one major trade-mark dilution case decided by a South African court, namely
SAR v Laugh It OjJPromotions, which is discussed in detail.
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OPSOMMING
Handelsmerke is van die waardevolste kommoditeite van die moderne besigheidswêreld.
Voldoende beskerming om die uitbuiting van handelsmerke se ongelooflike
bemarkingskrag te verhoed, is daarom belangrik.
Die oogmerk van die proefskrif is om aanbevelings te maak vir die verdure ontwikkeling
van bestaande Suid-Afrikaanse reg oor die beskerming van geregistreerde handelsmerke
teen verwatering, veral deur die howe. Die bestaande statutêre beskerming word
ondersoek en vergelyk met die reg op handelsmerke in the Verenigde State en die
Europese Unie.
Alhoewel die verwateringskonsep sy oorsprong in Duitsland het, is die konsep
hoofsaaklik in die Verenigde State ontwikkel, beginnende in 1927 met 'n artikel deur
Frank Schechter. Verwatering vind plaas wanneer die bewustheid dat 'n spesifieke merk
'n enkele produk vanuit 'n enkele bron aandui verander na 'n onmiskenbare bewustheid
dat dieselfde merk verskillende dinge vanuit verskillende bronne aandui. Die primêre
verskyningsvorme van verwatering is vertroebeling en besoedeling. Alhoewel die
verwateringskonsep wye erkenning geniet, is daar steeds 'n debat onder regsgeleerdes oor
die verdienstelikheid van die beskerming teen verwatering.
Die mate van beskerming wat die reg aan handelsmerke verleen, hang grootliks af van
wat gesien word as die sosio-ekonomiese funksies van 'n handelsmerk. Die aanvanklike
oorsprongsfunksie word beskerm deur die tradisionele bepalings rakende inbreukmaking.
Die identifiserings- of onderskeidingsfunksie, die kwaliteitsfunksie en die reklamefunksie
het later erkenning gekry. Die reklamefunksie word in verskillende jursidiksies statutêr
erken, wat die verwatering van handelsmerke verhoed.
In die Verenigde State het die eerste statutêre erkenning vir verwatering sedert 1947 in
die wetgewing van State plaasgevind. Beskerming is normaalweg gegee aan sterk
handelsmerke of handelsmerke wat kan onderskei in gevalle waar 'n soortgelyke merk
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Aanbevelings om die Suid-Afrikaanse howe in die toekoms te help met die interpretasie
en aanwending van die verwateringsbepalings, word in die finale hoofstuk gemaak.
Veranderinge aan die wetgewing word ook voorgestel, om groter duidelikheid te bereik.
gebruik is op ongelyksoortige goedere in die afwesigheid van verwarring op so 'n wyse
dat die waarskynlikheid bestaan dat die reputasie van die senior merk aangetas kan word.
Die maatstawwe van die konsep is hoofsaaklik ontwikkel en verfyn in hofsake. Federale
beskerming teen verwatering is eers in 1995 ingestel. Alhoewel dié nuwe wetgewing
wyd verwelkom is, het dit ook onvoorspelbaarheid en interpretasieproblerne
voortgebring.
Die "Uniform Benelux Trade Marks Act" het die eerste statutêre beskerming teen die
verwatering van handelsmerke in Europa gebied. Die "Trademark Directive" is in 1989
deur die Europese Unie aanvaar met die doelom die wetlike beskerming van
handelsmerke the harmonieer. Die "verwaterings"bepalings is geïnkorporeer in die
Verenigde Koninkryk se "Trade Marks Act" van 1994. Soms botsende interpretasies
hiervan is deur die Engelse howe en die Geregshofvan die Europese Unie gegee.
Die Suid-Afrikaanse wetgewing toon 'n groot mate van ooreenstemming met wetgewing
in the Verenigde Koninkryk en ander Europese lande. Aspekte van die bewoording van
die verwateringsbepalings is oop vir interpretasie deur die howe. Tot en met die einde
van 2003 was daar slegs een belangrike saak oor handelsmerkverwatering wat deur 'n
Suid-Afrikaanse hof beslis is, naamlik SAB v Laugh It Off Promotions. Dit word in detail
bespreek.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
All the glory be to God who granted me the intellectual capacity, inner motivation and
everything else needed to complete this study successfully. I am so grateful.
The efforts, contributions and support of many people made this dissertation possible:
My sincerest appreciation to my supervisor, Professor Coenraad Visser of the University
of South Africa, for his guidance, belief in my abilities and support.
My deepest appreciation also to my co-supervisor, Professor David Butler of the
University of Stellenbosch, for his indispensable supervision. He meticulously worked
through every draft of this dissertation to ensure that it is also linguistically up to
standard. As I was writing in my second language his efforts were highly appreciated.
A great thank you also to Professor RA Kelbrick of the University of South Africa, who
acted as external examiner and Professor Max Loubser of the University of Stellenbosch,
who acted as internal examiner.
The financial assistance of the National Research Foundation towards this research is
hereby acknowledged. A Doctoral Scholarship for Research Abroad, made four months
of research at the University of Maastricht, in the Netherlands and at Marquette
University Law School in Milwaukee, Wisconsin (USA) possible. Opinions expressed in
this dissertation and conclusions arrived at are those of the author and are not necessarily
to be attributed to the National Research Foundation.
I am also obliged to the Harry Crossley Trust for a bursary granted.
I am also deeply thankful towards Professor Kenneth Port (at that stage from Marquette
University Law School) and Professor Anselm Kamperman Sanders from the University
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
To my children, Zanél, Tjaart and Francois, I am also much indebted. So many times I
was not there for you when you needed me.
of Maastricht, who did so much to ensure that my time at their respective universities was
as fruitful as possible. We really appreciated their hospitality towards us.
Without my mother, Ansie Blignaut, this study would have been impossible. She was the
one above all who believed in me and my abilities, encouraged me and motivated me.
She made so many sacrifices to accompany me abroad and stayed for months at a time
with us in Pretoria where she took over a lot of the domestic responsibilities and care of
the children. Thank you so much for everything.
To my husband, Tjaart, who made it possible for me to complete this study, my deepest
gratitude. Thank you for your love, support, patience and encouragement; also for all
your help with the technical aspects of the dissertation.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
OPGEDRA AAN MAMMA
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1 FUNCTIONS AS BASIS FOR PROTECTION 2
1.2 POLICY CONSJDERATIONS UNDERLYING PROTECTION 4
1.3 DEFINITION OF THE DILUTION CONCEPT 6
1.4 AIM OF DISSERTATION 9
1.5 FRAMEWORK OF DISCUSSION 11
CHAPTER2
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS OF TRADE MARKS 13
2.1 ORIGIN OR SOURCE FUNCTION 15
2.2 IDENTIFICA nON AND DISTINGUISHING FUNCTION 20
2.3 QUALITY FUNCTION 25
2.4 ADVERTISING FUNCTION 30
2.5 INVESTMENT FUNCTION 34
2.6 PROTECTION OF TRADE MARK FUNCTIONS 34
CHAPTER3
THE CONCEPT OF DILUTION AND THE DILUTION DEBATE38
3.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF DILUTION AS A LEGAL CONCEPT 38
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
3.2 DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF DILUTION
3.3 TRADITIONAL INFRINGEMENT CONTRASTED WITH
DILUTION
3.4 TYPES OF DILUTION
3.4.1 BLURRING
3.4.2 TARNISHMENT
3.4.3 GENERICISM/GENERICISA TION
3.4.4 DISPARAGEMENT OR IMITATIVE DILUTION
3.4.5 ALTERATION
3.5 THE DILUTION DEBATE
3.5.1 ARGUMENTS AGAINST OFFERING TRADE MARKS
DILUTION PROTECTION
3.5.1.1 THE FEAR OF MONOPOL Y
3.5.1.2 FUNCTION HAS NOT EXPANDED
3.5.l.3 NO REAL INJURY
3.5.1.4 TRADE-MARK POLICIES
3.5.1.5 ADEQUATE PROTECTION
3.5.1.6 CREATING A COPYRIGHT IN A TRADE MARK
3.5.2 ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF OFFERING TRADE MARKS
DILUTION PROTECTION
3.5.2.1 EXPANDED FUNCTIONS OF TRADE MARKS
3.5.2.2 DILUTION DAMAGES TRADE MARKS
3.5.2.3 POLICIES UNDERLYING TRADE-MARK LAW
3.5.2.4 TRADE MARKS THAT CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT OF
CONFUSION
47
50
54
55
57
59
61
62
62
63
63
64
64
65
66
66
67
67
68
69
71
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 84
3.5.3 ROLE OF THE STATUS OF THE TRADE-MARK
PROPRIETOR'S RIGHT IN THE DILUTION DEBATE
3.5.4 CONCLUSION
71
81
CHAPTER4
4.1 AMERICAN STATUTORY TRADE-MARK LAW PRIOR TO 1947 84
4.2 FEDERAL TRADE-MARK LAW SINCE 1947 86
4.3 PROTECTION AGAINST DILUTION UNDER STATE DILUTION
LAWS 90
4.3.1 PROTECTION AND RELATED PROBLEMS 90
4.3.2 SOLUTIONS OFFERED 98
4.3.3 CASES UNDER STATE DILUTION LAWS 100
4.3.3.1 SECOND CIRCUIT CASES 100
(i) The similarity of the marks 107
(ii) The similarity of the products 108
(iii) The sophistication of the consumers 109
(iv) Predatory intent 109
(v) The renown of the senior mark III
(vi) The renown of the junior mark 111
(vii) Balancing the factors 112
(viii) Comments on the "Sweet Test" 112
4.3.3.2 SEVENTH CIRCUIT CASES 116
4.3.3.3 NINTH CIRCUIT CASES 121
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
4.10.1 IDENTICAL OR SIMILAR MARK?
4.10.2 DISTINCTIVENESS
4.10.3 FAMOUS MARKS
4.10.4 LIKELIHOOD OF DILUTION VSACTUAL DILUTION
4.10.5 "CONFUSION" UNDER THE FEDERAL ACT
4.10.6 CASES ON BLURRING
4.10.7 CASES ON TARNISHMENT
4.10.8 RETROACTIVITY OF THE ACT
145
147
149
158
180
181
183
186
4.3.3.4 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CASES
4.3.3.5 CONCLUSION
123
124
4.4 FEDERAL DILUTION PROTECTION BEFORE THE FEDERAL
Acr 1~
4.5 THE TRADEMARK LAW REVISION ACT OF 1988 128
4.6 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (1995) 129
4.7 THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT OF 1995 130
4.7.1 DEFINITION OF DILUTION IN THE ACT
4.7.2 DISCUSSION OF THE DIFFERENT FACTORS
4.7.3 EXCEPTIONS TO LIABILITY UNDER THE ACT
133
135
137
4.8 THE TRADEMARK AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1999
4.9 CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND POTENTIAL IMPACT OF
THE FEDERAL DILUTION ACT
4.10 CASE LAW UNDER THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION
ACT
140
141
145
4.11 REFORMING THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT? 188
4.12 SYNOPSIS 189
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
5.6 THE COMMUNITY TRADE MARK
5.7 LAWS OF SELECTED MEMBER STATES OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION 214
211
CHAPTERS
EUROPEAN UNION LAW
5.1 INTRODUCTION
5.2 STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE-MARK LAW IN
EUROPE
5.3 EARLY ORIGINS OF DILUTION IN EUROPE
5.4 THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
196
196
198
201
202
5.4.1 BACKGROUND AND AIM
5.4.2 COMPOSITION AND FUNCTIONS
202
202
5.5 THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE TRADEMARK DIRECTIVE 204
5.5.1 BACKGROUND TO THE DIRECTIVE
5.5.2 FINAL ADOPTION AND AIM
5.5.3 DILUTION PROVISIONS
5.5.4 INFLUENCE OF THE BENELUX LAW
5.5.5 MEANING OF "LIKELIHOOD OF ASSOCIATION"
204
205
206
208
209
5.7.1 BENELUXLAW 214
5.7.1.1 GENERAL 214
5.7.1.2 COURT SYSTEM IN THE BENELUX 215
5.7.1.3 "LIKELIHOOD OF ASSOCIATrON" IN THE BENELUX LAW 216
5.7.1.4 "USE IN RELATION TO GOODS AND SERVICES" 218
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
5.9 SYNOPSIS 280
5.7.1.5 ARTICLE 13A(2) OF THE UNIFORM BENELUX TRADE
MARKS ACT
5.7.1.6INFLUENCE OF THE TRADEMARK DIRECTIVE ON
BENELUX LAW 221
219
5.7.1.7 THE NEW BENELUX TRADE MARKS ACT 223
5.7.2 THE UNITED KINGDOM 223
5.7.2.1 GENERAL 223
5.7.2.2 THE PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF SECTIONS 10(2) &(3) 226
5.7.2.3 CASES ON SECTION 10(2) 228
5.7.2.4 CASES ON SECTION 10(3) 239
5.7.2.5 THE KEY CONCEPTS OF SECTION 10(3) 246
(i) "Use in the Course of Trade"
(ii) "Without Due Cause"
(iii) "Unfair Advantage or Detriment"
(iv) "Reputation"
(v) "Distinctive Character or Repute"
246
247
248
254
257
5.7.2.6 COMPARATIVE ADVERTISING IN THE UK
5.7.2.7 LOOKALIKES IN THE UK
257
259
5.8 JUDGMENTS OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (CJEC) 261
5.8.1 THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 4(1)(b) AND 5(l)(b) 261
5.8.2 THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 5(2) 273
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
303
CHAPTER6
THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION 286
6.1 HISTORY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE-MARK
LEGISLATION 286
6.2 REGISTRA TlON OF TRADE MARKS IN SOUTH AFRICA 288
6.2.1 THE REGISTRATION PROCESS
6.2.2 DEFENSIVE REGISTRAnONS
6.2.3 REGISTRABILITY UNDER THE 1993 ACT
288
291
293
6.3 BACKGROUND TO THE DILUTION PROVISIONS OF THE
1993 ACT 297
6.3.1 COMMON-LAW POSITION
6.3.2 PREVIOUS LEGISLATION
6.3.3 THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND
EUROPEAN LAW
6.3.4 SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
297
299
299
301
6.3.4.1 THE PARIS CONVENTION
6.3.4.2 THE GATT AGREEMENT ON THE TRADE RELATED
ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
301
(i) Three Basic Principles 305
(ii) Specific Provisions Regarding Trade Marks 305
(iii) Dilution Protection in the TRIPS Agreement 306
6.4 DISCUSSION OF THE DILUTION PROVISIONS AND CASES 307
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
6.4.1 INTRODUCTION
6.4.2 THE DILUTION PROVISIONS
307
308
(i) Use in the Course of Trade 309
(ii) Use ... in Relation to Any Goods or Services 309
(iii) Use of the Registered Mark or a Mark Similar Thereto 310
(iv) Well known 311
(v) Likely to Take Unfair Advantage of, or be Detrimental to,
the Distinctive Character or Repute 315
(vi) Notwithstanding the Absence of Confusion or Deception 318
(vii) Remedies 319
6.4.3 COMPARATIVE ADVERTISING
6.4.4 CASES
319
320
6.5 THE NEED FOR DILUTION PROTECTION 325
CHAPTER 7
REFINING STATUTORY DILUTION PROTECTION IN THE
LIGHT OF THE COMPARATIVE SURVEY 327
7.1 INTRODUCTION 327
7.2 SOUTH AFRICA'S DILUTION PROVISIONS COMPARED
TO THOSE OF US FEDERAL LAW 328
7.2.1 INTRODUCTION
7.2.2 THE DILUTION PROVISIONS
328
329
(i) Well known/famous 330
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
1.
2.
3.
INTRODUCTION
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT
357
358
358
(ii) Unfair advantage or detriment to distinctive quality or
repute/dilution of distinctive quality
(iii) Exceptions
335
340
7.3 SOUTH AFRICA'S DILUTION PROVISIONS COMPARED
TO THOSE OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 341
7.3.1 INTRODUCTION
7.3.2 THE DILUTION PROVISIONS
341
342
(i) Identical or similar mark/sign 345
(ii) Any goods or services/non-similar goods/services 346
(iii) Without due cause 347
(iv) Well known/reputation 348
(v) Likely to take/takes unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to,
the distinctive character or repute 349
(vi) Notwithstanding the absence of confusion or deception 352
7.4 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 354
7.5 CONCLUSION 355
ADDENDUM
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
LAUGH IT OFF v SOUTH AFRICAN BREWERIES
CASE CCT 42/04 - 27 MAY 2005 357
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
BffiLIOGRAPHY 369
4. THE JUDGMENT 358
5. COMMENTS ON THE JUDGMENT 361
5.1 "SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC DETRIMENT" 362
5.2 TARNISHMENT 364
5.3 LIKELIHOOD OF DILUTION VS ACTUAL DILUTION 365
5.4 EXCLUSIONS IN SECTION 16 366
5.5 PARODY 367
ARTICLES 369
BOOKS 378
CASE LAW
SOUTH AFRICA 379
UNITED STATES 381
EUROPE 388
INTERNA TIONAL DOCUMENTS 391
STATUTES 392
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
CHAPTERl
INTRODUCTION
"What's in a name? That which we call a rose, by any other name would smell as sweet."'
In the modem world of trade marks the above quotation is, however, not completely true. Today
the words used to identify products make a substantial contribution to what consumers associate
with these products. For this reason the growth of a business in many instances depends to a
large extent on first establishing and then promoting the trade marks linked to that business.
Consumers are relying more and more on trade marks to make informed decisions about the
products they want to buy. In the modem age of the Internet, customers do not even see the
physical products before they buy them.' Trade marks also enable one seller to compete more
effectively with another. They are essential in a competitive economy to promote competition,
lower consumer search costs dramatically and heighten the level of product quality.' Trade
marks have thus become one of the most valuable commodities of the modem business world."
Trade-mark proprietors expend vast sums of money through advertising to build up the reputation
and advertising value or selling power of their trade marks.i There is also a growing recognition
of a trade mark as an asset in itself, that is separate from the business in which and the goods and
The Complete Works of William Shakespeare Romeo and Juliet act II se, ii P 771 (1980) Atlantis London.
2 Lee DH "Remedying Past and Future Harm: Reconciling Conflicting Circuit Court Decisions Under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act" (2002) 29 Pepperdine Law Review 689.
3 Klieger RN "Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark Protection" (1997)
58 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 789 at 854-855.
4 See "Verrigtings van Uitgebreide Openbare Komitee - Volksraad; Wetsontwerp op Handelsmerke (Debat oor
Tweede Lesing)" Friday, 10 December 1993 15187-15190; Memorandum on the Objects of the Draft Trade
Marks Bill, 1992 § 1.2 at 101, Government Gazette, 30 August 1991.
In Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 at 213, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20786, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1882 (2nd Cir 1999) Pepperidge Farm gave evidence to the effect that it had spent more than $120 million
between 1995 and 1998 on promoting its GOLDFISH trade mark in the United States. In 1996 alone, Ringling
Bros.-Barnum spent about $19 million advertising and marketing their trade mark THE GREATEST SHOW ON
EARTH for their circus amongst the public. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Division ofTravel170 F.3d 449 at 451,1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4179, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065 (4th Cir 1999). Lee
(2002) 690 notes that companies invest anywhere between nineteen and forty million dollars a year to maintain
the strength of their trade marks.
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2services for which it is used." It is therefore important that trade marks, especially widely
recognised trade marks, have adequate protection against other companies trying to exploit the
incredible marketing power of these trade marks.
1.1 FUNCTIONS AS BASIS FOR PROTECTION
The extent of the protection which the law gives to trade marks will largely depend on the socio-
economic functions that a trade mark is perceived to fulfil. Traditionally trade marks were seen
as indicators of the source of origin of the goods sold under the trade marks.i In the early
development of trade-mark law trade marks served as indicators of the actual producer of the
goods on which they were affixed.9 This position has changed due to the complexities of modern
trade and the national and international distribution of goods through the importer and retailer to
the consumer. The source function was gradually given less emphasis by the courts and as early
as 1927 Schechter," who is considered the father of dilution law, stated that trade marks indicate
only that all the goods with a specific trade mark on them emanate from the same, possibly
anonymous, source. Il This means that as long as the consumers know that products with a
certain trade mark on them emanate from the same source, it does not matter if that source is
unknown to the consumers.
In legislation another function of trade marks was recognised. Under the definition of
"trademark" in federal legislation in the United States, namely the Lanham Act of 1946, for
example, the emphasis is placed on the identifying and distinguishing function of a trade mark.12
6 Wheeldon R "Trade Mark Dilution - What is it?" Lecture Notes I. McCarthy JT McCarthy on Trademarks 4th
ed (1996) West Group St Paul Minnesota § 24:100 states that the dilution doctrine, which is the focus of this
dissertation, protects a property interest in a trade mark. See also McCarthy (1996) § 24:71; Webster CE &
Morley GE Webster & Page South African Law of Trade Marks, Unlawful Competition, Company Names and
Trading Styles 4th ed (1997) Butterworths Durban par 12.24. See further Chapter 3.5.3 "Role of the Status of the
Trade-mark Proprietor's Right in the Dilution Debate" infra for the property debate.
7 See Chapter 2 "The Socio-Economic Functions of Trade Marks" infra for a detailed discussion of these
functions.
8 Schechter PI "The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection" (1927) 40 Harvard Law Review 813 at 813-814;
Webster & Page (1997) par 3.4.
9 McCarthy (1996) § 3:8. Schechter (1927) 814 suggests that this was the case four hundred years ago.
10 Schechter (1927) 816.
Il Also see McCarthy (1996) § 3:9.
12 Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C.A. 1127 defines a trade mark as any "word, name, symbol, or device" used by a
manufacturer or merchant "to identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured by others". At
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3In order to protect a trade-mark proprietor's'< interests in this source identifying function of a
trade mark, governments started to protect trade marks against uses that resulted in a likelihood
of confusion.i" In effect, two complementary policy considerations are adhered to, IS namely the
protection of the trade-mark proprietor's business or goodwill on the one hand and the protection
of the public from confusion and deception on the other hand. The emphasis was however rather
on the protection of the public from confusion and deception. The prerequisite for the provision
of protection under the traditional theory of trade-mark law is the occurrence of confusion or
deception."
Most commentators, however, agree that the functions of trade marks have further expanded over
time and that trade marks today also serve an advertising function.l Trade marks are also said to
function as guarantors of the consistency of quality of the trade-marked goods'" and as
embodiments of the proprietor's goodwill." Remedies provided by the law against infringing
uses that cause confusion offer virtually no protection for these most important functions of trade
marks. To protect these functions, especially the advertising function.j" the concept of dilution
was developed. This doctrine thus gives protection to trade marks beyond that provided by the
"likelihood of confusion" test.21 The introduction of this concept of dilution was a fundamental
that stage, although this distinguishing function has been recognised in writings and decisions, it has not been
acknowledged in statutory enactments in South Africa. See Webster & Page (1997) par 3.4.
13 It is accepted by most scholars that a trade mark does not confer any property right on its holder, but the term
"proprietor" is nevertheless generally used in the American, as well as South African law, when referring to the
holder of a trade mark. See, for example, s 15(a), 18(1), 23(2), 25, 35(3), etc. of the South African Trade Marks
Act 194 of 1993; Webster & Page (1997) inter alia par 5.1,5.2 (test for proprietorship), 5.3 (requirements for
proprietorship). For this reason the terms "proprietor" and "proprietary rights" will be used in this dissertation.
Where an alternative term is used, the reason for the deviation will be given, if this is not clear from the context.
14 Vuk WT "Protecting Baywatch and Wagamama: Why the European Union Should Revise the 1989 Trademark
Directive to Mandate Dilution Protection for Trademarks" (1998) 21 Fordham International Law Journal 861.
Compare the Lanham Act of 1946 and the South African Trade Marks Act 62 of 1963 s 44.
15 See Chapter 1.2 "Policy Considerations Underlying Protection" infra for a discussion of the policies underlying
trade-mark protection.
16 Wheeldon (lecture notes) 3.
17 McCarthy (1996) § 3: 12; Kamperman Sanders A & Maniatis SM "A Consumer Trade Mark: Protection Based
on Origin and Quality" (1993) European Intellectual Property Review 406 at 408; Vuk (1998) 862,877.
18 McCarthy (1996) § 3:10; Kamperman Sanders & Maniatis (1993) 407; Vuk (1998) 862, 875.
19 McCarthy (1996) § 3:2, 3: 12; Schechter (1927) 819; Vuk (1998) 862, 876.
20 Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24.
21 McCarthy (1996) § 24:70.
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4and radical departure from all previous theories of trade-mark protection, also in South Africa,22
and is still a controversial issue.23 Demarcation of this concept is therefore important.
1.2 POLICY CONSIDERATIONS UNDERLYING PROTECTION
There are also certain policy considerations underlying the protection afforded by the law to trade
marks. Some scholars name only two complementary policy objectives, namely the protection of
the trader's business or goodwill and the protection of the consumer public from confusion_24
Sometimes a third policy objective is also mentioned, namely the protection of competitiori.f
Goodwill is created by the effort (energy, time and money) a trade-mark proprietor put into the
production and advertising of a product. Statutes protect this goodwill by punishing infringing
uses of the trade mark by free riders or pirates, who try to gain advantage from another person's
efforts to establish a reputation in the market place. In this way the trade-mark proprietor's most
valuable investment is protected'? and manufacturers are motivated to continue to use and invest
in trade marks. Search and other transaction costs are also reduced.27
The second objective of preventing confusion makes sure that the public is not confused as to the
source or origin of the goods and also reduces the search costs for consumers.f Furthermore,
consumers can be sure that when they purchase a certain product bearing a particular trade mark,
22 Wheeldon (lecture notes) 1. Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24 call it "a brave and progressive step by the
legislature". Klieger (1997) 801 describes the dilution doctrine as "a radical alternative to consumer confusion".
Martino T Trademark Dilution (1996) Clarendon Press Oxford 86 calls dilution the "alien intruder".
23 McCarthy (1996) § 24: 114; Port KL "The "Unnatural" Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution
Statute Necessary?" (1995) 85 The Trademark Reporter 525 at 526; Vuk (1998) 916-922; Webster & Page
(1997) par 12.24. See also McCarthy (1996) § 24:114 fn 1 for a comprehensive list of writers that have argued
the pros and cons of the dilution doctrine.
24 Shanahan D "The Trade Mark Right: Consumer Protection or Monopoly" (1982) The Trademark Reporter 233 at
234; Vuk (1998) 880; Garcia JA "Trademark Dilution: Eliminating Confusion" (1995) 85 The Trademark
Reporter 489 at 489-490 fn 3; Rogers ES "The Lanham Act & the Social Function of Trademarks" (1949) 14
Law and Contemporary Problems 173 at 181.
2S See McCarthy (1996) § 2.1, 2.2; Vuk (1998) 880; Port KL "The Congressional Expansion of American
Trademark Law: A Civil Law System in the Making" (2000) 35 Wake Forest Law Review 827 at 896.
26 Rogers (1949) 181.
27 Port (2000) 896.
28 Vuk (1998) 881-882.
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5they get the product which they wanted/" Protecting consumers from confusion is the original
legal rationale of trade-mark protectiou"
The third policy objective mentioned above is the protection of competition. This actually refers
to inter-brand competition, a term used to describe two competing goods which are similar yet
are produced by two different companies." This policy is used to balance the protection of trade
marks on the one hand and the prevention of a monopoly in a trade mark on the other hand. A
trade-mark proprietor is thus prevented from acquiring the exclusive use of something'r that other
persons would need to compete effectively. In this way competition is promoted. It also entails
that new market entrants must have free market access.f
Signs of these policy considerations could already be found in the English common-law action
for passing-off, where the trader brings the action based on a misrepresentation made to
consumers. As stated above, however, there was a need for a registration system to avoid a
number of deficiencies in common-law systems. For example, in an action for trade-mark
protection under the common law the trade-mark proprietor had first to prove title to the mark.
This was a long and expensive process of adducing evidence of the proprietor's use and resulting
reputation." Registration could, however, serve as prima facie proof of the proprietor's right to
the exclusive use of the mark, thus giving security to the proprietor of the mark. It also gives
notice to third parties, who can much more easily ascertain whether someone else has a vested
right in the mark they wish to use. Furthermore, a registration system makes the enforcement of
trade-mark rights possible.Y A system of registration thus enables the orderly development of
trade-mark rights and reduces the risk of conflict and deception/"
29 Garcia (1995) 490; Rogers (1949) 181.
30 Port (2000) 896.
31 Vuk (1998) 882.
32 The trade-mark proprietor is, for example, prohibited from acquiring exclusive use by registration of words that
competitors need to describe their products in advertisements.
33 Port (2000) 896.
34 Webster & Page (1997) par 1.2.
35 Beier F-K "Basic Features of Anglo-American, French and German Trademark Law" (1975) International
Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law 285 at 288; Webster & Page (1997) par 1.2.
36 Shanahan (1982) 234.
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61.3 DEFINITION OF THE DILUTION CONCEPT3?
Schechter" defines dilution as "the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold
upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use on non-competing goods". He goes on to
argue that "the more distinctive or unique the mark, the deeper is its impress upon the public
consciousness, and the greater its need for protection against vitiation or dissociation from the
particular product in connection with which it has been used". Mcf.arthy'" also states that the
dilution theory "grants protection to strong, well-recognized marks even in the absence of a
likelihood of confusion, if the defendant's use is such as to diminish or dilute the strong
identification value of the plaintiff's mark even while not confusing customers as to source,
sponsorship, affiliation or connection". Horowitz and Prager" view dilution as "the
diminishment over time of the capacity of a distinctive trade mark to identify the source of goods
bearing that mark".41
Dilution protection is therefore protection against uses of a trade mark that take advantage of the
reputation of the trade mark and also against uses that damage the trade mark's character. This
concept of dilution finds application only in the case of famous or well-known trade marks.42 An
important feature is that it can be used in the case of non-competing products, where there need
37 Chapter 3.1 "The Development of Dilution as a Legal Concept" and 3.2 "Different Definitions of Dilution" infra
contain a more detailed exposition of the development of dilution as a legal concept and also explain the
significance of the concept.
38 Schechter (1927) 825.
39 McCarthy (1996) § 24.70.
40 Horwitz E & Prager EA "What is Dilution and How is it Proved?" (2 December 1996) The New York Law
Journal retrieved from the http://www.ljextra.com/trademarkldilution.htmlon 21 January 1999. No page
numbers provided.
41 See also the attempts of the United States courts to define the concept as noted in McCarthy (1996) § 24:71. See
also Chapter 3.2 "Different Definitions of Dilution" infra.
42 See for example McCarthy (1996) § 24:70; § 24:108-112. In terms of the Federal Trade Mark Dilution Act of the
United States only "famous" marks will qualify for protection. Art. 6bis of the Paris Convention refers to "well-
known" marks, while the European Trademark Directive, as well as the laws of member states of the European
Union require "reputation". The South African Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 also uses the term "well known".
See Chapter 6.4.2 "The Dilution Provisions (iv) Well known" infra; Chapter 7.2.2 "The Dilution Provisions (i)
Well known/famous" infra and Chapter 7.3.2 "The Dilution Provisions (iv) Well known/reputation" infra.
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7not be, and often is not, a likelihood of confusion as to sponsorship.Y According to Mct.arthy"
the public must make some connection between the mark and both parties. In the case of classic
infringement they make a mental link between the parties which leads to confusion as to
sponsorship. In the case of dilution they also make some kind of mental association, but they
know that there is no connection between the proprietors of the two marks. Because they now
associate the mark with two different sources the first user's mark no longer serves as unique
identifier of his goods and is blurred.45
Most authors on dilution mention that there are two types of dilution:46 dilution by blurring and
dilution by tamishment.Y Dilution by blurring is the classic or "traditional" type of dilution.48
Blurring dilutes the distinctiveness of the mark and occurs when a distinctive trade mark is used
in connection with other goods in such a way that the uniqueness of the mark and its capacity to
identify one source is damaged or diluted.49 The often quoted example of Schechter illustrates
the concept very well: "if you allow Rolls-Royce restaurants, and Rolls-Royce cafeterias, and
Rolls-Royce pants, and Rolls-Royce candy, in ten years you will not have the Rolls-Royce mark
any more".50 The Rolls-Royce trade mark would be lost because the consumer's association
between the Rolls-Royce trade mark and the Rolls-Royce car would be blurred due to its
presence on a plethora of different goods."
Tarnishment.Y on the other hand, impairs the quality associations that consumers have with the
trade mark. It occurs when a distinctive trade mark is "linked to products of shoddy quality, or is
43 Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24; Ginsburg in Visser C The New Law of Trade Marks and Designs (1995) Juta
& Co Ltd Kenwyn 36 with reference to the Memorandum on the Objects of the Draft Trade Marks Bill, 1992 §
9.3 at 109, Government Gazette, 30 August 1991. See also the definition of dilution in the Lanham Act § 45, 15
U.S.C.A. 1127.
44 McCarthy (1996) § 24:70.
45 Compare with the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 25, comment f (1995).
46 See Chapter 3.4 "Types of Dilution" infra for a detailed discussion of the different types of dilution.
47 McCarthy (1996) § 24:67-69; § 24:94-95; § 24:100-1071; Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24.
48 McCarthy (1996) § 24:68; 24:94.
49 McCarthy (1996) § 24:68; Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24; Horwitz & Prager (1996) no page numbers
provided; Hormei Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods. Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1516 (2nd Cir. 1996).
50 In hearings before the House Committee on Patents 72 Cong 1 st Sess p 15 (1932), quoted by Vuk (1998) 894;
Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24. See also Chapter 3.4.1 "Blurring" infra.
S! Vuk (1998) 895.
52 See discussion in McCarthy (1996) § 24: I04-1 07.
..
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8portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context with the result that the public will associate the
lack of quality or lack of prestige in the defendant's goods with the plaintiffs unrelated goods".53
The case of Coca-Cola Co. v Gemini Rising, Inc.54 offers perhaps the best-known example of
what tarnishment can constitute. The defendant, a poster manufacturer, was selling posters that
had the phrase Enjoy Cocaine written across them in the same stylised script, colours and format
as that of a registered Coca-Cola trade mark, Enjoy Coca-Cola. 55
Vuk56 mentions two other forms of dilution: disparagement and genericisation." Trade-mark
disparagement occurs when a later user alters an earlier user's mark so as to mock or denigrate it
and by doing so promotes his own product." Trade-mark genericisation can occur when a
competitor uses a trade mark in a way that encourages the public to view the mark as a product
type and not a source indicator or identifier.59 Examples of trade marks that have become generic
are aspirin, cellophane, escalator, telefax, windsurfer60 and, in South Africa, also venter.
There is unanimity in trade-mark circles that there must be protection against unauthorized uses
of trade marks that cause a likelihood of confusion. This is the classic type of protection against
trade-mark infringement and is addressed in all trade-mark statutes. There is, however,
disagreement on whether trade marks are deserving of protection against unauthorized uses that
dilute the trade mark, but do not cause a likelihood of confusion. This debate, which may have
far-reaching implications, will be examined in this dissertation.61
53 Horwitz & Prager (1996), quoting from Harmel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods. Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d 1516 (2nd Cir. 1996). This case quotes in tum from Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods. Inc., 41 F.3d 39 at
43,32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1936 (2nd Cir. 1994).
54 Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc. 346 F. Supp. 1183, 175 U.S.P.Q. 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
55 Vuk (1998) 920; McCarthy (1996) § 24:104; Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24.
56 Vuk (1998) 896.
57 The use of a trade mark in a generic sense is sometimes classified by commentators under blurring. See Webster
& Page (1997) par 12.24.
58 See Chapter 3.4.4 "Disparagement or Imitative Dilution" infra where this point is discussed in more detail.
59 Vuk (1998) 896-897.
60 Wheeldon (lecture notes) 10; Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24.
61 See Chapter 3.5 "The Dilution Debate" infra. Part of the debate also concerns the form protection should take.
Compare Wheeldon's views on the role of defensive registrations (lecture notes) 15-16.
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9The concept of dilution gained legal recognition in South Africa through sections 10(17)62 and
34(1)(C)63 of the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993, which commenced on 1 May 1995. Although the
concept of dilution was mentioned in case law before that date.'" protection against dilution via
the common law was not a viable option, as has been well argued by Salmon.f While the
concept is now part of statutory law in South Africa, however, the word "dilution" does not
appear anywhere in the Act.66 The sections that can be viewed as having a bearing on dilution
are still open to judicial interpretation. As can be seen from the British'" experience judicial
interpretation will probably ultimately determine how far protection against dilution in South
Africa will stretch.f"
1.4 AIM OF DISSERTATION
The aim of this dissertation is to make recommendations, which could aid the South African
courts in the future interpretation and application of the dilution provisions in the existing South
African legislation. If necessary, amendments to the legislation will also be proposed, with a
view to promoting greater clarity. Therefore, the protection of registered trade marks provided
62 SlO read as follows: "The following marks shall not be registered as trade marks or, if registered, shall, subject
to the provisions of sections 3 and 70, be liable to be removed from the register: ... (17) a mark which is
identical or similar to a trade mark which is already registered and which is well-known in the Republic, if the
use of the mark sought to be registered would be likely to take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the
distinctive character or the repute of the registered trade mark, notwithstanding the absence of deception or
confusion ... " See Chapter 6 infra for a discussion of the South African law.
63 This section corresponds to s 10(17) and states that "[t]he rights acquired by registration of a trade mark shall be
infringed by the unauthorized use in the course of trade in relation to any goods or services of a mark ... " and
then continues as in the italicised portion of s 10(17) in the previous footnote.
64 Cambridge Plan AG & Another vMoore and Others 19874 SA 820 (D & CLD) 847I-848A.
65 Salmon 0 Dilution as Rationale for Trade Mark Protection in South African Law LLM UNISA (1990) at Ill.
66 It is interesting to note that only the Federal Trade Mark Dilution Act of the United States uses and defines the
term "dilution". See Chapter 4.7.1 "Definition of Dilution in the Act" infra. No other statute mentions the word,
although it is commonly accepted that the relevant sections in the different statutes refer to the concept of dilution
as described by commentators. The provisions are generally identified as "dilution" provisions by the fact that
they grant protection against uses on non-competing products and that they do not require a likelihood of
confusion or deception. See Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24 fn 23.
67 According to s 108(1) the (British) Trade Marks Act of 1994 applies to England, Wales, Scotland and Northern
Ireland.
68 See Chapter 5.7.2 "The United Kingdom" infra.
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by South African law against dilution will be examined by comparing South African law with
trade-mark law in other selected countries.
Because the origin and development of the dilution doctrine are rooted in American
jurisprudence.i" United States law will be examined.Ï" The Policansky case71 also confirms that
South African courts may consider American authority where the Roman-Dutch law is silent.
The subject can therefore not be adequately researched without due reference to the dilution
concept in United States law. United States law is, however, not the source of the dilution
provisions in the current South African Trade Marks Act. The European Union Trade Mark
Directive of 198972 and the British White Paper on the Reformation of Trade Marks Law73 served
this function.Ï" The way in which the United Kingdom 75 deals with the concept is also relevant,
because in the field of trade marks and other areas of commercial law, the English common-law
system is the source from which our own law, particularly legislation, has largely evolved.
Since there has been only one significant judgment" on the dilution sections in the South African
Trade Marks Act to date, the application of the dilution concept in South African law is still
difficult to predict with any certainty." Given this and the history of the dilution sections in the
South African Trade Marks Act,78 it may well be that South African courts will tend to interpret
these sections rather narrowly, especially if they follow the approach of the courts in the United
Kingdom. If this happens, the level of protection intended by the concept of dilution, as
69 Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24.
70 See Chapter 4 "Law of the United States of America" infra. Between 1947 and 1995 protection against dilution
was only conceivable under State law. The emphasis will be on cases decided by the Second, Seventh, Ninth and
Eleventh Circuit. The Federal Trade Mark Dilution Act came into force on 16 January 1996 and a detailed
discussion of this Act and the cases decided thereunder will also form an important part of Chapter 4.
71 Policansky Bros Ltd v L.H. Policansky 1935 AD 89 at 97, 98.
72 First Council Directive to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks.
73 White Paper on the Reformation of Trade Marks Law Cm 1203; par 3.17 to 3.19 September 1990.
74 Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24. See Chapter 5" European Union Law" infra for a detailed discussion.
75 The position in the United Kingdom is discussed in Chapter 5.7.2 "The United Kingdom" infra.
76 SAB International tla Sabmark International v Laugh It Off Promotions [2003] 2 All SA 454 (C); Laugh It Off
Promotions CC v SA Breweries International (Finance) BV tla Sabmark International [2004] 4 All SA 151
(SeA). The only other case worth mentioning is Bata Ltd v Face Fashions CC 2001 1 SA 844 (SCA). See
Chapter 6.4.4 "Cases" infra.
77 Compare with Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24.1.
78 See Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24.
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developed in United States law, will not be reached. This may create the impression, also in the
international business world, that trade marks are not adequately protected in South Africa.
1.5 FRAMEWORK OF DISCUSSION
Chapter 2 contains an overview of the socio-economic functions of trade marks. As already
stated, the view one takes on the protection of trade marks against dilution is closely linked to
one's perception of the socio-economic functions that a trade mark is perceived to fulfil. The
possible functions that a trade mark can fulfil and their development, must therefore be
examined. Reference will also be made to the way in which different trade-mark statutes
describe the functions of trade marks. Chapter 3 will analyse the dilution concept and its
development from Schechter's pioneering publication in 1927 until 1947, when the first dilution
state statute was promulgated in the United States. The chapter also examines the academic
debate on whether protection against dilution is actually desirable.
In Chapters 4 and 5 a framework will be developed against which the South African situation can
be portrayed. These chapters provide a contemporary study of United States Law and European
Union Law. International conventions, statutory law and case law will be examined in order to
determine whether there is a pattern in the interpretation of the laws of these countries. In the
chapter on United States Law the focus will be on State Law in the period 1947 to 1995, with the
emphasis on cases decided by the Second Circuit, Seventh Circuit, Ninth Circuit and Eleventh
Circuit. From 1996 and onwards Federal Law becomes the main focus area of the dissertation as
the Federal Trade Mark Dilution Act came into force on 16 January 1996. In Chapter 5 the main
emphasis will be on the origin and development of the European Union's Trademark Directive.
The implementation and, more importantly, the interpretation of the dilution provision by the
different member states, especially the United Kingdom and the Benelux countries, will also be
examined.
Chapter 6 contains a review of the development of trade-mark law in South Africa. The formal
requirements for protection of registered trade marks will be briefly described. The system of
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defensive registrations, the predecessor of the dilution sections, will also be discussed. This will
be followed by an analysis of the sections on trade-mark dilution in the Trade Marks Act 194 of
1993, also with reference to relevant case law.
The final chapter will contain an analysis and interpretation of South African law in the light of
the comparative study done in Chapters 4 and 5. Possible ways in which the South African
dilution sections can be interpreted and applied will be identified. Recommendations will be
made with a view to assisting the judiciary in the furtherance of the protection of registered trade
marks in South Africa.
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CHAPTER2
THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC FUNCTIONS OF TRADE MARKS
As stated in Chapter 1, the extent of protection that is afforded to trade marks will largely
depend on the socio-economic functions that a trade mark is perceived to fulfil. In
general it can be said that trade marks perform four major functions: 1 first, the origin or
source function.' secondly, the identification and distinguishing function;' thirdly, the
quality function" and fourthly the advertising function.' At least one authority also
recognises a fifth function, namely the investment function of trade marks.'
All of these functions are important and the recognition of one does not exclude the
others. A trade mark fulfilling all these functions is referred to as a consumer trade mark
McCarthy IT McCarthy on Trademarks 4th ed (1996) West Group St Paul Minnesota § 3:2 quoting
Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Founders' Fire & Marine Ins. Co., lIS F.Supp.787, 99 U.S.P.Q.
38 (D. CaI.l953):
"1. To identify one seller's goods and distinguish them from goods sold by others;
2. To signify that all goods bearing the trademark come from or are controlled by a single,
albeit anonymous, source;
3. To signify that all goods bearing the trademark are of an equal level of quality; and
4. As a prime instrument in advertising and selling the goods."
Kamperman Sanders A & Maniatis SM "A Consumer Trade Mark: Protection Based on Origin and
Quality" (1993) II European Intellectual Property Review 406 also mention these four functions,
although incorporating the second one into the first. See also Rutherford BR "Misappropriation of the
Advertising Value of Trade Marks, Trade Names and Service Marks" (1990) 2 SA Mere LJ 151;
Klieger RN "Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark
Protection" (1997) 58 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 789 at 790-791. See, however Diamond SA
"The Historical Development of Trademarks" (1975) 65 The Trademark Reporter 265 at 289 who holds
the opinion that there are only three different trade-mark functions, namely the identification function,
the guarantee (quality) function and the advertising function, thereby denying the separate existence of
the first function, referred to in the text. Callmann R "Unfair Competition without Competition" (1947)
37 The Trademark Reporter 175 at 188; reprinted from 95 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 443
also recognises three functions, the indication of origin, guarantee of grade or quality and advertising.
2 Chapter 2.1 "Origin or Source Function" infra. From the literature on trade-mark functions it is clear
that the two terms "origin" and "source" refer to the same concept and are used as synonyms. See for
example McCarthy (1996) § 3:8. They will be used in the same way in this dissertation.
Chapter 2.2 "Identification and Distinguishing Function" infra.
4 Chapter 2.3 "Quality Function" infra.
Chapter 2.4 "Advertising Function" infra.
6 Port (personal comments to the author in May 2000). See Chapter 2.5 "Investment Function" infra.
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by Kamperman Sanders and Maniatis.7 The various economic functions of a trade mark
have evolved over the years and can be seen as points on a line along which legal
protection is gradually expanding.i The origin function, for example, is adequately
protected by the confusion doctrine." With the recognition of other functions of trade
marks, the need for their protection increased and the confusion doctrine was no longer
adequate. This is one of the arguments in favour of offering trade marks dilution
protection.i'' A new function can, however, be protected without necessarily abandoning
the protection previously provided to other functions.
Starting in the 1930s, there was, for example, a growing recognition of a new function of
trade marks, namely the quality function, which developed out of the source function.
This quality function, however, did not replace the source function, but supplemented it;
thus, the source and quality functions can be related, but are also distinct. One practical
consequence was that a trade mark from that time on did not always necessarily indicate
the physical source, but could also indicate the source of the standard of the quality of
goods. I I
-In the same way the source function and the identification function are linked. The trade
mark distinguishes the goods of one manufacturer from those of another. But another
way to see it is that the trade mark identifies the origin of the goods with a particular
manufacturer, who may be anonymous.V Beier sees this as only one function, namely to
7 Kamperman Sanders & Maniatis (1993) 406.
8 Michaels A "The Function of Trade Marks - The Law and the Reality" (1980) European Intellectual
Property Review 14; Webster CE & Morley GE Webster & Page South African Law of Trade Marks,
Unlawful Competition, Company Names and Trading Styles 4th ed (1997) Butterworths Durban par 3.4.
9 This doctrine protects trade marks from the use of the same or similar marks by others, where there is
the possibility of confusion or deception. See, for example, s 34(1 )(a) of the South African Trade
Marks Act 194 ofl993.
10 See Chapter 3.5 "The Dilution Debate" infra for a discussion of the arguments in favour and those
against dilution protection.
II McCarthy (1996) § 3: 10, § 18:40. See also Shanahan D "The Trade Mark Right: Consumer Protection
or Monopoly" (1982) The Trademark Reporter 233 at 238 who describes the primary function of a trade
mark as distinguishing the commercial origin of the goods or services and then states that the origin
"has a lot to do with the quality of the product".
12 Compare Beier F-K "Territoriality of Trademark Law and International Trade" (1970) International
Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law 48 at 61. The concept of the "anonymous"
manufacturer is explained in Chapter 2.1 "Origin or Source Function" infra.
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distinguish the goods as to their origin, which is protected by the exclusive right of use
granted to the trade-mark proprietor by statute.l'' According to him the traditional
concept of trade-mark law sees this also as the primary function of a trade mark and its
primary purpose is to prevent deception as to origin.
The four major functions of a trade mark, as well as the investment function, are now
discussed in more detail.
2.1 ORIGIN OR SOURCE FUNCTION14
In the early development of trade-mark law through to the nineteenth century, IS trade
marks were perceived as only indicating to consumers the physical source or origin of the
goods in relation to which the mark was used." This is also referred to as the common-
law position.l" Certain trade marks still have that kind of significance.l'' Mcf'arthy'"
refers to the MacMahan case20 of 1901 as the landmark decision of the source theory of
trade marks. Here it was inter alia held that trade-mark licensing was impossible, unless
the entire business of the licensor was transferred.21 The underlying rationale was that
licensing meant that persons not associated with the real manufacturing source were
13 Beier (1970) 61, 63. Rutherford (1990) 151 refers to the "source-identifying function" of a trade mark.
14 See fn 2 supra.
15 Michaels (1980) 13.
16 McCarthy (1996) § 3:8; § 18:39; Webster & Page (1997) par 3.4; Rutherford (1990) 151; Isaacs N
"Traffic in Trade-symbols" (1930-1931) 44 Harvard Law Review 1210; Hanak WE "The Quality
Assurance Function of Trademarks" (1974) 43 Fordham Law Review 363, (1975) 65 The Trademark
Reporter 318; Shanahan (1982) 239; Gielen C "Harmonisation of Trade Mark Law in Europe: The
First Trade Mark Harmonisation Directive of the European Council" (1992) 8 European Intellectual
Property Review 262; Vuk WT "Protecting Baywatch and Wagamama: Why the European Union
Should Revise the 1989 Trademark Directive to Mandate Dilution Protection for Trademarks (1998) 21
Fordham International Law Journal 861 at 874; Denicola RC "Some Thoughts on the Dynamics of
Federal Trademark Legislation and the Trademark Dilution Act of 1995" (1996) 59 Law and
Contemporary Problems 75 at 77; Klieger (1997) 797-798. See also Kamperman Sanders & Maniatis
(1993) 406, 407. They refer to this conception of the origin theory as "concrete origin". FOTexamples
from American case law see the cases referred to in Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund 659 P.2d 377 at
379,222 U.S.P.Q. 446 (Or. Sup. Ct. 1983).
17 Webster & Page (1997) par 3.4.
18 Shanahan (1982) 239. This will usually be the case where a small manufacturer is selling his goods
under his own trade mark in a specific geographical area.
19 McCarthy (1996) § 3:8; § 18:39.
20 MacMahan Pharmacal Co. v.Denver Chemical Mfg. Co., 113 F.468 (8th Cir. 1901).
21 See also Isaacs (1930-1931) 1210, 1211; Denicola (1996) 77.
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using the mark,22which was seen as fraud on the public. Licensors thus risked judicial
forfeiture of their trade-mark rights." Franchising, as we know it, was also impossible
under the strict source theory." Licensing and franchising were therefore seen as
philosophically impossible."
In 1916 the United States Supreme Court, in Hanover Star Milling Co v Metcalf/"
described the function of a trade mark as identifying the origin or ownership of the goods
to which it is affixed. This was still the leading case on the functions of trade marks
during the 1920s. The phrase "origin or ownership" used here, referred to "personal"
origin and ownership.v' meaning the manufacturer of the goods." According to
Schechter.r" writing in 1927, this was actually the position four hundred years earlier.
Due to the ramifications of modem trade and the distribution system of goods, the
consumer of the 1920s seldom knew the true origin of goods.'? These changes in both
wholesale and retail trade structures, as well as the shift in the character of the mark from
the rational and physical to the emotional and psychological, also altered the whole
, I
economic character of trade marks:' This progressive widening process was also
enshrined in the various statutes regulating the registration of trade marks.32 The 1916
South African Act,33 for example, stated the purpose of a trade mark as being to indicate
that the goods upon or in connection with which it was used were the goods of the
proprietor of the mark "by virtue of manufacture, selection, certification, dealing with or
offering for sale". The provisions of this Act were altered by the 1947 Act" which made
22 McCarthy {I 996) § 18:39.
23 Denicola {I 996) 77.
24 McCarthy {I 996) § 3:8.
25 McCarthy (1996) § 18:39. See also the cases listed there, some accepting the source theory as
restricting the licensing of trade marks and others in favour of licensing in specific factual situations.
26 Hanover Star Milling Co v.Metcalf, 240 U.S. 403, 412 (1916).
27 Schechter FI "The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection" {I 927) 40 Harvard Law Review 813 at 814.
28 Webster & Page {I 997) par 3.4
29 Schechter (1927) 814.
30 Some American courts also made this statement at the time. See Schechter (1927) 814, 815.
31 Michaels (1980) 13; Gielen (1992) 264, Rutherford (1990) 151, but see the Mathys Committee Report
on British Trade Mark Law and Practice, 1974, Cmnd 5601, par 22 which states that changes in trade
patterns have not changed trade-mark functions.
32 Webster and Page (1997) par 3.4.
33 Patents, Designs, Trade Marks and Copyright Act 9 of 1916.
34 Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Amendment Act 19 of 1947.
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provision for registered users, thus broadening the functions of a trade mark to that of
indicating a connection in one of the ways mentioned in the 1916 Act between the goods
and the registered proprietor or the registered user of the mark.
Schechter comes to the conclusion in his writings that a trade mark merely indicates that
all the goods with a specific trade mark on them, "emanate from the same - possibly
anonymous - source ... ".35 This statement leads him to identify other functions ofa trade
mark; namely the identification function and the quality function.f Gradually the courts
also softened their conception of the source function to come to the modem view as
defined by Schechter.V This concept of the "anonymous origin" means that the
consumer does not know or care who the manufacturer of a product is, but accepts that all
products with the same trade mark on them are linked to or sponsored by the same
source. The identity of the producer is thus less important for the consumer than the
identity of the product itself. 38 This position is endorsed by the 1984 amendments to the
Lanham Act, which in its amended form states that a mark will "indicate the source of the
goods, even if that source is unknown".39 The source or origin function of trade marks is
of benefit to consumers, because it reduces the search cost that they must incur in finding
the desired goods. By remembering the name of the products they prefer, consumers can
easily find them. The benefit to the trade-mark proprietor is that it provides him with a
guarantee that consumers will recognise his products.l" Trade marks further more ensure
35 Schechter (1927) 816. Also refer to Beier (1970) 64; Rutherford (1990) 151 fn 3. Case law also refer
to this definition, for example Sally Gee, Inc. v.Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621 at 625, 1983 U.S. App.
LEXIS 30710, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 658 (2nd Cir. 1983).
36 Schechter (1927) 818. Kamperman Sanders & Maniatis (1993) 407 refer to this broader concept of the
origin function as "abstract origin" and then also link it to the quality function, as does Shanahan (1982)
239. These other functions are discussed infra.
37 McCarthy (1996) § 3:9 and cases listed there. See also Vuk (1998) 870; Webster & Page (1997) par 1,
par 3.4.
38 Webster & Page (1997) par 3.20; Klieger (1997) 800, 809.
39 Lanham Act § 445,15 U.S.C.S. 1127; McCarthy (1996) § 3:9.
40 Vuk (1998) 875. Landes WM & Posner RA "Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective" (1987) 30
Journal of Law and Economics 265 at 269-270. To really reduce the search costs the brand must also
exhibit consistent quality. See Chapter 2.3 "Quality Function" infra.
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pride of workmanship, credit for good quality and responsibility for bad quality."
This broader conception of the origin function also permits the joint use of trade marks
by affiliated companies.f This can give satisfactory solutions for some trade-mark
problems and will, for example, solve the problem of parallel imports." Licensing is also
explicitly authorised by section 5 of the Lanham Act, which stipulated that the use of a
mark by "related companies" is for the benefit of the trade-mark proprietor.l" However,
there is the expectation that the kind and quality of the product are controlled by a
particular entity."
The use of so-called "dealers' brands" are also made possible under this broader concept
of the source function. Retail stores can order their goods made up with their own trade
mark instead of that of the manufacturer. This was already established practice in 1930
and was brought about by a change in the business structure of society." Under this
custom it could no longer be said that a trade mark represents a particular origin of goods,
thus the "manufacturing source" of the goods. The trade mark actually refers to
"commercial source".47
On the assumption that a trade mark only designates origin or ownership, the trade mark
will only be protected against misuse where there is actual confusion of source, resulting
41 In the absence of trade marks the producer with the cheapest, poorest and most dishonest product would
arguably attract the most customers. Rogers ES "The Lanham Act & the Social Function of
Trademarks" (1949) 14 Law and Contemporary Problems 173 at 175-176.
42 In modem practice it happens that groups of associated corporate bodies, between whom the operation
of the business is divided, conduct business together. A group of associated companies can, for
example, adopt a trade mark as a "house mark", which then indicates that the goods to which it is
applied originate from the group. Each member authorises the others to use the mark on behalf of them
all irrespective of in whose name it may have been registered. Furthermore, each member can authorise
use of the mark on behalf of all the other members. See the discussion of this topic in Webster & Page
(1997) par 12.15.
43 Beier (1970) 64-65. The concept of "parallel importation" refers to the situation where "goods
emanating from the registered proprietor are sold or otherwise disposed of by him under his mark and
subsequently offered for resale under the mark without his express authorisation or approval". See
Webster & Page par 12.11, 12.15. Further discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this
dissertation.
44 Denicola (1996) 78.
45 Shanahan (1982) 239; Denicola (1996) 77-78.
46 Isaacs (1930-1931) 1213, 1214.
47 Isaacs (1930-1931) 1213.
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in a diversion of trade or concrete financial loss or injury." This is the classic type of
infringement and was traditionally also the only kind of infringement against which
trade-mark statutes" gave protection. Confusion as to origin was a prerequisite in these
cases. Important case law during the late 1910s and early 1920s in the United States
shows that the use of similar marks on non-competing goods quite often occurredr''' In
these cases there was no diversion of custom and bearing in mind the absence of statutory
protection at that time, the courts went to great lengths to protect the trade-mark
proprietors.
The adoption of the exhaustion theory by the European Court of Justice and in certain
cases decided by national courts in member countries of the European Union seriously
undermines the credibility of the traditional origin theory of trade-mark functions." This
exhaustion theory mainly entails that the trade-mark proprietor is allowed to first place
goods upon the market under a specific trade mark. After the goods have been put into
circulation the trade-mark proprietor's rights are exhausted. Also, where the trade-mark
proprietor or an authorised person marketed the goods in one state of the European Union
and the goods are then imported into another state, his rights are deemed to be exhausted
in the latter. It is thus no longer possible to identify the origin of a product by reference
to a specific trade mark, as there may be numerous sources of the marked product and
also many people entitled to market the marked goods once they have been put on the
market.52
48 Schechter (1927) 825.
49 See for example the 1938 United Kingdom Trade Marks Act, as well as the South African Trade Marks
Act 62 of 1963. Under the Lanham Act (before the amendment in 1984, referred to supra) a trade-mark
proprietor also had to establish that an unauthorised user was using a similar trade mark on similar
goods and that such use resulted in a likelihood of confusion as to the good's source of origin. See Vuk
(1998) 861 and fn 3.
50 References to these cases can be found in Schechter (1927) 825.
51 Michaels (1980) 17.
52 Michaels (1980) l3, 14, 17.
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2.2 IDENTIFICATION AND DISTINGUISHING FUNCTION
According to Mcf'arthy'" the primary function of trade marks today is to identify and
distinguish goods. Already in 1927 Schechter pronounced that the true functions of a
trade mark are to "identify a product as satisfactory and thereby to stimulate further
purchases by the consuming public".54 The identification function does not mean that the
consumer must know the precise identity of the manufacturer or distributor of the goods.
As already explained in the discussion of the origin function, the trade mark merely
indicates that all products sold under the specific mark came from the same, possibly
anonymous, source.55 This is in line with a relaxation of the ties of a trade mark to a
specific business, by rather placing the emphasis on the product in connection with which
the mark is used.56 The mark thus indicates the nature of the product itself and therefore
licensing, franchising and the transfer of rights are possible.f
This function of trade marks is essential in a competitive economy. Trade marks are used
to identify and distinguish one product from another similar product from a different
manufacturer." In this way the consumer public can identify perceived differences in
product quality. The manufacturer is thus also forced to take responsibility for bad
quality. This serves as an incentive to producers to deliver products of a better quality or
rather of the best quality that they can." It is important to note that even in the case of a
sole manufacturer of a product, the trade mark can still potentially carry out a
distinguishing function. The trade mark indicates that the goods are connected in the
53 McCarthy (1996) § 3:6. This is also the conclusion of Michaels (1980) 16. See also Lunsford JR
"Consumers and Trademarks: The Function of Trademarks in the Marketplace" (1974) 64 The
Trademark Reporter 75 at 95 and Gielen (1992) 264. Compare however Shanahan (1982) 240 who
sees the descriptive or indicating function as a secondary or derivative function.
54 Schechter (1927) 818. Schechter referred here to the identification function, as well as the quality
function, which will be discussed separately in Chapter 2.3 "Quality Function" infra.
55 McCarthy (1996) § 3:7; Lunsford (1974) 78,88.
56 Webster & Page (1997) par 3.20.
57 See Michaels (1980) 14. See also Webster and Page (1997) par 3.18 & 3.20.
58 Diamond (1975) 289. See also Rogers (1949) 182.
59 McCarthy (1996) § 3:5; Diamond (1975) 289.
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course of trade with the proprietor of the goods and once other goods come into existence
the mark can truly perform its distinguishing function.i"
Apart from identifying the goods of one manufacturer and distinguishing them from the
goods of another manufacturer, trade marks can also serve to identify and distinguish a
secondary source. This means that a trade mark can indicate sponsorship or
authorisation, for example where the logo of a university is imprinted on wearing
apparel."
Furthermore a trade mark can identify and distinguish the non-producing seller or
merchant of certain goods. As illustration McCarthy uses the example of a picture used
in connection with goods. This picture serves to identify the source of the goods and not
the artist that created it, unless that person is the source of the specific goods.62
According to Beier, writing in 1970, the only function protected by trade-mark law was
still this function of identifying the goods as to their origin from a particular
manufacturer.Y The central aim of trade-mark law at this stage was protection against
the danger of confusion or deception."
Here again there was a progressive widening process in statutory law. The definition of a
"trade mark" in the 1938 (United Kingdom) Trade Marks Act65 discarded the recital of
ways in which goods had to be connected with the proprietor and merely stated that the
mark indicated that there was a connection in the course of trade between the goods and
the proprietor or registered user of the mark. This was also the objective of the 1963
60 See Webster & Page (1997) par 3.4.
61 McCarthy (1996) § 3:4.
62 McCarthy (1996) § 3:4.
63 Beier (1970) 63. As shown above this can also be seen as two functions, namely the modem source
function and the identification function, but Beier sees them as one.
64 Thus both the origin and distinguishing functions serve the same purpose, namely protection against
confusion or deception.
6S 1 and 2 Geo 6 c 22 s 68(1).
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South African Trade Marks Act, but the legislator did not achieve this result.66 This
objective was only accomplished by the Trade Marks Amendment Act 46 of 1971.67
In the United States of America both the common law and federal law follow the
definition of a "trademark" under the Federal Lanham Act.68 According to this Act a
trade mark is "any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof' that is
used by a manufacturer or merchant "to identify and distinguish his or her goods, ... ,
from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even if
that source is unknown".69 This function is one of three elements for a designation to
become a trade mark.Ï"
The same kind of description is to be found in statutes in the European Union. The
Trademark Directive71 states that trade marks "may consist of any sign capable of being
represented graphically .... provided that such signs are capable of distinguishing the
goods or services of one undertaking from those of another undertaking't.f The 1994
United Kingdom Trade Marks Act in following the Directive also refers to a sign "which
is capable of distinguishing goods or services of one undertaking from those of other
undertakings'V' The Uniform Benelux Trademark Law in article 1 similarly describes
66 See Webster & Page (1997) par 3.4.
67 The amended definition read as follows: '''Trade mark', other than a certification mark, means a mark
used or proposed to be used in relation to goods or services for the purpose of - (a) indicating a
connection in the course of trade between goods or services and some person having the right, either as
proprietor or as registered user, to use the mark, whether with or without any indication of the identity
of the person and (b) distinguishing the goods or services in relation to which the mark is used or
proposed to be used, from the same kind of goods or services connected in the course of trade with any
other person.".
68 McCarthy (1996) § 3: 1, § 3:4.
69 Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 ("Trademark"). The same definition is used to define a "Service
Mark" in this Act.
70 The other two being "the tangible symbol" and "the type of use". The requirement of a "tangible
symbol" means that a mark must consist of a word, name, symbol or device or any combination of
these. The "type of use" designates that there must be actual adoption of the symbol and that it must be
used as a trade mark by the manufacturer or seller of goods or provider of services. See McCarthy
(1996) § 3: 1.
71 First Council Directive to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, article
2,0.1. L401l, at 2 (1989).
72 This definition is identical to that contained in Council Regulation (EC) no 40/94 which provides for a
Community Trade Mark.
73 Trade Marks Act 1994 c 26 s 1(I).
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the function of a mark as being "to distinguish the goods of an enterprise". The capacity
to distinguish relates to the nature of the mark and its ability to be linked in the minds of
consumers to the goods of a certain manufacturer or seller.Ï" The identification or
distinguishing function of a trade mark is also emphasised in cases decided by the
European Court of Justice. In the Canon case,75the court summarised the previous case
law to which the court had been referred as fol1ows:
"the essential function of the trade mark is to guarantee the identity of the origin of the marked
product to the consumer or end user by enabling him, without any possibility of confusion, to
distinguish the product or services from others which have another origin ..... it must offer a
guarantee that all the goods or services bearing it have originated under the control of a single
undertaking which is responsible for their quality .... "
The 1993 South African Trade Marks Act also defines a trade mark mainly in terms of its
distinguishing function. The definition is similar to that contained in the 1994 United
Kingdom Act. A "trade mark" is defined as
"a mark used or proposed to be used by a person in relation to goods or services for the purpose of
distinguishing the goods or services in relation to which the mark is used or proposed to be used
from the same kind of goods or services connected in the course of trade with any other person"."
Webster and Page77 remark that this definition reflects a change in emphasis in the
function of a trade mark from the origin function to the distinguishing function, although
these two functions are closely linked.
A few recent court cases also commented on the function of a trade mark. The Valentino
judgment, although delivered in 1998, was decided under the 1963 Act. Justice Harms
commented that the function of a trade mark as a badge of origin has changed and that
74 Webster and Page (1997) par 3.18.
75 Case C-39/97, Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc [1999] R.P.C 117 (ECJ) 133,
discussed in Chapter 5.8 "Judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Communities (CJEC)"
infra. The CffiC reiterated this definition in the case of Koninklijke Philips Electronics NV v
Remington Consumer Products Ltd [2003] R.P.c. 2 14 (ECJ) par 22.
76 S 2(1) sv "trade mark". Emphasis added.
77 Webster and Page (1997) par 3.16.
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this change is reflected in the 1993 Act.78 In the Abbott case79 this change was also
recognised. The judge remarked that the "badge of origin approach" to a trade mark is no
longer at the forefront and has been replaced by the distinguishing capability of the mark.
In Cadbury v Beacon80 the court considered that the basic trade mark function was that of
"distinguishing as set out in section 9(1)". Both the Triome~1 and Cowbell82 cases
referred to the description of the essential function of a trade mark in the Canon case.83
Judge Smit in the court of first instance in the Triomed case added that the current South
African Act places greater emphasis on the capacity of a mark to distinguish. The
Supreme Court of Appeal, however, even after referring to recent decisions of the Court
of Justice of the European Communities, unfortunately turned back to the old view of a
trade mark as a "badge of origin". In the Cowbell case the court stated that the essential
function of a trade mark is "to indicate the origin of the goods in connection with which it
is used".84 This notion was perpetuated by the Supreme Court of Appeal in the Triomed
appeal case,85 where the court reiterated that by definition the function of a trade mark
was to indicate the origin of goods or services and that the enquiry was a "badge of
origin" inquiry/" This also happened in the case of SAFA v Stanton Woodrush,87 where
78 Valentino Globe BVv Phillips 19983 SA 775 (SCA) 7821; [1998] 4 All SA 1 (A) 6i-j.
79 Abbott Laboratories v UAP Crop Care (Pty) Ltd [1999] I All SA 502 (C) 509b-c, 51ll, 512g; 1999 3
SA 624 (C) 631F-G, 634£, 635C.
80 Cadbury (Pty) Ltd v Beacon Sweets & Chocolates (Pty) Ltd 20002 SA 771 (SCA) 777H-778A; [2000]
2 All SA 1 (A) 4f-g. See discussion in Chapter 6.2.3 "Registrability under the 1993 Act" infra.
81 Triomed (Pty) Ltdv Beecham Group pIc 2001 2 SA 522 (T) 537H-538B; [2001] 2 All SA 126 (T). See
Chapter 6.4.2 "The Dilution Provisions" and Chapter 6.4.4 "Cases" infra.
82 AG Cowbell v ICS Holdings Ltd 2001 3 SA 941 (SCA) 948A-C. This case concerned the respondent's
registered marks, DAIRY BELLE with cow device and ffiRSEYBEL with cow device and the
applicant's COWBELL with cow device. The case was decided under s 17(1) of the Trade Marks Act
62 of 1963. Judgment of the court a quo was reversed, with the result that the respondent cannot
prevent appellant's registration of the COWBELL mark.
83 Case C-39/97, Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc [1999] R.P.c. 117 (ECJ) 133,
discussed in Chapter 5.8 "Judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Communities (CffiC)"
infra and quotation from the Canon case in the text supra.
84 AG Cowbell v ICS Holdings Ltd 2001 3 SA 941 (SCA) 948A.
85 Beecham Group pic v Triomed (Pty) Ltd [2002] 4 All SA 193 (SCA); 2003 3 SA 639 (SCA).
86 Beecham Group pic v Triomed (Pty) Ltd [2002] 4 All SA 193 (SCA); 2003 3 SA 639 (SCA) 646A-B.
87 South African Footbal! Association (SAFA) v Stanton Woodrush (Pty) Ltd tla Stan Smidt & Sons and
another 2003 3 SA 313 (SCA) 322C; [2003] 1 All SA 274 (SCA) 280b-c. But see Laugh It Off
Promotions CC v SA Breweries International (Finance) BV tla Sabmark International [2004] 4 All SA
151 (SCA) 157a, where the Supreme Court of Appeal stated that section 34(1)(c) "is not concerned with
either origin or confusion." The Court then said that this section "protects the economic value of a trade
mark, more particularly its reputation and its advertising value or selling power." See also Chapter 2.4
"Advertising Function" infra.
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the Supreme Court of Appeal again stressed that a trade mark is a badge of origin and
that the function of a trade mark is to indicate origin.
2.3 QUALITY FUNCTION
Schechter was probably the first writer to identify the quality function as one of the true
functions of a trade mark." This function is variously described as the "quality,,89 or
"guarantee'f" function. Although it was based on the source function, it expanded
thereon. Some writers, such as Hanak91 are of opinion that this function is the primary
function of trade marks and that the origin of the product is only important to consumers
because the manufacturer's product has become associated with a certain level of quality.
Beier,92 however, holds the opinion that the quality function has no independent legal
significance and just means that consumers believe that goods with the same trade mark
on them have the same quality, because they have the same origin. Shanahan goes even
further by contending that a trade mark does not symbolise the actual origin of the
product or its quality, but the origin of that quality."
Most writers say that this function serves to indicate a consistent level of quality." In
other words, this function indicates a single quality control source. The quality function
88 Schechter (1927) 818 pronounced that the true functions of a trade mark are to "identify a product as
satisfactory and thereby to stimulate further purchases by the consuming public". See also McCarthy
(1996) § 18:40, Klieger(1997) 802.
89 McCarthy (1996) § 3:10; Vuk (1998) 875. Hanak (1974) 363-378 uses the term "quality assurance
function" for this function, which he defines as "that of assuring the purchaser a certain degree of
uniformity or quality in the products to which they are attached".
90 This word can be misleading, because a trade mark is not necessarily a guarantee in the legal sense.
McCarthy (1996) § 3:10. This term is, however, used by some writers, such as Lunsford (1974) 78;
Diamond (1975) 289; Stuart M "The Function of Trade Marks and the Free Movement of Goods in the
European Economic Community" (1976) International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright
Law 27 at 31.
91 Hanak (1974) 364. He holds the opinion that a trade mark fulfills only two functions: the primary
function of indicating degree of quality and secondarily to identify the origin or source of goods.
92 Beier (1970) 63, 64.
93 Shanahan (1982) 240.
94 McCarthy(1996)§3:10; Lunsford (1974) 78; Diamond (1975) 289; Hanak (1974) 363; Kamperman
Sanders & Maniatis (1993) 407; Vuk (1998) 875; Rogers (1949) 182; Stuart (1976) 31; Swann JE &
Davis TH "Dilution, an Idea Whose Time has Gone; Brand Equity as ProtectabIe Property, the
New/Old Paradigm" (1994) 84 The Trademark Reporter 267 at 270. But according to Isaacs (1930-
1931) 1215-1216 it is quite possible that a manufacturer can change the formula or produce a cheaper
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does not mean that all goods are of a high standard of quality, but merely that the quality
level of all the goods under a specific mark are consistent and predictable, whether that
quality is high, low or mediocre.Ï'' Each trade mark therefore carries its own unique
message concerning quality." Schechter identified two cases that, although not expressly
recognising the quality function of trade marks, evidenced the same reasoning." In the
Aunt Jemima case98 the court held that the applicant's registered trade mark AUNT
JEMIMA'S for self-rising flour was infringed by the defendant's use of the same trade
mark for pancake syrup. The court reasoned that "syrup and flour are both food products,
and food products commonly used together. Obviously the public, or a large part of it,
seeing this trade-mark on syrup, would conclude that it was made by the complainant ....
In this way the complainant's reputation is put in the hands of the defendants".99 The
Aunt Jemima Doctrine or related goods doctrine, which recognises the importance of
trade marks outside directly competitive relationships, developed out of this case.IOOThe
other case was the Eastman Photographic caselOl where the use of KODAK on bicycles
was held to infringe the registered mark KODAK for cameras. Many shops sold bicycles
and cameras and the court held that except for confusion and deception, use of the word
by the defendant would be injurious to the applicant.
The quality function of a trade mark does not, however, according to Kamperman
Sanders and Maniatis.l'" constitute a legally enforceable warranty. If it did, the
product. Although the manufacturer stays the same, there can be a misrepresentation, as the quality of
the product is no longer the same.
95 McCarthy (1996) § 3:10, § 18:40; Kamperman Sanders & Maniatis (1993) 407; Klieger (1997) 803.
96 This also implies that the trade-mark proprietor gets the credit for good products and the discredit if
they are bad. Rogers (1949) 177, in this context, spoke of trade marks as "symbols of responsibility".
97 Klieger (1997) 803-804. At this stage, namely 1925, Schechter seemed to work within the consumer
protection model, but this would radically change in 1927, when he write his now well-known article
"The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection" (see fn 27 supra). See also Klieger (1997) 805-806.
98 Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co. 247 F.407 (2nd Cir. 1917).
99 Aunt Jemima Mills Co. v. Rigney & Co. 247 F.407 (2nd Cir. 1917),410.
100 Port KL "Learned Hand's Trademark Jurisprudence: Legal Positivism and the Myth of the Prophet" 27
(1996) Pacific Law Journal 221 at 244 describes this case as the "most important and most expansive
new grant of trademark rights known at the time". This was the first case in which it was acknowledged
that use of the same mark on products that might be expected to come from the plaintiff even if the
plaintiff never produced them, could be enjoined (that is prevented by obtaining an injunction) by the
plaintiff. See also Martino T Trademark Dilution (1996) Clarendon Press Oxford 12.
101 The Eastman Photographic Materials Company Limited and Another v. The John Griffiths Cycle
Corporation Limited and the Kodak Cycle Company Ltd. 15 R.P.C. (1898) 105.
102 Kamperman Sanders & Maniatis (1993) 407.
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"floodgates of litigation" would be opened by consumers. The mark would furthermore
lose its individuality and be a common indicator of quality that anybody could use for the
same goods.
This consistency in quality is expected by consumers regardless of the producing source.
A person buying a McDONALD'S burger at an outlet in South Africa assumes that the
quality of menu, décor and service will be similar to outlets in the United States and the
rest of the world.I03 Beier, as said above, is, however, of the opinion that a trade mark
fulfils a quality function only to the extent that it guarantees to the consumer a constant
source of origin, as he sees the latter as the only protected function of trade marks.l'" He
thus argues that it is unimportant whether goods offered for sale in different countries
under the same trade mark are of similar or of different quality. NESCAFé coffee
provides a good example. This product is distributed in different countries under the
same trade mark and get-up, but it varies considerably in its composition and taste to suit
the demands of different people. It cannot be expected from the manufacturer to
renounce the use of this well-known trade mark in certain countries. He might well use a
different get-up to identify the different qualities. This phenomenon is especially
controversial within the European Union, where there are still products with differing
tastes and possibly differences in quality marketed under the same trade mark, despite the
creation of an internal market and the advanced state of harmonisation procedures. lOS
The most important feature of this function is therefore that the trade-mark proprietor is
entitled to maintain control over the quality of the goods sold under his trade mark. If it
happens that a certain product deteriorates because of staleness, for example, after it was
made by another manufacturer with permission from the trade-mark proprietor, that
product is no longer the genuine product and the trade-mark proprietor can sue for
infringement or dilution.l'" This is because the trade-mark proprietor's quality control
103 See McCarthy (1996) § 3:10, § 18:40; Lunsford (1974) 78.
104 Beier (1970) 66, 67.
105 Kamperman Sanders & Maniatis (1993) 408.
106 McCarthy (1996) § 3: 1O. See Warner-Lambert Co. v. Northside. Dev. Corp., 86 F.3d 3, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
1136 (2nd Cir. 1996) where a preliminary injunction was ordered against the sale of HALL'S cough
drops that are older than the use-by date indicated on the package.
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standards are no longer met and this could lead to the situation where quality deficiencies
are attributed to this proprietor. This feature of the quality function is especially strong in
the case of house marks, for example the "no name" brands of the Pick 'n Pay
supermarket chain, where the control of quality by the proprietor is expected by the
consumer.I07
If the producer of a certain trade-marked product maintains a consistent quality for the
product, consumer costs are reduced. This is one of the benefits of trade marks.I08 The
consumer saves search costs by identifying the product he wishes to buy by its trade
mark, rather than investigating the attributes of all similar goods. Therefore it is
important that the quality remains consistent at all times. This benefit of trade marks in
lowering consumer search costs presupposes legal protection for trade marks.l'"
The development of the quality function of trade marks paved the way for the modem
view regarding the licensing and franchising of trade marks.i'" The underlying
assumption is that the licensor or franchisor will exercise control over the quality of the
products and services now provided by licensees and franchisees. The consumer expects
an equal level of quality for all products sold under a single franchised mark. I I I He
basically views the franchised mark as a symbol of equal quality, regardless of the
physical source of the goods and the relationship between the trade-mark proprietor and
the personnel running the franchised outlets.112 This quality control function is so
important that the Lanham Act of 1946 affords the trade-mark proprietor the right to
inspect and certify the quality of the goods manufactured and sold under the proprietor's
trade mark.l13 The trade-mark proprietor not only has a right to control quality, but has a
107 Michaels (1980) 16.
108 Landes & Posner (1987) 269.
109 See further Landes & Posner (1987) 270 and 275-280 for a more detailed discussion.
110 See the discussion in McCarthy (1996) § 3: II and § 18:40.
III McCarthy (1996) § 3: Il.
112 McCarthy (1996) § 18:40.
113 See McCarthy (1996) § 3:11; Lanham Act § 45,15 U.S.C.S. § 1127 ("Related Company"); Lanham
Act § 5, 15 U.S.C.S. § 1055 ("Use by Related Companies"). The Act does not specifically allow trade-
mark licensing, but these provisions clearly contemplate licensing.
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duty to do SO.114 The Lanham Act has thus indirectly established the quality theory in
United States' law.
If the quality function of trade marks is so important, a question which is clearly relevant
is how this function can be preserved. Thus, how can trade-mark proprietors be
discouraged from secretly and substantially altering the nature of their products?115 The
means most frequently employed by the courts in the United States is to deny the trade-
mark proprietor relief for trade-mark infringement or unfair competition on the basis of
unclean hands.i'" One of the first cases where this approach was used, was that of
Independent Baking Powder Co. v. Boorman.l17 Here a manufacturer of baking powder
used alum as the acid constituent. The product was sold under the trade mark SOLAR.
After many years the manufacturer substituted phosphate for alum, but did not inform the
public. Another manufacturer then started to use the trade mark SOLAR on baking
powder. An infringement suit was brought against the latter. The court denied the
plaintiff relief in equity, by holding that the conduct of secretly and substantially
changing the nature of the product was deceptive.l " The doctrine of unclean hands has
one serious limitation when used in this way to maintain the quality of trade-marked
products. The effect is that both the trade-mark proprietor and infringer are now allowed
to use the mark and this is even more deceptive to the public. Some judges and
academics suggest that both parties should be enjoined to use the mark.119
114 Gorenstein Enterprises, Inc. v. Quality Care-USA, Inc., 874 F.2d 431, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1762, 1764 (7th
Cir. 1989). Also see McCarthy (1996) § 18:42; Michaels (1980) 16.
115 Hanak (1974) 374-377 also discusses a number of permissible changes in trade-marked products, which
would not be regarded as deceptive. This includes slight variations necessitated by trade discoveries,
newer and more economical methods of making the same product or changed manufacturing conditions.
For example, slight mechanical changes in a new model of a known car would be acceptable.
116 Hanak (1974) 365.
117 Independent Baking Powder Co. v. Boorman, 175F.448(C.C.N.J.1910).
118 Hanak (1974) 366 also mentions the following cases in this regard: Mulhens & Kropff, Inc. v. Ferd
Muelhens, Inc. 38 F.2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1929), rev'd on other grounds, 43 F.2d 937 (2nd Cir.), cert.
denied, 282 U.S. 881 (1930) (the 4711 case); Menendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc. 345 F. Supp. 527
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified on other grounds sub nom. Menendez v. Saks & Co., 485 F.2d 1355 (2nd Cir.
1973), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Republic of Cuba v. Saks & Co., 42 U.S.L.W. 3501 (U.S. 21
February 1973) (No. 73-1287).
119 Hanak (1974) 367, 368.
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According to Hanakl20 there are also other means to preserve the quality function of trade
marks. He sees § 43(a) of the Lanham Act,121which makes any person who applies a
false designation of origin or any false description or representation to goods and services
and causes them to enter into commerce, liable in a civil action, as potentially the most
effective way. The scope of this section is quite broad and if a trade mark that became
associated with goods of a high quality is now attached to goods of a lesser quality, it
might be regarded as a false representation.V' He also sees denial of registration on the
federal principal register of the United States as a tool for promoting the quality
function.l " Registration normally provides a number of procedural and substantive
advantages not found in the common law. A mark can also be cancelled if the proprietor
subsequently alters the nature of the product in a deceptive and material way.124 In
United States Law the Federal Trade Commission also has the authority to petition for the
cancellation of registered trade marks on various grounds.i"
2.4 ADVERTISING FUNCTION
In performing a distinguishing function, a trade mark also performs an advertising
function.126 The advertising function is regarded by modern commerce as the most
important economic function of a trade mark.127 In the 1942 Mishawaka Rubber case128
the marketing function 129of modern trade marks was described as follows:
120 Hanak (1974) 368.
121 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) 1970.
122 Hanak (1974) 368-370.
123 Hanak (1974) 370-372. This might be a possibility under South African law, as s lO and specifically s
10(13) of the 1993 Trade Marks Act specify that "a mark which, as a result of the manner in which it
has been used, would be likely to cause deception or confusion" ... "shall not be registered as a trade
mark or, if registered, shall ... be liable to be removed from the register". If a trade mark is used on a
product, the nature of which is subsequently changed to a substantial extent and the same trade mark is
still used, the mark would cause deception "as a result of the manner in which it has been used". See
also s 21 regarding the procedure to oppose a registration.
124 See slO and s 10(13) of the South African Trade Marks Act 194 Of 1993 quoted in fn 123 supra.
125 See Hanak (1974) 373 for a discussion of these grounds.
126 Michaels (1980) 13.
127 Rutherford (1990) 151.
128 Mishawaka Rubber & Woo/en Manufacturing Co. v. s.s. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203 at 205, 62 S. Ct.
1022,86 L. Ed. 1381,53 U.S.P.Q. 323 (1942).
129 The term "marketing function" is sometimes used as an alternative for the term "advertising function".
Stuart (1976) 32 also uses the term "suggestive function" as a further alternative to "advertising
function".
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"The protection oftrade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychological function of symbols.
If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less true that we purchase goods by them. A trade-
mark is a merchandising short-cut which induces a purchaser to select what he wants, or what he
has been led to believe he wants. The owner of a mark exploits this human propensity by making
every effort to impregnate the atmosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial
symbol. Whatever the means employed, the aim is the same - to convey through the mark, in the
minds of potential customers, the desirability of the commodity upon which it appears. Once this
is attained, the trade-mark owner has something of value. If another poaches upon the commercial
magnetism of the symbol he has created, the owner can obtain legal redress".
It is generally accepted that trade marks also serve as a prime element in the advertising
of goods, besides the other functions they fulfi1.13o Similar to advertisements, trade
marks convey information and persuade consumers to purchase certain goods. I31 Thus, if
a trade mark calls to mind a specific product and evokes an association of satisfaction and
desirability with that product, it possesses advertising value.132 This advertising function
of trademarks became important during the time when the geographical scope of markets
expanded and the distribution system of goods became more and more complex.Y' Some
see this function as a cumulative result of the origin and quality functions.134 By
employing the advertising function of trade marks a seller can create a positive image of
his goods among consumers in the market place. He can establish product acceptance
and encourage consumer loyalty. In this way sales are stimulated. Consequently
goodwill is generated and the proprietor of the mark has something of value. Goodwill is
an intangible quality and can be defined in many different ways. It can be described as
the value attributable to a going concern apart from its physical assets, capital, stock or
funds. It emanates mostly from the reputation and integrity earned by an established
130 Rutherford (1990) 151 indicates that in performing a distinguishing function, a trade mark also
performs an advertising function. See also Lunsford (1974) 78-79; Beier (1970) 63; Diamond (1975)
290; Gielen (1992) 264.
131 Vuk (1998) 877.
132 Mostert FW "Trade Mark Dilution and Confusion of Sponsorship in United States, German and English
Law" (1986) 17 international Review of industrial Property and Copyright Law 80 at 86-87; Mostert
FW "Well-known and Famous Marks: is Harmony Possible in the Global Village?" (1996) 86 The
Trademark Reporter 103 at 134.
133 See McCarthy (1996) § 3:12, quoting from the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, § 9,
comment c (Tentative Draft No.2 1990).
134 Kamperman Sanders & Maniatis (1993) 408; Webster & Page (1997) par 3.20.
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well-known and well-conducted business, but sometimes from other, even accidental
circumstances.l'" Some scholars thus describe a trade mark as the "objective symbol of
the goodwill" of a particular business.i " A trade mark is, however, not merely a symbol
of goodwill, but can serve as an effective agent in the creation and perpetuation of
goodwill.F" The mark has a selling power138 independent of the goodwill of the goods to
which it is attached and thus the mark actually sells the goods. This is acknowledged by
the recognition of advertising as a separate function of a trade mark.139 The more
distinctive the mark, the more effective is its selling power. This selling power will
encourage consumers to return to and purchase again the goods with which they have
become familiar. Therefore the protection of the reputation, uniqueness and individuality
of the trade mark is very important to the proprietor of the mark.'?" It is also important to
note that it is the selling power of the trade mark which is protected and not the mark per
se.141
This selling power is also referred to as the commercial magnetism of the mark.142 The
existence and economic importance of this commercial magnetism cannot be denied. It is
also certain that these values are often subjected to damage. Furthermore, the greater the
135 Vuk (1998) 869 and fn 34; Rogers (1949) 176. These other accidental circumstances can, for example,
be the location of the business. Vuk actually sees the "embodiment of goodwill" and the "advertising
function" as two different functions ofa trade mark. See Vuk (1998) 876-877.
136 McCarthy (1996) § 3:2; Vuk (1998) 862, 876. See Rogers ES "Some Historical Matter Concerning
Trade-Marks" (1910) 9 Michigan Law Review 29 at 43 who already in 1910 said that "a trade mark is
nothing but good will symbolized".
137 Schechter (1927) 818-819; McCarthy (1996) § 3:12; Rutherford (1990) 152; Shanahan (1982) 241;
Gielen (1992) 266,268. This was also stressed by Callmann (1947) 190. He refers to the use of the
famous TIFFANY trade mark by a motion-picture company. Although this use did not affect the
goodwill of the jewellery firm, it definitely endangered the mark's advertising value "by possible
dilution of its catch-word potential". See further Tiffany & Co. v. Tiffany Productions, Inc. 237 A.D.
801,260 N.Y.S. 821 (1932); Martino (1996) 14-15.
138 This selling power is defined as the strength of the mark vis-a-vis consumers. See Garcia JA
"Trademark Dilution: Eliminating Confusion" (1995) 85 The Trademark Reporter 489 at 504-505.
139 Kamperman Sanders & Maniatis (1993) 408. They use the example of Coca Cola and the value of the
brand independently of the soda drink itself to demonstrate this.
140 Rutherford (1990) 152. In this regard see also the statement of Mr Justice Frankfurter from the
Mishawaka Rubber case, quoted by Diamond (1975) 288.
141 Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24.
142 See quote from the Mishawaka Rubber case supra and Pattishall BW "The Dilution Rationale for Trade
Mark - Trade Identity Protection, its Progress and Prospects" (1977) 67 The Trademark Reporter 607 at
620,624.
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advertising value of a trade mark, the greater the risk of misappropriation.F '
Rutherford144summarises the position as follows:
"Any unauthorised use of the trade mark by other traders will lead to the gradual consumer
disassociation of the trade mark from the proprietor's product. The reputation and unique identity
of the trade mark will become blurred. The selling power becomes eroded and the trade mark
becomes diluted."
Vast sums of money are also invested in building up the advertising value of a trade
mark. The commercial magnetism, selling power and advertising value of a trade mark
are often exploited by unauthorised users.145 It is therefore highly important that there
must be some kind of protection for these values.
This advertising function has also been recognised by the courts. In the Stork case,146for
example, the judge remarked that in modern business the trade mark performs "the added
function of an advertising device". The selling power, advertising function and
commercial magnetism of a trade mark which has become well-known, is also statutorily
recognised in different Acts and this precludes trade-mark dilution.147 In South Africa
the Supreme Court of Appeal recognised the advertising function in the case of Laugh It
Off Promotions v SAB. The court said that section 34 (l)(c) of the Trade Marks Act
"protects the economic value of a trade mark, more particularly its reputation and its
advertising value or selling power".148
143 Rutherford (1990) 152.
144 Rutherford (1990) 152.
145 Mostert FW "The Parasitic Use of Commercial Magnetism of a Trade Mark on Non-competing Goods"
(1986) II European Intellectual Property Review 342.
146 Stork Restaurant, Inc. v Sahati, 166 F.2d 348, 1948 U.S. App. LEXIS 3355, 76 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 374
(9th Cir. 1948), quoting from Arrow Distilleries v. Globe Brewing Co., 117 F.2d 347 at 351,1941 U.S.
App. LEXIS 4233, 48 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 157 (4th Cir. 1941).
147 See Webster & Page (1997) par 3.20; 12.24; Mostert (1986 IIC) 87, 91; Mostert (1996) 133. Lanham
Act § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c); Trademark Directive art. 5(1) & (2); United Kingdom Trade Marks
Act s 5(3) and 10(3); South African Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 s 1O(17) and 34(1)( c).
148 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SA Breweries International (Finance) BV tla Sabmark International
[2004] 4 All SA 151 (SCA) 157a.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
34
Besides enabling consumers to identify a product, trade marks provide the automatic
commencement of the advertising process. A trade mark can only be used outside its
original connotation and connection with a specific product if the proprietor of the mark
does not object. This fact has also been enhanced by dilution provisions in different
statutes all over the world.149
2.5 INVESTMENT FUNCTION
Although most scholars and even courts hold that dilution protection is justified on the
basis of the advertising or publicity function of trade marks, Port sees the investment
function as the only possible justification for dilution protection.P" The investment
function is based on the following assumptions. The stronger or more famous the trade
mark, the more the consumers will know of the products on which it is used. The result
is that the search costs are lower, as are the consumer costS.151 Therefore, if a company
invests in a strong mark, society gets cheaper goods. This is according to Port the only
true function that should be protected by trade-mark dilution.152
2.6 PROTECTION OF TRADE MARK FUNCTIONS
It is clear from the above discussion that trade marks have acquired additional functions
over time. It is of utmost importance that these modem functions of trade marks are
adequately protected. To achieve this goal additional protection outside that afforded by
the confusion doctrine is necessary. Courts and legislatures have realised this and have
begun to protect trade marks from uses which damage trade marks through dilution'Y of
149 Kamperman Sanders & Maniatis (1993) 409 fn 27.
ISO Port (personal comments to the author in May 2000).
151 Consumer costs includes the acquisition of reliable information about the source of a product, which
also predicts the characteristics and quality of the goods. Denicola (1996) 80.
152 Port (personal comments to the author in May 2000).
153 This concept will be discussed in Chapter 3 "The Concept of Dilution and the Dilution Debate" infra.
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their distinctiveness, but which do not necessarily result in a likelihood of confusion.i'"
By doing this, these modern functions of a trade mark are protected.
The Benelux countries'<' in their interpretation of article 13A of the Uniform Benelux
Trade Marks Act, have given a very broad interpretation as to what will be regarded as
infringing use of a trade mark. They developed the concept of risk of association, which
entails that if the public on seeing a certain sign, makes an association with a registered
trade mark, although not confusing them, there can be trade-mark infringement.P" By
doing this, the Benelux countries have essentially accepted that the function of a trade
mark is not confined to that of an indicator of the source or origin. It even goes beyond
that of an indicator of the quality of the mark. They actually see the trade mark as having
acquired a function, by way of publicity, whereby the mark can be kept continually in the
minds of the public. The mark thus acquired goodwill, which may be independent of the
origin and quality functions of that mark.157
In contrast, the Court of Justice of the European Communities, even in the 1970s still
held the view that the relevant function of a trade mark is to guarantee to the consumer
the origin of the goods and services.158 In the 1980 and 1985 drafts of the Trademark
Directivel59 the purpose of a trade mark is also still indicated as "an indicator of origin".
However, in the final version of the Directive the recognition of broader functions of
trade marks can also be seen. A similar trend can be discovered in the Community Trade
154 Vuk (1998) 862, 922; Lanham Act § 43, 45, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125, 1127, as amended by the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995; Uniform Benelux Trademarks Act art. l3A; 1994 United Kingdom
Trade Marks Act s 10(3). See the discussion of these statutes infra in chapters 4 and 5.
155 See Chapter 5.7.1 "Benelux Law" infra for a complete discussion on the Benelux countries and the
interpretation of the Uniform Benelux Trademarks Act ofl971; Gielen (1992) 264.
156 Harris PA "Wagamama: Confusion Still Reigns in the UK" (October 1995) Trademark World 12-13.
157 Harris (1995 TW) 13; Harris PA "UK Trade Mark Law: Are You Confused?" (1995) 12 European
Intellectual Property Review 601.
158 See Gielen (1992) 264 for some references.
159 See Davies IM (general editor) Sweet & Maxwell's European Trade Mark Litigation Handbook (1998)
Sweet & Maxwell London 695-706 Appendix A. See Chapter 5.5 "The European Union and the
Trademark Directive" infra for a discussion of the Trademark Directive.
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Mark Regulation (CTMR), 160although these two documents do not go as far as the
Benelux law. In the tenth recital to the Trademark Directive, as well as the seventh
recital to the CTMR, the function of a trade mark is stated as "in particular to guarantee
the trade mark as an indication of origin".161 From this statement it is clear that the origin
function is no longer regarded as the only function of a trade mark. Both the Directive
and the Regulation also protect other functions of a trade mark, by providing for so-called
dilution protection in articles 4(3), 4(4)(a) and 5(2) of the Directive and articles 8(5) and
9( 1)(c) of the CTMR, whereby reputed marks are protected even in the absence of
confusion. The result of the negotiations between the Member States was a clear
recognition that other functions, for example facets of the advertising function like the
communication, publicity and goodwill functions, are recognised under European trade-
mark law. 162
But then the United Kingdom's Chancery Division, in the Wagamama case,163 which was
decided after the implementation of the 1994 Act, refused to acknowledge this modem
view of the functions of a trade mark, by giving a strict origin-based decision.i'" If one
looks at some recent decisions of the European Court of Justice there is, however, a
tendency to treat the trade mark as an item of property. In the Dior v Evora case165 the
160 Council Reg. No. 40/94 on the Community Trade Mark, [1994] 0.1. Lllll [1995] 0.1. O.H.LM. 50;
[1995] O.J. O.H.l.M. 511. See Davies (1998) 707-776 Appendix B for a copy of this Regulation. The
CTMR is discussed in Chapter 5.6 "The Community Trade Mark" infra.
161 Emphasis added.
162 Gielen C "Likelihood of Association: What Does it Mean?" (February 1996) Trademark World 21;
Kamperman Sanders A "The Wagamama Decision: Back to the Dark Ages of Trade Mark Law" (1996)
1 European Intellectual Property Review 4; Gielen (1992) 264, 266, 268.
163 Wagamama Ltd v City Centre Restaurants pic [1995] F.S.R. 713; [1996] E.T.M.R. 23.
164 See Chapter 5.7.2.3 "Cases on Section 10(2)" infra for a detailed discussion of this case and the position
in English law.
165 Case C-337/95 Parfums Christian Dior v Evora BV, 4 November 1997 [1998] R.P.C. 166. See also
Norman H "Perfume, Whisky and Leaping Cats of Prey: A UK Perspective on Three Recent Trade
Mark Cases before the European Court of Justice" (1998) 8 European Intellectual Property Review
306-307.
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court recognised that a subsequent reselIer of goods can damage the reputation of a trade
mark, even where the condition of the goods was not impaired. It seems that the interests
of the proprietor in a trade mark itself as a vehicle for the creation of goodwill can in this
way be protected.
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CHAPTER3
THE CONCEPT OF DILUTION AND THE DILUTION DEBATE
3.1 THE DEVELOPMENT OF DILUTION AS A LEGAL CONCEPT
It is generally accepted that the dilution theory originated in Germany in 1924.1 The
court' created the concept by protecting the trademark ODOL for mouthwash from use
on steel products. The court held that the use of the mark ODOL even on non-competing
goods, was "gegen die guten Sitten".3 Consumers would think of the mouthwash
whenever they were exposed to ODOL on steel products. The court then concluded that
it was in the utmost interest of the applicant that its mark was not diluted iverwassertï,
because if that happened the mark would lose its selling power." There is, however, an
earlier English case, viewed by some scholars as the origin of the dilution theory.' In the
case Eastman Photographic Materials.' the concept of dilution was recognised, though
not identified as such. The plaintiff argued that its trade mark KODAK was weakened by
See Schechter FI "The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection" (1927) 40 Harvard Law Review 813 at
831; Vuk WT "Protecting Baywatch and Wagamama: Why the European Union Should Revise the
1989 Trademark Directive to Mandate Dilution Protection for Trademarks" (1998) 21 Fordham
International Law Journal 863 at 889; Mostert FW "The Parasitic Use of Commercial Magnetism of a
Trade Mark on Non-competing Goods" (1986) II European Intellectual Property Review 342; Martino
T Trademark Dilution (1996) Clarendon Press Oxford 4-5; Middleton GE "Some Aspects of
Trademark Dilution" (1957) 47 The Trademark Reporter 1023-1024.
2 Civil Court, Elberfield, 25 Juristische Wochemschrift 503; XXV Markenshutz Und Wettbewerb 264, Il
September 1925. Just a few years previously, in 1905, the Supreme Court in Hamburg found that the
proprietors of the trade mark KODAK for cameras were not entitled to cancel the registration of
KODAK for bath tubs, because the public would not believe that the products came from the same
company.
This phrase forms part of art 826 of the German Civil Code which provides that: " ... one who
designedly injures another in a manner violating the good morals [gegen die guten Sitten] is bound to
indemnify the other for the injury". Schechter (1927) 831.
See Schechter (1927) 832. For a more detailed discussion of this case see Chapter 5.3 "Early Origins of
Dilution in Europe" infra.
Garcia JA "Trademark Dilution: Eliminating Confusion" (1995) 85 The Trademark Reporter 489 at
491; Wheeldon R "Trade Mark Dilution - What is it?" Lecture Notes I at 7.
The Eastman Photographic Materials Company Limited and Another v. The John Griffiths Cycle
Corporation Limited and the Kodak Cycle Company Ltd. 15 R.P.C. (1898) 105.
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the defendant's use of the same mark on bicycles. The court agreed and ordered the
defendant to stop the use of the trade mark on its bicycles.
In the United States there is a reported Court of Appeals (Third Circuit) case from 1925,
Wall v. Rolls-Royce of America.' in which the power of a trade mark to form valuable
associations in the minds of consumers was recognised." The respondent was the well-
known company manufacturing high quality automobiles and aeroplane engines. Rolls-
Royce Tube Company sold mail-order radio tubes, which were described In
advertisements as "Rolls-Royce" radio tubes.9 Despite the evident absence of
competition between the two companies, the court gave injunctive relief to Rolls-Royce
of America. It accepted that the name Rolls-Royce had given its proprietors an
established, distinctive and valuable business asset. The court found that it was the
purpose of Wall to take the goodwill and reputation of the Rolls-Royce Company and to
use these to convey a false impression to the public. This would injure the Rolls-Royce
Company and substantially detract from its goodwill. The court however based the
injunctive relief on the tenuous reasoning that both companies sold products that involved
electricity!
In the 1924 case of Vogue v. Thompson-Hudson CO.,IO the court found that the public
would be deceived into believing that the plaintiffs magazine vouched for, sponsored, or
approved the hats offered by the defendant under a mark that utilised the letter "V". The
plaintiff owned two trade marks, namely "Vogue" and another one comprising of the
letter "V" with the figure of a woman, known as the "V-Girl". The hats were marketed
under the name "Vogue Hats" and another mark also using the letter "V". The court
7 Wall v.. Rolls-Royce of America, Inc., 4 F.2d 333,15 T.M.R. 239 (3rd Cir. 1925).
See Taviss ML "Case-note: In Search of a Consistent Trademark Dilution Test: Mead Data Central,
Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sa/es, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2nd Cir. 1989)" (1990) 58 University of
Cincinnati Law Review 1449 at 1456.
9 The quotation marks were used in the advertisements. The advertisements also said that the radio tubes
were "like their name, significant of quality". The tubes were also prominently marked as Rolls-Royce,
with no indication of the actual manufacturer.
10 Vogue Co. v. Thompson-Hudson Co., 300 Fed. 509 (6th Cir. 1924), rehearing denied, 12 F.2d 991
(1926), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 706 (1926).
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ruled that the mark "Vogue" was substantially descriptive as it is synonymous with the
word "style" or "fashion". There was also no exclusive use of the mark by the plaintiff.
Concerning the "V" mark the court then found unfair competition, after explaining that in
cases where there is unfairness, the absence of market competition can be overlooked. I I
The court concluded that this "is a sound principle, and should be applied in appropriate
cases".
This radically new concept of dilution in United States trade-mark law was first identified
as such in 1927 by Frank I. Schechterl2 in an article entitled The Rational Basis of
Trademark Protection.13 According to Schechter, who is considered the father of dilution
law," "the preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark should constitute the only
rational basis for its protection ... ".15 According to Port his implicit claim is that there is
an unacceptable gap in trade-mark protection." In Schechter's view, the first indication
in case law that the identification function of a trade mark needs protection is to be found
II The court inter alia referred to Eastman Co v. Kodak Co, 15 R.P .C., sited above.
12 See Vuk (1998) 863, 890; Gilson Gilson on Trademark Protection & Practice (1999) Matthew Bender
& Company, Inc. § 5.12[1][b]; Pattishall BW "The Dilution Rationale for Trade Mark - Trade Identity
Protection, its Progress and Prospects" (1977) 67 The Trademark Reporter 607; Seitz BG "The Actual
Harm Requirement and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act: Ringling Brothers-Barnum & Bailey
Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development" (1999) 10 Journal of Art and
Entertainment Law 113 at 115; Garcia (1995) 491; Port KL "The 'Unnatural' Expansion of Trademark
Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?" (1995) 85 The Trademark Reporter 525 at 529;
Klieger RN "Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for Trademark
Protection" (1997) 58 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 789 at 796-797; McCabe KB "Dilution-by-
Blurring: A Theory Caught in the Shadow of Trademark Infringement" (2000) 68 Fordham Law Review
1827 at 1845-1846; Kim PE "Preventing Dilution of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act: Why the
FTDA Requires Actual Economic Harm" (2001) 150 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 719 at
724; Webster CE & Morley GE Webster & Page South African Law of Trade Marks, Unlawful
Competition, Company Names and Trading Styles 4th ed (1997) Butterworths Durban par 12.24. But
see Higgins JR & Duvall SA "The FTDA after Moseley v VSecret" (2003) 93 The Trademark Reporter
813 at 819 who seriously question Schechter's contribution to dilution law.
13 Schechter (1927) 813-833. This article was actually based on a book, The Historical Foundations of the
Law Relating to Trade-Marks, published by Shchecter in 1925. This book, his doctoral thesis, and long
out of print, was appraised as one of the most outstanding works on trade-mark law. See Martino
(1996) 16-17. He says that the article presents to its readers "only the edited highlights of the assiduous
research, which would underscore the dilution rationale".
14 See Martino (1996) 16-17,22-27 for a vivid description of Schechter's background and work.
15 Schechter (1927) 831. Schechter never actually referred to this concept as "dilution", although the
word appears in his reference to the German Odol case, referred to in fn 2 supra. See also Pattishall
BW "Dawning Acceptance of the Dilution Rationale for Trade Mark - Trade Identity Protection"
(1984) 74 The Trademark Reporter 289; McCabe (2000) 1846 fn 138.
16 Port (1995) 529.
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in the 1926 case of Duro Pump v. California Cedar Products.17 The court ruled that the
trade mark DURO had become identified with the Duro Company and, if used by the
California Cedar Products Company, would lead to confusion of identity. This loss of
identity would become even more serious if other companies were to use it as well.
Schechter introduced many of the conceptual elements that make up the modern dilution
doctrine.l'' These include the property aspects of trade marks. He argued that the right to
the "preservation of the uniqueness of a trademark" amounted to a "property right",
which belonged to the proprietor of the trade mark and should be protected.l" He also
stressed the value of the selling power of a trade mark" and the role of distinctiveness in
the protection of trade marks." As trade marks themselves sell products, trade marks
themselves should be protected.v' Trade marks, in other words, stimulate sales by
. d '1123creatmg goo WI . Confusion was not regarded as a necessary requirement for the
provision of protection. The definition of the dilution concept formulated by Schechter
furthermore only allowed for the protection of the trade mark if used upon non-
competing goods/" A further limitation Schechter imposed on the use of the dilution
remedy was that only famous marks merit protection. For this purpose they must at least
17 Duro Pump & Mfg. Co. v. Cal. Cedar Products Co., II. F.(2d) 205 (Ct. of App. D.C. 1926).
18 Taviss (1990) 1456; Pattishall (1984) 289; Pattishall (1977) 607.
19 Schechter (1927) 831 read in conjunction with Garcia (1995) 491. See also Klieger (1997) 796-797
who says that Schechter recognises an "in gross property right no more limited than that in the physical
assets of a business" and Kim (2001) 725. See the in depth discussion on property rights in trade marks
by Martino (1996) 78-85. Like Schechter, he comes to the conclusion that property rights should exist
only in distinctive, thus coined or arbitrary, marks.
20 The value of a trade symbol to generate sales was seen as its primary value, which should therefore be
protected. See Denicola RC "Some Thoughts on the Dynamics of Federal Trademark Legislation and
the Trademark Dilution Act of 1995" (1996) 59 Law and Contemporary Problems 75 at 85.
21 Schechter (1927) 819 contended that the mark actually sells the goods and the more distinctive the
mark, the greater its selling power.
22 Marroletti W "Dilution, Confusion, or Delusion? The Need for a Clear International Standard to
Determine Trademark Dilution" (1999) 25 Brooklyn Journal of international Law 659 at 662.
23 See Martino (1996) 25.
24 See Chapter 3.2 "Different Definitions of Dilution" infra. In the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
1995 this is taken a step further by granting dilution protection also against use on competing goods.
See Chapter 4.7 "The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995" infra.
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be arbitrary, coined or fanciful marks with prominent associations with particular
products."
Shortly after this the concept also got support, although indirectly, from the Court of
Appeals (Second Circuit). The great judge." Learned Hand, in Yale Electric
Corporation v. Robertson27 approved injunctive relief for the YALE trade mark, used on
locks, against its use by someone else on flashlights. The court based its decision on "a
loss of reputation rationale" and did not mention dilution as such. The language used by
Justice Hand had an immense influence upon the law of trade-mark infringement and
unfair competition and has been repeatedly quoted." He said:
"However, it has of recent years been recognized that a merchant may have a sufficient economic
interest in the use of his mark outside the field of his own exploitation to justify interposition by a
court. His mark is his authentic seal; by it he vouches for the goods which bear it; it carries his
name for good or ill. If another uses it, he borrows the owner's reputation, whose quality no
longer lies within his own control. This is an injury, even though the borrower does not tarnish it,
or divert any sales by its use; for a reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and
creator, and another can use it only as a mask."
The court thus recognised that a merchant might have an economic interest in the use of
his mark outside his normal field of operations and that this could justify interference by
a court.29 If another person used his mark, then the proprietor could no longer control the
25 See also Pattishall (1977) 607; Klieger (1997) 813; Martino (1996) 26. See further Chapter 3.2
"Different Definitions of Dilution" infra.
26 Port KL "Learned Hand's Trademark Jurisprudence: Legal Positivism and the Myth of the Prophet" 27
(1996) Pacific Law Journal 221-222.
27 Yale Electric Corporation v. Robertson 26 F.2d 972 (2nd Cir. 1928).
28 Pattishall BW "The USA Courts and the Prevention of Unfair Competition" (1963) 53 The Trademark
Reporter 599 at 602-603.
29 The "Aunt Jemima Doctrine" (see Chapter 2.3 "Quality Function" supra) was further expanded by
Hand in this case into what became known as the "Hand Doctrine". The Doctrine can be defined as
follows: "if an article bearing a copied symbol was a product that may be understood to have emanated
from the plaintiff, the defendant's use of such a mark should be enjoined. Subsequent to 1940,
however, the "Hand Doctrine" came to stand for the opposite proposition, namely that actual confusion
must be shown by the plaintiff. Port caJIs the latter the "Real Hand Doctrine". See Port (1996) 245,
249.
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quality of his reputation and this was regarded as an injury. This case according to
Gilson was an important step in the development of the recognition of dilution in trade-
mark protecrion." Port, however, strongly feels that this reasoning is forced and that
Gilson is wrong. According to him "Hand would never have gone with dilution".3l Port,
in a well-researched article on Learned Hand, writes the followingr '
"Learned Hand's trademark jurisprudence ... exhibits a rather amazing conservatism .... He was
extremely resistant to change. This is perhaps explained by what appears to be Hand's
understanding of legal positivism - that law is a statement of the will of the sovereign and judges
are not free to create law without a clear statement of authority from the State. This judicial
philosophy by Hand actually had an extremely restrictive impact on the development of trademark
law."
It thus seems that Justice Hand's judgment in the Yale case was used in a way that he
himself would never have intended. The 1905 Act refused registration if the mark was
used on goods of the same descriptive properties. Justice Hand did not believe that locks
and keys were of the same descriptive properties as flashlights and batteries, but he felt
that he must follow the positive law on the subject. Bound by the Second Circuit's
judgment in the Aunt Jemima case, Justice Hand refused registration.v' Port writes that
Justice Hand spent the next thirty years in an attempt to confine his opinion in the Yale
case."
30 Gilson (1999) § 5.l2[1][b]. See Port (1996) 232 fn 86 for more proponents that hold the same opinion.
31 Personal comments to the author in May 2000. See also Port (1996) 251-253, 295-260 for a discussion
of subsequent judgments by Hand, from which a hostility towards trade-mark proprietors is apparent.
Hand thus made a total reversal from his earlier judgements in Yale and Waterman (see fn 44 infra) to
his judgments in cases after 1940.
32 Port (1996) 223.
33 Justice Hand thus followed the law as applied in the Aunt Jemima case, although he delivered the
dissenting opinion in this case (Port (1996) 246-247). Martino (1996) 7 writes that Justice Hand
actually extended trade-mark infringement in the Aunt Jemima case beyond competing goods to
different but related goods. He, however, emphasised that Justice Hand's reasoning was based on the
law of deceit and that the "predicate of trademark protection remained public confusion or deception".
34 Port (1996) 223, 245. This case was, interestingly, the case for which Justice Hand was most often
cited and on which much of his trademark jurisprudence fame was based. Martino (1996) 8-9 fn 21
also stated that Justice Hand was narrowing the scope of trade-mark protection in subsequent cases.
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The Yale case was followed a year later by the very short judgment of Justice Coxe in
Alfred Dunhill of London v. Dunhill Shirt Shop.35 The applicant, a well-known
manufacturer of pipes and other smokers' requisites, applied for injunctive relief against
the defendants who had commenced using the name DUNHILL for their haberdashery
shop, which made and sold men's shirts. The judge found that the only possible reason
for the use of the name by the defendant was "to trade on the reputation and goodwill of
the plaintiff'v"
Another important common-law case during the early development of a dilution doctrine
was Tiffany & Company v. Tiffany Productions, Inc.37 This case, together with the Wall
v. Rolls-Royce case/8 is considered to be the foundation-stone of the dilution concept in
United States law, although in both there was reliance on the element of confusion and
defendant's wrongful intent to confuse.39 Tiffany & Company, the famous jewelry
corporation, instituted action to prevent a movie distributor from using the mark
TIFFANY. Even though the court held that there was no competition between the
companies, they granted an injunction on the basis of predatory advertising that
emphasised a connection between the parties that did not exist. The court also stated that
the real injury was the gradual whittling away of the identity and hold upon the public
mind of plaintiff's name. Thus, although the court approved Schechter's theory, it did
not accept it unequivocally, but referred to the issue of confusion.4o This judgment was
35 Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc., v. Dunhill Shirt Shop, Inc. 3 F.Supp. 487, 1929 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1882
(S.D.N.Y. 1929). This is one of only two cases (the other one being Bu/ova Watch Co., Inc., v.
Sto/zberg 69 F.Supp. 543, 1947 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2901, 72 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 72 (D. Mass. 1947)
discussed infra) noted by Denicola (1996) 85 as actually acknowledging trade-mark dilution as
described by Schechter.
36 The judge cited Wall v. Rolls-Royce and Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, both discussed above, as
authority.
37 Tiffany & Company v.Tiffany Productions, Inc. 147 Misc. 679, 264 N.Y. Supp. 459, 260 N.Y. Supp.
281 (Sup. Ct. 1932) affirmed 262 N.Y. 482, 188 N.E. 30 (1933). Klieger (1997) 814-815. See also Port
(1995) 530. He mistakenly avers that the court applied the New York dilution statute, but New York
only enacted their first dilution statute in 1955! See Chapter 4.3.1 "Protection and Related Problems"
infra.
38 See fn7 supra.
39 Patti shall (1977) 608; Klieger (1997) 814; Note "Dilution: Trade Mark Infringement or Will-ot-The-
Wisp?" (1964) 77 Harvard Law Review 520; reprinted in (1964) 54 The Trademark Reporter 184 at
190.
40 See Callmann R "Unfair Competition without Competition" (1947) 37 The Trademark Reporter 175 at
178; reprinted from 95 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 443; Martino (I996) 14-15.
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affirmed by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York.41 Most courts, in
these early cases, actually relied on a finding of confusion or intention to confuse,
although they seem to support the existence of a dilution rationale.Y The result was that
a practice was characterised as an act of unfair competition, notwithstanding the absence
of competition."
An interesting limitation to this application of the common law in cases of non-
competing goods was formulated by Justice Hand in L.E. Waterman & Co. v. Gordon.44
In that case plaintiff used the trade mark WATERMAN'S on fountain pens when
defendant started to sell razor blades under the name WATERMAN. Justice Hand stated
that it is settled law that relief can also be granted against use of a trade mark upon "such
other goods as might naturally be supposed to come from [the trade-mark proprietor]".
He emphasised however that the protection given to non-competing goods should not be
extended to cases where the relationship is too remote from any goods that the proprietor
would be likely to make or sell, by using the example of steam shovels and lipsticks."
This was not the case here as razor blades might naturally be supposed to come from a
pen maker. A decree for the plaintiff was thus affirmed by the coun." Not all dilution
proponents would accept this limitation, especially in the case of coined or arbitrary
marks with secondary meaning."
41 Tiffany & Company v. Tiffany Productions Inc. 237 A.D. 801,260 N.Y.S. 821 (1932).
42 Taviss (1990) 1457; Pattishall (1963) 621; Middleton (1957) 1026. For a brief discussion of more of
these early cases, see Harvard note (1964) 190-191.
43 Callmann (1947) 179. See further Chapter 3.5.3 "Role of the Status of the Trade-mark Proprietor's
Right in the Dilution Debate" supra for his underlying theoretical justification for the granting of relief
in cases like these.
44 L.E. Waterman & Co. v. Gordon, 72 F.2d 272 (2nd Cir. 1934). See also Port (1996) 247 for his
perspective on this case.
45 L.E. Waterman & Co. v. Gordon, 72 F.2d 272 at 273 (2nd Cir. 1934): "It would be hard, for example,
for the seller of a steam shovel to find ground for complaint in the use of his trade-mark on a lipstick".
See also Harvard note (1964) 186. Martino (1996) 8 fn 14 notes that Justice Hand used the word "hard"
not "impossible", thus if the steam shovel maker could indeed show that an appreciable percentage of
consumers would think there is a connection between the two products, he can get relief.
46 This was tbe last case where Justice Hand applied the Aunt Jemima Doctrine to the benefit of the
plaintiff. In the words of Port (1996) 248 subsequent cases "take a remarkable shift and become
extremely restrictive". After 1940 Justice Hand refused to apply the Aunt Jemima Doctrine.
47 Harvard note (1964) 186.
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In Bulova Watch Co., Inc. v. Stolzberl8 the court granted an injunction to the plaintiff
upon the basis of unfair competition, but used typical dilution language to describe the
wrong. The plaintiff had registered the trade mark BULOVA in the class for watches,
watch movements and watch cases. Although not fanciful, it was used for over 50 years
and extensive advertising has been carried on by the plaintiff. Defendant, trading as
"Eddy's Shoes" registered his trade mark BULOV A for shoes in 1941. The court
referred to the notion that a trade mark serves as a symbol of goodwill and then stated
that "unfairness" must form the basis for the intervention of the court. He referred to the
Waterman rule,49 that if the relationship between the products is not too remote,
protection should be given. He then ruled that watches and shoes, while non-competing,
are not so remote and might possibly come from the same source. He found that
defendant "stands to injure plaintiff's reputation and dilute the quality of his trade.
mark".5o
As early as 1932 there were attempts in the United States to enact a federal dilution
statute. The so-called "Perkins" bill, drafted by Schechter, 51 made provision for a
federally registered, coined or inventive or fanciful or arbitrary trade mark to be protected
against injury to its goodwill, reputation and business credit, thus against dilutive uses.52
There was, however, concern on the part of the Department of Justice regarding the
creation of property rights in trade marks, which prevented the discussion and enactment
48 Bu/ova Watch es, Inc., v. Stolzberg 69 F.Supp. 543, 1947 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2901, 72 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
72 (D. Mass. 1947).
49 This rule, formulated by Justice Hand in L.E. Waterman & Co. v. Gordon 72 F.2d 272 (2nd Cir. 1934),
was discussed above.
50 He also took into account the fact that defendant used the mark on low-priced shoes. The court also
referred to Wall v. Rolls-Royce of America (fn 7 supra) as authority.
51 Regrettably, Schechter died before the promulgation of the first state dilution statute by Massachusetts
in 1947, leaving more questions than answers concerning the interpretation of dilution statutes. See
Martino (1996) 26. For a discussion of the Massachusetts statute and other state legislation see Chapter
4.3.1 "Protection and Related Problems" infra.
52 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][b]; Garcia (1995) 491; Martino (1996) 28; Belongia HL "Why is Fame Still
Confusing? Misuse of the 'Niche Market Theory' Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act" (2002)
51 DePaul Law Review 1159 at 1165. Marks that would certainly be protected under this statute are
KODAK, ROLLS-ROYCE and TIFFANY. Trade marks like VOGUE would not be covered. In most
cases however the courts would have to decide whether a mark comply with the precondition set in the
statute on a case to case basis.
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of the bill. The next step towards dilution protection would be taken by state legislatures
in the United States.
The first statutory recognition of dilution took place in 1947, when the state of
Massachusetts enacted a statute prohibiting dilution.t' This was nearly twenty years after
Schechter's article introducing the dilution theory. A steadily expanding legislative
endorsement of the concept followed.54
3.2 DIFFERENT DEFINITIONS OF DILUTION
The first legal definition of the concept of dilution, although he did not use the word
"dilution", was given by Schechter in 192755 in the following words:
"It is the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind ofthe
mark or name by its use upon non-competing goods. The more distinctive or unique the mark, the
deeper is its impress upon the public consciousness, and the greater its need for protection against
vitiation or dissociation from the particular product in connection with which it has been used."
He emphasised the fact that coined, arbitrary and fanciful words or phrases, as, for
example, ROLLS-ROYCE, KODAK, MAZDA and NUJOL, deserve a much broader
degree of protection than words and phrases in common use. These fanciful words and
phrases have been added to rather than withdrawn from the human vocabulary" They
have from the beginning been associated with a particular product. If other people start
to use these words on either related or non-related goods and services, they will definitely
lose their effectiveness and unique distinctiveness, despite their originality and ingenuity.
53 Act of 2 May 1947, cho 307, § 7a, Mass. Acts 300 (codified as amended at Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. cho
II0B, § 12 (West 1996)); Vuk (1998) 863; Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][b]; Garcia (1995) 492; Klieger
(1997) 811; McCabe (2000)1847. See also Chapter 4.3.1 "Protection and Related Problems" infra.
54 The history of dilution and dilution protection in the United States Law from 1947 onwards will be
discussed in Chapter 4.2 "Federal Trade-Mark Law since 1947" infra as contemporary law.
55 Schechter (1927) 825. See Vuk (1998) 892; Taviss (1990) 1455; McCabe (2000) 1829.
56 Schechter (1927) 828-830. Callmann (1947) 190 also reasons that the stronger the mark, the more
extensive is its need for protection. Arbitrary, coined or fanciful marks should thus be given a much
broader degree of protection.
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This uniqueness was important, because trade marks serve, especially in a free-market
economy, primarily as marketing toolS.57
Therefore, trade-mark dilution occurs when a trade mark's distinctive quality is reduced
due to the use of the trade mark on other products. 58 The American Heritage Dictionary
defines dilution as "the process of making weaker or less concentrated". Numerous legal
definitions of the concept of dilution were formulated after that of Schechter. McCarthy
defines it as "a weakening or reduction in the ability of a mark to clearly and
unmistakably distinguish one source".59 Other definitions are: "the lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or services'Y" "the whittling
away of an established trademark's selling power and value through its unauthorised use
by others upon dissimilar products't.'" "the diminishment or reduction of a trademark's
ability to clearly distinguish one source, thereby, creating the perception, in the
consumer's mind, that a trademark no longer represents one source of goods because a
second manufacturer is now using the trademark to represent another source,,;62 the use
of a identical or substantially similar mark, "triggering a mental association on the part of
the consumer between the two marks, thereby eroding the strength of the original
mark".63
It is clear from these and other definitions that the most important elements are the
distinctive quality''" of the infringed mark and the dissimilarity of the goods on which the
marks are used.
57 Schechter (1927) 822.
58 Dilution of the distinctiveness of a trade mark, comprises only unauthorised uses of the mark. See
Denicola (1996) 85.
59 McCarthy JT McCarthy on Trademarks 4th ed (1996) West Group St Paul Minnesota § 24:67.
60 Lanham Act § 45,15 U.S.c. § 1127.
61 Allied Maintenance Corporation v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 538, 369 N.E.2d 1162,
1977 N.Y. LEXIS 2429, 399 N.Y.S.2d 628, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 418 (1977), which is regarded as a
watershed case in the development of dilution. See Pattishall (1984) 295-297 for various definitions for
dilution from cases between 1977 and 1984.
62 Vuk(l998) 863.
63 McCabe (2000) 1828. Belongia (2002) 1166 also emphasises this "mental association" created in the
public's mind between the two marks.
64 There is a difference in opinion between those scholars and courts requiring a mark to be famous,
meaning a unique, arbitrary or coined mark and those scholars and courts seeing distinctiveness in the
sense of the identifier of a product as enough to qualify for dilution protection. See Chapter 4.3.1
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Distinctiveness plays an important role in the protection of trade marks from dilution. In
the first place it should be remembered that distinctiveness is a requirement for a symbol
to qualify as a trade mark. It is normally said that a symbol must be so distinctive that it
is capable of performing the function of identifying and distinguishing the goods, which
bear the symbol from other goods. Coined or arbitrary marks are usually accepted to be
distinctive. Coined words are invented for the sole purpose of identifying a product, for
example KODAK and POLAROID. Arbitrary marks are existing words, which are
applied to a product in an unexpected and non-descriptive manner. The example of V-8
for a drink made from the juice of eight vegetables is given by Justice Roberts in
Wedgewood Homes, Inc. v. Lund.65 A mark can also become distinctive by acquiring a
secondary meaning.Ï" This happens when the mark become synonymous in the mind of a
substantial part of the public with a particular business or product, rather that with its
primary meaning. It is, however, essentially agreed by most courts that distinctiveness
for dilution purposes means something more than distinctiveness for confusion
purposes.Y
Traditionally, there had to be use of the same or a similar mark on different goods for a
finding of dilution. This was also reflected in many statutes, for example the Model State
Trademark Bill,68 on which most of the states in the United States of America based their
state dilution statutes. Yet Patti shall notes that differences between goods can be so
substantial that the use of the trade mark on the other product will be so remote that the
"Protection and Related Problems" infra. Most modem statutes however require some degree of fame
(Webster & Page (1997) par 12.27). See for example s 10(17) of the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993,
which requires a mark "well-known in the Republic"; § 43(c)(I) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.c. §
1125(c) requiring a "famous mark" and art. 5(2) of the European Union's Trademark Directive
requiring that the mark must have "a reputation in the Member State". See also discussion in Chapter
6.4.2 "The Dilution Provisions (iv) Well known" infra.
65 Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund 294 Or. 493, 659 P.2d 377, 222 U.S.P.Q. 446 (Or. Sup. Ct. 1983).
66 Examples of such marks are AMERICAN airlines, FORD motor cars and KENTUCKY FRIED
CHICKEN. These initially weak marks acquired strength through secondary meaning. In fact, they had
become strong marks far beyond the minimum necessary for secondary meaning. See McCarthy (1996)
§ 11.83.
67 Klieger (1997) 831-833.
68 Model State Trademark Bill, § 12 (USTA 1965), which reads "notwithstanding the absence of
competition between the parties ... ".
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distinctiveness of the senior mark cannot be diluted.69 He admits that these are "difficult,
nebulous and ephemeral fact questions of state of mind reaction to given stimuli".
McCarthy is of the opinion that consumer surveys can be helpful in this regard. If it can
be shown that the consumer, when seeing the defendant's mark, would not even think of
the plaintiffs mark, there is no dilution."
Middleton summed up the conditions that must be met for a claim of trade-mark dilution
as follows: The mark must be arbitrary, coined or fanciful and substantially the same as
those used by the plaintiff; the parties must use the mark on unrelated and non-
competitive goods or services; and there must be a complete absence of actual or likely
confusion.7I
3.3 TRADITIONAL INFRINGEMENT CONTRASTED WITH DILUTION
The basis of the historical or traditional confusion of source rationale is deceit. The
object and test is a likelihood of confusion or deception as to source with the goods of the
prior user of the trade mark. This means that by protecting against confusion, trade-mark
law protects consumers against deceptive sale practices and businesses against unfair
competitive practices.f The rationale, therefore, is the right of consumers to protection
from confusion of identity. This is also known as the consumer protection model.Ï'' Any
mark that identifies source is thus entitled to protection against a likelihood of
confusion.Ï" The scope of "confusion" has expanded over time and now not only means
confusion of source, but also confusion of sponsorship and even "post sale" confusion.f
69 Pattishall (1984) 299. He refers to the example of "lipsticks and steamshovels" used by Justice Hand in
the case of L.E. Waterman Co. v. Gordon, 72 F.2d 272, 273, 22 U.S.P.Q. 268, 269 (2nd Cir. 1934). See
fn 45 supra.
70 McCarthy JT "The 1996 Federal Anti Dilution Statute" (1998) 16 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law
Journal 587 at 593.
71 Middleton (1957) 1025-1026.
72 Welkowitz DS "Protection against Trademark Dilution in the U.K. and Canada: Inexorable Trend or
will Tradition Triumph?" (2000) 24 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 63 at 66-67.
73 Edgecombe JR "Off the Mark: Bringing the Federal Trademark Dilution Act in Line with Established
Trademark Law" (2002) 51 Emory Law Journal 1247 at 1249.
74 See Pattishall (1984) 308; Port (1995) 529; McCarthy (1996) § 23:1.
75 Confusion of sponsorship implies that one knows that company A does not make product A, but one
thinks that the company has approved product A or licensed someone else to use company A's name.
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The dilution doctrine, as it has developed, requires a totally different state of mind. It
enables the trade-mark proprietor to protect his mark in cases where the traditional
requirement of likelihood of confusion is absent. It therefore stands in sharp contrast to
the confusion rationale. It recognises a second kind of damage, one that diminishes the
trade mark's ability of functioning as an identification agent, thus protecting mark owners
from a possible diminution in the value of their trade marks.Ï'' Garcia confirms that "the
gravamen of a dilution complaint is that the continuing use of a mark similar to plaintiffs
mark will inevitably have an adverse effect upon the value of plaintiffs mark and that if
he is powerless to prevent such use, the plaintiffs mark will eventually be deprived of all
distinctiveness.v" The dilution doctrine, thus, does not protect the indication of source or
origin of the goods, but rather the distinctive quality or selling power that is embodied in
the mark itself. Protection is given against the detrimental effect to the distinctive
character and unique quality of the mark, which could be caused through the association
between the other sign and the registered trade mark and would weaken the strength of
the registered mark.78 The harm caused by dilution can thus be described as an
undermining of the distinctiveness of a mark and the favourable association that has
accrued as a result of the trade-mark proprietor's commercial success. The mark will no
longer immediately call to mind only the product of the trade-mark proprietor." In this
way the mental image will be blurred. This harm caused by dilution will almost always
be irreparable.l" As the mark weakens, the owner furthermore loses the power to restrain
any but the clearest cases of confusion.8l
"Post sale" confusion exists where the buyer is not confused about the manufacturer or sponsor, but
people seeing the item in the buyer's house, are confused about its source. See Welkowitz (2000) 67.
76 Welkowitz (2000) 67. Although trade marks are intangible assets, they can have enormous, sometimes
even incalculable, value for the proprietor.
77 Garcia (1995) 489-490 quoting from Gilbert/Robinson Inc. v. Carrie Beverage-Missouri Inc., 758
F.Supp. 512 at 527, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d 1481 at 1490 (E.D. Mo. 1991), citing WSM, Inc. v. Hilton, 724 F.2d
1320 at 1332,221 U.S.P.Q. 410 (8th Cir. 1984). See also Callmann (1947) 179.
78 Kamperman Sanders A "Some Frequently Asked Questions about the 1994 UK Trade Marks Act"
(1995) 2 European Intellectual Property Review 70 fn 31. See also Vuk (1998) 890-891.
79 See example given by McCabe (2000) 1829. See also Welkowitz (2000) 67.
80 See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet Inc., 855
F.2d 480 at 485,8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1072 (th Cir. 1988).
81 Harvard note (1964) 187.
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Dilution is thus conceived as a concept completely separate from infringement.
Infringement actions, as described, are based upon the prevention of fraudulent and
deceitful practices. Dilution, in contrast, is rooted in trespass and according to some
authors, makes provision for the protection of property rights, albeit incorporeal. 82
Traditional infringement and dilution hence look to distinct harms to a trademark and can
be pleaded as alternative legal claims. The state of mind required for infringement as
opposed to dilution is also distinct and dissimilar.83 Dilution can in fact only occur when
confusion as to source or origin is absent. If someone is confused, the mark remains the
sole identifier of the senior user's product in his mind. He thus perceives the two marks
as representing the same source. Dilution, on the other hand, occurs when the awareness
that a specific mark signifies a single product from a single source, changes to an
unmistakable awareness that the same mark signifies various things from various
sources.t" It presumes a mental association in a reasonable consumer's mind between the
two parties and their marks, but the association is not so strong as to cause the consumer
to believe the goods are coming from a single source. Or as McCarthy put it "[t]he
relevant public sees the junior user's use, and intuitively knows, because of the context of
the junior user's use, that there is no connection between the owners of the respective
marks.,,85 But the distinctive link between the plaintiffs mark and its goods is blurred,
because the relevant public now also associates that trade mark with a new and different
source. The junior user's use can therefore cause confusion in some people's minds and
at the same time cause dilution in other people's minds. Both perceptions cannot
however occur in one person's mind at the same time."
82 Taviss (1990) 1455; Pattishall (1984) 309; McCarthy (1998) 589; Garcia (1995) 500; Marroletti
(1999) 662. Edgecombe (2002) 1250 explains that dilution emerged from the property model of trade
marks in contrast with infringement which stems from the consumer protection model. Under the
former model the trade-mark owner's (property) right in his mark is violated when another uses the
same or similar mark or does something that damages the uniqueness of the mark, regardless of
consumer confusion.
83 See Voss MS "Ringling Bros-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel
Development & Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc." (2000) 15 Berkeley Technology Law Journal265 at
281; McCabe (2000) 1841; Belongia (2002) 1169.
84 Pattishall (1984) 300, 308.
85 McCarthy (1998) 592, emphasis added; McCarthy (1996) § 24:70.
86 McCabe (2000) 184l. See also the example given in Viacom Inc. v. Ingram Enters., Inc., 141 F.3d 886
at 891 fn 9 (8th Cir 1998).
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It is also important to note that the damage due to dilution, unlike damage due to
confusion, is not immediate. Dilution harm is caused subtly and gradually and has been
described as something like a virus infection or a cancer. If allowed to spread it will
inevitably destroy the distinctiveness of the trade mark, by rendering the mark generic87
or available to common use.88
What the likelihood of confusion and dilution concepts have in common is that both of
them deal with the rather ephemeral "state of mind". This could also contribute to the
confusing opinions regarding the justification for and application of the dilution concept.
Both concepts, as Pattishall explains.i" can relate only to the "state of mind" or
consciousness of the people who come across the infringing mark. He continues:
"Neither tort may be expected to exist in one hundred percent terms. As to those who are
confused, there can be no dilution of distinctiveness of the prior mark because from their
confusion they believe there is only one source. As to those who are not confused, however, the
accused mark is another use, and therefore, the distinctiveness of the prior mark may be diluted by
their awareness of the additional use."
He therefore concludes that it is not so rare to find dilution of the distinctive quality of
the mark in cases where there appears no likelihood of confusion. Although likelihood of
confusion and dilution address different harms, they can nevertheless coexist as legal
findings. It can for example be proved that a significant number of people will be
confused, while simultaneously among a significant number of people that are not
confused, there will be dilution.9o
87 This can happen through non-commercial use of a mark, in for example dictionaries and books. If the
mark becomes generic, the owner will have no protection at all. See Harvard note (1964) 188.
88 Callmann (1947) 179; Vuk (1998) 891; Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][c][i]; Mostert FW "Well-known and
Famous Marks: is Harmony Possible in the Global Village?" (1996) 86 The Trademark Reporter 103 at
141; Lunsford JR "Trademarks: Dilution and Deception" (1973) 63 The Trademark Reporter 41 at 47.
Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid Inc., 319 F.2d 830 at 836 (th Cir. 1963); Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey
Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet Inc., 855 F.2d 480 at 484, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1072 (th
Cir. 1988).
89 Pattishall (1977) 614-615. See also McCarthy's explanation supra, as well as Voss (2000) 281.
90 See the reasoning of McCarthy (1998) 592.
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The careless use of another's trade mark by a third party can also block the trade-mark
proprietor from expanding the use of its mark to other goods." It may well be that the
trade-mark proprietor decides to expand his product range, even to goods that are quite
unrelated to his initial range of products. Use of a mark can also be expanded by trade-
mark licensing, which may then be impeded by dilution. Sometimes a trade-mark
proprietor may even expand his business by acquiring a manufacturer of unrelated
products, which products he then wants to sell under his own trade mark.
3.4 TYPES OF DILUTION
The first and primary theories formulated by the United States courts as to how dilution
occurs, are blurring and tarnishment.Y Later on, the courts also invented other peripheral
theories, named genericisation and disparagement or imitative dilution. Port also
mentions dilution by alteration." Most recently, another type of dilution has received
prominence, namely domain name dilution or cybersquatting.Ï"
91 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[2][a].
92 Vuk (1998) 893; Denicola (1996) 85. See for example also Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor
Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2nd Cir. 1989) at 1031.
93 Port KL "The Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil Law System in the
Making" (2000) 35 Wake Forest Law Review 827 at 879.
94 This is actually a subject on its own and will not be addressed in any detail in this dissertation.
Although some scholars, for example Port (personal comments to the author in May 2000) and McCabe
(2000) 1843, view the relatively recent occurrence of "domain name dilution" as a separate kind of
dilution, others find it preferable to accommodate it under blurring or tarnishment or even imitative
dilution. Domain name dilution, in short, arises when a third party incorporates another person's
famous trade mark into a domain name on the Internet and makes commercial use of it (Gilson (1999) §
5.12[1][c][i]). What most frequently happens, is that customers of the trade-mark proprietor attempt to
use the name in an attempt to find his website. As someone else is using the name for his website, the
name and reputation of the proprietor are placed beyond his control and there is an inherent lessening of
the distinctiveness of the famous mark (Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][ c][i]). See also Panavision Int 'I, L.P. v.
Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316,46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1998) and the Anti-eybersquarting Consumer
Protection Act, Pub L No 106-113, 113 Stat. 1537 (1999) (codified as amended at 15 USC 1125(d)
(1999» or § 43(d) of the Lanham Act. Port (2000) 882 refers to this Act as the Anti-eybersquarting
Trademark Owner Monopoly Act, as it, according to him, protects the trade-mark owner and not the
consumer. See discussion in Port (2000) 882-887.
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3.4.1 BLURRING95
This theory may be referred to as one of the classic or traditional methods of dilution. In
the Mead Data case96 blurring was defined as "the whittling away of an established
trademark's selling power and value through its unauthorized use by others upon
dissimilar products". Dilution by blurring occurs when a distinctive trade mark, or one
similar to it, is used in connection with non-competing goods in such a way that the
uniqueness or distinctiveness of the trade mark and its capacity to identify source is
damaged." In Deere v. MID Products the court described blurring as occurring where
the defendant uses or modifies the plaintiff's trade mark to identify the defendant's goods
and services, with the result that the trade mark loses its ability to serve as a unique
identifier of plaintiff s product." Another way to describe blurring is that it occurs where
a consumer sees a junior user's mark and has a mental association with the senior user,
although he knows that the senior user is not the source of the goods."
In cases of dilution by blurring the consumer thus knows that the senior trade-mark
proprietor did not produce the goods on which the junior user affixed the trade mark, but
on seeing the same or a similar mark on the goods, no longer associates the senior user's
mark with its goods, but instead begins associating both the senior user and the junior
user with the mark.lOo Over time, as the trade mark is used on various goods and
associated with them, the trade mark will no longer serve to ensure a unique association
95 Port (1995) 526 fn 9 uses the term "pure dilution" instead of dilution by blurring.
96 Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1961
(2nd Cir. 1989). See Chapter 4.3.3.1 "Second Circuit Cases" infra for a discussion ofthis case.
97 Horwitz E & Prager EA "What is Dilution and How is it Proved?" (2 December 1996) The New York
Law Journal retrieved from the website http://www.ljextra.com/trademarkldilution.htmlon 21 January
1999, no page numbers provided. See also the definition of Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24, which
corresponds closely to the one of Horwitz & Prager. See also Mostert FW "Trade Mark Dilution and
Confusion of Sponsorship in United States, German and English Law" (1986) 17 International Review
of Industrial Property and Copyright Law 80 at 87; Klieger (1997) 823-827; McCabe (2000) 1842.
98 Deere & Co. v. MTD Prod., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 at 43, U.S.P.Q. 2d 1936 (2nd Cir. 1994), emphasis added.
Although blurring was defined as such in the Deere case, the court found that the facts did not fit in
under blurring. This case actually fits in under "imitative dilution". See Chapter 4.3.3.1 "Second
Circuit Cases" infra for a discussion of the Deere case.
99 Marroletti (1999) 663; McCabe (2000) 1842; Kim (2001) 733.
100 Times Mirror Magazines Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, 212F.3d 157 at 168, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
8553 (3rd Cir 2000).
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of the mark with the senior user's goods and therefore it will become blurred.i'"
Schechter uses the now oft quoted example of ROLLS-ROYCE to illustrate the concept.
If competitors were allowed to use the ROLLS-ROYCE trade mark on any type of goods,
the ROLLS-ROYCE trade mark would be lost, because the association between the trade
mark and the ROLLS-ROYCE car would be blurred.l'" Other oft-quoted examples of
blurring are DUPONT shoes, BUICK aspirin, SCHLITZ varnish, KODAK pianos and
BULOVA gowns.l'"
Some casesl04 in which blurring was found to have occurred are Mead Data Central, Inc.
v. Toyota Motor Sales, USA., Inc.,105where the court found that LEXUS for cars does
not blur LEXIS for computer software; Mclionald's Corporation v. Mcliagel's, Inc./06
where it was decided that McBAGELS for bagels blurs McDONALD's trade marks and
Hyatt Corporation v. Hyatt Legal Servicesl'" where HYATT, originally used in respect
of plaintiffs hotel chain was prohibited in respect of defendant's legal services chain.
101 Mostert (1986 IIC) 88. Jacoby J "The Psychological Foundations of Trademark Law: Secondary
meaning, Genericism, Fame, Confusion and Dilution" (200 1) 91 The Trademark Reporter 1013 at
1046-1047 uses the example of ROLEX to demonstrate this point. Consumers who know the famous
trade mark, ROLEX, form a particular cognitive network when hearing the name. They think of high
quality, high performance, luxury watches, which convey a certain status to the wearer. A second
comer starts to use the name ROLEX on vacuum cleaners. The consumers are not confused, but now
possess two cognitive networks for the same mark. From now on there will be a "blurring of the mental
associations evoked by the mark". The ability of the mark to "uniquely evoke the cognitive network
originally associated with that mark has been whittled away or diluted".
102 Quoted in Vuk (1998) 894 and Martino (1996) 28: "If you take Rolls Royce - for instance, if you allow
Rolls Royce restaurants and Rolls Royce cafeterias, and Rolls Royce pants, and Rolls Royce candy, in
lO years you will not have the Rolls Royce mark any more." Schechter used this example in an address
to the Congressional Committee on Patents in 1932 to convince them to recognise the concept of
dilution.
103 Voss (2000) 269.
104 Cases decided under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 in which there were signs of blurring,
are discussed in Chapter 4.10.6 "Cases on Blurring" infra.
105 Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc.,87S F.2d 1026,1032, lO U.S.P.Q.2d 1961
(2nd Cir. 1989). See Chapter 4.3.3.1 "Second Circuit Cases" infra for a discussion of this case.
106 McDonald's Corporation v. McBagel's, Inc., 649 F.Supp. 1268, I U.S.P.Q.2d 1761 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
See Chapter 4.3.3.1 "Second Circuit Cases" infra.
107 Hyatt Corporation v. Hyatt Legal Services, 736 F.2d 1153,222 U.S.P.Q.2d 669 (7th Cir. 1984). For a
discussion see Chapter 4.3.3.2 "Seventh Circuit Cases" infra.
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3.4.2 TARNISHMENT108
Just as the distinctiveness of a trade mark is protected by the blurring theory of dilution,
the quality associations that consumers have for a trade mark, is protected by the
tarnishment theory.l'" While blurring focuses on associations between the two marks,
. h c hl· f h .. 110tarrus ment rocuses on t e eva uatrve aspect 0 t ose assocrations. A further
distinction is that blurring focuses on the quantity and strength of associations and
tarnishment on the quality of the associations of the plaintiff's mark.
The following definitions of tarnishment have been given. McCarthy describes
tarnishment as degrading positive associations of a mark, which in that way dilutes the
distinctive quality of the mark. I II In the Deere case, dilution by tarnishment is described
as occurring where the plaintiff's trade mark is linked to products of shoddy quality, or is
portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context, which will give rise to unflattering
thoughts about the plaintiff's prodUCt.112 It can also be described as detraction from the
trade-mark proprietor's goodwill due to the use of the trade mark on products produced
by an infringer whose goods cause public dissatisfaction, which is then held against the
trade-mark proprietor.i" In all these cases consumers are led to see the senior trade mark
in an unflattering way and thus the senior trade mark's reputation and commercial value
are diminished. Consumers will now associate the lack of quality or lack or prestige of
108 Klieger (1997) 828 also refers to the term "evaluation dilution" as a synonym for tamishment.
109 Vuk (1998) 895; Harvard note (1964) 186; Marroletti (1999) 664; Kim (200 I) 731-732.
110 Jacoby (2001) 1050-1052.
III McCarthy (1998) 593. See also Triomed (Ply) Ltdv Beecham Group pic [2001] 2 All SA 126 (T) 155;
2001 2 SA 522 (T) 557C where the court stated that "[t]amishing occurs where unfavourable
associations are created between the well-known registered trade mark and the mark of the defendant".
The court went on to say "[i]t is an impairment of the well-known mark's capacity to stimulate the
desire to buy". See also SAB International tla Sabmark International v Laugh It Off Promotions [2003]
2 All SA 454 (C); Laugh lt Off Promotions CC v SA Breweries International (Finance) BV tla Sabmark
International [2004] 4 All SA 151 (SCA); Mostert (1986 lIC) 89; Martino (1996) 60; Port (2000) 879.
112 Deere & Co v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 at 43, U.S.P.Q.2d 1936 (2nd Cir. 1994). See also Hormei
Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prod., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1516 (2nd Cir. 1996) at 507, also
referred to as the SPAM case. The court held in this case that there was no dilution through blurring or
tamishment of appellant's mark SPAM for luncheon meat by respondent's intended use of a character
named "Spa-am" on merchandise related to respondent's film "Muppet Treasure Island". Gilson (1999)
§ 5.12[1 ][f][iv]. See Chapter 4.3.3.1 "Second Circuit Cases" infra for a discussion of both cases.
113 Tiffany & Co. v. Boston Club, Inc., 231 F.Supp. 836 at 844; 1964 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9081; 143 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 2 (D.Mass. 1964).
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the defendant's goods with the plaintiffs unrelated goods. In the Clinique casel14 the
court also indicated that tarnishment would take place where the defendant was
attempting to associate the plaintiffs products with obscenity or sexual or illegal activity.
Unlike blurring, tarnishment can also take place when the mark is used to "refer back" to
the trade-mark proprietor in the course of commentary, criticism or parody. This
however raises substantial constitutional and public policy issues.lls
Certainly the most well-known case of tarnishment is the one of Coca-Cola Co. v.
Gemini Rising, Inc., 116 where the court had enjoined the use of the slogan ENJOY
COCAINE in the same colour and script as the famous, registered ENJOY COCA-COLA
trademarked slogan. Another example is the one where the court ruled against the use of
the slogan WHERE THERE's LIFE ... THERE's BUGS.ll7 The defendant used this
slogan in the sale of a combined floor wax and insecticide. The successful plaintiff was
the proprietor of the slogan WHERE THERE's LIFE ... THERE's BUD, which was used
in the sale of BUDWEISER beer. The trial court, which granted a permanent injunction,
stated that "the association of bugs with BUD or BUDWEISER is sufficient to merit the
apprehension that the ill repute of one type of goods is likely to be visited upon the
other".l18 Editorial or artistic parodies of famous trade marks are today frequently
allowed, but the First Amendment is less protective of parodies that identify a
commercial product, such as clothing.i'" Another example of tarnishment is to be found
in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, ua'" Cases decided under
114 Clinique Laboratories, Inc., v. Dep Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) at 562. See Chapter 4 fn
554.
115 See Denicola (1996) 86 and the cases discussed there. This paragraph refers specifically to First
Amendment Rights under the United States Constitution. See also Chapter 4.7.3 "Exceptions to
Liability under the Act" infra.
116 Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F.Supp. 1183, 175 U.S.P.Q. 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1972); Martino
(1996) 61.
117 Chemical Corporation of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433,134 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 524, 2
ALR. 3d 739 (s" Cir. 1962).
118 Chemical Corporation of America v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 306 F.2d 433 at 435,134 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
524,2 A.L.R. 3d 739 (5th Cir. 1962). This was endorsed by the court of appeal.
119 McCabe (2000) 1843 fn 116; Gilson (1999) § 5.12[I][c][i]. See also Chapter 4.7.3 "Exceptions to
Liability under the Act" infra.
120 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd. 604 F.2d 200, 203 U.S.P.Q. 161 (2nd Cir.
1979). In this case there was pornographic use of the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleading costumes. This is
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the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 in which there were signs oftamishment, are
discussed infra.121
Some commentators, however, strongly feel that tarnishment "cannot logically be
classified as trademark dilution".122 The reason given is that the harm caused by
tamishment is much more immediate and the injury to the senior mark is almost direct, in
contrast to the "gradual whittling away" of the selling power of the mark envisaged by
the dilution definition.
3.4.3 GENERICISMIGENERICISATION123
A generic term is considered to be inherently non-distinctive and for that reason can
never function as a trade mark.124 Generic marks are descriptive terms used to name a
class, category or genus of products or services of which the particular product is a
species. Therefore they are incapable of identifying the originator or even source of the
goods.125 Moreover, trade marks can become generic when they lose their distinctive
character or source-related associative significance. This change in status is known as
one of the strongest cases of tarnishment as there is a special threat to the good name and goodwill of
the true owner. See Chapter 4A "Federal Dilution Protection before the Federal Act" infra for the
discussion of this case.
121 See Chapter 4.10.7 "Cases on Tarnishment" infra. These cases are Anheuser-Busch, Inc., v. Andy's
Sportswear, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1542 (N.D. Cal. 1996) [BUDWEISERJBUTTWISER); Hasbro, Inc. v.
Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1479 (W.D. Wash. 1996) [CANDY
LAND/CANDYLAND); Toys "R" Us v. Akkaoui 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17090, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1836 (N.D. Cal. 1996) [TOYS "R" US/ADULTS "R" US).
122 Klieger (1997) 830-83l.
123 Some commentators classify "use of a trade mark in a generic sense" under blurring (Webster & Page
(1997) par 12.24; Mostert (198611C) 88), but in this dissertation it will be discussed as a separate form
of dilution.. Martino (1996) 57 also refers to the terms "genericide", "generization" and
"trademarkicide" as synonyms for genericism. See Martino (1996) 57 fn 7 for the abundant literature
on this subject.
124 The terms "generic" and "trade mark" are mutually exclusive. See McCarthy (1996) Chapter 12
"Generic Terms" for a detailed discussion of this subject. See also Landes WM & Posner RA
"Trademark Law: An Economic Perspective" (1987) 30 Journal of Law and Economics 291-296.
Webster & Page (1997) par 13.17.3 state that distinctiveness is the very essence of a trade mark. S
10(2)(c) of the South African Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 states that a mark which "consists
exclusively of a sign or an indication which has become customary in the current language or in the
bonafide and established practices of the trade" shall not be registered or if registered, shall be liable to
be removed from the register. See also Webster & Page (1997) par 13.17A.
12S Port KL "The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability" (1993) 26 Indiana Law Review 519 at 529.
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genericide or genericisation.l'" The key determinant of genericisation in the United
States is consumer perception. In the United Kingdom the test is more objective, namely
the mark must have "become the common name in the trade for a product or service for
which it is registered" and the mark's decline must be "in consequence of acts or
inactivity on the part of the proprietor" of the mark.127 Webster and Page refer to an old
English case in which it was said that if the mark has come to be so public and in such
universal use that nobody can be deceived by the use of it, it has become generic.128
Trade-mark genericisation can occur when a competitor uses a trade mark in a way that
encourages the public to view the mark as a product type and not as a source indicator or
identifier.129 It can also happen where other people use the trade mark in relation to the
same goods as those of the proprietor.P'' or when it is used generically by newspapers,
magazines, dictionaries and similar publications.i" Trade-mark owners are themselves
often to blame.l " If a trade mark is repeatedly used in this way, its ability to distinguish
the proprietor's goods is weakened and in the end it loses its distinguishing function. The
trade mark becomes generic and the trade-mark proprietor loses all legal protection. Use
of a trade mark in a generic sense is sometimes also considered as dilution by blurring.133
Well-known examples of famous marks that have become generic in this way are lite for
beer, shredded wheat, thermos, 134 yo-yo, aspirin, elevator, linoleum and cellophane.
The test is whether the primary significance of the mark identifies the producer or the
product. If the mark identifies the product, rather than the producer, it has become
126 See Carter SL "Does it Matter Whether Intellectual Property is Property?" (1993) 68 Chicago-Kent Law
Review 715 at 722. Carter argues that if trade marks are seen as property, the public would have to
compensate the trade mark proprietor (in cash) if they use his trade mark in a generic sense. This seems
to be fair as the only reason for the generic use of a trade mark normally is linguistic convenience.
127 Martino (1996) 117; Trade Marks Act of 1994 s 46(1 )(c), emphasis added.
128 Webster & Page (1997) par 13.17.4.2, referring to the case of Ford v. Foster (1872) LR 7 Ch 611 at
628.
129 Vuk (1998) 896-897. Use of a trade mark in a generic sense would typically be in relation to competing
goods. See Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24.
130 Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24.
131 Mostert (1986/IC) 88.
132 Martino (1996) 59.
133 Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24; Mostert (1986 1IC) 89.
134 Lunsford JR "Consumers and Trademarks: The Function of Trademarks in the Marketplace" (1974) 64
The Trademark Reporter 75 at 82-83.
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generic.l " Any competitor may then freely use the mark. It is presumed that the public
then owns the term and it can never function as a trade mark again. There is however a
historical exception. In 1896 the mark SINGER for sewing machines was found to be
generic.v" Singer however continued its use and in 1953 it was found to be a distinctive
mark again, after establishing a new secondary meaning t~rough use.
This issue came to court in a recent decision of the Seventh Circuit in Ty Inc v. Ruth
PerrymanP' Perryman sells second-hand Beanie Babies, most of them manufactured by
Ty through a website named www.bargainbeanies.com. Ty manufactures bean-filled
toys and owns the trade marks BEANIES and BEANIE BABIES. Ty issued proceedings
against Perryman claiming dilution of its rights in the BEANIE and BEANIES trade
marks. The court found that being descriptive names, the trade marks would easily
become generic names, in particular since the word "beanies" is catchier than "bean bag
stuffed animals" or "bean bag toys". The court decided that it is against the public
interest to use dilution laws to prevent commercial uses of a trade mark which would
accelerate its transition from trade mark to generic name. The court thus refused to
extend the principle of dilution to prevent the BEANIE trade marks from becoming
generic.
3.4.4 DISPARAGEMENT OR IMITATIVE DILUTION138
According to Vuk, trade mark disparagement occurs when a junior user alters a senior
user's mark in such a way as to mock or denigrate it. He gives the example where an
advertiser mocks a widely recognised mark of another product to promote a different
product.F" This is not the same as the use of another person's unaltered trade mark in
135 Port KL "Foreword: Symposium on Intellectual Property Law Theory" (1993) 68 Chicago-Kent Law
Review 585 at 596-597; Port (1993/ndiana LR) 530; Lunsford (1974) 82.
136 See Port (1993 Chicago-Kent LR) 597 fn 85.
137 Ty Inc. v. Ruth Perryman, Case No. 02-1771 er: Cir. 2002). See the discussion in Albertini L
"Contradictory Decisions? Dilution issues compared in US and UK cases" (December/January 2003)
Trademark World 23-25.
138 So called by Port (personal comments to the author in May 2000). Port only recognises three types of
dilution: blurring, tarnishment and imitative dilution.
139 Vuk (1998) 896.
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comparative advertising or even the use of a mark in parody, which might both be
allowed. The best example of disparagement in case law, is probably the Deere case.140
An altered version of a competitor's trade mark was used to identify this competitor in a
comparative advertisement. The court found that there was neither blurring nor
tamishment, but that "the blurring/tamishment dichotomy does not necessarily represent
the full range of uses that can dilute a mark ... ".141 Although the court found that there
was dilution of the DEERE logo, it did not specifically mention disparagement either.142
3.4.5 ALTERATION
Dilution by alteration occurs where one entity in the process of comparative advertising
alters the trade mark of another and presents it to consumers in that altered form, whether
or not it is coupled with the intention to tamish.143
3.5 THE DILUTION DEBATE
There is still a debate amongst legal scholars and judges on whether trade marks deserve
protection against unauthorised uses that cause dilution of the distinctive character and
reputation of the trade mark in the absence of a likelihood of confusion. Those against
protecting trade marks from uses that cause dilution, the so-called restrictionists, mainly
fear that dilution protection will give the proprietor of the trade mark a monopoly in
words.!" They also feel that dilution does not address a real injury to trade marks. Some
of them also argue that the only function of trade marks is still the designation of origin.
Welkowitz, for example, contends that dilution is based on "tenuous assumptions and
represents an unnecessary extension of traditional trademark law" .145 Those in favour of
dilution protection rely heavily for the basis of their arguments on the expanded functions
140 See Vuk (1998) 896.
141 Deere & Co v.MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39 at 44, U.S.P.Q.2d 1936 (2nd Cir. 1994).
142 See Chapter 4.3.3.1 "Second Circuit Cases" infra for a more detailed discussion of this case.
143 Port (2000) 879 is the only commentator that refers to alteration dilution. He mentions the Deere case
as example.
144 See Lee (2002) 697-700.
145 Welkowitz (2000) 67 fn 15.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
63
of trade marks. Other arguments advanced by them are that dilution damages trade
marks and that the policies underlying trade-mark law call for protection against dilution.
For one commentator the only real issue is however whether one perceives trade marks as
property or not. These arguments are now discussed in more detail.
3.5.1 ARGUMENTS AGAINST OFFERING TRADE MARKS DILUTION
PROTECTION
3.5.1.1 THE FEAR OF MONOPOLY
Critics of dilution are concerned that protection against dilution will afford the trade-
mark proprietor a monopoly in the language comprising the trade mark.146 They believe
that trade-mark proprietors will be getting exclusive use of their trade marks and that this
will prevent others from entering the marketplace. Communication of useful information
by other sellers in the marketplace can also be inhibited.147 As a result effective
competition will be curtailed. This fear of monopolisation was one of the most important
influences of the depression era. Patti shall noted that a "considerable reticence toward
granting anyone anything that remotely resembles a monopoly" was established in trade
mark and related fields of law.148 Courts are also reluctant to stretch the dilution doctrine
too far through fear of monopolisation. This led to limitations imposed by courts, such as
requiring actual dilution in order to succeed with a dilution c1aim.149
Also in South Africa there is fear that provisions against dilution will inhibit the free
market econorny.P" Wheeldon argues that a free market economy depends on freedom
of competition and is hostile to monopolies. Monopolies stifle competition and
146 Middleton (1952) 175; Port (1995) 552, 556; Carty H "Do Marks with a Reputation Merit Special
Protection?" (1997) 12 European Intellectual Property Review 684 at 688. See also Schechter (1927)
833; Vuk (1998) 921; McCabe (2000) 1833 and Wheeldon (lecture notes) 14-15.
147 Denicola (1996) 80.
148 Pattishall (1963) 606. Pattishall is one ofthe proponents of dilution. His views are seriously criticised
by Port (1995) 552-553.
149 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development 449,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4179, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065 (4th Cir. 1999). See Chapter 4.10.4 "Likelihood of
Dilution vs Actual Dilution" infra.
150 See Wheeldon (lecture notes) 1, 14-15.
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competition is for the benefit of both the consumer and the economy as a whole. But the
monopoly acquired by a trade-mark proprietor in terms of the registration of his mark is
traditionally limited in several ways. For example, registration can only be obtained for
the goods in relation to which he traded. It must furthermore be remembered that it is not
the mark per se that is protected, but the advertising value or selling power of the trade
mark.151 This advertising value or selling power is normally the result of an extensive
advertising effort.
3.5.1.2 FUNCTION HAS NOT EXPANDED
Many critics of dilution also argue that the sole function of trade marks is still that of
designating the source of origin of the goodS.152 This function is not adversely affected
by dilution and is adequately protected by the confusion doctrine. Therefore these critics
contend that dilution protection is not necessary.153 The English Chancery Division in
the Wagamama decision also rejected the notion that trade marks now serve as
advertising commodities.154
3.5.1.3 NO REAL INJURY
The third argument of critics of the dilution theory is that dilution does not address a real
injury, as no mark has ever actually, quantitatively been established to have been
diluted.155 They also believe that dilution does not actually damage a trade mark.156 If
151 Rutherford BR "Misappropriation of the Advertising Value of Trade Marks, Trade Names and Service
Marks" (1990) 2 SA Mere LJ 152. See also Chapter 2.4 "Advertising Function" supra.
152 See Michaels A "Confusion in and about Section 5(3) and 10(3) of the Trade Marks Act 1994" (2000)
European Intellectual Property Review 335 at 336 who states that "the essence of trade mark protection
is to protect the function of the trade mark as an indication of trade origin". At 339 she refers again to
the "central function of a trade mark, namely to indicate or guarantee origin".
153 See the discussion by Vuk (1998) 921.
154 Wagamama Ltd v. City Centre Restaurants pic [1995] F.S.R. 713; [1996] E.T.M.R. 23. For a
discussion of the case see Chapter 5.7.2.3 "Cases on Section 10(2)" infra.
155 See Port (1995) 538 who contends that the saying "a remedy without a wrong" is applicable to dilution
legislation. Vuk (1998) 921 also mentions that there are scholars who think that dilution does not
address a real injury.
156 Moskin JE "Dilution or Delusion: The Rational Limits of Trademark Protection" (1993) 83 The
Trademark Reporter 122 at 130-133; Welkowitz DS "Re-examining Trade Mark Dilution" (1991) 44
Vanderbilt Law Review 531 at 533.
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there is damage, they believe that it is only momentary and therefore dilution protection
is still inappropriate.Y' They also criticise the metaphors used to describe how dilution
damages a trade mark and stress the lack of empirical proof and support for actual
dilution.158 Port, for example, states that "no mark has ever actually and quantitatively
been established to have been diluted".159
3.5.1.4 TRADE-MARK POLICIESl6o
The main policies generally mentioned as underlying the protection of trade marks are
the protection of the goodwill of the trade-mark proprietor, the protection of the
corresponding right of consumers to be free from confusion and deception and the
ensuring of free market access for third party competitors.l'" The principle of dilution,
however, stands in sharp contrast with this as it protects only the private interest of the
proprietor of a distinctive and famous trade mark and there seems to be no identifiable
benefit to the public.162 Carty, for example, notes that to protect the value of the mark in
itself "writes out the public interest as part of the equation and could arguably work
against the public interest".163 Garcia also recognises this phenomenon, but her criticism
is more muted. She sees dilution protection as deriving "less from a desire to protect
consumer interests that an effort to protect the selling power of the owner's mark".164
This was also echoed in the case of Ameritech v. American Information Technologies.P"
when interpreting the Ohio common-law dilution doctrine. The court explained that
"[r]ather than focusing on consumer confusion, the dilution theory seeks to protect the
senior user's interests in the trademark".
157 Moskin (1993) 130-133; Welkowitz (1991) 531, 538-43.
158 See Vuk (1998) 922.
159 Port (1995) 538.
160 Policies underlying trade-mark law are also used by people arguing in favour of dilution protection.
See Chapter 3.5.2.3 "Policies Underlying Trade-mark Law" infra.
161 Port (2000) 896-897.
162 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][a]; Mostert (1986 IIC) 90; Port (2000) 897, 910.
163 Carty (1997) 688.
164 Garcia (1995) 490.
165 Ameritech, Inc. v. American Information Technologies Corp., Inc., 811 F.2d 960 at 965, 1987 U.S. App.
LEXlS 2243,1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1861 (6th Cir. 1987).
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Bringing in another angle, Handler comments that the dilution theory strongly enhances
the rights of plaintiffs, but fails to consider the rights of defendants. This approach, he
says, runs contrary to the historical purposes of trade-mark law, which weight the rights
of both parties.l'"
3.5.1.5 ADEQUATE PROTECTION
In South Africa some opponents of the dilution provisions argued that the 1963 Act
provided adequate protection under section 44(1)(b) and section 53, which made
defensive registrations possible. The other alternative they believe in is the common-law
remedy of passing off.167
3.5.1.6 CREATING A COPYRIGHT IN A TRADE MARK
Middelton argues that in granting statutory rights to a trade-mark holder to prevent a third
party's di lution of the mark essentially creates a copyright in the trade mark.168 Port goes
even further and claims that dilution also grants a copyright in the idea of the trade mark
in the minds of consumers.P" However, copyright law does not protect ideas, only the
expression of the idea in tangible form. This is known as the idea/expression dichotomy,
which is therefore violated by the dilution theory.
166 Handler MW "Are the state anti-dilution laws compatible with the national protection of trademarks?"
(1985) 75 The Trademark Reporter 269 at 282.
167 Compare Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24.
168 Middleton (1952) 178-179; Middleton (1957) 1032. Middleton (1957) 1031 further argues that
dilution is not a trade-mark tort, because in the contemplation of trade-mark law the trade is more
important than the mark, while the dilutionists "exalt the mark above the trade".
169 Port (1995) 573.
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3.5.2 ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF OFFERING TRADE MARKS DILUTION
PROTECTION
3.5.2.1 EXPANDED FUNCTIONS OF TRADE MARKS
The first argument in support of the protection of trade marks against dilution is that the
socio-economic functions of trade marks have expanded and that trade marks now inter
alia serve as advertising agents.170 One of the first persons noting this expansion of
functions was Schechter. He was of the opinion that trade marks are more than just
indicators of source. He argued that the primary function of a trade mark is to serve as a
marketing or advertising tool.171 Some people also refer to this function as a trade mark's
commercial magnetism'F or the trade mark's selling powerl73 or even the promotional
aura of the mark.174 The trade mark can only perform this function properly if it is
unique to a single proprietor.i/'' The use of a trade mark as an advertising agent
constantly promotes the trade-mark name amongst the public. This drawing power of the
trade mark stimulates consumers to purchase certain goods, thus building up goodwill.l "
This goodwill can have great value for the proprietor of a mark. When one allows the use
of the same or a similar trade mark on different products, it will result in a loss or
diminution of this goodwill. The reason is that people will no longer associate the trade
mark with a single product. On the other hand, protection of goodwill will encourage
investment in this valuable asset of the trade-mark proprietor.177 This expanded
advertising function is also recognised under Benelux trade-mark law.178 Schechter
moreover contends that a mental association is formed between the trade mark and the
170 Vuk (1998) 917, 924-925. See Chapter 2 "The Socio-Economic Functions of Trade Marks" supra for a
detailed discussion on the functions of trade marks and for additional references.
171 Schechter (1927) 818-819.
172 Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter in Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Manufacturing Co. v. s.s. Kresge
Co., 316 U.S. 203 at 205,62 S. Ct. 1022,86 L. Ed. 1381,53 U.S.P.Q. 323 (1942), thereby recognising
the expanded advertising function of a trade mark. See also Mostert (1986 IlC) 91.
173 Kamperman Sanders A & Maniatis SM "A Consumer Trade Mark: Protection Based on Origin and
Quality" (1993) II European Intellectual Property Review 406 at 411.
174 Carty (1997) 687.
175 Kamperman Sanders & Maniatis (1993) 411.
176 Vuk (1998) 918.
177 Denicola (1996) 80.
178 See the discussion in Chapter 5.7 "Benelux Law" infra.
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product by consumers. The confusion doctrine, traditionally used as the rationale for
trade-mark protection, does not protect the expanded advertising function of a trade mark
or this psychological association referred to above.179
3.5.2.2 DILUTION DAMAGES TRADE MARKS
The second argument is that dilution damages a trade mark by diminishing the trade
mark's ability to identify the source of the goods bearing the trade mark. Dilution
primarily damages the mental association that consumers have with respect to a trade
mark and that could lead to a decrease in sales. Swann and Davisl80 aver that the damage
suffered from confusion caused by an infringing mark is usually restricted to one
immediate sale, while the damage caused by a negative association distorts the image that
purchasers have towards the trade mark and this can result in a permanent loss of sales.
Damage to a trade mark due to dilution is thus far more severe than damage to a trade
mark due to confusion.l'" Vuk quotes the example of the Coca-Cola Company. They
would suffer less economic damage from an occasional consumer who mistakenly buys a
can of Pepsi instead of Coke, than having the consumer associate Coke with cocaine. In
the case of Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc.182 a poster manufacturer started to sell
posters with the phrase "Enjoy Cocaine" on it, written in the same colours and stylised
script as the trade mark "Enjoy Coca-Cola". The Court recognised that the negative
association in the mind of consumers would damage the selling power of the Coca-Cola
trade mark. Other United States courts also accepted that dilution damages a trade
179 Schechter (1927) 822.
180 Swann JE & Davis TH "Dilution, an Idea Whose Time has Gone; Brand Equity as Protectabie Property,
the New/Old Paradigm" (1994) 84 The Trademark Reporter 267at 274.
181 Vuk (1998) 919.
182 Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc. 346 F.Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). See Chapter 3.4.2
"Tarnishment" supra.
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mark.183 This damage is moreover recognised by legal scholars and legislators.l'"
3.5.2.3 POLICIES UNDERLYING TRADE-MARK LAW 185
In trade-mark law there are also underlying policies that support the protection of trade
marks from dilution.186 One of the central policies for protecting trade marks is the
protection of the goodwill which trade-mark proprietors create through the use of the
trade mark. This goodwill can also be damaged by uses of the trade mark that do not
cause confusion. Examples of this type of damaging use are parodies involving a trade
markl87 and production of non-similar products of bad quality.188 Dilution protection
also prevents free-riding by people who attempt to gain an advantage from another's
trade mark without paying anything for this advantage.l'" Rutherford, from a South
African perspective, also describes the reason and basis for protection against dilution in
terms of this policy:190
"The preservation of the reputation and unique identity of the trade mark and the selling power
which it evokes is of vital importance to the trade-mark proprietor to protect and retain his
goodwill. Other traders will frequently wish to exploit the selling power of an established trade
mark for the purpose of promoting their own products. The greater the advertising value of the
183 American Express Co. v. Vibra Approved Labs. Corp., 10 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 2006 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) at
2013 found that the reputation of American Express might be tarnished by a novelty credit card, similar
to its credit card, with a condom attached to it. Ringling Bros-Bamum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc.
v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet, 855 F.2d 480, 482-485 (th Cir. 1988) held that an advertisement of a
used car dealer using the slogan "The Greatest Car Show on Earth" tarnished the slogan "The Greatest
Show on Earth" the trade mark of the well-known Ringling Brothers' circus.
184 See for example Horwitz & Prager (1996) no page numbers provided; the Uniform Benelux Trade
Mark Act art. 13A(2) in Chapter 5.7.1.5 "Section 13A(2) of the Uniformed Benelux Trade Mark Act"
infra and the Lanham Act in § 43(c) in Chapter 4.7 "The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995"
infra.
185 The protection of goodwill, the prevention of confusion of the public and the protection of competition
are mentioned as policies underlying trade mark law.
186 Vuk (1998) 920; Mostert (1986 IIC) 93 fn 60.
187 See Baywatch Productions Co. Inc. v. Home Video Channel Ltd [1997] F.S.R. 22 discussed in Chapter
5.7.2.4 "Cases on Section 10(3)" infra and Deere & Co. v. MTD Prod., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, U.S.P.Q. 2d
1936 (2nd Cir. 1994) discussed in Chapter 4.3.3.1 "Second Circuit Cases" infra.
188 Vuk (1998) 923.
189 Vuk (1998) 881.
190 Rutherford BR "Misappropriation of the Advertising Value of Trade Marks, Trade Names and Service
Marks" (1990) 2 SA Mere U 151 at 152. See also Ginsburg in Visser C The New Law of Trade Marks
and Designs (1995) Juta & Co Ltd Kenwyn 36.
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trade mark, the greater the risk of misappropriation. Any unauthorized use of the trade mark by
other traders will lead to the gradual consumer disassociation of the trade mark from the
proprietor's product. The more the trade mark is used in relation to the products of others, the less
likely it is to focus attention on the proprietor's product. The reputation and unique identity of the
trade mark will become blurred. The selling power becomes eroded and the trade mark becomes
diluted."
The policies of protecting interbrand competition and preventing monopolies also support
the provision of dilution protection for trade marks.!" Such protection does not frustrate
interbrand competition or give a monopoly to the trade-mark proprietor.Y' The
advertising function, protected by a dilution claim, is a particularly important instrument
which promotes competition and specifically quality competition.l'" The trade-mark
proprietor only gets protection for a valuable asset that has been created by the
proprietor's ingenuity and the merit of the owned goods. This limited "monopoly"
cannot affect legitimate competition.!" A competitor does not require the use of another
competitor's trade mark to compete effectively.l " There are also other aspects of trade-
mark law, such as requirements for registration and the concept of genericism that make
it impossible for people to register words and phrases that are necessary for the
promotion of effective competition, as trade marks.!"
Another important policy in trade-mark law is the protection of consumers from
confusion. It is often said by scholars arguing against dilution that protection against
dilution is only for the benefit of the private interest of the trade-mark proprietor.l'" This
was put into perspective by the Court of Appeal (Seventh Circuit) in Hyatt Corporation
v. Hyatt Legal Services.198 The court granted an injunction which prohibited Hyatt Legal
191 Vuk (1998) 923-924.
192 Rose SA "Will Atlas shrug? Dilution Protection for 'Famous' Trademarks: Anti-Competitive
'Monopoly' or Earned 'Property' Right? (1995) 47 Florida Law Review 653 at 707-708.
193 Mostert (1986 IIC) 93 fn 60.
194 Schechter (1927) 833.
195 Think for example of the trade marks COKE and PEPSI.
196 See Vuk (1998) 924.
197 See, for example, Port (1995) 526-527 who says that giving protection against dilution would "shift the
balance of protection of interests strongly in favor of the trademark holder at the expense of the
consumer and uninvolved third parties".
198 Hyatt Corporation v. Hyatt Legal Services 736 F.2d 1153 at 1159,222 U.S.P.Q.2d 669 (7th Cir. 1984).
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Services from using the registered service mark, HYATT, of the Hyatt hotel group in
order to prevent further dilution of the mark. The court said that this injunction would
not operate against the public interest. It held moreover that the public has "an interest in
the protection of trademarks and trade names".
3.5.2.4 TRADE MARKS THAT CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT OF CONFUSION
Another reason mentioned by Vuk in favour of protection against dilution is that certain
trade marks are able to become so powerful and well-known that the possibility of
confusion is minimal in the extreme.199 The examples used are McDonalds and Coca-
Cola. Although people will not think that a blue car with the name COKE on it comes
from the Coca-Cola Company, it will cause a subconscious association between the car
and the Coca-Cola Company. If the car is of inferior quality, this will indirectly lead to
the loss of some goodwill for the Coca-Cola Company.
3.5.3 ROLE OF THE STATUS OF THE TRADE-MARK PROPRIETOR'S
RIGHT IN THE DILUTION DEBATE
The question whether trade marks give property rights200 to their proprietors has been one
of the most keenly debated questions in the law of trade marks.i'" The reason for its
importance is that the answer to this question will arguably determine how far and how
wide the protection against infringement should stretch. The answer is especially
relevant in the context of non-competing goods, as an action based on the common law of
unfair competition is impossible, due to the fact that there is no cornpetition.Y' Should
statutory protection cover these cases?
Perhaps one should first identify what the term "property" really contemplates. Carter,
writing from an American perspective, sees property as "only a legal conclusion". He
199 Vuk (1998) 925.
200 As in the case of tangible goods.
201 See Carter SL "The Trouble with Trademark" (1990) 99 Yale Law Journal 759; Carter (1993) 715.
202 See Callmann (1947) 175-194. His views are discussed infra.
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then continues by saying that "[i]n theory, the term does not refer to any object or to any
necessary set of legal rights that always inheres in a property relationship", but rather
"refers to a bundle of rights - rights that define, singly or collectively, the relationship of
an individual to a resource".203 According to Carter, there are actually two different ways
in which to look at property. The legal theorist will, by using the term "property", mean
"the relevant set of legal relations". To the layperson "property" refers to a thing which
implies one owner.204 There is, however, according to Carter, "no ordinary conversation"
about intellectual property, which causes many problems.t'" Port defines the term
"property" as used by courts and laypersons as "a tangible object from which the owner
has rights to exclude others"_2°6 Intangibles were initially not considered property, but
became recognised as property because they demonstrate some of the classical incidents
of ownership. This is according to Port true of copyrights and of patents, whose owners
enjoy the "bundle of rights" notion of property, but not of trade marks. Trade-mark
holders, according to Port, possess only the right to exclude others from using the mark in
the same sphere of interest.i'" Another perspective comes from Landes and Posner who
describe a property right as "a legally enforceable power to exclude others from using a
resource, without need to contract with them,,.208
The way in which Schechter proposed the dilution theory creates a property right "in
gross,,209 in unique or coined marks. This is because the use of all marks in a way, which
reduces the uniqueness of these marks, even in the absence of any other type of harm,
would be prohibited.i" Port sees this concept of dilution as "revolutionary". This is in
the light of the fact that the common law of trade marks only grants protection to the
203 Carter (1993) 716.
204 Carter (1993) 716. The term "conversational habit" is also used to refer to this "ordinary way" in which
most people see property: If someone is the owner, he has a nearly absolute right to exclude other.
205 See Carter (1993) 717-718.
206 Port (1993 Indiana LR) 552.
207 Port (1993 Indiana LR) 553, 561-562.
208 Landes & Posner (I 987) 266.
209 This means that a property right vests in the proprietor of the mark solely on the basis that the mark is
unique or coined and irrespective of whether or not the mark was used in fact.
210 Seitz (1999) lIS; Klieger(I997)811,817.
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extent that the marks are used on goods and services." I It is thus against the common
law of the United States and England to speak of trade marks as property.212 Trade-mark
law developed from unfair competition, which in tum developed from the tort of fraud
and deceit.213 lts general concern is to protect consumers from confusion as to source.i'"
Therefore, trade-mark infringement is, according to Port, not a trespass on the trade mark
itself.215 Trade-mark rights can, for this reason, not be a right "in gross", as claimed by
Schechter.216 The rights to a trade mark are appurtenant to the goodwill or product on
which they are used. This emphasizes the fact that trade-mark holders do not possess a
right oftransmissibility or alienation as owners of "normal" property do.217
Another way in which Port looks at the question of ownership of trade marks, is to
analise it against the definition of property.i" Exclusive control is one of the primary
incidents of ownership. Trade-mark holders, however, do not have the exclusive right to
control their mark. Trade marks are, for example, subject to "fair use" by third parties.
Trade-mark holders' rights to use their marks are also restricted. They are not allowed to
use their mark on a different product for which another has already obtained prior trade-
mark rights through use or registration.i'" His conclusion is that none of the traditional
property right concepts support the creation of property rights in a trade mark itself.220
However. according to opponents of dilution, this is precisely what is achieved through
the dilution rationale.t"
211 Port (1995) 529; Port (1993 Indiana LR) 554. This position was also indorsed by the Supreme Court in
1879 in the Trade-Mark Cases v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82 at 94 (1879).
212 Port (1995) 553; Port (1993 Indiana LR) 520, 552, 554; Port (2000) 829.
213 McCabe (2000) 1835.
214 Port (1995) 563; Klieger (1997) 865; McCabe (2000) 1835.
215 Port (1995) 554-555.
216 Port (1993 Indiana LR) 559.
217 Port (1993 Indiana LR) 558,560.
218 Port (1993 Indiana LR) 554, 555.
219 Port (1993 Indiana LR) 555.
220 Port (1993 Indiana LR) 561.
221 Klieger (1997) 816-7 says that dilution statutes are "nothing more than a thinly veiled manifestation of
trademark rights in gross".
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Port claims that the expansion of American trade-mark law222 has actually resulted in a
system that "emulates" trade-mark jurisprudence of civil-law countries, such as Japan and
France, where a trade mark itself is considered subject to property ownership.I" In these
jurisdictions rights subsist upon registration and not use. Assignments in gross, where
the trade mark is transferred without the appurtenant goodwill, are allowed. Naked
Iicensing=" and the divisibility of trade mark rights are also allowed_225 He, however,
does not argue that this change is "normatively wrong", but he states that this change is
"inconsistent with American common law and, perhaps, even the American
Constitution". He suggests that such a change should be done "intentionally" and not
"accidentally'Y'"
Klieger based his opposition to the dilution rationale on the differences between trade-
mark law on the one hand and patent and copyright law on the other. In the case of
patent and copyright law near absolute rights are given for a limited term of years to
provide an incentive for invention and the creation of more works. Trade-mark law
balances free competition with fair competition and consumer protection should thus be
the only rational basis for protection of trade marks. Therefore, he argues that the
dilution doctrine in creating a property right in a trade mark, overlooks these and other
fundamental differences between patent and copyright law compared to trade-mark law.
If the balance between free and fair competition is disturbed, market efficiency and
consumer welfare will be undermined.227
McCabe point to the fact that propertising trade marks implies significant costs to society.
He specifically mentions the cost from lost opportunities and higher prices_228
222 Port identifies three major developments in American law that caused this expansion: the intent to use
system, the Federal Dilution Act and the Anti-cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act. See Chapter 4
"Law of the United States of America" infra.
223 Port (2000) 829, 91l.
224 This is the process where the use of a mark is licensed, without controlling the quality of the licensees'
goods or services.
225 See his discussion on the civil law of trade marks Port (2000) 831-834.
226 Port (2000) 834, 911-912.
227 Klieger (1997) 864-866. See also Middleton (1952) 179.
228 McCabe (2000) 1833.
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Middleton, writing in the 1950s, was another opponent of the dilution theory. He says
that trade-mark rights have nothing to do with property in ideas, since a trade mark is
"only a symbol that cannot exist apart from the trade which it symbolizes"_229A dilution
claim amounts to a claim of property in a trade mark apart from the business or trade in
connection with which it is employed.
Callmann, however, like Schechter, believes that the trade-mark proprietor=" has a
property right in the trade mark and thus that relief can be granted against any injury
which would preclude the trade-mark proprietor from fully utilising that trade mark.231 In
his motivation for a dilution rationale, he stressed that there can be non-competitive
violations of a trade mark, which, due to the absence of competition, cannot be covered
by the unfair competition doctrine.232 As there is no legal relationship between non-
competitors, the only basis of relief can be an exclusive right, such as property.233 Other
commentators, such as Swann, are also convinced that trade marks should be protected as
property. Swann, however, expressly limits this protection to famous brands.t'"
This is also the conclusion reached by Martino,235 who demonstrates that from an
economic perspective, property rights confer valuable economic benefits and that the
absence of property rights would lead to the inefficient use of scarce resources.
Economic efficiency therefore demands that scarce resources should be the subject of
ownership and that their owners should be able to exclude others. He then indicates that
descriptive marks are not scarce resources, only distinctive marks_236 Property rights
229 Middleton (1952) 179.
230 They use the word "trade-mark owner". For examples see Schechter (1927) 831, 833; Callmann
(1947) 183. Port (1995) 529 fn 29 however refrains from using the concept "trade-mark owner",
because he believes that one cannot have property rights in trade marks and therefore there is no trade
mark to own. He rather uses the term "trade-mark holder". As explained in Chapter 1 fn 13 infra the
term "trade-mark proprietor" is used in this dissertation.
231 Callmann (1947) 183.
232 Callmann (1947) 175, 179, 183, 193.
233 Callmann (1947) 184, 193.
234 Swann JB " An Intuitive Approach to Dilution" (1999) 89 The Trademark Reporter 907. He says that a
famous brand is usually more valuable than the physical assets used to produce the goods on which it is
used.
235 Martino (1996) 78-85.
236 It is irrelevant whether the marks are inherently distinctive or have become distinctive through
secondary meaning.
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should therefore only be recognised in some marks. The dilution theory is therefore not
at the expense of the public. It also acknowledges the public's interest in the trade-mark
system. Martino indicates, for example, that it would enjoin denominative trade usages
which cause the senior mark to deteriorate. This reduces consumer search costs by
enabling consumers to select desired items without the need to test purchases. He also
claims that "the exclusive appropriation of coined or arbitrary marks has no negative
implications for the imperative of continued free competition". Descriptive and
suggestive marks should continue to be protected through the traditional likelihood of
confusion test.237
Callmann also referred to case law as supporting his viewpoint. One of the first cases
that proposed a property right in a trade mark was the 1838 case of Millington v. Fox.238
Injunctive relief was granted against a defendant without any fraudulent intent. There
was an old English rule in equity that an injunction would not be granted unless a
property right was at stake.239 It was on this rule that Callmann relied. Port argues that
this was an erroneous conclusion.
The notion of protecting property alone was also adhered to by Lord Westbury LC in
three cases decided in 1863.240 A number of other cases cited by Callmann also held that
property in a trade mark accrues without the aid of a statute. Between 1890 and 1926,
there was, however, a shift in approach.i"' Then in the Hanover Star Milling case and
Beech-Nut case the courts came closer to the property concept again by proposing a
237 They could become eligible for dilution relief after several years of exclusive use and following
advertisement of their intended promotion. See Martino (1996) 85.
238 Millington v. Fox 3 Myl. & C. 338 (1938), cited by Callmann (1947) 184.
239 Port (1995) 554.
240 See Callmann (1947) 184 for citations. He also cites subsequent cases that support this property notion,
but indicates (at 185) that there were also decisions to the contrary.
241 In the 1925 case of American Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372 at 380 the Supreme Court, for
example, stated that "[t]here is no property in a trade mark apart from the business or trade in
connection with which it is employed".
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qualified property concept.242 In the Beech-Nut case243 the existence of a property right
in a trade mark independent of the goodwill associated with the mark was implicitly
recognised: "The fact that the good-will once associated with it has vanished does not
end at once the preferential right of the proprietor to try it again upon goods of the same
class with improvements that renew the proprietor's hopes." Thus, the trade mark has a
value independent of the goodwill associated with the goods on which it was used. Yet,
Callmann in 1947 declared that "it is still problematic whether the courts will recognize a
property right in a trade-rnark't.f''" He sees the conclusion that a trade mark has no
independent value as erroneous, unsatisfactory and unfortunate.v'''
Callmann states that the trade-mark proprietor generally has a right to be protected with
respect to the functions of a trade mark, namely indication of origin, guarantee of quality
and advertisement. He proceeds to say that this is the protection the law normally
accords to "property'v''" In addition, a trade mark has value other than as a mere symbol
of goodwill. Callmann also stresses the fact that the property right has never been an
absolute right. There are certain limitations regarding transfer, territorial scope or
242 Hanover Star Milling Co v. Metcalf240 U.S. 403 at 414 (1916); Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P'Lorillard
Co., 7 F.2d 967 (3rd Cir. 1925), certiorari granted, 269 U.S. 551 (1926),273 U.S. 629 at 632 (1927).
These courts see a trade mark as only a symbol of the goodwill of the business of the trade-mark owner.
A trade mark is therefore not property in the ordinary sense of the word but only indicates the origin of
the goods.
243 Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. PiLorillard Co., 7 F.2d 967 (3rd Cir. 1925), certiorari granted, 269 U.S. 551
(1926), 273 U.S. 629 at 632 (1927). The issue was whether BEECH-NUT on chewing tobacco and
cigarettes, infringed the BEECH-NUT mark for chewing gum, bacon and other food products. This was
also echoed in other cases. See Callmann (1947) 191.
244 See Callmann (1947) 186, 190. He sees the crucial point of the controversy as "not so much the
question whether a trade-mark may be protected as property, but whether the trade-mark may be an
independent subject of a property right". He demonstrates his viewpoint with a citation form the case
Hanover Star Milling Co. v. Metcalf240 U.S. 403 at 414 (1916): "In the English courts it often has
been said that there is no property whatever in a trade-mark, as such. But since in the same cases the
courts recognize the right of the party to the exclusive use of marks adopted to indicate goods of his
manufacture ... it is plain that in denying the right of property in a trade-mark it was intended only to
deny such property right except as appurtenant to an established business or trade in connection with
which the mark is used".
245 Callmann (1947) 188.
246 Callmann (1947) 188.
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business expansion, but he sees that as not affecting the nature of the right, only the scope
f . 247o protection.
However, in the United States, as stated above, it seems to be fundamentally wrong to
speak of a property right in a trade mark as an assignment of the mark in gross, with the
result that the assignment of the mark without the specific goodwill associated with the
mark, is invalid.i'" The reasoning behind this assertion is that rights in a trade mark flow
from its use and not from its existence. In the case of property, the mere fact that the
creator has brought the res into existence is the reason for its protection. This is the
common-law position, also indorsed by the Supreme Court.249 Even though an
application for trade-mark registration may since 1988 be filed before the mark IS
actually used in commerce, the mark cannot be registered until it is in fact used_25o
Port argues very strongly against the existence of the dilution concept. He sees it as a
gross expansion of trade-mark rights. There is according to him, no satisfactory
theoretical justification for such an expansion.i"
Carter states that in essence, marks are only protected to the extent that they distinguish
the owner's goods.252 Carter then proceeds to argue on the basis that trade marks can be
property and reasons that "perhaps it is not such a bad idea after all".253 This would lead
247 Callmann (1947) 192-193. This is true not only for trade-mark property, but for other property as well,
which is also frequently subject to general limitations or limitations flowing from the nature of the
property, for example limitations on the transfer of certain land.
248 See Port (1993 Chicago-Kent LR) 600; Port (1995) 529. He cites the case of American Steel Foundries
v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 380 (1925) as authority. He also refers to Japan, where in contrast to the
United States, private property rights in trade marks are recognised. Assignments in gross, totally
divorced from the goodwill, are there also valid. See also Carter (1993) 720; Landes & Posner (1987)
285-287.
249 See Port (1995) 529; Port (1993 Indiana LR) 554.
250 See the Lanham Act 15 U .S.C. § I051 (b), which is the so-called intent to use provision, provided for in
the 1988 revisions of the Lanham Act. See also Chapter 4.2 "federal Trade-mark Law since 1947"
infra.
251 Port (1995) 526, 527, 556; Port (2000) 874. The only justification acknowleged by Port is the out-
dated and discredited version of natural rights. This theory originated with the Romans and entailed
that the first person to possess an object has a natural right to own that object, provided that it was not
owned by someone else and was capable or ownership. The problem with trade marks, according to
Port, is that the marks themselves are not subject to ownership. See Port (1995) 559-561.
252 Carter (1993) 720.
253 Carter (1993) 720-721.
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to the situation where trade marks are protected not because they have been used to
distinguish, but merely because someone has thought them up. In effect this means a
property-based rather than an incentive-based trade-mark system. A new conversational
habit in which intellectual property would be called property will be developed.v'" This
trend is already evident in the law of copyright, where more emphasis is put on the
property rights of the owner compared to the "rights" of the public.255 Carter concludes
his article by saying that the perception about whether something intangible is property
may change in future.256
Pattishall has an alternative answer also from an American perspective:
"The anti-dilution concept may be implemented through either of two fundamentally different
approaches: (1) the Schechterian-Callmann 'property right' philosophy, or (2) the 'values resulting
from use' rationale. Experience has shown that the 'property' approach is not only repugnant to
the judicial sensibilities because of potential for abuse and obnoxious monopoly, but also because
it collides resoundingly with a fundamental tenet of Anglo-American trade identity law - that
there is no property right as such in a mark. The 'values resulting from use' approach, however, is
not only realistic in that it is directed to the actual 'state of mind' subject matter of the dilution
concept, but also it is consistent with the fundamental philosophy of our established trade identity
law.,,257
Pattishall believes that the dilution concept has been "basically misconceived and
wrongly advocated" as a property theory.258 He rather sees the dilution concept as based
upon a quasi-property right, at least in the mark's distinctive quality_259He views this as
a legal recognition of the concept of "commercial magnetism" generated by commercial
endeavor, and already recognised for years in the commercial market place. Therefore
254Carter (1993) 721. See too his comments on the decision of Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc 112
S. Ct. 2753 (1992). In this case, brought under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, one party's restaurant décor
was protected merely because she had it first, without requiring secondary meaning or even registration.
255See Carter (1993) 722.
256Carter (1993) 723.
257Patti shall (1977) 624.
258Pattishall (1977) 62l.
259Pattishall (1977) 618. He refers in this context to the oft-quoted paragraph in Mishawaka Rubber &
Woolen Manufacturing Co. v. s.s. Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203 at 205, 62 S. Ct. 1022, 86 L. Ed. 1381, 53
U.S.P.Q. 323 (1942) by Mr. Justice Frankfurter. See Chapter 2.4 "Advertising Function" supra and fn
172 supra in this Chapter.
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there is no "property right" in the mark itself, the only possible "property right" is the
mark's distinctiveness. Also McCabe refers to this quasi-property right in a trade mark.
This implies limited rights260 and protections and is contingent on protecting the public
from confusion.261
In the recent case of Ringling Brothers v. Utah, the court interpreted the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act.262 The court saw the phrase "the lessening of the capacity of a
famous mark, to identify and distinguish goods or services" in the statutory definition of
dilution as a clear indication that it is the mark's selling power and not its distinctiveness
that must be protected. According to the court, if only the distinctiveness of the mark is
protected, it will amount to a property right in gross in the trade mark. This was the
model originally proposed by Schechter. The court did not think that Congress would
have intended to create a property right unlimited in time, unless they made such
intention clear. The Federal Act, according to the court, requires specific harm to the
senior mark's economic value and a causal connection between this harm and the use of
the junior user. Thus the Act does not support the property right in gross interpretation.
Swann and Davis however submit that a brand's equity, that is the positive associations
that comprise a brand, "can rise to the level of a property right". This property right, they
. . Ied to seoarate nrotecti 263propose, IS entit t p r t pr t tion.
In German law steps have also been taken in recent years to protect the reputation and
commercial magnetism embodied in a trade mark as an independent intellectual property
interest.264 A cause of action known as "Rufausbeutung" can be used to protect the
reputation of a well-known trade mark in respect of competing, as well as non-competing
260 See McCabe (2000) 1836 for these limitations.
261 McCabe (2000) 1835, 1836, 1837.
262 Ringling Bros-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development 935
F.Supp. 763, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13304,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1303 (E.D. Va. 1996); 955 F.Supp.
605, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2116, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (E.D. Va. 1997); affd. 170 F.3d 449 at
459, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4179, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065 (4th Cir. 1999). See Chapter 4.10.4 "Likelihood
of Dilution vs Actual Dilution" infra for a discussion of this case.
263 Swann & Davis (1994) 282-299.
264 Mostert (1986 IIC) 93-95.
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goods. Examples can be found in the Rolls Royce case265and in the Dimple case.266
These decisions came, according to Mostert.i'" very close to the "recognition and
protection of the reputation and commercial magnetism of a trade mark as an independent
interest". He also notes that there is a growing trend to emphasise the "proprietary
overtones of a trade mark". This means that a trade mark is perceived as a "bonum in se
protectible as a ius in se", in other words an intellectual property right in and of itself.268
He finds confirmation for his view in the language of the EC Harmonisation Directive.269
Mostert argues strongly that the reputation and commercial magnetism embodied in a
trade mark should be recognised and protected as independent intellectual property
interests.
3.5.4 CONCLUSION
Many scholars have thus criticised the dilution theory as monopolistic, anti-competitive
and inconsistent with the consumer protection rationale of trade-mark law. They also
argue that the function of a trade mark has not been expanded and that dilution causes no
real injury to a trade mark.270 Most of this criticism is however addressed by proponents
of the dilution doctrine in their arguments in favour of dilution protection.r " It is quite
generally accepted that the functions of trade marks have expanded and that trade marks
now also have an advertising function, which serves to built up the goodwill of the trade
mark. Dilution surely damages the mental association that consumers have with respect
to a trade mark and this can result in permanent loss of sales. This situation cannot be
remedied by the traditional remedies used in the case of confusion. Furthermore, the
265 Rolls-Royce, 86 BGHZ 90, (1983), [1983] GRUR 247, 1984 lIC 240. See Mostert (1986 IIC) 94 for a
brief discussion.
266 Dimple, BGH, 29. II. 1984, [1985] GRUR 550. See also Mostert (1986 IIC) 94.
267 Mostert (1986 IIC) 94.
268 Mostert (1996) 136.
269 Phrases such as "taking an unfair advantage of the distinctiveness or repute" and "exploiting the
reputation" of the commercial magnetism of a trade mark in the Directive reflects, according to Mostert
(1996) 136, "the tenor of legal sentiment in characterising the proprietary rights embodied in a
trademark". See Chapter 5.5 "The European Union and the Trademark Directive" infra for a discussion
of the Directive.
270 Chapter 3.5.1 "Arguments Against Offering Trade Marks Dilution Protection" supra.
271 Chapter 3.5.2 "Arguments in Favour of Offering Trade Marks Dilution Protection" supra.
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advertising function, protected by a dilution claim, actually promotes competition and
therefore is in the interest of society. Dilution protection is also not in conflict with the
consumer protection rationale as the public has an interest in the protection of trade
marks.272
Turning to the property debate,273there is also a split of authority. Commentators such as
Schechter, Callmann, Swann and Martino propose directly or indirectly a property right
in trade marks. Others like Port and Middleton are of the opinion that this is
fundamentally wrong and inconsistent with American common law and even the
American Constitution. A few commentators like Patti shall and McCabe follow the
middle way and propose a quasi property right.
One of Port's arguments against property rights in trade marks is that the trade-mark
proprietor does not have the exclusive right to control his mark, in contrast with the
owner of corporeal property. However, the owner of corporeal property also does not
have an unlimited capacity to act with the res at will. His "capacity to exercise
ownership entitlements is still limited by law and by the rights of others".274
From an economic perspective it seems that property rights in trade marks are necessary
to avoid the inefficient use of scarce resources.275 A number of cases discussed above
also lend credibility to the property right rationale. Even Port concludes that granting
. trade marks property rights is not "normatively wrong", but should be done intentionally.
Thus, it seems that the debate regarding the competing theories is set to continue. For
purposes of this dissertation the outcome of the debate is however only of academic
interest. The South African Supreme Court of Appeal in Laugh It Off Promotions v SA
272 See Hyatt Corporation v. Hyatt Legal Services 736 F.2d 1153 at 1159,222 U.S.P.Q.2d 669 (7th Cir.
1984).
273 See Chapter 3.5.3 "Role of the Status of the Trade-Mark Proprietor's Right in the Dilution Debate"
supra.
274 Mostert H The Relevance of Constitutional Protection and Regulation of Property for the Private Law
of Ownership in South Africa and Germany LLD Stellenbosch (2000) 130.
275 See Martino (1996) 78-85 and accompanying text to fn 235 supra.
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Breweries, although noting some judicial resistance, declares unequivocally that trade
marks are property.i" Furthermore, from a practical perspective, a properly limited
dilution doctrine provides a much needed remedy for a harm inadequately addressed by
traditional trade-mark infringement remedies.
276 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SA Breweries International (Finance) BV tla Sabmark International
[2004] 4 All SA lSI (SeA) 162g and lS6b, where the court said: "On the other hand, and in spite of
some judicial resistance in certain quarters, trade marks are property, albeit intangible or incorporeal.
The fact that property is intangible does not make it of a lower order."
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CHAPTER4
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
4.1 AMERICAN STATUTORY TRADE-MARK LAW PRIOR TO 1947
The purpose of trade-mark law is to promote economic efficiency and to give businesses
the incentive to invest in a mark.] This takes place for the benefit of the consumer.' The
benefits of a registration system led to the passing of trade-mark statutes in many
different parts of the world. In the United States of America trade marks were afforded
their first federal statutory protection in 1870.3 This statute was enacted on international,
rather than domestic demand, as it was primarily to implement international treaties
already agreed upon." Interestingly enough, this first statute was based on the English
common law governing trade-mark protection.' The Act provided inter alia for the
registration of trade marks without regard to whether or not they were used in interstate
or foreign comrnerce.? This Act was however found to be unconstitutional by the United
States Supreme Court in 1879.7 The reason was that the statute was promulgated under
I McCabe KB "Dilution-by-Blurring: A Theory Caught in the Shadow of Trademark Infringement"
(2000) 68 Fordham Law Review 1827 at 1832.
2 This rationale is known as the "Consumer Protection Model". See Edgecombe JR "Off the Mark:
Bringing the Federal Trademark Dilution Act in Line with Established Trademark Law" (2002) 51
Emory Law Journal 1247 at 1249.
3 Act of 8 July 1870, ch.230 § 77-84, 16 Stat. 198, 210-212 entitled "An Act to Revise, Consolidate and
Amend the Statutes Relating to Patents and Copyrights". This Act was amended in 1876. See Vuk WT
"Protecting Baywatch and Wagamama: Why the European Union Should Revise the 1989 Trademark
Directive to Mandate Dilution Protection for Trademarks" (1998) 21 Fordham International Law
Journal 861 at 878; McCarthy JT McCarthy on Trademarks 4th ed (1996) West Group St Paul
Minnesota § 5:3; Port KL "The Illegitimacy of Trademark Incontestability" (1993) 26 Indiana Law
Review 519 at 525; Pattishall BW "The USA Courts and the Prevention of Unfair Competition" (1963)
53 The Trademark Reporter 599 at 602.
4 See Port (1993 Indiana LR) 525 for more detail.
5 Vuk (1998) 878.
6 McCarthy (1996) § 5:3.
7 Trade-Mark Cases v. Steffens, 100 U.S. 82 at 94 (1879). See Vuk (1998) 879; Port KL "Foreword:
Symposium on Intellectual Property Law Theory" (1993) 68 Chicago-Kent Law Review 585 at 594
notes that the court reasoned that trade marks do not depend on any novelty, invention or discovery. No
imagination, genius or laborious thought is necessary. Trade marks are just founded on priority of
application.
Stellenbosch University http://scholar.sun.ac.za
85
the patent and copyright clause of the Constitution8 instead of under the "Commerce
Power" clause," After another two years a new statute was passed by Congress, which
provided for the registration of trade marks used in commerce with foreign nations and
the Indian tribes, but did not cover interstate commerce.l" According to McCarthy the
provisions of this statute were totally inadequate. It was repealed and replaced by, what
can be called, the first "modem" federal trade-mark registration statute in 1905." This
Act reintroduced the protection of trade marks in interstate commerce, but was limited in
its effect as only purely fanciful and arbitrary marks could be registered. Thus
descriptive marks, primarily geographical terms and personal names of individuals, firms
and corporations could not be registered.V A series of amendments followed, with a
major amendment in 1920, which inter alia made the registration of descriptive marks
possible. In spite of this the Act still remained inadequate.l '
Already in 1920 at a meeting of the Patent Section of the American Bar Association the
first steps were taken in the formulation of what would become the Lanham Act some
twenty-seven years later.14 A commission that was appointed at that meeting to revise
the Federal Trademark Act of 1905 drafted a bill for submission the following year. This
draft became the "Vestal Bill".15 The "Vestal Bill" was reconsidered by the American
Bar Association between 1935 and 1937. They made some changes to the bill so that it
created substantive-law rights as well as procedural advantages to trade-mark
registrants.i'' Edward S Rogers, a prominent Chicago lawyer, drafted what would
become the Lanham Act over several years as part of his services to the American Bar
1USC § 8(8). See McCarthy (1996) § 5:3; Vuk (1998) 879.
1 USC § 8(3). This clause gives the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the
several states and with the Indian Tribes.
10 Act of3 March 1881,26 Stat. 1106. McCarthy (1996) § 5:3.
Il Act of 20 February 1905, 33 Stat. 724, 15 USC § 81 et seq. See McCarthy (1996) § 5:3. Port (1993
Indiana LR) 527 noted that this Act was not well conceived and had been described as "a slovenly piece
of legislation, characterised by awkward phraseology, bad grammar and involved sentences [by a
draftsman who] had a talent for obscurity amounting to genius".
12 McCarthy (1996) § 5:3.
13 See McCarthy (1996) § 5:3 for a brief discussion of some inadequacies.
14 See Rogers ES "The Lanham Act & the Social Function of Trademarks" (1949) 14 Law and
Contemporary Problems 173 at 177-180 for a detailed discussion of the legislative process between
1920 and 1947.
15 HR Rep No 72-7118, (1931). See McCarthy (1996) § 5:4; Rogers (1949) 177.
16 McCarthy (1996) § 5:4.
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Association.i ' In 1937 he was asked to come and see the chairman of the House Patent
Committee dealing with trademarks, Congressman Fritz Garland Lanham, who had heard
of the Rogers draft and was highly interested.18 Lanham introduced Rogers' personal
draft of a Trade-mark Act the next year. 19 It however took another eight years, due to
various distractions, including World War Jl, before it was enacted into law in 1946.20 It
took effect one year later on 5 July 1947.21
4.2 FEDERAL TRADE-MARK LAW SINCE 1947
Thus, after a lot of controversy and the enactment of several other trade-mark statutes,
trade-mark law in the United States has been governed by the Lanham Act since 1947.
This Act materially advanced and improved United States trade-mark and trade-identity
law and has been generally rated as a success.i" lts objectives were to codify the law and
to modernise all existing trade-mark statutes, to comply with international commitments,
to give clarity on conflicting interpretations thus eliminating confusion, to simplify and
liberalise registration, to dispense with overly technical prohibitions and also to give
prompt and effective relief in infringement cases." In short, its purpose was to protect
trade marks and to repress unfair competition.i" However, protection was only given to
trade-mark proprietors against unauthorised users who used identical or similar trade
marks on similar or competing goods and where there was a likelihood of confusion. The
basis for bringing a successful action against an infringer was thus being able to prove
17 Pattishall BW "50th Anniversary of the Lanham Act: The Lanham Act at Fifty - Some History and
Comment" (1996) 86 The Trademark Reporter 442. See Rogers (1949) 180 for his own rendering of
the process.
18 McCarthy (1996) § 5:4.
19 HRRepNo9041 introduced on 19January 1938. Rogers (1949) 180.
20 Patti shall (1996) 442. For more details on this whole process see McCarthy (1996) § 5:4 and the
authorities cited there. See also Pattishall BW "The Lanham Trademark Act - lts Impact Over Four
Decades" (1986) 76 The Trademark Reporter 193.
21 Lanham Act § 46(a), 15 USC § 1051; Vuk (1998) 877.
22 See Pattishall (1996) 448. See also the discussion of Denicola RC "Some Thoughts on the Dynamics of
Federal Trademark Legislation and the Trademark Dilution Act of 1995" (1996) 59 Law and
Contemporary Problems 75-83 on the success of the Lanham Act.
23 See Pattishall (1996) 442; Rogers (1949) 182-183; Vuk (1998) 877 fn 73.
24 Pattishall (1996) 445.
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that elements of mistake, deception or confusion were present." It is accepted that trade-
mark law was in the first place developed to protect the consumer public from confusion,
but at the same time it also protects the trade-mark proprietor's right to a non-confused
public." Probably the most remarkable feature of the Act, is the role it played in
developing a unified theory of trade-mark law.27 It essentially established a federal
registration process for trade marks, defined instances of infringement and provided
remedies. Registration on the Principal Register even constituted constructive notice of
the registrant's claim of ownership of the registered mark. Registered trade marks were
awarded a higher degree of protection that unregistered trade marks. Section 43, the only
section affording relief to owners of unregistered marks, could be used to get relief in
unfair competition and false advertising cases, also on condition that confusion could be
proved."
Furthermore, the Act only made provision for the protection of marks used in interstate
commerce and also left important issues, such as the acquisition of exclusive trade-mark
rights, to the common law.29 In contrast with the position in England, the Lanham Act
presupposed the existence of an exclusive trade-mark right under the common law. It
merely established the presumption that the registered proprietor has the exclusive right
to use the mark." The consequence was that trade marks could only be acquired as a
result of adoption and use. Unused marks or even marks intended to be used could not be
registered in the United States. The reason for the "use" requirement was that the
regulation of trade marks was based on the Commerce Clause of the Constitution and not
the Patent and Copyright Clause." This was, however, an unsatisfactory situation and
also had the result that the United States did not comply with its obligations under the
2S See Taviss ML "Case-note: In Search of a Consistent Trademark Dilution Test: Mead Data Central,
Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, US.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2nd Cir. 1989)" (1990) 58 University of
Cincinnati Law Review 1449 at 1453.
26 Vuk (1998) 872 fn 48.
27 Denicola (1996) 76.
28 This section falls into Title VIII - "False Designations of Origin and False Descriptions Forbidden".
See Taviss (1990) 1453-1454.
29 Beier F-K "Basic Features of Anglo-American, French and German Trademark Law" (1975)
International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law 285 at 290.
30 Beier(1975)291.
31 Port (1993 Chicago-Kent LR) 594. See also discussion of the 1870 Statute supra.
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Paris Convention.f This situation was fortunately rectified by the Trademark Law
Revision Act of 1988.33
This Act implemented the intent to use system, described by Port as one of the most
significant changes to United States trade-mark law.34 Applications for trade-mark
registration are now permitted prior to any use whatsoever of the mark. All that needs to
be shown, is a bona fide intention to use the trade mark on goods in commerce.f
Registration under this intent to use clause is possible for three years, whereafter the
mark must in fact be used to keep the mark registered." Furthermore, the filing of an
application to register an intent to use mark constitutes constructive use of the mark,
conferring a right of priority on the mark. Thus, once a mark is registered, the registrant
enjoys a nationwide first use date as of the date of the intent to use application. If the
proprietor of an intent to use trade-mark registration succeeds with an injunction against
an infringer, but ultimately does not use the mark, the injunction will be set aside.
Pattishall sees this expansion of trade-mark law as a positive, desirable step which
relaxed to some extent the "rigidity of the use requirement'v" Previously business
persons had to spend considerable amounts of money on initial or preliminary use before
it was legally sufficient for registration, without being protected if someone else chose to
32 Convention of Paris for the Protection ofIndustrial Property 20 March 1883. It has been revised from
time to time, the last revision having been effected at Stockholm on the 14th ofJuly 1967. See Webster
CE & Morley GE Webster & Page South African Law of Trade Marks, Unlawful Competition,
Company Names and Trading Styles 4th ed (1997) Butterworths Durban par 8.47 & Appendix 6 for the
text. See Beier (1975) 292.
33 15 USC § 1051(b) (l988). See also Chapter 4.5 "The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1988" infra.
34 Port KL "The Congressional Expansion of American Trademark Law: A Civil Law System in the
Making" (2000) 35 Wake Forest Law Review 827 at 835. A detailed discussion of the intent to use
(ITU) system falls outside the scope of this dissertation, but see Port (2000) 835-874. He sees this as
part of the congressional expansion of American trade-mark law, which moved the American system of
trade-mark jurisprudence much closer to a civil law system.
35 See Pattishall (1996) 446. Use must then be consummated within six months after publication and
granting of the application, although it is possible to obtain an extension of this period. See also Port
(1993 Chicago-Kent LR) 594-595; Port (2000) 835-836.
36 Within six months of the date of the Notice of Allowance, issued by the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, the applicant must file an affidavit claiming actual use or file a Request for and
Extension of Time. The initial period can be extended for and additional six months without showing
cause and an additional aggregate of twenty-four months by showing cause: thus a total of thirty-six
months or three years. See Port (2000) 836.
37 Pattishall (1996) 447.
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copy the mark during that time.38 Port argues that the intent to use provision would
clearly have been held unconstitutional if addressed in the Trade-Mark Cases." where
the 1870 Act was found unconstitutional for the same reason.
One of the superior features of the Lanham Act was its broad definition of what can
constitute a trade mark. A trade mark was defined as essentially any word, name, symbol
or device used to identify or distinguish one's goods." Although comprehensive
statutory protection was afforded to trade marks under the Lanham Act, this protection
was, as said above, only against infringing uses, which caused confusion as to the source
or origin of the goods. The Act even provided for concurrent registrations where the
same or substantially similar marks were used but only in different geographical areas or
for different goods and services, therefore causing no likelihood of confusion.41 The
Model State Trademark Bill, which became the standard for state trade-mark legislation,
was patterned on the Lanham Act.42 There was no federal protection against uses of a
trade mark that did not cause confusion, until 1995, when a dilution provision was added
to the Lanham Act.43
38 In the Lemon Tree case, John Lecroy & Son, Inc. v. Langis Foods Ltd., 376 F.Supp. 962; 1974 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8308; 182 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 132 (Dist. D.C. 1974), the Canadian company Langis applied
for registration of the LEMON TREE trade mark in the United States (Sept. '69 with priority date of
March '69), before any use in the States. The plaintiff began to use the same trade mark in the United
States (May '69) and thereafter applied for registration (June '69). The court determined at 967 that
"prior right in a trademark in the United States depends on priority of use in the United States and is not
affected by priority of use in a foreign country". The priority filing date could not grant a substantive
right in the trade mark, if the mark had never been used in the United States. Defendant was, therefore,
not entitled to registration of the LEMON TREE mark. This finding was, however, reversed in the
Appeal case, SCM Corp. v. Langis Foods, Ltd., 176 U.S. App. D.C. 194,539 F.2d 196, 1976 U.S. App.
LEXIS 8391, 190 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 288 (D.C. Cir. 1976). See commentary of Port (2000) 856-857.
39 See Chapter 4.1 "American Statutory Trade-Mark Law Prior to 1947" and fn 7 supra.
40 Pattishall (1996) 442. The Lanham Act thus opted for an integrated approach to trade symbols and the
archaic distinction between trade marks and trade names existing under common law was abandoned.
See Denicola (1996) 77.
41 See Pattishall (1996) 445.
42 Model State Trademark Bill of 1949, revised in 1964 and 1992; Denicola (1996) 77.
43 Vuk (1998) 868. See Chapter 4.7 "The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995" infra.
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4.3 PROTECTION AGAINST DILUTION UNDER STATE DILUTION LAWS
4.3.1 PROTECTION AND RELATED PROBLEMS
The first statutory recognition of dilution in the United States also' occurred in 1947,
when the state of Massachusetts enacted a statute prohibiting dilution." This was nearly
twenty years after Schechter's article introducing the dilution theory. IIIinois45 and New
York were the next states to enact statutes that offered trade marks protection against
dilution in respectively 1953 and 1955.46 They were followed by Georgia.V These
statutes influenced subsequent judicial and legislative treatment of the dilution doctrine.
Just about half of the states have considered dilution protection as worthy of adoption."
44 Act of 2 May 1947, cho 307, § 7a, Mass. Acts 300 (codified as amended at Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. cho
110B, § 12 (West 1996»: "Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive
quality of a trade name or trade-mark shall be a ground for injunctive relief in cases of trade-mark
infringement or unfair competition notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or of
confusion as to the source of goods or services". See Martino T Trademark Dilution (1996) Clarendon
Press Oxford 29-30. Martino (1996) 30 describes the drafting process and clearly shows that the
intention of the drafters was to limit the protection to coined or peculiar words and unique symbols.
This was in the formulation of the House Bill as approved by the House of Representatives, but not in
the Senate version of the Bill which became the new law. See also Handler MW "Are the state anti-
dilution laws compatible with the national protection of trademarks?" (1985) 75 The Trademark
Reporter 269 at 275; Vuk (1998) 863; Taviss (1990) 1457; Gilson, Gilson on Trademark Protection
& Practice (1999) Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. § 5.12[1][b]; Garcia JA "Trademark Dilution:
Eliminating Confusion" (1995) 85 The Trademark Reporter 489 at 492 fn 19; Port KL "The
'Unnatural' Expansion of Trademark Rights: Is a Federal Dilution Statute Necessary?" (1995) 85 The
Trademark Reporter 525 at 530; Klieger RN "Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the
Rational Basis for Trademark Protection" (1997) 58 University of Pittsburgh Law Review 789 at 811;
McCabe (2000) 1847; Kim PE "Preventing Dilution of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act: Why the
FTDA Requires Actual Economic Harm" (2001) 150 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 719 at
726.
45 It was quite ironic that Massachusetts and Illinois were the first two states to adopt dilution statutes as
they were considered two of the most conservative states of the United States. See Martino (1996) 29.
46 1953 III. Laws 455, § 1 (codified at III. Ann. Stat. cho 140, § 22 (Smith-Hurd 1986); 765 Ill. Compo
Stat. 1036/65(West 2000»; New York, Act of 18 April 1955, cho453, § 1 (codified at N.Y. Gen. Bus.
Law § 368-d (McKinney 1968); (McKinney 1996 & Supp. 2000), repealed by L. 1996, eh 319, § 2, eff.
I January 1997). See Vuk (1998) 898 fn 209; Klieger (1997) 812; Handler (1985) 276.
47 Patti shall (1963) 621; Klieger (1997) 812. Ga. Code Ann. § 106-112A (1955).
48 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][a] & [bl. Gilson mentions that only 25 states enacted dilution statutes;
McCarthy JT "The 1996 Federal Anti Dilution Statute" (1998) 16 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law
Journal 587 mentions 26 states; Garcia (1995) 493 fn 26, Denicola (1996) 85 and Port (1995) 535 fn
65 mention 27 states. (However, Port (2000) 876 only refers to 25 states.) Klieger (1997) 811, Kim
(2001) 726 and Lee DH "Remedying Past and Future Harm: Reconciling Conflicting Circuit Court
Decisions Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act" (2002) 29 Pepperdine Law Review 689 at 700
28, but Vuk (1998) 898 especially fn 211 gives a list of 31 states (with the citations of the different
statutes), which according to him, have adopted statutory dilution protection, namely Alabama, Alaska,
Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine,
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In addition, four other states, namely Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey and Ohio,
recognised dilution as a common-law doctrine.Y
At first, legislatures called these statutes "anti-dilution statutes", because they were laws
purporting to prevent dilution. In modern trade-mark law this term has, however, become
obsolete.i''
Although there are slight variations in the wording of the different state statutes, they are
substantially similar." Protection is generally given to distinctive or strong trade marks52
where a similar mark is used on dissimilar goods'" in such a way that the reputation of
the senior mark will be injured. This can happen where the trade mark's distinctiveness
is injured or its image tamished.i" Although showing confusion as to source is
unnecessary, the "gradual whittling away of trademarks' distinctiveness through use by
third parties on non-confusing, non-competing products" is prevented.f As there was no
express reference to harm to the senior mark's economic value in these statutes, dilution
was interpreted as solely loss of the mark's distinctiveness.i" Most of the states in fact
Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, West
Virginia and Wyoming.
49 Compare Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][b] and Garcia (1995) 495. Port (1995) 535 and fn 66; Port (2000)
876 fn 204 only names Michigan, New Jersey and Ohio. His opinion is, however, that it is quite
unlikely that a plaintiff would in these states prevail with a pure dilution cause of action under the
common law. Before the enactment of a dilution statute Minnesota also had a common-law cause of
action.
50 See for example the comment by Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][b]. But compare SAB International tla
Sabmark International v Laugh It Off Promotions [2003] 2 All SA 454 (C) 457d-e, where this obsolete
term is still used in South African trade-mark jurisprudence.
51 See Patti shall BW "The Dilution Rationale for Trade Mark - Trade Identity Protection, its Progress and
Prospects" (1977) 67 The Trademark Reporter 607 at 609.
52 The Massachusetts Statute was very broad, covering any trade mark, regardless of its uniqueness. This
actually rendered the consumer confusion test immaterial. See Klieger (1997) 812.
53 Historically the doctrine was only employed in the case of non-competitive goods, but the modem trend
is to apply it to similar and competing products as well. See Garcia (1995) 492, especially the
discussion at 497-500.
54 Vuk (1998) 899.
55 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet Inc. 855 F.2d 480
at 482,8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1072 (th Cir. 1988). See also Gilson (1999) § 5.12[2][a].
56 Seitz BG "The Actual Harm Requirement and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act: Ringling Brothers-
Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development" (1999) I0 Journal of
Art and Entertainment Law 113 at 117. Ringling Bros. -Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Utah Division of Travel Development 170 F.3d 449 at 454, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4179, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d
1065 (4th Cir. 1999).
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followed the wording of the Model State Trademark Bill of 1964,57 which provides as
follows:
"Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark
registered under this Act, or a mark valid at common law, shall be a ground for injunctive relief
notwithstanding the absence of competition between the parties or the absence of confusion as to
the source of goods or services."
If it can be proved that the mark is distinctive, relief is normally granted. Without
distinctiveness, there is no "distinctive quality" to be injured. To determine
distinctiveness the following factors may be considered: "The length of time the mark has
been used, the scope of advertising and promotions, the nature and extent of the business
and the scope of the first user's reputation.Y" Garcia contends that a distinctive mark is
equal to a strong mark and therefore weak or new marks, which have not yet generated
goodwill and beneficial consumer associations, cannot be protected. They do not have
the attributes protected by a dilution statute.i" A strong mark is then described as either
having inherent distinctiveness or having acquired distinctiveness through secondary
meaning. Klieger, however, differentiates between distinctive marks on the one hand and
arbitrary, coined or fanciful words on the other hand.i"
If the mark is coined or invented, however, distinctiveness is even easier to show. The
state statutes do not require that the plaintiffs mark must be famous, although a number
of courts applying the statutes have insisted on trade-mark fame. If the mark was well-
known or famous, the courts almost certainly have found the requisite trade-mark
distinctiveness. They also tended to grant relief to a famous mark, even where they
would in other cases have required a likelihood of confusion. As has been noted by some
57 Model State Trademark Bill § 12 (USTA 1964), drafted by The International Trademark Association
(INTA); Klieger (1997) 813. The Model Bill currently closely follows the wording of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act. It was amended by the INTA subsequently to the submission of the proposed
federal act to Congress. See Port (1995) 528. The scope of the Model Bill is now thus limited to
famous trade marks. See in this regard Garcia (1995) 495.
58 Hyatt Corporation v. Hyatt Legal Services 736 F.2d 1153 at 1158,222 U.S.P.Q.2d 669 (7th Cir. 1984).
See also Garcia (1995) 504 and other cases cited there.
59 Garcia (1995) 503-505.
60 Klieger (1997) 813. See also Edgecombe (2002) 1276; 1256-1258.
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scholars, the line between truly distinctive marks and well-known or even famous marks
is very thin or even non-existent." This dichotomy between those requiring a mark to be
famous, meaning a unique, arbitrary or coined mark, and those seeing distinctiveness in
the sense of the identifier of a product as enough to qualify for dilution protection will
certainly go on, even beyond a Federal Dilution Act.62
Although the dilution doctrine was traditionally only applied in the case of non-
competing goods, the modem trend, also discernable from the state court decisions, is to
apply it also where the products or goods are competing. According to Garcia this is the
better view, supported by the Model State Trademark Bill and the purpose of the
doctrine. This also makes the dilution action a valuable adjunct to statutory infringement
and unfair competition claims.63 There are however still conflicting decisions between
some state courts. Garcia considers the adherence to only non-competitive application as
a "stubborn and inexplicable adherence to an outdated theory't'"
The state statutes require a showing of a "likelihood of dilution". To establish a
"likelihood of dilution" a mental association between the two marks by consumers is
required. Klieger feels that this is not sufficient as it "leaves unanswered the question of
how a likelihood of dilution of the selling power of a mark is to be identified once the
requisite mental connection has been made".65 The state courts generally recognised two
different types of dilution, namely dilution by blurring and dilution by tamishment" A
new dimension of dilution was however recognised in 1994 by the Second Circuit Court
61 See for example Gilson (1999) § 5.12[2][b].
62 See Chapter 4.10.2 "Distinctiveness" infra.
63 Garcia (1995) 500-502, 497-500.
64 This application is also despite the clear language of the statutes that relief will be afforded
notwithstanding the absence of competition. Moreover, no explanations are given for their viewpoints.
Garcia (1995) 499-500. See also the Federal Act, discussed in Chapter 4.7 "The Federal Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995" infra, which expressly states that the dilution doctrine can be used, inter alia,
"regardless of the presence or absence of (I) competition between the owner of the famous mark and
other parties ...". But see Edgecombe (2002) 1278 who argues that dilution protection should only be
possible in the case of non-competing goods and in the absence of confusion.
65 Klieger(l997) 821-822.
66 See Chapter 3.4 "Types of Dilution" supra for the distinction between these concepts.
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in the Deere case.67 This is referred to as imitative dilution or disparagement." To
determine blurring, the courts will normally evaluate a number of factors and then use a
balancing test.69 Demonstrating actual or potential harm to a trade mark is traditionally
more difficult in the case of blurring than in the case of tarnishment. 70 The reason might
be that blurring is based upon an associational quality between the marks, while in the
case of tarnishment there is a more direct negative impact. Some courts, however,
require proof of actual tarnishment and not just a risk of tarnishment."
The "injury to business reputation" provision included in the Model Bill and most state
dilution laws, was criticised by Patti shall as "unduly broad in scope and largely unrelated
to the dilution concept".72 This concept is moreover also covered in the provisions of the
Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act.73 He further remarked that uses that cause this
kind of injury are more likely to confuse as to source than to dilute. It also clouded the
interpretation of the dilution concept by many courts. In contrast with these judgments,
Judge Roberts in Wedgwood v. Lund/4 gave a lucid explanation of this phrase. He stated
that this phrase refers to tarnishment of reputation. If that is so, then there is actually no
need for including this phrase in the dilution provision as tarnishment is traditionally
encompassed within the meaning of dilution in the phrase "dilution of the distinctive
quality of a mark". This criticism was apparently noted by the drafters of the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act as this Act just refers to "dilution of the distinctive quality of the
67 Deere & Co. v. MTD Products Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1936 (2nd Cir. 1994), discussed in
Chapter 4.3.3.1 "Second Circuit Cases" infra. See Garcia (1995) 493.
68 See Chapter 3.4.4 "Disparagement or Imitative Dilution" supra.
69 In the case of Mead Data Central Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 702 F.Supp. 1031, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d 1442 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), judge Sweet, in his concurring opinion, developed a test for
determining likelihood of dilution. This test, although rejected by some courts and the subject of much
criticism, has gained widespread acceptance. See Chapter 4.3.3.1 "Second Circuit Cases" infra for a
detailed discussion of the case, as well as the "Sweet Factors" and see further Garcia (1995) 506-514.
70 Garcia (1995) 493, 514-517.
71 See Garcia (1995) 515 and Chapter 4.10.4 "Likelihood of Dilution vs Actual Dilution" infra.
72 Pattishall BW "Dawning Acceptance of the Dilution Rationale for Trade Mark - Trade Identity
Protection" (1984) 74 The Trademark Reporter 306-307.
73 Reprinted in 7 Uniform Laws Ann 325 (1970). See Pattishall (1977) 623.
74 Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund 294 Or. 493, 659 P.2d 377 at 381-382, 222 U.S.P.Q. 446 (Or. Sup. Ct.
1983), discussed in Chapter 4.3.3.1 "Second Circuit Cases" infra.
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famous mark".75
In summary, the state dilution laws share the following four features."
1. Protection for marks which possess distinctive quality.
2. Relief is granted if the senior user can demonstrate a "likelihood of
dilution".
3. There IS no express reference to harm of the senior mark's economic
value.
4. Only injunctive relief is provided."
The state courts in general were very slow to embrace the dilution concept, despite clear
'legislative acceptance." This could be ascribed to the ambiguous language of some early
statutes," fears of monopolisation.t" judicial antipathy" and confusion with the vested
7S See discussion of this 1995 Act in Chapter 4.7 "The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995" infra.
76 See Seitz (1999) 117. See also Ringling Bros. -Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah
Division of Travel Development 170 F.3d 449 at 454, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4179, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065
(4th Cir. 1999).
77 In Mead Data Central Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, US.A., 702 F.Supp. 1031 at 1045,9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1442
(S.D.N.Y.), reversed in 875 F.2d 1026, lO U.S.P.Q.2d 1961 (2nd Cir. 1989) the district court, applying
the New York dilution statute, found that the defendant diluted the LEXIS trade mark of the plaintiff
and in order to soften the tremendous hardship of an permanent injunction, ruled that it could choose
between subjecting itself to an injunction or, inter alia, financially compensating the plaintiff on an
annual basis for the diminution in value of its mark. This is the only example of a court awarding
monetary damages based solely on dilution under state legislation. See Garcia (1995) 490, 492 and
Chapter 4.3.3.1 "Second Circuit Cases" infra.
78 Pattishall (1977) 610, 612; Note "Dilution: Trade Mark Infringement or Will-o'-The-Wisp?" (1964)
77 Harvard Law Review 520; reprinted in (1964) 54 The Trademark Reporter 184 at 194. Port (1995)
530, 539 however, is of the opinion that the courts remained "unconvinced and openly hostile" to the
dilution concept, in spite of clear legislative mandates. He uses the example of the New York dilution
statute where the use of a mark may be prevented by way of injunction regardless of whether there are
confusion or competition and regardless of whether the mark is registered. There is also no requirement
of strength or fame, but still the Second Circuit Court in the Mead Data case refused an injunction
without a showing of confusion and a famous or even very famous trade mark. See discussion of this
case in Chapter 4.3.3.1 "Second Circuit Cases" infra.
79 See Pattishall (1977) 615 who refers to the words "cases of trademark infringement or unfair
competition" included in the original Massachusetts and New York statutes. This led to the situation
where courts continue to require likelihood of confusion as pre-requisite for a dilution finding. See also
Harvard note (1964) 195; Martino (1996) 35. Port (personal comments to the author in May 2000)
comments that these statutes were actually very clear as to what they required. See also Port (1995)
530.
80 Harvard note (1964) 194-195; McCabe (2000) 1841-1842; Martino (1996) 40. See also Chapter 3.5
"The Dilution Debate" supra.
81 Martino (1996) 35.
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infringement doctrine.f The dilution rationale stands in sharp contrast with the
confusion of source rationale, on which the traditional infringement doctrine was based.83
The issue of federal pre-emption could also have played a role in the courts' failure to
apply the dilution rationale.i" Other reasons could be an antipathy to modem advertising,
judicial unwillingness to recognise a trade mark as property and relegation of the public
interest to a role subordinate to private interests.f State dilution laws lacked uniformity
and consistency in application." Some scholars rate the application of the dilution
concept by the state courts in general as largely unsuccessful. 87
The protection given by the courts was seen as inadequate. The reason was that many
courts did not grasp the concept, despite the apparently clear language of the Model Bill.
The absence of any definition of the term "dilution" in the state statutes perhaps also
contributes to this.88 Klieger89 comments that "dilution is an amorphous concept" and
that no state dilution statute exactly addresses the questions what dilution is or how it can
be proven. The courts were reluctant to enforce a dilution claim standing alone. By way
of example, the courts, especially those of New York, sought some other basis, such as
the traditional likelihood of confusion, before they were prepared to give an injunction in
a dilution case.90 The reasoning in some cases was that distinctive trade marks already
82 See Taviss (1990) 1458. See also Garcia (1995) 495-496 who discusses the inclusion of the confusion
requirement by some of the state courts when interpreting their common-law dilution doctrines.
83 See Patti shall (1984) 308; Patti shall (1977) 622; Chapter 3.3 "Traditional Infringement contrasted with
Dilution" supra.
84 Martino (1996) 38-39. Federal pre-emption means that federal law, here the Lanham Act, overrules the
state laws. An analysis of the federal pre-emption doctrine is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
However, as noted by Martino, "nothing in the Lanham Act or its legislative history evinces an express
or implied intent to preclude all state regulation of trade marks".
85 Martino (1996) 40.
86 Kim (2001) 727.
87 Gilson (1999) § 5.l2[1)[a) & [b), although he mentions that there were a few exceptions. McCarthy
(1998) 587 states that the state dilution laws were very seldom useful or effective. Port (1995) 530
comments that "no court accepted the true expansive meaning of dilution as expressed in the state
statutes". See also Klieger (1997) 815-819; Kim (2001) 727.
88 Pattishall (1977) 617.
89 Klieger (1997) 794, 816-817.
90 Patti shall (1963) 621-622; Martino (1996) 36. In 1977 Pattishall 612 declared that "[i)t is a sad
commentary (and an unhappy testimonial) to our judicial process that the courts have not yet fully
appreciated the concept of dilution". He goes on to say "it is especially disconcerting to read opinions
which, despite state statutes clearly declaring that confusion is not a premise of dilution, still cling to the
commonplace that dilution cannot be recognized as actionable unless the element of 'likely confusion'
is present". He referred (at 613) to numerous courts which "have stated stubbornly and illogically that
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enjoy fairly broad protection against use on unrelated products under the normal
likelihood of confusion doctrine in the Lanham Act.91 Contrary to this approach, some
courts held that when confusion is present the dilution statutes could not be applied.92
Some courts, notably the Illinois courts,93 maintained that dilution protection could only
be afforded in the case of non-competing goods. As a result they either ignored the
dilution aspect or just remarked on it briefly at the end of a judgment. The New York
lower courts" have nevertheless also applied the New York statute in cases where the
products were in competition. It was also difficult to get a nationwide injunction under
state law, forcing some trade-mark owners of famous national marks to institute multiple
actions in different states in order to protect their trade marks from dilution.95 The
differences in state dilution laws also encouraged forum-shopping." Another point of
debate regarding state dilution law is about the meaning and content of distinctiveness.
Some courts reasoned that only famous marks are entitled to protection, while others
accepted a lower standard of distinctiveness.97 The amount of protection that should be
afforded to trade marks was also at issue."
relief from dilution requires evidence of likelihood of confusion". See cases cited there, inter alia
Haviland & Co., Inc. v. Johann Haviland China Corporation 269 F.Supp. 928, 1967 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11333, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) and Cue Publishing Co., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive
Company45 Misc. 2d 161,256 N.Y.S.2d 239,1965 N.Y. Mise LEXIS 2303,144 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 371,
affd. 23 A.D.2d 829,259 N.Y.S.2d 377, 1965 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4224,145 U.S.P.Q. 736 (1965)
discussed in Chapter 4.3.3.1 "Second Circuit Cases" infra. See also Schwartz D & Morfesi D "Dilution
Comes of Age: the United States, Europe and South Africa" (1997) 87 The Trademark Reporter 436 at
444.
91 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[2][a].
92 See Pattishall (1977) 614, as well as cases cited in fn 48.
93 Illinois falls into the Seventh Circuit. See Gilson (1999) § 5.12[2][a] fn 119 for a list of these cases.
94 New York forms part of the Second Circuit.
95 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][b]; Garcia (1995) 517-520. In the case Deere & Co. v. MTD Products Inc., 41
F.3d 39, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d 1936 (2nd Cir. 1994) the Second Circuit court explicitly recognised its authority
to issue nationwide injunctions, although it upheld the district court's injunction limited to the State of
New York.
96 Belongia HL "Why is Fame Still Confusing? Misuse of the 'Niche Market Theory' Under the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act" (2002) 51 DePaul Law Review 1159 at 1172.
97 Taviss (l990) 1464. See also discussion in Chapter 4.3.3 "Cases under State Dilution Laws" infra.
Compare to the situation under the Federal Act discussed in Chapter 4.10.2 "Distinctiveness" infra.
98 Lee (2002) 70 I.
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4.3.2 SOLUTIONS OFFERED
Varying solutions were offered by legal scholars. Derenberg favoured the Schechterian
notion that protection must be limited to coined, unique or fanciful marks. He uses the
collective term "celebrated marks".99 Lunsford100 proposed that the doctrine must be
applied to all valuable and distinctive trade marks through a federal dilution statute. In a
comment published in the Harvard Law Reviewlol the view was expressed that it would
be more desirable to confine dilution protection to coined or fanciful marks, but that there
might be marks which had acquired strong secondary meanings that also deserved
protection from dilution. Others also put the emphasis on the distinctiveness of the mark.
A mark can acquire distinctiveness before it becomes well known and therefore there
should not be a limitation to celebrated or famous marks.
Pattishall also strongly favoured protecting the distinctiveness 102 of the mark and saw it
as the only quality that is to be protected.l'" It is a question of fact regarding the state of
mind of the relevant market which can be proved, in contrast to the abstract question of
invention or coining.l'" He also felt that there are enough safeguards against wholesale
application built into this method of protection. He therefore contended that the
protection of the distinctive quality or commercial magnetism of a trade mark should not
necessarily be limited to coined, unique, fanciful, invented or arbitrary marks. JOS He
found no social or commercial justification for such a limitation. According to him that
would rather lead to "patent"-like protection for coined or invented trade marks. Also,
the state dilution statutes do not require such a limitation. He goes on to say: "The
limitation logically implicit in them is entirely adequate and may be described as follows:
99 Derenberg WJ "The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Antidilution Statutes" (1956) 44 California
Law Review 439 at 451.
100 Lunsford JR "Trademarks: Dilution and Deception" (1973) 63 The Trademark Reporter 41 at 53-55.
101 Harvard note (1964) 197-198.
102 Distinctiveness can stem from the mark's uniqueness, long use, the superior quality of the goods for
which it has been used, the skillful, appealing or extensive advertising of the mark or a combination of
these factors. The way distinctiveness is attained should however be immaterial to the dilution
question. See Pattishall (1977) 621.
103 Pattishall (1977) 617.
104 Pattishall (1977) 621.
105 Pattishall (1977) 620-621.
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'That which does not have a distinctive quality may not be protected. '" This distinctive
quality or commercial magnetism, which a mark can enjoy, can only be acquired by
commercial use.106 If the state courts could see the concept in this way, he believed that
the legal problems relating to the state statutes would become much more manageable.
But some scholars like Middleton 107 viewed the whole concept of dilution as unwarranted
and superfluous. He argued that it amounted to affording "patents" or "copyrights" on
words. His answer to dilution was that the "likelihood of confusion" rationale should just
be extended when necessary. Pattishall criticises both his attack on dilution and his
solution for the problem of dilution.i'"
Pattishall, in 1977, ascribed a lot of the problems surrounding dilution to a
misunderstanding of the concept.l'" However, state dilution law had developed gradually
to the point in 1984 where Pattishall could state that "recent decisions are disclosing a
maturing legal grasp of the anti-dilution concept"."O He also commented that these
courts noted and rejected the errors of many previous decisions. The definitions of
dilution given in these later decisions also appear to be quite sound and clear. I II Despite
this "dawn of anti-dilution enlightenment", as Pattishall calls it, some of the district
courts, while even recognising that confusion is not part of the dilution doctrine, still
required a likelihood of confusion for a finding of dilution.112
106 See the example of KODAK Pattishall uses at 621 to demonstrate his view.
107 Middleton GE "Some Reflections on Dilution" (1952) 42 The Trademark Reporter 175 at 179, 187;
Middleton GE "Some Aspects of Trademark Dilution" (1957) 47 The Trademark Reporter 1023 at
1032, 1033.
108 See Patti shall (1977) 618.
109 Patti shall (1977) 613.
110 Pattishall (1984) 291. A few years later Garcia (1995) 524 also mentions positive changes to "anti-
dilution" theory and states that the outcome of dilution cases in the state courts has become "more
predictable and more easily established".
III See Pattishall (1984) 295-297. He quotes definitions from various court cases decided after the
watershed judgment in Allied Maintenance Corporation v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d
538,369 N.E.2d 1162, 1977 N.Y. LEXIS 2429, 399 N.Y.S.2d 628,198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 418 (1977),
which is discussed in Chapter 4.3.3.1. "Second Circuit Cases" infra.
112 See Pattishall (1984) 297 for references to these cases.
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Notwithstanding the enactment of the Federal Trademark Dilution Actl13 in 1995 the
state dilution laws will continue to be of importance. The main reason is that the federal
law does not pre-empt the existing state laws and even common law. This means that
action can still be brought under state law, for example, in cases where a trade mark does
not have the required fame or is not used in an extensive geographical area.114 Trade-
mark owners will certainly chose federal recourse, wherever possible. In practice, they
will normally institute action under the Federal Act, but also in the alternative under the
state dilution law. The fact that federal dilution protection is available may, however,
lead to the situation where state law becomes obsolete and may even be withdrawn. I IS
State law precedent will, however, especially in the first few years of the Federal Act,
play an important role in the interpretation of that statute. The "Sweet Test" formulated
under the New York dilution law may, according to Gilson, become integral in
interpreting the Federal Trademark Dilution ACt.116
4.3.3 CASES UNDER STATE DILUTION LAWS
4.3.3.1 SECOND CIRCUIT CASES
New York forms the centre of the Second Circuit.ll7 In the earlier court decisions
interpreting the New York dilution statute, it was given a quite narrow interpretation.l "
One of these cases was Cue Publishing v. Colgate Palmolive.ll9 The plaintiff sought
protection for his trade mark CUE for a magazine guide to dining and entertainment in
New York against use of the same mark for toothpaste by the well-known manufacturer
of toothpaste, soap and detergent products. Relief was denied, inter alia, because there
113 Discussed in Chapter 4.7 "The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995" infra.
114 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1 ][c][iv]; Schwartz and Morfesi (1997) 447.
115 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][e].
116 See Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][t][v][A].
117 Other states in the Second Circuit are Connecticut and Vermont.
118 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[2][c].
119 Cue Publishing Co., Inc. v. Colgate-Palmolive Company 45 Misc. 2d 161,256 N.Y.S.2d 239, 1965
N.Y. Misc LEXlS 2303, 144 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 371, affirmed 23 A.D.2d 829, 259 N.Y.S.2d 377, 1965
N.Y. App. Div. LEXTS 4224, 145 U.S.P.Q. 736 (1965).
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was no likelihood of confusion, also no possible injury to the business reputation of the
plaintiff.
Both parties had registered the name CUE in the United States Patent Office, plaintiff in
1935 and defendant in 1939, as well as in a number of states. The defendant has actually
been using CUE for over 25 years at the time of the trial, although not continuously. The
court also remarked on the standing, status and stature of the defendant corporation, from
which it was clear that they did not try to ride on plaintiffs goodwill. The court, after
interpreting previous case law, established that "some measure of confusion" must be
present for a finding of dilution. The plaintiff had also failed to prove "distinctive
quality" which is necessary in a dilution claim. CUE is a simple word of the English
language and no secondary meaning had been acquired by plaintiffs use of the mark
CUE. Plaintiff also claimed tarnishment as a separate ground of action. It alleged that
the advertisements for CUE toothpaste would create oral hygiene connotations for the
name CUE, which are grossly inconsistent with their use of name as symbol for fine
dining. The court found this argument farfetched and without merit, also commenting
that CUE magazine had not yet achieved the same amount of fame as for example
Tiffany and Rolls Royce.
Another early decision of the Southern District Court of New York also reflected the
reluctance of the courts to embrace the dilution concept. In Haviland & Co., Inc. v.
Johann Haviland China Corporation't'' the court stated: "Plaintiff cannot claim right to
relief under the New York State anti-dilution statute, since it has failed to show
likelihood of confusion or unfair intent on the defendant's part." This was the common
view held by courts at that stage.!"
120 Haviland & Co., Inc. v. Johann Haviland China Corporation 269 F.Supp. 928 at 957, 1967 U.S. Dist.
LEXlS 11333, 154 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). The parties marketed different types of
chinaware and therefore, although competitors, could not be described as direct competitors.
121 See Patti shall (1977) 612.
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In the years following these and other decisions, the Second Circuit courts granted more
esteem to the dilution statute and also increased its application.V' In the landrnark'i"
1977 case of Allied Maintenance v. Allied Mechanical Trades,124 the court broke with the
long-standing judicial reluctance to apply the clear language of state dilution statutes.125
The court clearly stated that the statute meant exactly what it states - it did not require
proof of either likelihood of confusion or competition. It was designed to provide
protection above and beyond the traditional trade-mark protection for infringement or
unfair competition. It accepted that the provision should be interpreted literally to
effectuate its intended purpose, namely protection against dilution, which they defined as
"a cancer-like growth of dissimilar products or services which feeds upon the business
reputation of an established distinctive trademark or name". It was, however, stressed
that it is only marks that are truly distinctive or have acquired secondary meaning that
deserve this protection. This reasoning appeared to be consistent with Schechter's
interpretation of the concept of dilution.126
The plaintiff had since 1888 cleaned and maintained office buildings. The defendant
started in 1968 to install and repair heating, ventilating and air-conditioning equipment.
Neither competition nor likelihood of confusion was found by the Appellate Division.
The majority emphasised that dilution relief was available. They, however, found that
122 Port (1995) 532, however, disagrees. He holds the opinion that the courts remained "extremely
hesitant" to apply the dilution doctrine. According to his research dilution has arisen only 159 times in
federal courts of appeal between 1977 and 1995. An injunction was sustained solely on the basis of
dilution in only 40fthese cases. These cases were Ringling Bros-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows,
Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet Inc., 855 F.2d 480, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1072 (th Cir. 1988); Hyatt Corp. v.
Hyatt Legal Services, 736 F.2d 1153, 222 U.S.P.Q.2d 669 (th Cir. 1984); The Instrumentalist Co. v.
Marine Corps League and the United States Marine Youth Foundation Inc., 694 F.2d 145, 1982 U.S.
App. LEXIS 23832, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 951 (th Cir. 1982); Community Federal Savings and Loan
Ass'n v. Orondorff, 678 F.2d 1034, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 18225; 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 26 (11th Cir.
1982); all discussed in Chapter 4.3.3.2 "Seventh Circuit Cases" and Chapter 4.3.3.4 "Eleventh Circuit
Cases" infra.
123 This case was also described as "the beginning of a new age of dilution" and "triggering a renaissance
in dilution application". See Martino (1996) 40, 44. Handler (1985) 277 refers to a "one-hundred
eighty degree shift in the judicial attitude towards the anti dilution legislation".
124 Allied Maintenance Corporation v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 538, 369 N.E.2d 1162,
1977 N.Y. LEXIS 2429, 399 NYS.2d 628, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 418 (1977).
125 Taviss (1990) 1459; Klieger (1997) 819; Welkowitz DS "Protection against Trademark Dilution in the
U.K. and Canada: Inexorable Trend or will Tradition Triumph?" (2000) 24 Hastings International and
Comparative Law Review 63 at 68 fn 18.
126 Port (1995) 531.
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the word ALLIED MAINTENANCE had not acquired the necessary secondary meaning
and thus distinctive quality, but in contrast, was a weak, generic or descriptive trade
name. Thus, although dilution proponents view this case as an important turning point in
the acceptance by the courts of the dilution concept, they actually rely on a case where
the court did not find dilution.l'"
Judge Cooke, in a dissenting opinion, addressed the distinctiveness issue.128 He
expressed the view that a narrow, overly technical interpretation would dilute the dilution
statute. He suggested a broader view in the light of the wider protection available under
the State common law. He stressed the fact that a less well-known name can also be
diluted and that the effect can even be more harmful than in the case of a well-known
mark. He saw the name ALLIED as having acquired a secondary meaning amongst a
certain segment of the public and should therefore be granted protection.
From the Allied case it was clear that there were two requirements that must be satisfied
in a dilution claim. In the first place, the senior mark had to be distinctive and secondly,
there had to be a likelihood of dilution. 129 Distinctiveness can be acquired through the
inherent strength of the mark or through an acquired secondary meaning. A secondary
meaning is attained when the public has come to associate a certain mark only with a
specific product. In Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund130 the Oregon Supreme Court
attempted to define this concept of distinctiveness more clearly. The court said that the
value of a mark was in its advertising and selling power and it was against this
background that distinctiveness had to be interpreted. This selling power consisted of the
favourable associations that attracted customers, sometimes called "commercial
magnetism". The selling power, according to the court, could develop over time. In
other words, the mark could gain a secondary meaning and thus become distinctive.
127 See Port (I995) 531.
128 See also comments of Martino (1996) 42.
129 See Taviss (1990) 1460; Martino (1996) 41. The court in Wedgwood, infra, saw only "diminution of
the uniqueness" of a mark as fulfilling the second requirement of "likelihood of dilution".
130 Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund, 294 Or. 493, 659 P.2d 377 (1983). See Chapter 4.3.3.3 "Ninth Circuit
Cases" infra for a more detailed discussion.
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The appeal court in Sally Gee v. Myra Hogan,131 although not finding dilution,
nevertheless clarified the circumstances under which it applies. They emphasised the fact
that it is the selling power of a mark that the courts seek to protect and that consumer
confusion and direct competition are not elements of a dilution claim.132 The two-
pronged Allied test was used, but the court held that only very strong marks that are in
effect famous, could be regarded as distinctive. The court held further that the only
possible types of dilution under the likelihood of dilution requirement were blurring or
tarn ishment. Although the SALLY GEE mark was recognised as fairly strong and
fanciful, neither blurring nor tarnishment could be proved. The court also took an unduly
narrow view of the concept of selling power. It appears that the fact that the junior user's
use was on a product of greater quality caused the court to decide that there was no
diminution of the sell ing power of the mark SALLY GEE. I33 However, the reputation of
an inexpensive product is not less valuable than that of a more exclusive product. The
court also took into account the absence of predatory intent. Patti shall criticised this
inclusion of wrongful intent as a requisite element of a dilution action.i "
In Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, US.A., Inc.135even more content was
added to the New York dilution provision.l " The controversial "Sweet Test" was also
formulated by Judge Sweet in his concurring opinion in this case. Mead Data was using
131 Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621,1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 30710, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
658 (2nd Cir. 1983).
132 Contrary to the finding of the district court. The applicant tried to protect the registered trade mark
SALLY GEE used on low-priced women's apparel against the use of the name SALLY LEE for highly
priced, high-quality, hand-made women's apparel.
133 See Garcia (1995) 505, who argues that part of Sally Gee's interest in its mark related to its reputation
for the value that its ready-made clothes offered consumers. The appeal of Sally Gee's clothing can
thus also be diminished by higher-quality, more expensive hand-made clothing.
134 Patti shall (1984) 307. See other cases cited there. See also Pattishall BW "The Impact of Intent in
Trade Identity Cases" (1970) 65 NW U L Rev 421, reprinted in (1970) 60 The Trademark Reporter 575
for a general discussion of the nature, historical development, proof and appearance in case law of
intent in the broader context of trade identity law.
135 Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc 875 F.2d 1026, 1032, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1961
(2nd Cir. 1989). This case is regarded as one of the leading cases under New York's dilution law. See
Schwartz and Morfesi (1997) 441. See also the summary of the case in Schwartz and Morfesi (1997)
441-444.
136 Port (1995) 540 uses this case as an example of the reluctance of the courts to apply the dilution
doctrine, as the Second Circuit Court required a demonstration of confusion, as well as a high degree of
fame, despite the clear language of the New York dilution statute to the contrary.
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the registered trade mark LEXIS 137 for an on-line legal research service. The appeal
court indicated that LEXlS was a strong mark in the legal and computerised legal
research fields, although the general public did not associate LEXlS with any particular
product. The court declared that "lexis" was a common word in the English language.
There was also evidence of several other companies using the word "lexis" in their trade
names. Toyota Motor Corporation then started to use the name LEXUS on a new range
of luxury automobiles for well-educated, professional consumers.l " Mead Data claimed
dilution under the New York dilution statute. The appeal court accepted the two
elements defined in the Allied case, namely, sufficient distinctive quality capable of
dilution and likelihood of dilution, but also imposed a third requirement of mark
similarity. They also accurately defined dilution as requiring "some mental association
between the marks". They, however, rejected Mead Data's claim.139 The main
contentions of the court were that LEXIS and LEXUS were insufficiently similar and that
the LEXIS mark was distinctive only within a narrow group of sophisticated purchasers,
with the result that LEXIS has very little selling power outside that market. For these
reasons blurring was unlikely. The court required substantial similarity before they
would apply the dilution doctrine. They believed that the requisite mark similarity did
not exist between LEXlS and LEXUS, because lawyers and television and radio
announcers in commercial advertising would pronounce the words LEXlS and LEXUS
differently. For blurring to occur, the court stated that there must be "some kind of
mental association" between the marks of the plaintiff and the defendant. They found
that in the eyes of the general public, LEXIS had no distinctive quality that LEXUS
137 The applicant claimed that this coined word was a combination of "lex", the Latin word for law and
"I.S." an acronym for Information System.
138 The Project Manager took the name Alexis, suggested by a marketing company, dropped the "A" and
arrived at Lexis. He claimed that he was not aware of Mead's LEXIS mark. He changed the "i" for an
"u" because he felt that it connoted luxury. See Martino (1996) 47.
139 The district court had granted the dilution claim, noting that LEXUS would become extremely well-
known and that the advertising value of the LEXIS mark would be diminished and diluted. Mead Data
Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 702 F.Supp. 1031 (S.D.N.Y. 1988). See the discussion
in Martino (1996) 48-49.
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would dilute.14o The sophistication of LEX IS' clients also played an important role in the
final outcome of this case.
The majority has been criticised for not defining blurring adequately, by making only
"vague conclusions about mental associations and limited markets". It is not possible to
ascertain from their reasoning why they came to their conclusion or how the dilution or
blurring test must be applied in future cases.l" Their only contribution seems to be the
holding that dilution cannot occur absent substantial mark similarity.r'"
Judge Sweet gave a concurring opinion, but disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
LEXIS was not a strong mark capable of dilution. Although he also was in favour of the
two-part Allied test, he held a different view of the factors necessary for a finding of
dilution. With regard to the question of distinctive quality, he remarked that the
majority's view limited protection to nationally famous marks.143 He saw the renown of
the senior mark as a factor to determine likelihood of dilution, and not distinctiveness.
His opinion was that the interest protected is the selling power that a distinctive mark has
created in the mind of the consuming public. As LEXIS has selling powerl44 amongst its
consuming public, it should be protectabie as a distinctive mark. Taviss agrees with this
reasoning of Judge Sweet and also points out what he regards, as the faulty reasoning of
the majority.l'"
Judge Sweet, in his opinion, formulated the following unified, six-factor test, after
reviewing previous anti-dilution cases in the Second Circuit, to determine whether there
was a sufficient likelihood of blurring to constitute a likelihood of dilution:
140 If this case had been decided under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, the outcome probably would
have been the same as LEXIS is not a famous trade mark according to the eight factor test laid down in
the Act. See Chapter 4.7.1 "Definition of Dilution in the Act" infra.
141 See Taviss (1990) 1472.
142 Martino (1996) 51.
143 See also the discussion by Taviss (1990) 1468.
144 Also called commercial magnetism. See Taviss (1990) 1472.
145 Taviss (1990) 1472. See also the critical discussion of this case by Port (1995) 540-544. He concluded
at 543 that the "judicially-crafted contortions used to avoid an injunction based upon trade-mark
dilution can only lead to the conclusion that at least the Second Circuit is not receptive to the dilution
cause of action."
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(1) The similarity of the marks;
(2) The similarity of the products covered by the marks;
(3) The sophistication of the consumers;
(4) Predatory intent;
(5) The renown of the senior mark; and
(6) The renown of the junior mark.
These factors form the standard for a dilution-by-blurring analysis and have been adopted
by virtually all courts hearing subsequent blurring claims.146 Each of these six factors
will now be briefly discussed, followed by an analysis of the response to the "Sweet
Test" by some commentators and in some subsequent cases.
(i) The similarity of the marks
This factor is clearly an important one in the determination of dilution. It is generally
accepted that exact identity between the marks is not required, but the more similar the
marks the higher the likelihood of dilution.147 As there is no exact way to measure
similarity, some say that there must be some mental association between the marks. It is
clear that if the marks are totally dissimilar, dilution cannot be present.l'" Although
Judge Sweet found that LEXIS and LEXUS are similar in pronunciation, he noticed that
there were differences in context and physical appearance. He rejected the majority's
view that mark similarity is separate element of a dilution claim, as this would only cloud
the already difficult application of this concept. This is also stressed by Taviss who holds
the opinion that "mark similarity should not be dispositive of whether a mark deserves
dilution protection".149 He also remarks, that the majority, although finding insufficient
similarity went on with their analysis in the case, thereby showing distrust for the
conclusiveness of their own test. Other decisions in which a likelihood of dilution was
146 Some of these cases will be discussed infra in this Chapter.
147 See for example Garcia (1995) 507.
148 See Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][f][v][A]; Garcia (1995) 508 and examples given there.
149 Taviss (1990) 1471. See infra how he uses this factor in combination with consumer sophistication to
determine the likelihood of dilution.
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found because of the close similarity between the marks, are McDonald's Corporation v.
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(ii) The similarity of the products
According to Judge Sweet the similarity of the products covered by the marks, increases
the likelihood of blurring. As the two products in question, namely automobiles and
computer assisted legal research were so dissimilar, it counted against a finding of
blurring. Some have criticised this factor, as dilution, in the classic sense, could only be
found if the famous mark is used on totally unrelated products. It is, however, generally
accepted that it is also possible for dilution to occur where the goods are similar. Garcia
sees it as an important factor in these cases to determine the rights and obligations of the
parties,152 but this factor would still be more relevant in a likelihood of confusion test.153
Gilson views this one as the only factor that should not be part of the "Sweet Test".154
Patti shall, however, indirectly endorses this factor, when he states that there can be
differences between goods which are so substantial that the use on the second is too
remote to cause dilution of the prior mark.155 This seems to be in contravention with the
traditional dilution theory.
150 McDonald's Corporation v. McBagel's, Inc., 649 F.Supp. 1268 at 1275, 1281, I U.S.P.Q.2d 1761
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). The court prevented by injunction the use of the McBAGEL's trade mark by
defendant in connection with a bagel bakery and restaurant in New York. The court said at 1281 that
"the similar element that associates defendant's name with plaintiff's family of marks, the use of the
'Mc' prefix with the name of a generic food item, is immediately apparent." The distinctiveness of
plaintiffs marks and predatory intent on the side of the defendant were also taken into account in the
court's finding of dilution.
151 Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 599 F.Supp. 1189 at 217 U.S.P.Q. 1137 (E.D.N.Y.
1983). Toys "R" Us, the well-known toy store, also sells children's clothing under its registered trade
mark TOYS "R" US. Defendant then began to sell their children's clothing under the KIDS 'r' US
trade mark. The court determined at 1207 that TOYS "R" US has acquired a secondary meaning and
therefore was distinctive. The court then said: ... "the identity of the "R"US suffixes and the similarity
of the children's products sold by the stores compels me to conclude that the name KIDS 'r' US is
likely to blur TOYS "R" US' product identification." The court also found predatory intent.
152 Garcia (1995) 508-509.
153 See Taviss (1990) 1473 who also finds this factor an inadequate measure of likelihood of dilution, but
fit for the measure of likelihood of confusion. This is also the conclusion of Martino (1996) 52.
154 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][f][v][A].
155 Patti shall (1984) 299.
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(iii) The sophistication of the consumers
If the consumers of the goods bearing the famous mark are quite sophisticated, this factor
will favour the defendant. This was exactly the position in the Mead Data case. This is
because in such a case, it is less likely that the junior mark will dilute the distinctiveness
of the senior mark.156 This factor, together with the similarity of the marks, are the only
true indicators of the likelihood of dilution, according to Taviss.ls7 He sees consumer
sophistication as relevant to the determination of the scope ofa mark's selling power. He
argues as follows: "The smaller the market for a product, the more sophisticated the
consumers must be in order to be aware of the product. In other words, consumer
sophistication is a direct measure of the degree of dilution that is likely to occur." He
sees a balancing of consumer sophistication and the similarity of the marks, as the proper
way of determining the likelihood of dilution. This stands in sharp contrast with the view
of Martino, who sees this factor as a more appropriate measure of the likelihood of
confusion.l'"
(iv) Predatory intent
Predatory intent refers to a conscious decision by the junior user to profit from the
goodwill generated by the senior user's mark. This is regarded, by Gilson, as an entirely
appropriate issue in a dilution context.l '" but Taviss found it of no bearing on the
possibility of dilution.16o Judge Sweet admitted that this factor alone cannot constitute a
cause of action under the New York dilution statute.'?' But the legislative history of the
156 See also Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][f][v][A]. Garcia (1995) 510 states that more sophisticated consumers
are "less likely to suffer confusion about a product's source by the use of similar marks". Thus, Garcia,
citing a few cases as authority, erroneously brings the confusion concept into the test for trade-mark
dilution. If a person is confused as to source, he cannot possibly experience dilution.
157 Taviss (1990) 1474. See also the example he postulates in fn 246.
158 Martino (1996) 53. He says that this is the "clearest indication yet that the Mead minority conflated the
concepts of dilution and confusion".
159 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][f][v][A].
160 Taviss (1990) 1473; Martino (1996) 53-54. They argue that if dilution is likely to occur, it is likely
whether or not the junior user's selection of a mark was intentional. See also criticism against the
inclusion of wrongful intent as a requisite element in a dilution claim by Pattishall (1984) 307.
161 See also Garcia (1995) 511-512.
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New York statute offers support for predatory intent as a relevant factor to determine
dilution162 in the following words: "the owners of established trade-marks may be
expected to welcome protection of their good names against attempts by infringers, with
infinite other words to choose from, to obtain a free ride.,,163 If it can be demonstrated
that the junior user acted in bad faith, believing that he can benefit commercially from the
fame or repute of the senior mark, this will certainly be regarded as strong evidence of
predatory intent.164 Mere knowledge by the junior user of the senior mark is not enough
for a finding of predatory intent. At the same time, if all the other factors indicate a
finding of blurring, the fact that the junior user acted in good faith will not be of much
help to his case. In numerous decisions this factor was recognised as relevant to
determine dilution.l'" but it can be very difficult to prove. Prior knowledge of the senior
mark, open confessions and even the timing of use by the defendant, can indicate
predatory intent.166
In the Deere v. MTD Products case167 the court noted the factor of predatory intent, as
formulated in Mead Data, but stated that New York law has not "authoritatively
clarified" what "predatory intent" means in a dilution claim. Therefore, they handled the
concept very cautiously, but noted that it can be helpful in the context of trade-mark
parody or alteration. In a previous case, Sally Gee v. Myra Hogan,168 the absence of
predatory intent by the junior user was also found to be a relevant factor in assessing a
claim under the anti-dilution statute.
162 See Garcia (1995) 512.
163 N.Y. Leg. Ann. 49 (1954), quoted in Mead Data Central Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, US.A., Inc., 875
F.2d 1026 at 1037, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1961 (2nd Cir. 1989).
164 See Mostert FW "Well-known and Famous Marks: is Harmony Possible in the Global Village?" (1996)
86 The Trademark Reporter 103 at 123 quoting from Miles Alexander's statement at the 1995 INTA
Annual Meeting.
165 See authority cited in the Mead Data case at 1037 and the cases discussed infra. There is, however,
some authority where this factor was omitted. See Clinique Laboratories, Inc., v. Dep Corp., 945 F.
Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). This omission was criticised by Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1 ][t][v][A].
166 The courts normally draw inferences from all the circumstances of use by the junior user. This might
be potentially unfair towards the junior user. See Garcia (1995) 512.
167 Deere & Co. v. MTD Prod., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, U.S.P.Q. 2d 1936 (2nd Cir. 1994), discussed infra in this
section.
168 See Sally Gee, Inc. v. Myra Hogan, Inc., 699 F.2d 621, 1983 U.S. App. LEXIS 30710, 217 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 658 (2nd Cir. 1983) supra in this section.
III
(v) The renown of the senior mark
This factor is still heavily debated in the legal literature on dilution law. For some it is
quite obviously relevant in the dilution context.169 This is especially demonstrated by the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act, where it is not only a requirement for a dilution claim
that the senior mark must be famous, but where there is also a list of factors included for
the determination of a famous mark.17o The argument runs that the more well known a
senior mark is, the more likely it is that the junior mark will blur its capacity to
distinguish goods. Although Judge Sweet found LEXIS to be a strong, distinctive mark,
it lacked the renown necessary for a finding of a likelihood of blurring.171 Garcia views
renown to be identical with the "strength" of the mark, but she also holds the opinion that
only well-known marks merit protection from dilution. The inclusion of this factor in the
dilution test was, however, criticised by Taviss, who contends that an unknown mark can
just as easily be diluted as a famous mark.172 He actually believes that a famous mark is
less likely to be diluted, because of its established value in the minds of consumers.
(vi) The renown of the junior mark
This factor comprises the prospect that a junior mark may become so famous that it will
overwhelm the senior mark. The result might be that the junior user would then be
entitled to the same protection as that which the senior user is seeking. It was used in the
Mead Data case in a newcomer situation, where the junior user was just entering the
market. This factor supported the likelihood of dilution of the LEXIS mark by the
LEXUS mark, the junior mark in this case, as the court found that the use by Toyota of
the LEXUS mark could ultimately overtake the senior user's use. Judge Sweet
mentioned, though, that situations where the junior mark has the potential of becoming so
famous that it would overwhelm the senior mark, will arise quite rarely in dilution cases.
169 See Martino (1996) 54 who sees renown of the senior mark as a "true measurement" for dilution relief.
170 See discussion of the Act and the specific factors in Chapter 4.7.1 "Definition of Dilution in the Act"
and Chapter 4.7.2 "Discussion of the Different Factors" infra.
171 He accepted the general rule at that stage that the senior mark need not be famous. It must be kept in
mind that the state dilution laws did not require a mark to be famous before it qualified for protection.
172 Taviss (1990) 1473.
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Gilson, while admitting the speculative element of this factor, feels that it should be
retained and definitely applied to newcomer situations.V'
(vii) Balancing the factors
The last step to determine the likelihood of dilution by blurring would then be the
balancing of the mentioned factors. Judge Sweet found that the only factor which
favoured Mead Data, was the fact that LEXUS may become so famous that members of
the general public who now associate LEXIS or LEXUS with nothing at all may associate
it in time with Toyota's automobiles and that Mead's customers may think first of
Toyota's car when they hear the word LEXlS. All the other factors, especially the degree
of consumer sophistication, weighed heavily against a finding of dilution in this case.
(viii) Comments on the "Sweet Test"
According to Taviss, Judge Sweet had instinctively applied the proper emphasis and
balance in his analysis.l " Although some other commentators, like Garcia also find this
a well-defined balancing test for determining likelihood of dilution,175 criticism against
the use of the "Sweet Test" is widespread.
McCarthy sees these factors as "the offspring of classical likelihood of confusion
analysis'v" For this reason he finds them not very helpful or relevant to resolve a
dilution by blurring claim. In his opinion factors two, three, four and six are not
appropriate in a dilution claim and use of this test will therefore "lead to erroneous
results". Similarity of products should not be a factor as dilution law traditionally applies
in cases where the products are neither competing nor related. Sophisticated customers
will not think there is a connection between the products, but will know that there are two
173 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1 ][t][ v][A]. The use of this factor was however criticised by the court in Clinique
Laboratories, Inc., v. Dep Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), which argued that this factor will
always favour the junior user, because his mark will never be famous.
174 See Taviss (1990) 1474.
175 Garcia (1995) 506.
176 McCarthy § 24:94.1.
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different sources of goods. Thus, sophistication of customers has little place in a blurring
analysis. Blurring occurs in consumers' minds, regardless of the junior user's intent and
predatory intent carries for this reason not much weight in a blurring claim. McCarthy
believes that the renown of the junior mark "has relevance only because the dilution
caused by blurring is more, not less, likely if the junior user has a strong, independent
image and reputation for its mark."
Klieger177 also states that only a few of these factors have any relevance to whether a
particular junior use will weaken the selling power of a mark. One point of criticism is
against the first two factors, similarity of the marks and similarity of the products, which
are used to determine whether there is a mental connection between the two marks, but
do not tell whether the selling power of the mark is threatened. In his view consumer
sophistication should not playa roll in the determination of the effect on the selling
power of the mark. Also, the intent of the junior user to dilute the selling power should
bear little relation to the likelihood of dilution. The renown of the senior mark can be
used to determine whether a particular mark qualifies for dilution, rather than to
determine the likelihood of dilution. The renown of the junior mark is relevant only
where the junior use is so prominent that it alone can destroy the selling power of the
senior mark.
McCabe, like McCarthy, states that four of these factors, namely the similarity of the
products, sophistication of consumers, predatory intent and renown of the junior mark
incorporate a likelihood of confusion standard into the dilution enquiry.i" He, however,
feels that they must be considered in the light of the dilution standard and in conjunction
with other dilution factors. He critisises the "Sweet Test" for not incorporating the most
important factor in determining a dilution claim, namely the mental association made
between the two marks. Two of the factors, nevertheless, implicitly evaluate this mental
association: the sophistication of the consumers and the predatory intent of the junior
177 See Klieger (1997) 826-827 for a more detailed discussion.
178 McCabe (2000) 1853.
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user.179 In spite of his criticism, he still feels that the creation of a dilution standard
"marks an important milestone in the recognition oftrade-mark dilution".
Martino gives credit to Judge Sweet for his "genuine attempt" to establish a coherent
framework for testing likelihood of dilution. He, however, criticises this test as it is
unclear precisely how each of the factors is to be weighed or applied. He also feels that
Judge Sweet failed to distinguish between the concepts of dilution and confusion, as the
factors used closely resemble those of the likelihood of confusion test.180
According to Taviss,181 the Mead Data case is an illustration of the flaws in modern
dilution analysis. He sees both the majority and concurring opinions as further clouding
the application of the dilution doctrine. Judicial treatment of the concept remains
inconsistent. Despite this criticism, the majority of the "Sweet Factors" are seen as a
helpful guide to determine whether there is dilution by blurring.182
This decision was followed in other Second Circuit Court of Appeals cases,183 as well as
quite a number of district courts. Some courts also applied these factors to cases under
the Federal Trademark Dilution ACt.184 The "Sweet Test" was also however rejected by
some courts interpreting the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.185
Also in the Deere v. MTD Products case,186 concerning a rarely litigated issue, the
Second Circuit Court upheld a dilution-based injunction. This was the first time that the
court had to decide whether the use of an altered version of a distinctive trade mark to
identify a competitor's product in comparative advertising, can constitute trade-mark
dilution. Deere is the world's largest supplier of agricultural equipment and has used the
179 McCabe (2000) 1853.
180 Martino (1996) 51-52.
181 Taviss (1990) 1471, 1474.
182 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][f][v][A].
183 Merriam-Webster, Inc. v. Random House, 35 F.3d 65, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 24401, 32 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1010 (2nd Cir. 1994).
184 McCarthy § 24:94.1. See Chapter 4.10 "Case Law under The Federal Trademark Dilution Act" infra.
185 See the discussion in Chapter 4.10 "Case Law under The Federal Trademark Dilution Act" infra.
186 Deere & Co. v.MTD Prod., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, U.S.P.Q. 2d 1936 (2nd Cir. 1994).
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DEERE logo as a trade mark for over hundred years. MTD manufactures and sells lawn
tractors. They wanted to make an advertisement, identifying Deere as the market leader,
but conveying the message that their YARD-MAN tractor was of comparable quality, but
less costly than the Deere equivalent. They altered the DEERE logo in such a way that in
the advertisement one sees, in an animated version, a deer that appears smaller than a
small dog and scampers away from the dog and a lawn tractor, looking over its shoulder
in apparent fear. This was done in a humorous, amusing way. Action was brought under,
infer alia, the New York anti-dilution statute.187
Under section 368-d the plaintiff must prove that his trade mark is truly distinctive or has
acquired secondary meaningl88 and that there is a "likelihood of dilution". Traditionally,
this court has defined dilution either as blurring or as tamishment. The court believed
that the facts in this case did not fit under either of these theories, but stated that these
two do not comprise all possible uses that can dilute a mark under the New York
statute.l'" Although the court was hesitant about broadening this section to prohibit all
uses of a distinctive mark that the owner does not like,190 promoting sales by poking fun
at well-known marks of others could not be allowed. The degree and nature of the
alteration must, however, be taken into account. The court concluded that in this case
there was "the risk that consumers would likely attribute unfavourable characteristics to
the mark and ultimately associate the mark with inferior goods and services."
The Hormel case!" followed shortly afterwards. The appellant relied on the Deere case,
however, without any success.l'" The appellant, producer of luncheon meat, has a
187 New York Gen. Bus. Law § 368-d (l984). Violation of § 43(a) of the Lanham Act was also alleged.
Common-law claims of unfair competition and unjust enrichment were also filed.
188 This was not disputed in the case.
189 Gilson's opinion is that the facts in the Deere case seemed to fit in under tarnishment. See Gilson
(1999) § 5.12[2][c]. Port (personal comments to the author in May 2000) believes that it rather fits into
a separate category, which he calls "imitative dilution". Some scholars also refer to this as
"disparagement". See Chapter 3.4.4 "Disparagement or Imitative Dilution" supra.
190 Tolerable uses will be use of an unaltered mark in comparative advertising or parody of a mark for
social comment by someone not selling a product. There may be a slight risk of dilution, but it is
tolerated in the interest of broad opportunities for expression.
191 HormeI Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prod., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1516 (2nd Cir. 1996).
192 HormeI Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prod., Inc., 73 F.3d 497 at 507, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1516 (2nd Cir. 1996).
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distinctive, widely recognised mark, SPAM. The respondent intended to use a character
named "Spa-am" on merchandise related to his film, "Muppet Treasure Island".
Appellant sued for trade-mark infringement and dilution. The court denied an injunction
on both grounds. Concerning the dilution claim, the court first identified the two
elements of a dilution claim under section 368-d, namely ownership of a distinctive mark
and a likelihood of dilution. As the mark was extremely strong, the court just had to
decide the second enquiry. This can be established through either blurring or
tarnishment. The court found that "there is very little likelihood that Henson's parody
will weaken the association between the mark SPAM and Hormel's luncheon meat."
Thus, there was no blurring. Hormei argued that the image of "Spa-am" as a "grotesque,
untidy wild boar would inspire negative and unsavory associations with SPAM luncheon
meat.,,193 It was, however, found that "Spa-am" was a likeable, positive, not unhygienic
character that would not generate any negative associations. This, together with the fact
that the parties are not direct competitors and that the parody inheres in the product, led
the court to find that there was also not a likelihood of dilution under the tarnishment
theory.
4.3.3.2 SEVENTH CIRCUIT CASES
The only state in the Seventh Circuit with a dilution statute is Illinois. The first
application of the Illinois Anti-dilution Statutel94 by the Seventh Circuit Court was in
Polaroid Corporation v. Polaraid Inc.,195 where it was given broad application. Port
regards this case as "the only significant dilution development" between 1930 and
1977.196 Plaintiffs federally registered trade mark POLAROID is a coined or invented
and highly distinctive word that has definitely acquired famous-mark status. It is used on
a wide variety of products, such as optical devices, photographic products, television and
193 Harmel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prod., Inc., 73 F.3d 497 at 507,37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1516 (2nd Cir. 1996).
194 Ill.Ann. Stat. cho 140, § 22 (Smith-Hurd 1986).
195 Polaroid Corporation v. Polaraid Inc., 319 F.2d 830, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 4810, 138 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 265 (7th Cir. 1963). Thejudge said: "We are aware of no Illinois case which has construed this
provision."
196 Port (1995) 530. This comment is in itself remarkable, as Port is a self-declared critic of the dilution
concept. See also Lunsford (1973) 48 who declares that the decision is a landmark case on dilution.
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other electrical devices in every state and at that stage in some seventy foreign countries.
The defendant was a rather small company, specialising in the designing and installation
of refrigeration and heating systems. On the unfair competition claim, the majority
decision was that it is sufficient to show a likelihood of confusion, especially as the
resemblance between the names was so close. This was done by the plaintiff. Proof of
competition between the parties was not required and the claim was upheld.
With the regard to the dilution claim, the court referred to the definition of dilution,
noting that the injury to the advertising value of the trade mark is not immediate, but
inevitably will destroy it. They discerned that dilution is a substantially different action
from infringement, requiring not consumer confusion, but rather continuous eroding use
of the plaintiffs mark. The court also stressed the fact that POLAROID is a strong,
coined name with a widespread reputation and much goodwill. It noted that there were
several incidents of confusion between the names, but clearly stated that even without
any proof thereof, dilution would still have occurred. The court had clearly taken the
dilution provisions at their face value and applied them without reliance on the traditional
confusion doctrine.l'" This set a strong precedent for other courts and issued a clear
warning for those who think of diluting an existing mark.198
Three other decisions by the Seventh Circuit Court during the 1980s resulted in an
injunction based solely on the dilution statute.199 One of these was Ringling Bros.-
Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet Inc_2°o The court
granted injunctive relief against the slogan THE GREATEST USED CAR SHOW ON
EARTH, thereby protecting the slogan, THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH,
registered by the plaintiff as a trade mark. It concluded that the slogan used by the
defendant would blur the strong association that the public has between Ringling
Brothers' mark and its circus and would cause irreparable harm. The plaintiff started to
197 Pattishall (1977) 611, who also mentions additional cases. See also McCabe (2000) 1847.
198 McCabe (2000) 1848.
199 See Port (1995) 532.
200 Ringling Bros-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Celozzi-Ettelson Chevrolet Inc., 855 F.2d
480,8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1072 (7th Cir. 1988).
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use this slogan already in 1891 for its circus. The defendant, a well-known JIlinois car
dealer, erected two signs in 1985 written in big, bold, red circus-style letters with the
words THE GREATEST USED CAR SHOW ON EARTH. It is important to note that
the entire mark of Ringling Brothers was used, just with the insertion of the words "Used
Car". The court found that the plaintiffs slogan, although not coined, was distinctive,
due to the duration of its use, the extensive advertising and promotion and the scope of
the plaintiffs reputation, which is nationwide. The court also stated that the injury
caused by dilution will almost always be irreparable, notwithstanding the fact that it is
almost impossible to measure it or convert it into damages. The court also felt that by
protecting Ringling Brothers' mark, it would not be granting them a monopoly over other
laudatory phrases.
Another fine example, which illustrates the difference between an action based on
infringement and one based on dilution, is Hyatt Corporation v. Hyatt Legal Services.ï"
In the district court the applicant's motion for infringement and unfair competition under
the Lanham Act and dilution under the Illinois Anti-Dilution Act was denied. The Court
of Appeal confirmed that there was no likelihood of confusion between the term HY ATT
for legal services and the trade mark HYATT, the service mark of a well-known and well
regarded hotel operator, due to the distinct difference in the service offered. The court,
however, concluded that the hotel group was entitled to relief for dilution under the
Illinois Anti-Dilution Act. The court went actually further than it did in Polaroid,
because it did not rely on likely confusion as an alternative ground for relief.202 The
court also took a small step towards establishing an analytical framework for determining
distinctiveness.203
HY ATT Hotels at that stage operated about 70 up-market hotels in the United States and
had been in business for twenty-five years. In 1977 HYATT Legal Services was
established in Ohio, providing basic legal services at reasonable prices. At the time of
201 Hyatt Corporation v. Hyatt Legal Services, 736 F.2d 1153,222 U.S.P.Q.2d 669 (th Cir. 1984).
202 See Gilson (1999) § S.12[2][d).
203 Martino (1996) 46.
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the trial, their business had already expanded to sixteen states. The court also required
the two elements, namely distinctiveness and likelihood of dilution, for a finding of
dilution. Although HYATT is a reasonably common name, the court found, after
considering several factors,204that it had become distinctive for HYATT Hotels. To find
dilution the court took notice of two important factors, namely the fact that the marks
were similar and that HYATT Legal Services, the defendant and junior user, made
extensive use of the name, especially through advertising. The court also found
irreparable harm. The court granted a limited remedy and ordered HYATT Legal
Services to change its name_2°5 Port206 comments that it seems odd that the court's
remedy was based on a confusion approach, although confusion is not a requirement for a
dilution claim. The purpose of a dilution claim was thus obfuscated. His opinion is that
the name JOEL HYATT LEGAL SERVICES as suggested by the court, would dilute
HYATT just as much as HYATT LEGAL SERVICES.
In another Seventh Circuit decisiorr " the well-known and famous trade mark BACARDI
for rum was enforced against the user of BACARDI for a jewelry business, engaged in
the repair and manufacture of jewelry. The district court found for the plaintiff on
grounds of federal trade-mark infringement, unfair competition and violation of the
Illinois Anti-dilution Statute. The court said that the use of the trade mark by defendant
created a likelihood of injury to the plaintiffs business and the distinctive quality of the
trade mark, BACARDI, and also caused irreparable damage to their goodwill. This
judgment was affirmed by the Seventh Circuit Appeal Court.
204 The court specifically referred to long-term use, extensive advertising and excellent reputation in the
hotel business. There were also no other national or regional businesses, except for defendant, which
uses the name "Hyatt". See also Chapter 4.3.1 "Protection and Related Problems" supra. Compare the
text above for the factors considered in the Ringling Bros. case.
205 The court did not want to be prescriptive in the process of choosing a new name, but indicated that
something like "Joel Hyatt Legal Services" would be acceptable. Joel Hyatt was a partner and also a
defendant, together with the business. Actually this did not happen and some ten years later the
business was still known as HYATT Legal Services. See Port (1995) 533.
206 Port (1995) 533.
207 Bacardi & Co. Ltd. v. Bacardi Mfg. Jewelers Co., Inc., 1972 U.S. Dixt. LEXIS 13541, 174 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 284 (N.D. III. 1972), affirmed per curiam, 475 F.2d 1406, 1973 U.S. App. LEXIS 10221, 177
U.S.P.Q. 558 (7th Cir. 1973). The same court, however, upheld ajury verdict under this statute on the
ground that EXXON and EXXENE, used on unrelated products, neither looked nor sounded the same.
See Exxon Corp. v. Exxene Corp., 696 F.2d 544, 1982 U.S. App. LEXlS 22955, 217 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
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Another Seventh Circuit decision where the Illinois Anti-dilution Statute was applied, is
The Instrumentalist v. Marine COlpS League and the United States Marine Youth
Foundation_2°8 This is, however, an example of how the dilution statute should not be
applied. The Instrumentalist created and sold a band award known as "The John Philip
Sousa Band Award" to high schools. The name and likeness of John Philip Sousa was
prominently used on the award certificate. In 1973 they finally got a trade-mark
registration on the use of the Sousa name and likeness. The Marine Corps also started
with a band award and in 1980 changed the name of their award to the "John Philip
Sousa Award for Musical Excellence". After objections from the Instrumentalist they
substituted the Sousa-name with "Semper Fidelis", but retained the likeness of Sousa on
the front and his name and biography on the back.
The Instrumentalist brought an action in the district court alleging infringement of their
trade mark. The court ruled that the Instrumentalist had failed to show a "likelihood of
confusion" and therefore had no probability of success on the infringement claim. The
court then granted a preliminary injunction based upon the Illinois Anti-dilution Statute,
although the plaintiff had not pleaded dilution as a cause of action and the parties had not
briefed the court_2°9 The court stated that "the similarity between the defendants'
'Semper Fidelis' Award and the Instrumentalist's award had the potential effect of
'diluting' the distinctiveness of the Sousa Award.,,21o
The Circuit Court affirmed the ruling of the district court. The court said that the
"confusing similarity" of the awards causes the "dilution of the distinctive quality of the
[plaintiff's] mark". Furthermore, the court commented that "[t]his definition of
'confusingly similar' goes beyond mere visual similarity and depends more upon the
215 (th Cir. 1982). The fact that EXXENE was not used as a trade name, also played a role in the
decision.
208 The Instrumentalist Co. v. Marine Corps League and the United States Marine Youth Foundation inc.,
694 F.2d 145, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 23832, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 951 (th Cir. 1982).
209 Port (1995) 532.
210 The instrumentalist Co. v. Marine Corps League and the United States Marine Youth Foundation inc.,
694 F.2d 145 at 149, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS 23832, 216 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 951 (7'h Cir. 1982).
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context in which the plaintiffs trademark .... is used."
4.3.3.3 NINTH CIRCUIT CASES211
The Ninth Circuit in the 1981 case of Toho v. Sears, Roebuck212 correctly interpreted the
dilution doctrine. The court declared that the focus of the dilution doctrine "is on damage
to the mark's inherent value as a symbol, rather than on whether consumers have been
misled as to origin or sponsorship".
Another notable decision by a state court in a state falling under the Ninth Circuit was the
one by the Oregon Supreme Court in Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund,213 in which the
basic principles of the dilution rationale were clearly set out. The plaintiff had already
used the name WEDGWOOD for twenty-five years in its home building business, which
entailed the development, construction and marketing of single and multiple family
residential real estate in eastern Washington County. It then wanted to enjoin defendant's
use of the same word in its business names "Wedgwood Downs" and "Wedgwood Place"
for its two dormitory-style retirement apartment complexes in the same county, under the
O . dil . ?14regon ann- I ution statute.- As the statute does not define either "dilution" or
"distinctive quality" the court then gave its own interpretation of these two terms.
It referred to distinctive marks as coined or arbitrary marks or marks that had acquired a
secondary meaning. Distinctiveness is also a condition for qualifying as a trademark.i''
but according to the court that "may be different from the distinctive quality deserving of
protection from dilution". The court continued: "the fact that a plaintiff may possess a
distinctive tradename only begins our inquiry. The meaning of 'distinctive quality' must
take shape within the confines of the interests sought to be protected by the anti-dilution
211 Eleven states and territories, namely Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada,
Oregon, Washington, Guam and Northern Mariana Islands, form the Ninth Circuit.
212 Toho Co., Ltd. v. Sears, Roebuck& Co., 645 F.2d 788, 210 U.S.P.Q. 547 (9th Cir. 1981).
213 Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund 659 P.2d 377, 222 U.S.P.Q. 446 (Or. Sup. Ct. 1983).
214 Or. Rev. Stat. § 647.107 (1999). This statute used basically the same wording as the Model State
Trademark Bill. See Chapter 4.3.1 "Protection and Related Problems" supra.
215 In this sense a symbol must be so distinctive that it is capable of performing the function of identifying
and distinguishing the goods which bear the symbol, to qualify as a trade mark.
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statute.,,216 The court then explained the modem function of a trade mark as an
advertising agent and referred to its selling power.217 It explained that this selling power,
or "favorable associational value" of the mark in the minds of consumers, is the
protectabie quality of a mark. It also gave examples of how this attribute may be
developed. It then concluded:
"If the mark has come to signify plaintiffs product in the minds of a significant portion of
consumers and if the mark evokes favorable images of plaintiff or its product it possesses the
distinctive quality of advertising value - consumer recognition, association and acceptance - and
will be entitled to protection from dilution."
The court thus rejected the argument that only coined or truly famous marks deserve
protection from dilution. The important attribute is advertising value and even coined
words must develop that over time. Protection can thus be given, regardless of the
manner by which a trade mark has become distinctive or even the span of a mark's fame.
Thus, even a mark with a high degree of local fame, such as WEDGWOOD HOMES, can
be protected.t" After a lucid discussion of the meaning of dilution with reference to
other cases, the court concluded that dilution of the distinctive quality of the plaintiffs
name was demonstrated. It prevented by injunction the defendant's use of the name,
WEDGWOOD, to prevent the diminution of plaintiff's name as an advertising tool.
In a more recent decision however, the Ninth Circuit Court found no dilution by the use
of FRUIT CUPS on bustiers or the use of FRUIT FLOPS on thongs of the FRUIT OF
THE LOOM trade mark as used on underwear.i" The court found that because the word
FRUIT alone was not famous for underwear, the FRUIT OF THE LOOM mark was not
216 Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund 659 P.2d 377 at 379, 222 U.S.P.Q. 446 (Or. Sup. Ct. 1983).
217 He relied in this context on the famous passage by Justice Frankfurter in Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen
Mfg. Co. v. SS Kresge Co., 316 U.S. 203, 62 S. Ct. 1022,86 L. Ed. 1381,53 U.S.P.Q. 323 (1942),
quoted in Chapter 2.4 "Advertising Function" supra, which refers to the "psychological function of
symbols" and their "commercial magnetism".
218 Compare with the position under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act in Chapter 4.10.3 "Famous
Marks" infra.
219 Fruit of the Loom Inc. v. Girouard994F.2d 1359,26U.S.P.Q.2d 1782 (9'h Cir. 1993).
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diluted by defendant's use of the word FRUIT_22o Port22 I sees this decision as indicative
of the courts' normal approach to dilution, which he describes as going as far as possible
to avoid applying a dilution statute.
4.3.3.4 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CASES222
The Eleventh Circuit court also showed its appreciation of the need for dilution
protection in Community Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Orondorff,223 by
endorsing the approach of the Second Circuit in the Allied case.224 The appellant was a
federal savings and loan association with a registration for COOKIE JAR and jar design,
which was found to be a unique and strong mark. It was used on one of its automatic
teller machines. Across the street form the main branch, the respondent used ANNIE'S
COOKIE JAR and a jar design with the silhouette of a lady lying on top, on a billboard to
advertise its topless go-go bar. The court stated that confusion and competition were not
elements of a dilution claim. The court then found that appellant's rights were violated
under the Florida Dilution Act,225 after establishing that there was the "actual or likely
whittling away of the unique character of appellant's mark"_226 The court, however,
failed to propound a dilution test.227
220 Port (1995) 534 describes this as a "tortured bifurcation" of the FRUIT OF THE LOOM mark. The
mark as a whole should be compared to the defendant's mark as a whole.
221 Port (1995) 534.
222 The Eleventh Circuit comprises Florida, Georgia and Alabama.
223 Community Federal Savings and Loan Association v. OrondorfJ, 678 F.2d 1034, 1982 U.S. App. LEXIS
18225; 215 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 26 (11 th Cir. 1982). This was one of only four cases decided between 1977
and 1995 where an injunction was sustained solely on the basis of a dilution statute. The other three
were discussed in Chapter 4.3.3.2 "Seventh Circuit Cases" supra. See also Port (1995) 532.
224 Discussed in Chapter 4.3.3.1 "Second Circuit Cases" supra. See also Taviss (1990) 1460.
225 Fla. Stat. Ann. § 495.151 (West 1997 & Supp. 2000).
226 This was a case oftamishment. Even Port, who is an opponent of the "pure" dilution doctrine, is of the
opinion that in cases of tarnishment recovery should be possible if a likelihood of injury to business
reputation could be proved. He, however, feels that the evidence in this case was not very strong. See
Port (1995) 532.
227 Martino (1996) 44.
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4.3.3.5 CONCLUSION
It is clear from the case law discussed above that state courts applying state anti-dilution
laws established dilution either by inference from balancing certain factors that they
considered relevant, often using the "Sweet Test", or by simply presuming dilution
merely based on the similarity of the two marks.228
4.4 FEDERAL DILUTION PROTECTION BEFORE THE FEDERAL ACT
Dilution protection by federal law only become a reality in January 1996, when the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act was adopted.229 Earlier attempts to grant trade marks
federal protection against dilution had failed.23o
But even in the absence of statutory federal protection against dilution, federal courts in
the United States had still implicitly relied upon the dilution doctrine to protect trade
marks from dilution under the common law.231 This treatment, especially in the earlier
cases, has contributed substantially to both the development and the substance of the
dilution concept.232 Pattishall records a case in 1925, thus even before Schechter's
landmark article, in which the unnamed concept of dilution was used to protect the
ROLLS ROYCE trade mark.233 In many subsequent cases the court found a likelihood of
confusion when no likelihood of confusion was actually present. In 1948 in the Stork
case,234 for example, the dilution theory was in effect utilised to protect a trade mark,
where the likelihood of confusion was slim. The court held that direct competition
228 See Voss MS "Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, inc. v. Utah Division of Travel
Development & Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc." (2000) 15 Berkeley Technology Law Journal265 at
270.
229 See discussion in Chapter 4.7 "The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995" infra.
230 See inter alia the discussion in Chapter 4.5 "The Trademark Law Revision Act of 1998" infra.
231 Pattishall BW, Hilliard DC & Welch IN Trademarks and Unfair Competition (1994) Matthew Bender
& Co. incorporated New York & Oakland § 8.01 349.
232 See Chapter 3.1 "The Development of Dilution as a Legal Concept" supra.
233 Patti shall (1994) § 8.01 349; Wall v. Rolls-Royce of America, 4 F.2d 333, 334 (3rd Cir. 1925). The
ROLLS ROYCE trade mark, renowned for its use on automobiles, was protected against its use on
radio tubes. See further the discussion in Chapter 3.1 "The Development of Dilution as a Legal
Concept" supra.
234 Stork Restaurant, Inc. v. Sahati, 166 F.2d 348,1948 U.S. App. LEXIS 3355, 76 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 374
(9th Cir. 1948).
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between the parties was not necessary for a finding of unfair competition. They found
that the use by the respondent of the name STORK CLUB for his small bar in San
Francisco, California, justified an injunction on the basis of likelihood of confusion. The
appellant owned and operated an expensive, up-market, well-known and well-publicised
night club in New York, named THE STORK CLUB, which has acquired a widespread
and valuable reputation. It was noted that this name was fanciful and truly arbitrary and
therefore especially entitled to protection. The court referred to the law as set out in Yale
Electric Corporation v. Robertson,235 where it was said that a merchant may have a
"sufficient economic interest" outside his own field of exploitation. It then found that
this was a clear case where a junior user was seeking to ride on the prestige of the senior
user's mark. The court then defined confusion of source, where there is no direct
competition, as a misleading of the public by the use of the mark for the purpose of
securing some of the goodwill of the trade mark or trade name_236
In 1961 the Second Circuit Court in Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp.237 was
the first to formulate certain factors that could be applied to determinate whether a
likelihood of confusion exists in the case of non-identical goods or services.v" The court
said that among other factors, the following should be taken into account:
"the strength of [the plaintiffs] mark, the degree of similarity between the two marks, the
proximity of the products, the likelihood that the prior owner will bridge the gap, actual confusion,
and the reciprocal of defendant's good faith in adopting its own mark, the quality of defendant's
product, and the sophistication of the buyers."
These Polaroid factors, although first formulated to determine the likelihood of confusion
between non-identical goods, are now utilised by United States Courts in all likelihood of
235 Yale Electric Corporation v. Robertson, 26 F.2d 972 (2nd Cir. 1928). See further Chapter 3.1 "The
Development of Dilution as a Legal Concept" supra.
236 This Stork Club doctrine was also subsequently applied by the 3rd Circuit in the case of Ambassador
East v. Orsatti, Inc. 257 F.2d 79, 48 TMR 1251 (3rd Cir. 1958). See Pattishall (1963) 613.
237 Polaroid Corp. v. Po/arad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492 at 495; 1961 U.S. App. LEXIS 5191; 128
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 411; 4 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 81 (2nd Cir. 1961). See short discussion of these
and other cases in Vuk (1998) 872-873 fn 48.
238 Pattishall (1994) §6.02 234.
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confusion cases, including cases involving identical goods. Also, all United States
Circuit Courts have adopted similar factors to determine the likelihood of confusion.239
In Quality Inns Int'l v. McDonald's Corp.,240 the Maryland court protected the
McDONALD's trade mark by finding likelihood of confusion when there was not really
evidence of likelihood of confusion. Although the court thus found trade-mark
infringement and unfair competition, it implicitly relied on dilution.241 Quality Inns
planned to market a chain of economy hotels under the name McSLEEP INN. The
McDonald's Corporation immediately reacted, as they believed that this name would
infringe upon their "Me" trade marks.242 Quality Inns then asked the court for a
declaratory judgment that they will not infringe the "Me" trade marks and the McDonald'
Corporation then initiated counterclaims alleging trade-mark infringement and unfair
competition. In addition they alleged dilution in violation of the lllinois Anti-Dilution
Act.243
The court noted that the products were in different markets and the trade names would,
for this reason, normally not cause confusion.244 The court, nevertheless, concluded that
the McSLEEP trade mark would infringe upon McDONALD's trade marks due to the
likelihood of confusion between the two marks and because of dilution. The court never
analised or discussed the dilution statute, but in the end just stated that dilution had also
occurred under the Illinois statute. Probably because no federal dilution statute was in
place, the court hid their decision behind a finding of confusion.245
Another example of a federal court granting protection to a trade mark where there was
not really a likelihood of confusion, is to be found in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders v.
239 Vuk (1998) 873 fn 48.
240 Quality Inns Int 'I v.McDonald's Corp., 695 F.Supp. 198 (D. Md. 1988).
241 Vuk (1998) 900, quoting from a Trademark Law Lecture by Professor Hugh Hansen at Fordham
University School of Law (Fall 1996).
242 The McDonald's Corporation owns quite a number of trade marks, such as McChicken, McMuffin,
McCola, McFeast and McPizza.
243 III. Ann. Stat. cho 140, § 22 (Smith-Hurd 1986).
244 Quality Inns also presented survey evidence to the court, which showed that there existed no likelihood
of confusion between the marks. See Vuk (1998) 901 fn 226 for details of this survey.
245 Vuk (1998) 900 fn 223, again referring to the interpretation of Professor Hansen.
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Pussycat Cinema.246 The court granted protection to the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders'
trade mark from use in a pornographic movie. The Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders are a
squad of girls that performs dance and cheerleading routines at the games of the
American football team, the Dallas Cowboys. Apart from that, they also make national
television and public appearances and license others to distribute items like posters,
calendars and T-shirts with the cheerleaders portrayed on them. The cheerleaders always
wear their distinctive white and blue outfits: white boots, white shorts, blue blouse and
white star-studded vest and belt. The Pussycat Cinema, a New York corporation which
owns a cinema in New York City, then began to show a pornographic movie, called
DEBBIE DOES DALLAS. In the movie, Debbie was chosen as a cheerleader for the
Texas Cowgirls. She needed money to go to Dallas and then she and her fellow
cheerleaders engaged in sexual acts to raise money. At the end of the movie, Debbie was
shown dressing herself in an outfit resembling those of the Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders
and again was involved in various sexual acts.
The plaintiff instituted an action alleging trade-mark infringement under section 43(a) of
the Lanham Act, as well as unfair competition and dilution in violation of section 368-d
of the New York General Business Law. The District Court247 found for the plaintiff on
all these grounds. With regard to the dilution claim, the court only set forth the definition
and rationale and then stated that there was clearly dilution in this case as the continued
use of the uniform in the pornographic movie would dilute and whittle down the trade
mark's reputation and goodwill.
On appeal, the Second Circuit Court affirmed this ruling.248 Although plaintiff did not
have a registered trade mark, the court found that plaintiff had a trade mark in its
uniform. The court rejected the defence of the defendant, that the Lanham Act only gives
protection against uses that cause confusion as to origin, as being too narrow an
246 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 203 U.S.P.Q. 161 (2nd Cir.
1979). See the discussion of the case in Vuk (1998) 902-903.
247 The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders,
Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 F.Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
248 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 203 U.S.P.Q. 161 (2nd CiT.
1979).
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interpretation. The court no.ted that if the public perceives that the trade-mark owner
sponsored nr approved the use of the trade mark by another person, it will be enough to.
satisfy the confusion requirement. It was clear to. the court that the public, by seeing the
uniform used in Debbie Does Dallas, would be reminded of the Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders and would associate them with the movie. The court then held that this
mental association would result in confusion, which would injure the Dallas Cowboys
Cheerleaders' reputation. They remarked: "The trademark laws are designed not only to.
prevent consumer confusion but also. to. protect the synonymous right of a trademark
owner to. control his product's reputatio.n.,,249 Like the District Court, the Second Circuit
Court did not discuss the dilution concept. They merely noted in a footnote that if the
plaintiff had not established a likelihood of confusion, it would have been entitled to.
relief under the New York dilution law.
Many scholars campaigned for the enactment of statutes prohibiting dilution in the
remaining states, but even mo.re for a federal dilution statute.2SO Pattishall, for example,
proposed a provisinn following the language of the Model State Trademark Bill, but
withnut the "injury to. business reputation" provision, which he considered as
inappropriate.f " He also. opted for broader relief rather than only injunctive relief.
4.5 THE TRADEMARK LAW REVISION ACT OF 1988
In 1988 extensive amendments were made to. the Lanham Act by the Trademark Revision
Act2S2 after a thorough review of the United States trade-mark law.253 The most
important change was the inclusion of an intent to. use basis for applications for
249 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200 at 205, 203 U.S.P.Q. 161
(2nd Cir. 1979).
250 See for example Pattishall (1984) 309; Pattishall (1977) 623.
251 See Chapter 4.3.1 "Protection and Related Problems" supra. See also Pattishall (1977) 623.
252 Pub. L. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935. The Trademark Law Revision Act was enacted on November 16,
1988 and commenced operation exactly one year later.
253 Garcia (1995) 492. This review, which culminated in the Report and Recommendations on the United
States Trademark System and the Lanham Act «1987) 77 The Trademark Reporter 375), was performed
by the Trademark Review Commission (TRC), a private committee established by the United States
Trademark Association. See Denicola (1996) 88; Klieger (1997) 835-839. McCarthy (1996) § 5:9
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registration.i'" The changes to section 43, which deals with infringement, included a
broader cause of action for misrepresentation in false advertising claims and full access to
all statutory Lanham Act remedies.255 A further proposed amendment to section 43(a)
would have prohibited the use of a mark or any other conduct "likely to disparage or
tarnish the mark of another".256 Influenced by the perceived inadequacy of state dilution
laws and the need for national uniformity, Congress also attempted to include federally
recognised protection against dilution in a separate section of the Act, namely section
43(c). According to Denicola this separation of the tarnishment and dilution of
distinctiveness theories was not an accident.f" The reasoning of the Trademark Revision
Commission was that tarnishment is "less dilution than injury to reputation".258 In terms
of the proposed section 43(c), protection against dilution would only be afforded to
famous trade marks. Although the Senate supported the inclusion of the provision, the
House of Representatives was opposed to such expansion of trade-mark rights. They fear
that the proposed section would infringe upon advertisers' First Amendment rights
pertaining to freedom of speech. They were influenced by strong opposition from the
advertising, publishing and broadcasting industries.i'" After a last minute compromise
between the Senate and the House of Representatives the Trademark Revision Act was
passed but without both the tarnishment and dilution provisions.P"
4.6 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION (1995)
During the drafting of the Restatement261 by the American Law Institute (ALI), the
proper interpretation of state dilution statutes was on the table. It appeared that the merits
of dilution protection was a controversial subject, with academic members of the Institute
describes the changes made by this Act as "the most sweeping changes to the Lanham Act" since its
enactment.
254 See Chapter 4.1 "American Statutory Trade-Mark Law prior to 1947" supra.
255 Taviss (1990) 1454; McCarthy (1996) § 5:9.
256 Denicola (1996) 89.
257 Denicola (1996) 89.
258 See Denicola (1996) 89 and references to the TRC Report cited there.
259 Vuk (1998) 904; Gilson (1999) § 5.l2[1][b]; Port (1995) 525; McCabe (2000) 1855.
260 Garcia (1995) 492. See also McCarthy (1998) 587-588; Denicola (1996) 89; Klieger (1997) 837-838.
261 § 25, titled "Liability Without Proof of Confusion: Dilution and Tarnishment," is the relevant section.
See Denicola (1996) 87.
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being generally opposed to the notion and trade-mark practitioners being generally
supportive of it.262 Under section 25(2) non trade-mark use, for instance to comment on,
criticise, ridicule, parody or disparage, is not actionable under the dilution action.
Proponents of the federal legislation, in contrast, claim that the Federal Act of 1995263
encompasses all forms of dilution, including disparagement.f"
4.7 THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT OF 1995265
This law represents in the words of Professor 1. Thomas McCarthy "a radical and
fundamental break with prior federal trademark law"_266 Port describes it as "the broadest
and least legitimate congressional expansion of the trademark right".267 One of the aims
of this law was to harmonise dilution protection among the states by providing
consistency, clarity and a uniform level of protection for all federal c1aims.268 This
federal protection against dilution was introduced in 1995, when the United States
Congress passed the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.269 This Act, which amended the
Lanham Act, was signed into law by President Clinton on 16 January 1996, with
immediate effect.27o The International Trademark Association (INTA) was a strong force
behind the enactment of this legislation. It was also supported by the American Bar
Association (ABA), American Intellectual Property Law Association (AlPLA), Patent
and Trademark Office (PTO) and industry groups.i" The strongest arguments in favour
of the Act were based on considerations of foreign trade. The lack of federal dilution
262 Denicola (1996) 87.
263 See following section.
264 See Denicola (1996) 88 and his criticism of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act discussed infra.
265 Port (personal comments to the author in May 2000) also referred to it as "The Trademark Lawyer
Employment Act of 1995". See also Port (2000) 874.
266 McCarthy (1998) 587.
267 Port (2000) 874.
268 Belongia (2002) 1172; Ruwe, K "The Federal Trademark Dilution Act: 'Actual Harm' or 'Likelihood
of Dilution'?" (2002) 70 University of Cincinnati Law Review 1175 at 1177; Kostello DL "Grappling
With the Limits of Fame under the FTDA - Do Marks Famous only in a Niche Market or Limited
Geographic Area Qualify for Protection?" (2001) 91 The Trademark Reporter 1133; Lee (2002) 692.
269 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1995) (codified as
amended at IS USC § 1125, 1127 (West 1996)).
270 Vuk(1998) 865, 905; Gilson (1999) § 5.I2[I][a]; Seitz (1999) 117; Denicola (1996) 83.
271 McCarthy (1998) 588. But see Port (1995) 525-575 who expressed his strong opposition to a federal
dilution statute.
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relief damaged negotiations by the United States in forging the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GA TT). Other countries used this lack of federal relief as an excuse
for their own shortcomings, thus frustrating the negotiations.F" There was also fear that
limiting the Act to federally registered trade marks would undercut the United States'
position in relation to its trading partners.v"
The following subsection, virtually the same as the draft proposed by the Trademark
Review Commission in 1987,274 was added to § 43:
"(c)(1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles of equity and upon
such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an injunction against another person's commercial
use in commerce of a mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous
and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain such other relief as is
id d i hi bsecti ,,275provi e In t IS su section ....
Thus, the plaintiff must be the owner of a famous mark. Defendant must make
commercial use of plaintiffs mark in interstate commerce, because only the use of the
mark by another as a trade mark for that person's own products can lessen the capacity of
the mark to identify and distinguish the goods and services of the trade-mark owner.276
Defendant's use must begin after the plaintiffs mark became famous and must cause
dilution of the mark's capacity to identify and distinguish goods. Both the substantial
investment of the owner of the mark and the commercial value and aura of the mark are
recognised and protected from those who would appropriate it for their own gain.277
272 McCabe (2000) 1855; Belongia (2002) 1172.
273 See Denicola (1996) 84 for these and other concerns raised during the debates that led to the enactment
of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.
274 "The United States Trademark Association Trademark Review Commission Report and
Recommendations" (1987) 77 The Trademark Reporter 375.
275 Lanham Act § 43(c), 15 USC § 1125(c).
276 See definition of dilution in § 45 discussed in Chapter 4.7.1 "Definition of Dilution in the Act" infra.
See also McCarthy (1998) 588; Denicola (1996) 90.
277 HRRep No 104-373,3 (1995).
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There are several key differences from state dilution laws. Firstly, protection is given
only if the junior user's use began "after the mark has become famous",278 thus requiring
fame and not just distinctiveness for protection.i" Secondly, the Federal Act uses the
language "causes dilution" and not "likelihood of dilution".28o fn the third place, dilution
is expressly defined in terms of the trade mark's capacity to "identify and distinguish
goods or services",281 thus, specifically describing the harm caused by dilution_282 State
dilution laws and decisions and also federal decisions before 1996, apparently giving
protection against dilution, will, in spite of these differences, be extremely important in
the interpretation of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.283
As only famous trade marks benefit from this law, the section continues to give a list of
factors, which may be considered by a court in determining whether a mark is distinctive
and farnous.i'" In order to receive protection under the Act, these criteria must be met.
Denicola argues that in the light of the Act's limitation to famous marks, the Act is only
applicable in cases where there is blurring. The argument goes that tarnishment and
disparagement can also take place in the case of weak marks_285 According to the House
Report, accompanying the Act, dilution "is designed to encompass all forms of dilution
recognized by the courts, including dilution by blurring, dilution by tarnishment and
disparagement, and by diminishment.,,286
278 There was one district case which dealt with the timing of the fame inquiry, namely The Network
Nehvork v. CBS, Inc 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1150 (C.D. Cal. 2000). The court stressed that the junior user' first
commercial use must be proven to be after the time that the plaintiffs mark achieved fame.
279 McCabe (2000) 1858. Discussion in Chapter 4.10.3 "Famous Marks" infra.
280 See Klieger (1997) 840; Marroletti W "Dilution, Confusion, or Delusion? The Need for a Clear
International Standard to Determine Trademark Dilution" (1999) 25 Brooklyn Journal of International
Law 659 at 677; Kim (200 I) 729, 735. See in depth discussion in Chapter 4.10.4 "Likelihood of
Dilution vs Actual Dilution" infra.
281 Voss (2000) 270; Lee (2002) 703. Compare Seitz (1999) 117-118.
282 Lanham Act § 45, IS USC § 1127. See Chapter 4.7.1 "Definition of Dilution in the Act" infra and
Marroletti (1999) 677.
283 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][b].
284 This will be discussed in Chapter 4.7.2 "Discussion of the Different Factors" infra.
285 Denicola (1996) 90.
286 HR Rep No 104-373,8 (1995). See also Schwartz and Morfesi (1997) 445. Nevertheless, the Supreme
Court of Appeal in Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. IllS at 1124 (2003) questioned the
scope of the Federal Act. The Court said that the state statutes expressly refer to both "injury to
business reputation" and to "dilution of the distinctive quality of a trade name or trade mark", thus
respectively tarnishment and blurring. The FTDA only refers to the latter and thus arguably supports a
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The first version of the Act introduced to Congress, made provision for the protection of
famous, federally-registered marks. This version was later broadened as a result of
concerns raised by the Administration. The Administration argued that if protection
would only be given to federally-registered marks, the United States' position that
famous marks should be protected regardless of whether they are registered in the
country where protection is sought, would be weakened.i" This was a new direction,
which was not the subject of extensive debate or investigation. Probably the Act's
application to unregistered marks will be quite rare, since most famous marks are already
registered.i'" From the discussions that led to the acceptance of the Act, it was clear that
Congress sees it as a means to secure better protection for famous trade marks of United
States companies in foreign countries.i'"
4.7.1 DEFINITION OF DILUTION IN THE ACT
Dilution is defined in the Act as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1)
competition between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of
confusion, mistake, or deception.,,29o
An important part of the definition is the phrase "to identify and distinguish goods and
services". This phrase is taken from the definition of a trade mark in section 45 of the
Lanham Act and can be summed up in the word "distinctiveness" according to Gilson_291
If the distinctiveness of the famous mark is lessened, then the chance of finding dilution
is good. This can be done by different kinds of trade-mark uses, such as blurring,
narrower reading. This view is supported by Higgins JR & Duvall SA "The FTDA after Moseley v
VSecret" (2003) 93 The Trademark Reporter 813 at 823.
287 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][c]; Denicola (1996) 83-84; Klieger (1997) 845.
288 This is the viewpoint of Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][c].
289 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][c].
290 Lanham Act § 45, 15 USC § 1127.
291 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][ cHi]. See Chapter 4.10.2 "Distinctiveness" infra.
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tarnishment and disparagement.i'" The court in the Ringling Bros. v. Utah case,293
however, arrived at a different interpretation. It saw the phrase "the lessening of the
capacity of a famous mark, to identify and distinguish goods and services" as a perfectly
clear indication that the Act's aim is to protect the mark's selling power, rather than its
distinctiveness as such.
The last part of the definition makes it clear that neither competition, nor likelihood of
confusion, is necessary to find dilution. This even goes beyond the Schechter doctrine, as
he only saw the concept as applying to non-competing goods. However, as the Act
indicated, it is true that if a junior user uses a mark similar to that of a senior user on a
competing product, a consumer may recognise the slight differences between the marks
and not be confused about the source of the junior user's product, but the senior mark is
nevertheless diluted by the unauthorised use.
The most important requirement of the definition is, however, that the trade mark must be
"famous".294 The Act as drafted, gives protection to famous trade marks, if the other
person's use causes "dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark". The Act continues
to list factors, which can be used to determine "whether a mark is distinctive and
famous".
The factors listed in section 43(c)(1) of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act for
determining trade-mark distinctiveness and fame, are phrased as follows:
"In determining whether a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider factors such as,
but not limited to
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark;
292 For a detailed discussion of these different theories of dilution, see Chapter 3.4 "Types of Dilution"
supra. Denicola (1996) 89-90 argues that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act only encompasses
blurring. He based his assumption on the history of the dilution section. See also Chapter 4.5 "The
Trademark Law Revision Act of 1998" supra.
293 Ringling Bros. -Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development 170
F.3d 449 at 458,1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4179, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065 (4th CiT. 1999). See further the
discussion in Chapter 4.10.4 "Likelihood of Dilution vs Actual Dilution" infra.
294 See the discussion in Chapter 4.10.3 "Famous Marks" infra.
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(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the goods or services with which
the mark is used;
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark;
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used;
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the mark is used;
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade of the mark's
owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought;
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties; and
(H) the existence of a registration under the Act of March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20,
1905, or on the principal register."
As stated by the Act, this list is not exhaustive. These factors are not completely new and
have been used in relation to other trade-mark issues in the past. What is expected of the
courts is to weigh all these factors and to try to find a balance. Each case will have to be
decided on its own merits.295
4.7.2 DISCUSSION OF THE DIFFERENT FACTORS
The first factor refers to the inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark, and thus
leaves room for marks to acquire secondary meaning and in that way to develop into
distinctive marks. As distinctiveness is a requirement for federal registration, marks
federally registered would be regarded as distinctive from the outset. To prove fame
consumer surveys may be helpful, or courts could even take judicial notice of the fact.296
It is, however, not clear whether distinctiveness for dilution purposes is the same as
distinctiveness for confusion purposes. The courts interpreting the state dilution statutes
mostly suggested that a stricter distinctiveness threshold is required in dilution cases than
in confusion cases.297
The second and third factors mention the duration and extent of use and of advertising
and publicity of the mark. In general, famous marks will already have been used for
295 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][c][iii].
296 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][c][iii].
297 Klieger (1997) 843. See the discussion of "distinctiveness" in cases under the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act in Chapter 4.l0.2 "Distinctiveness" infra.
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some time and there will be proof of widespread advertising campaigns and publicity. It
is, however, possible for a mark to become famous almost "overnight". But in practice
these two factors offer little concrete guidance to courts. This creates an unrestrained
discretion for courtS.298
Regarding the geographical extent of the trading area, it would probably be required that
the mark is used throughout a substantial portion of the United States. This was
confirmed by the House Report.299 As there is no exact indication of what the extent of
use must be, a case-by-case approach will be awaited.r'" In the Star Markets case it was
held that use in only one state is not enough, while use in five states for ninety years has
been held sufficient in Wawa v. Haaf30l
The next two factors have to do with the channels of trade and trading areas and the
degree of recognition of the mark in these channels. These factors are more suitable to
determine whether consumers will make the requisite mental connection between the two
marks than to determine fame.302 It is, however, quite certain that the better the
plaintiff's mark is known in the defendant's trading areas, the greater the likelihood that
the distinctive quality of the mark will be negatively affectcd.l'" A mark that is only
famous to a sub-group of consumers, is thus protectabie against dilution only in that
particular sub-market. This was seen in the LEXIS/LEXUS case,304 decided under the
New York dilution law, and would probable serve as example to courts applying the
federal law. LEXIS was only famous in the narrow market of attorneys and accountants
and only about 1% of the general public recognised the mark. The court concluded that
LEXIS has no distinctive quality that LEXUS would dilute. The degree of recognition of
298 Klieger (1997) 843.
299 HRRepNo 104-373,7(1995).
300 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][c][iii]; McCarthy (1998) 596.
301 Star Markets, Ltd v. Texaco, Inc. 950 F.Supp. 1030 (D. Haw. 1996); WAWA Inc. v. Haal, 40
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629 (E.D. Pa. 1996). See the discussion of these and other cases in Chapter 4.10.3
"Famous marks" infra. The House Report refers to a substantial part of the United States rather than to
a substantial number of states.
302 Klieger (1997) 844.
303 See McCarthy (1998) 596-597 and examples used there.
304 Mead Data Central Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1961 (2nd
Cir. 1989), discussed in Chapter 4.3.3.1 "Second Circuit Cases" supra.
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the plaintiffs mark desired by the court would thus be recognition amongst a significant
percentage of the defendant's market.
The nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third parties are also
mentioned as a factor. This makes sense, because the more the mark is used by third
parties on a variety of goods, the lesser will be its fame for plaintiffs goods.305 This
factor is also used in traditional infringement cases to determine the strength of the mark.
The last factor, referring to federal registration, is proof of the distinctiveness of the
mark, but does not necessarily lead to proof of fame, as already indicated.306 Although
federal registration is not a requirement, as the Act applies to both registered and
unregistered marks, this factor surely encourages federal registration. Federal registration
is also encouraged by section 43(c)(3), which provides that the owner of a federal
registration has an absolute defence against any claim brought under state or common
law.
Furthermore, it must be kept in mind that not-yet-famous trade marks could still be
protected in terms of state dilution laws, which do not require fame as a prerequisite for
protection.
4.7.3 EXCEPTIONS TO LIABILITy307 UNDER THE ACT
Three exceptions are mentioned in section 43(c)(4). The first one makes fair use of a
famous mark in comparative advertising non-actionable. This means that fair, non-
confusing, truthful use of another's trade mark in, for example, product comparisons will
be allowed. This is actually not a new exception to infringement in general, but is still
welcomed as it creates certainty in the area of dilution infringement. McCarthy uses the
example of a hypothetical fast food company called Bay Burgers. If they put up a sign
305 Klieger{l997) 844; Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][c][iii].
306 Klieger (1997) 845.
307 For a more extensive discussion of these exceptions, see Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][c][vi].
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which says "Better burgers. Faster Service than Burger Queen", it constitutes fair
comparative advertising and there will be no dilution of the BURGER QUEEN trade
mark.308
Gilson309 mentions the second exception of "non-commercial use of a mark" as the most
important of the three, while McCarthllO regards it as redundant In view of the
requirement in .section 43( c)( 1) that the use of the defendant must be "commercial
use".'!' However, as a result of this provision the use of a famous trade mark in non-
commercial speech, such as parodies.I''' consumer product reviews, even if unfavourable,
news and investigation reports will be absolutely legal. These forms of speech are thus
constitutionally protected under section 43( c). 313
This issue came under scrutiny In the Ninth Circuit COUl1 in the case of Dr. Seuss
Enterprises v. Penguin Books USA.314 A book about the OJ Simpson trial, published by
Penguin Books, mimicked the distinctive style of the Dr. Seuss children's books. The
plaintiff's argument was that its mark was used to make the book more entertaining and
to sell more copies. Therefore, it argued, it cannot fall within the non-commercial use
exception for parodies. The court rejected this and found that this use was exempted
from the Federal Act.315
308 McCarthy (1998) 598. See also Denicola (1996) 91,
309 Gilson (1999) §5.12[1)[c)[vi).
310 McCarthy (1998) 598 fn 59.
311 Compare however the discussion of the Mattei case in the text infra.
312 See Swann JB & Davis TH "Dilution, an Idea Whose Time has Gone; Brand Equity as ProtectabIe
Property, the New/Old Paradigm" (1994) 84 The Trademark Reporter 267 at 288-298. See too Martino
(1996) 62 fn 64 for a list of articles written on the topic of parodies and First Amendment rights.
313 They are protected in the same way under § 43(a).
314 Dr, Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 924 F.Supp. 1559 (S.D. Cal. 1996), affd. 109 F.3d
1394,42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1997).
315 Compare this decision to the one in Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc, v. Bucci, 42
U.S.P.Q.2d 1430 (S.D.N,Y 1997), where the court rejected the defendant's argument of non-
commercial speech. The defendant, an anti-abortion activist, registered the domain name
"plannedparenthood.corn" and used the web site to promote an anti-abortion book. On the web site the
words "Welcome to the PLANNED PARENTHOOD HOME PAGE" appeared. The plaintiff, a well-
known reproductive health care organisation and owner of the registered trade mark PLANNED
PARENTHOOD, objected. The promotion of the book was clearly a commercial activity and the
defendant also requested contributions for his activities. His activities also harmed the plaintiff
commercially.
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The case of Mattel v. MeA Records316 also shed more light on the judicial application of
this exception. The well-known toy manufacturer brought suit against the music
companies for inter alia trade-mark dilution. Aqua, a Danish band produced the song
BARBIE GIRL on their album Aquarium. There was no doubt that MeA uses Mattei's
mark and that the song pokes fun at Barbie. The court acknowledged that BARBIE
qualifies as a famous and distinctive trade mark and became famous long before MeA
started to market the BARBIE GIRL song. There was also "commercial use in
commerce". The court then stated that MeA's use of the mark clearly amounts to
dilution by blurring. The court then discussed the "non-commercial use" exemption.
The court said that "[i]f the term 'commercial use' had the same meaning in both
provisions, this would eliminate one of the three statutory exemptions defined by this
subsection, because any use found to be dilutive would, of necessity, not be non-
commercial.v"? The court then looked at the legislative history of the Federal Act and
came to the conclusion that "non-commercial use" refers to a use that "consists entirely
of non-commercial" or fully constitutionally protected, speech".318 If speech is not
"purely commercial", meaning that it does more than propose a commercial transaction,
it is entitled to full First Amendment protection. The court concluded that BARBIE
GIRL is not purely commercial speech and is therefore protected.?" It falls within the
"non-commercial use" exception.
At the insistence of the National Association of Broadcasters and because of free speech
concerns raised by the media, a third exception was added. "All forms of news reporting
and news commentary" are also not actionable under the dilution provision. This will
even include allegedly tasteless or nasty modifications of famous marks in for example
newspaper cartoons, magazine stories or web pages on the Internet.32o
316 MatteI, Inc. v.MeA Records, Inc. 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
317 Mattei, Inc. v. MeA Records, Inc. 296 F.3d 894 at 904 (9th Cir. 2002).
318 Parodies are deemed to be fully constitutionally protected speech. See Mattei, Inc. v. MeA Records,
Inc. 296 F.3d 894 at 905 (9th Cir. 2002).
319 The song was used to sell copies of Aqua's record, but the song also "lampoons the Barbie image and
comments humorously on the cultural values Aqua claims she represents".
320 McCarthy (1998) 599.
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4.8 THE TRADEMARK AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1999321
This Act further extended section 43(c) to apply to administrative proceedings before the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TT AB) and the United States Patent and Trademark
Office (PTO). The Act was aimed at two important areas of dilution law. In the first
place this Act now allows the owner of a famous mark to oppose an application for the
registration of another mark on the basis that it will dilute his mark or to file a petition for
the cancellation of such a mark. The Act will apply to any registration issued or
application for registration filed after the effective date of the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act, which was 16 January 1996.322 The House Repore23 explains the reason for this
amendment. It was thought that a resolution of a dispute regarding dilution by the
Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, rather than by a Federal District Court, would lead to
more timely, economical and expeditious decisions. It would also help to get the issue
resolved before too much damage has been done to the famous mark and before the
applicant for registration had invested too much money in his proposed mark. What is
even more important for the whole issue of dilution is that the Board will now give
guidance by way of precedent as to what qualifies as a famous mark and what exactly
constitutes dilution.
The second amendment was to rectify an oversight in the Dilution Act and to clarify the
remedies available for trademark dilution. In section 43(c)(2) of the Dilution Act it is
stated that the owner of a famous mark shall be entitled only to injunctive relief, unless
the other person willfully intended to trade on the owner's reputation or to cause dilution
of the famous mark. If so, the owner shall be entitled to the remedies set forth in sections
35(a) and 36. These remedial sections of the Lanham Act were, however, not adjusted to
include dilution violations. This was now accomplished by the Amendment Act.324
Monetary relief, such as defendant's profits, damages, costs and reasonable attorney's
321 See Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][c][vii] & 5.12[1][d] for a discussion of the Trademark Amendments Act.
322 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][d].
323 HR Rep No 100-250, (1999).
324 See 15 USC § 116(a) (injunctive reliet), § 117(a) (profits, damages and costs), § 118 (delivery and
destruction of articles bearing the diluting mark). § 34(a), 35(a) and 36 of the Lanham Act were
amended.
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fees, as well as the destruction of articles carrying the diluting mark, are now possible, if
there was willful intent.
Although this is not new to trade-mark law in general,325 monetary relief is not available
under state dilution laws. They only provide for injunctive relief. This is probably due to
the intangible damage caused by dilution. Exact ascertainment or even reasonable
approximation is unlikely to be proved.i" Something less than a complete injunction,
like for example a disclaimer of essoclation.l" will not provide adequate relief in nearly
all dilution cases. As Judge Roberts declared in Wedgwood Homes v. Lund:328 "In light
of the detrimental impact any second use could have on the advertising value of
plaintiff's name, injunction is the appropriate remedy."
Pattishall would welcome this new amendment, allowing for damages. He already made
the statement in 1984 that if the whole value of a trade mark is lost by dilution,
"injunctive relief becomes moot and monetary relief would be the only meaningful
remedy".329 Guidelines for the ways and means of reasonably estimating dilution
damage must however still be developed.
4.9 CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND POTENTIAL IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL
DILUTION ACT
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act, although only protecting famous marks, has raised
trademark protection in the United States, according to Gilson, "to an unprecedented
325 There is ample authority in case law.
326 Pattishall (1984) 304-305. See also Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Services, 736 F.2d 1153 at 1158-1159,
222 u.S.P.Q.2d 669 (ih Cir. 1984).
327 Jacoby J "The Psychological Foundations of Trademark Law: Secondary meaning, Genericism, Fame,
Confusion and Dilution" (2001) 91 The Trademark Reporter 1013 at 1067 and 1068 declares that
"employing a disclaimer as a remedy in a dilution case would produce an opposite effect to that
intended" and" it may be impossible to meaningfully employ a disclaimer remedy to counteract the
dilution of a famous mark".
328 Wedgwood Homes, Inc. v. Lund 294 Or. 493, 659 P.2d 377 at 383, 222 U.S.P.Q. 446 (Or. Sup. Ct.
1983), discussed in Chapter 4.3.3.3 "Ninth Circuit Cases" supra. See also Pattishall (1984) 305-306.
329 Pattishall (1984) 306.
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level".330 Others also regard it as a significant and worthy advance in federal trade
identity law.33l Dilution is no longer a second-class concept protected only by some
states, because being a federal claim now, it is on the same level as protection given to
trade marks for other infringement causes. It is now possible to get a nationwide
injunction and greater uniformity in dilution protection will now be possible. It is,
however, expected that courts will very slowly and cautiously apply the Act. As stated
above,332 dilution protection is seen as essentially a private property protection device, as
it only promotes the policy of protecting business goodwill. The perception may be that
only a small group of elite businesspersons will benefit and this can also have the effect
that courts may be quite reluctant to enforce the provisions of the Act.333
Klieger, on the other hand, feels that the dilution section creates no new rights in truly
famous marks. He argues that the incorporation of dilution into the Lanham Act will
eclipse confusion as the "gravamen of most federal trademark actions" and create trade-
mark rights in gross.334 McCabe is also not very enthusiastic about the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act. He sees the passage of the Act as a step to "rectify and clarify
erroneous analyses of dilution", but feels that there was little change in the courts'
perceptions of dilution.335
Gilson considered it as a major breakthrough for an elite category of trade-mark
owners.336 He even sees a new class of trade marks, named the "Superrnarks"
developing. Marks that he thinks fit this description will, for example, be MARLBORO,
COCA-COLA, McDONALD'S, IBM, DISNEY, KODAK, KELLOGG'S and
BUDWEISER. On the other side, these exceptionally famous marks certainly
communicate almost unlimited associations in connection with even completely unrelated
products. Thus, if consumers see one of these marks on totally unrelated goods, they will
330 Gilson (1999) § 5.l2[I][a].
331 Pattishall (1996) 447. See also McCarthy (1998) 587, 599.
332 See Chapter 3.5.1.4 "Trade-mark Policies" supra.
333 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][e].
334 Klieger (1997) 847.
335 McCabe (2000) 1859.
336 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[I][a].
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almost certainly assume an association with the trade-mark owner.337 Depending on how
far the likelihood of confusion test can be stretched, it will even be possible to protect
these marks without the necessity for the dilution concept.338
These supermarks are obviously famous, but marks can also be famous, although they are
not famous throughout the whole country or in every market. The broadest impact of the
dilution law might even be on industrial and commercial marks not famous amongst a
broad segment of the public. Although the concept sounds very elitist, the enormous
value of the distinctive quality of famous marks is hereby recognised and also the fact
that this deserves protection.
Pattishall, however, criticises this concept of "famous" marks.339 He sees it as an
indefinite and subjective concept, which makes the dilution law one-sided, illogical and
impracticable. Jt also unfairly favours only the larger and richer companies, while there is
no indication why the owners of famous marks need or deserve more protection than the
owners of less famous marks. He argues for the acceptance of a federal statute based on
the Model State Trademark Act, which he portrays as "carefully drafted, tried and tested
statutory language". He ascribes the limitation of the trade-mark dilution act to "famous"
marks as trying to combat fear that the Act was "going too far".
As already said above, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act does not pre-empt state laws,
with the result that a dilution claim can still be instituted under state dilution laws.34o
This aspect is criticised by McCarthy.341 He believes that the federal law should have
replaced the state dilution laws. That would have the result that the selection and
adoption of new marks are less risky and more predictable. According to him, just the
opposite result was achieved by the new Act.
337 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[I][e].
338 Compare with the situation in European law. See the discussion of the Canon case in Chapter 5.8.1
"The Interpretation of Articles 4( 1)(b) and 5(1)(b)" infra in this regard.
339 Pattishall (1996) 448.
340 The state dilution laws are in certain respects more lenient than the Federal Act, which requires both
distinctiveness and fame and therefore certain trade-mark owners are more likely to continue bringing
claims under the state statutes. See McCabe (2000) 1858.
341 McCarthy (1998) 589.
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However, greater uniformity in the interpretation and application of the dilution concept
is certainly created by the Federal Act. The specific factors to be considered for the
determination of famous marks, although criticised, will definitely also promote this aim.
But it must be kept in mind that it is still possible for different circuits to give different
interpretations to the same section.
Yet, there are some foreseeable problems in the application of the new Act.342 The major
source of unpredictability of the new law is the fact that there is no certainty as to which
marks will qualify as famous marks, despite the eight-factor test.343 In the absence of a
"famous mark" register, it will be very risky for trade-mark practitioners to give
"clearance" to new trade marks. Port is also in support of a Super Registry, as he refers
to it.344 He says that such a registry "would have gone a long way to reduce the costs of
uncertainty". Without such a registry the result will be that trade-mark practice will
become more uncertain. Fame will have to be determined on a case-by-case basis
through litigationï"
The degree of similarity of the conflicting marks is not defined and this may cause some
interpretation problerns.l'" Another problem might be with regard to the granting of
injunctions. It might be difficult to prove the "lessening of the capacity" of a famous
mark to distinguish, as well as irreparable harm in the absence of confusion and also
urgency, as normally required.347
Port strongly feels that some kind of restriction, as has been introduced in Congress, is
needed. He refers to a bill introduced in 1998,348 which proposed that any claim for
342 See Gilson {I999) § 5.12[1][e].
343 See McCarthy (1998) 589-590. See also Klieger (1997) 845-6; Belongia (2002) 1161.
344 Port (2000) 894, 911.
345 Belongia (2002) 1174. See the discussion of "fame" in case law under the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act in Chapter 4.10.3 "Famous Marks" infra.
346 See the discussion in Chapter 4.10.1 "Identical or Similar Mark" infra.
347 In the early cases decided after the implementation of the Act, most of the disputes were indeed
centered on whether and how the distinctiveness of the famous mark was lessened. See Gilson (1999) §
5.12[1][f].
348 HR Rep No 105-3119, (1998). See Port (2000) 828 fn 4.
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dilution under the Lanham Act would have to be brought within one year of the date of
registration of a mark or be forever barred. This bill, which Port describes as
"exceedingly rational legislation which would constrain the unfettered congressional
expansion of the trademark right", however failed.
Despite these and other reservations, the Federal Dilution Act definitely carries great
promise and without doubt fills a gap in trade-mark protection.i'"
4.10 CASE LAW UNDER THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT
As was predicted, the federal courts relied firmly on decisions given by state courts on
dilution in applying the Federal Trademark Dilution Act. One of the landmark
interpretations of dilution law, the "Sweet Test" for determining the lessening of the
distinctiveness of the famous mark, was, for example, accepted by some federal courts_350
Some important decisions by the federal courts regarding the Act will be discussed in this
section.
4.10.1 IDENTICAL OR SIMILAR MARK?
The degree of similarity of the conflicting mark is not defined in the Act. McCarthy
argues that the familiar test used for similarity in likelihood of confusion cases cannot be
applied here, due to the substantial differences in the concepts of likelihood of confusion
and dilution.351 The question is whether a famous trade mark will receive dilution
protection only against identical offending trade marks or also against similar offending
trade marks? This issue was partly settled in the case of Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey
Combined Shows v. Utah Division of Travel.352 The defendant argued that the use of the
slogan THE GREATEST SNOW ON EARTH did not dilute plaintiffs well-known trade
349 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][e].
350 This test is discussed and evaluated in Chapter 4.3.3.1 "Second Circuit Cases" supra.
351 McCarthy (1998) 591.
352 Ringling Bros-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Utah Division of Travel, 935 F.Supp. 763, 40
U.S.P.Q.2d 1303 (E.D. Va. 1996), affd. 170 F.3d 449,50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065 (4th Cir. 1999).
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mark THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH, because the marks are not identical as
required by the Act. The district court rejected this argument. It contended that the "plain
and unambiguous language" of the Act clearly intended that similar or imitative marks
should also be included under the dilution provision. The court, in following a common-
sense approach, noted that the two references to "the mark" in the section, obviously
referred to the famous mark. When using the indefinite "a mark" to refer to the offending
mark, the legislature clearly indicates that it need not be identical to the famous mark.
This is also in line, according to the court, with congressional intention of establishing
uniformity amongst the states and to conform to international provisions on dilution.353
The decision was affirmed in the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. This court just added
that in the case of similar marks, they must evoke a mental association in the minds of
consumers. The crucial question still remains as to how similar the conflicting marks
must be to cause dilution. Possibly the "substantially" similar test of the LEXIS/LEXUS
case will apply.354
In the Federal Express case355 the similarity of the marks was also addressed. The two
marks at issue were FEDERAL EXPRESS for an overnight delivery business and
FEDERAL ESPRESSO for a coffee shop. The district court found that given the
"inherent difference between 'Express' and 'Espresso'" and the "context in which the
parties use them" the marks are not very or substantially similar. The court even stated
that this dissimilarity alone could defeat plaintiffs blurring claim. The Circuit Court
however indicated that it might find that the marks are of "sufficient similarity so that, in
the mind of the consumer, the junior mark will conjure an association with the senior
user.,,356
353 The District Court mentioned two other decisions in which it was implicitly assumed that imitative
marks also qualify for dilution protection under the Act, namely Wallla, Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d
1629 (E.D. Pa. 1996) and Ringling Bros. -Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows, 937
F.Supp. 204,40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
354 Mead Data Central Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1961 (2nd
Cir. 1989). See Chapter 4.3.3.1 "Second Circuit Cases" supra for a detailed discussion on this case.
See also McCarthy (1998) 591.
355 Federal Express Corp. v. Federal Espresso, Inc., 201 F.3d 168, 2000 U.S. App. LEXlS 96, 53
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1345 (2nd Cir. 2000).
356 Federal Express Corp. v. Federal Espresso, Inc., 201 F.3d 168 at 177,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 96, 53
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1345 (2nd Cir. 2000).
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4.10.2 DISTINCTIVENESS
Distinctiveness is a crucial trade-mark concept, reflecting the inherent strength or
weakness of a mark. Distinctiveness can be measured against the well-known spectrum
of marks, ranging from generic to descriptive, suggestive, arbitrary and fanciful.357 The
question of distinctiveness in a dilution claim was addressed by the court in the Nabisco
dccision.f" The court determined that distinctiveness is something quite different from
fame.359 Distinctiveness, in addition to fame, is an essential element of the statutory
requirement. The more distinctive the mark, the greater the interest to protect and the
better the chances of a finding of dilution. In a later decision36o the court interpreted the
Nabisco court's "distinctiveness" test to be equivalent to "inherent distinctiveness" as
opposed to distinctiveness achieved through secondary meaning. Inherent distinctiveness
was also the standard set by the Second Circuit in TCPIP Holding Co v. Haar
Communications''" for protection under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act. The court
interpreted the Act to require a "level of distinctiveness beyond normal trademark law"
and said that such a "heightened distinctiveness requirement" can only be met if a mark
357 Kera OJ & Davis TH "Annual Review: A. United States: The Fifty-Third Year of Administration of the
Lanham Trademark Act of 1964" (2001) 91 The Trademark Reporter 119 at 120; Edgecombe (2002)
1256-1258. See also the discussion of the spectrum of marks in V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley,
259 F.3d 464 at 469 (6th Cir. 2001). The VICTORIA'S SECRET mark was found to be in the category
of arbitrary and fanciful marks and therefore deserving of a high level of trade-mark protection. A
generic mark is not inherently distinctive and describes a product class. Descriptive marks, although
not inherently distinctive, can become distinctive through secondary meaning. A suggestive mark is
inherently distinctive, but still has a descriptive element, which implies a quality of the product. An
arbitrary mark bears no relationship to the product with which it is associated, like APPLE Computers,
CAMEL cigarettes or IVORY soap. Fanciful or coined marks are marks invented by the mark holder to
singularly represent his product, for example KODAK cameras.
358 Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208,1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20786, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1882 (2nd Cir. 1999). See Chapter 4.10.4 "Likelihood of Dilution vs Actual Dilution" infra for the facts
and a more detailed discussion of this case. The court found that the shape of Pepperidge Farm's
goldfish was "reasonably distinctive".
359 This was also acknowledged in the case of Avery Dennison Corp. v. Jerry Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868 at
877; 1999 U.S. App. LEXlS 19954; 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801; 99 Cal. Daily Op. Service 6795; 99
Daily Journal DAR 8723 Wh Cir. 1999) where the court held that "famousness requires a showing
greater than mere distinctiveness". See also V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464 at 469
(6th Cir. 2001); Edgecombe (2002) 1258.
360 New York Stock Exchange v. New York, New York Hotel LLC, 69 F. Supp.2d 479, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1884
(S.D.N.Y.1999).
361 TCPlP Holding Co. v. Haar Communications, Inc., 244 F.3d 88 (2nd Cir. 2001).
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possesses inherent distinctiveness. This, however, goes against the language of the
statute, which refers to "the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness". 362
The requirement of distinctiveness is furthermore an important limitation. A mark can be
famous, yet lacking distinctiveness and for that reason cannot be protected under the
Dilution Statute. Examples of such marks are AMERICAN, NATIONAL, FEDERAL,
FEDERATED, FIRST, UNITED, ACME, MERIT or ACE.363
Subsequently, in the Times Mirror case, the court, however, quoted McCarthy to the
effect that distinctiveness is used here only as a synonym for fame.364 The court also said
that Congress did not intend the Federal Act to require separate tests for fame and
distinctiveness.r'" Gilson agrees and explains further that "distinctive quality" is inherent
in every famous mark. Thus, if a mark is famous, it must have distinctive quality, but the
converse does not apply.366 According to Gilson, the use of the word "distinctive" in the
dilution provision is merely explanatory and even redundant.f"
In the case of Viacom Inc v. Ingram Enterprises, Inc368 the court found that a merely
suggestive mark,369 which is thus not fanciful or arbitrary, does not merit dilution
362 See Edgecombe (2002) 1276 who believes that the FTDA should be amended to require only inherent
distinctiveness, as the underlying rationale of dilution protection is that it should only extend to a
limited class of marks. Thus, only fanciful marks should be protected. However, in the proposed
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, distinctiveness is still described as inherent or acquired
distinctiveness. See discussion of this Act in Chapter 4.10.4 "Likelihood of Dilution vs Actual
Dilution" infra.
363 VSecret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464 at 470 (6th Cir. 2001). This point was also taken in
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 at 227, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20786,51 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1882 (2nd Cir. 1999).
364 Times Mirror Magazines Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, 212 F.3d 157 at 167,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS
8553 (3rd Cir. 2000).
365 The court already found that THE SPORTING NEWS had acquired a secondary meaning and therefore
is distinctive and has fame in a niche market.
366 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][ c][ii]; Belongia (2002) 1175. Therefore, if the court found that a mark is
distinctive, it could not assume that the mark is famous as well, as the court did in Lexington Mgmt.
Corp. v. Lexington Capital Partners, 10 F.Supp. 2d 271, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d 1558 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). The
court incorrectly stated that either famous or distinctive marks are protected in terms of the Dilution
Act.
367 Gilson (1999) § 5.12[I][c][ii].
368 Viacom Inc v. Ingram Enterprise, Inc., 141 F.3d 886 (8th Cir. 1998).
369 A suggestive mark is one that indirectly describes a product or service in a way that requires a mental
leap on the part of the consumer.
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protection. Viacom, which owns the well-known entertainment franchise,
BLOCKBUSTER, tried to enjoin defendant's use of the mark BLOCKBUSTER
FIREWORKS on its fireworks stands in Missouri and California. The court was afraid
that granting protection to a suggestive term, would create a complete monopoly in the
word. McCabe feels that since most marks are merely suggestive, denial of protection
will result in a lack of protection for a majority of marks. This, in his view, will
undermine the entire dilution doctrine.37o
4.10.3 FAMOUS MARKS
By requiring a famous mark for a finding of dilution, the scope of the Federal Act is
limited. The determination of fame has become the critical issue or dispositive factor in a
dilution case.371 However, fame is a non-quantifiable term and not a term with any
inherent legal signiflcance.Y' Only a few courts have already taken the opportunity to
apply the eight-factor test of section 43(c). Some of the courts did so with little analysis
and also show little or even less understanding of the Act. It is very unpredictable how
these factors will be balanced and applied. Professor Port finds it interesting that
virtually all marks found to be famous by the courts, were found to be diluted as wel),373
The one case in which a detailed discussion of the eight factor-test was done, is Star
Markets, Ltd. v. Texaco.LncÏ'"
The facts in the Star Markets case were as follows. The plaintiff was the owner of the
supermarket chain, called STAR MARKETS. It operated the stores in Hawaii since
1946. The defendant operated gasoline stations with convenience stores throughout the
United States, thus including Hawaii. It then began in 1995 to use the name STAR
MART, together with a Texaco logo ("Star T") for its convenience stores in Hawaii. The
plaintiff instituted an action, based on the dilution section in the Federal Trademark
370 McCabe (2000) 1862.
371 Port (2000) 880.
372 Edgecombe (2002) 1252.
373 Personal comments to the author in May 2000. See also Port (2000) 880.
374 Star Markets, Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc., 950 F.Supp. 1030 (D. Haw. 1996).
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Dilution Act.375 The court had to consider whether the trade mark STAR MARKETS is
famous enough to qualify for protection.
Although the first three factors, namely degree of distinctiveness, duration and extent of
use and duration and extent of advertising and publicity, favoured the plaintiff, all the
other factors weighed quite heavily in favour of the defendant. The question of
geographical extent was an important issue before the court. The court was strongly of
the view that fame in only one state was definitely not enough to qualify for federal
dilution protection.Ï" There was also extensive third party usage of the word STAR and
STAR MARKETS, which counted against the plaintiff. The last factor also favoured the
defendant, as the mark STAR MARKETS was not federally registered. The court,
therefore, concluded that the trade mark STAR MARKETS was not famous enough to
qualify for dilution protection under section 43(c).377
Another case, decided in the same year, was Golden Bear Int'l v. Bear US.A.,m where
the court had to rule on the fame of the GOLDEN BEAR trade mark used by the
defendant on a number of products, especially clothing associated with golfing. The
trade mark was owned and also licensed by the applicant. They also linked it to the
famous golfer, Jack Nicklaus, who was good publicity for the mark. The defendant used
its BEAR USA mark for clothing mainly in inner-city markets. The court founded that
the GOLDEN BEAR mark was indeed well-known by golfers, but questioned its fame
under the general public and, more specifically, the purchasers of defendant's clothing.
Like in the Star Market case, there was extensive third party usage of the word BEAR
and bear logos in connection with sporting goods and clothes. The court thus ruled
against the plaintiff.
375 A recognition survey was also used here to indicate the fame of the plaintiff's mark.
376 State dilution statutes were not pre-empted by the Federal Act and were still available for the protection
of locally famous marks.
377 Some other marks were also held not to be famous under the 1995 Federal Trademark Dilution Act.
Some examples of these marks and cases are COLUMBIA University (Trustees of Columbia Univ. v.
Columbia/HCA Healthcare Corp., 964 F. Supp. 733, at 750, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1083 (S.D.N.Y.
1997)); PETRO truck stop services (Petro Shopping Ctr. L.P. v. James River Petroleum, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1853 (E.D. Va. 1997)); WE'LL TAKE GOOD CARE OF YOU slogan for a retail drugstore
chain (Genovese Drug Stores, Inc. v. TGC Stores, Inc., 939 F. Supp. 340 (D.N.J. 1996)).
378 Golden Bear Int 'I v. Bear US.A., 969 F.Supp. 742,42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1283 (N.D. Ga. 1996).
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In contrast with these decisions, Gilsorr " mentioned another two where he feels that the
court totally misunderstood the mechanics and purpose of the Federal Act. The first one,
decided by the Maryland district court was The Gazette Newspapers Inc. v. The New
Paper Inc.38o The plaintiff used the unregistered common-law trade mark GAZETTE on
its eighteen newspapers, but only in two counties in Maryland. The defendant started to
use the name THE FREDERICK GAZETTE on its paper in one of the two counties. Suit
was brought under section 43(a), for infringement, as well as under section 43(c). The
court first considered the claim under section 43(a) and found that relief would be
warranted. Then, with no further analysis, it declared that the section 43(c) factors were
essentially the same as those considered under section 43(a).381 The court found for the
plaintiff on both claims, without even considering the fame of the trade mark GAZETTE.
The second case where the concept was misunderstood was in Nailtiques Cosmetic Corp.
v. Salon Sciences Corp.382 The court reached the same conclusion as in the Gazette case,
granting a preliminary injunction on the basis of both likelihood of confusion and
dilution. The plaintiffs trade mark, NAIL TlQUES, for fingernail care products, was
indeed very successful. The defendant commenced the use of PRO-TECHNIQUES on
similar products with a similar trade dress. Although the court listed the eight factors of
section 43(c), it just referred to its discussion of the infringement claim to decide the
dilution claim. Again, it was clear that the court did not understand the dilution
provision.
In Syndicate Sales v. Hampshire Paper383 the issue of trademark fame also came under
379 See Gilson (1999) § 5.12[1][f][iii].
380 The Gazette Newspapers Inc. v. The New Paper Inc., 934 F.Supp. 688, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1900 (D. Md.
1996).
381 The .court erroneously referred to these factors as "factors for determining whether trademark dilution
has occurred". See also Klieger (1997) 850.
382 Nailtiques Cosmetic Corp. v. Salon Sciences Corp. 41 U.S.P.Q.2d 1995 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
383 Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corporation 192 F.3d 633, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 21884, 52
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1035 (7th Cir. 1999). See also Seitz (1999) 135-136; Kera& Davis (2001) 123 for
short discussions of this case.
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scrutiny. The appellant inter alia claimed trade dress384 dilution under the Federal Act.
Syndicate Sales had produced plastic baskets used for floral bouquets at funerals since
1960. Then in 1994 Hampshire Paper also entered this market, using Syndicate Sales'
baskets as a model for its baskets. The baskets looked very similar, with only a few
noticeable differences. Both companies sold their products to wholesalers, who then sold
them to retailers. The boxes in which the products were packed were respectively white
and brown and each company's name was displayed on the boxes. The district court
found that if Syndicate Sale's trade dress is famous at all, it is only amongst wholesalers
and retail florists and that "fame in such a niche market cannot be sufficient to establish
fame for purposes of the FTDA". The circuit court, after analysing case law, stated that
niche-market renown might be a factor indicating fame in cases where the plaintiff and
defendant are in the same or related markets, as was the case here.385 According to the
court this is also supported by one of the factors to determine fame, namely "the degree
of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade used by the marks'
owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought". The mark must still be
used in a substantial segment of the country, but within that segment, its fame may be
limited to those engaged on a regular basis in commercial activity involving this
product.i'"
Niche-market fame was also acknowledged in the case of Times Mirror.387 The court
found that the mark, THE SPORTING NEWS, was famous in a niche market. The court
384 Trade dress refers to the total image of a product, including features such as size, shape, colour or
colour combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques.
385 The Fifth Circuit in Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, Co., 238 F.3d 378 at 380 (5th
Cir. 200 I) agreed with Syndicate Sales that only niche-market fame is required by the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act. The court, however, found that Enterprise's WE'LL PICK YOU UP mark
was not sufficiently famous within the car rental industry.
386 See Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corporation 192 F.3d 633 at 634, 639-641, 1999 U.S.
App. LEXIS 21884, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1035 (7th Cir. 1999). The case was remanded to the district
court to determine whether Syndicate Sale's trade dress was famous in the specific market as defined by
the circuit court.
387 Times Mirror Magazines Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, 212 F.3d 157, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 8553
(3rd Cir. 2000). The court stated at 164: "We are persuaded that a mark not famous to the general
public is nevertheless entitled to protection from dilution where both the plaintiff and defendant are
operating in the same or related markets, so long as the plaintiffs mark possesses a high degree of fame
in its niche market." The trade marks, THE SPORTING NEWS and LAS VEGAS SPORTING NEWS,
competed in the same niche market for sports periodicals. See the discussion of the case in Chapter
4.10.4 "Likelihood of Dilution vs Actual Dilution" infra.
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followed other cases that found niche-market fame and also referred to the Restatement
for further support that niche-market fame is sufficient for protection against dilution.388
The court also considered the fame factors of the Dilution Act.389
In WAWA v. HaaJ,390the owner of the WAWA convenience store chain asked for an
injunction against a competitor using the name HAHA.391 In deciding whether WAWA
was a famous mark for purposes of a dilution claim, the court considered at least some of
the eight factors cited in the Act, namely the duration of the senior user's use of the mark,
the extent of its advertising of the mark and public recognition of the mark.392 The court
then declared the WAWA mark to be famous.l'" The court, however, did not expressly
mention the fame factors, thereby creating the impression that the fame inquiry is not
particularly important.
Other examples of marks that were held to be famous under the 1996 Act, are
BUDWEISER for beer in Anheuser-Busch v. Andy's Sportswear; CANDYLAND for a
children's game in Hasbro v. Internet Entertainment Group; DON'T LEAVE HOME
WITHOUT US in American Express v. CFK; THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH in
the Ringling Bros.-Barnum cases; INTERMA TIC for electrical products in Intermatie v.
Toeppen; PANAVISION for movie and television cameras in Panavision v. Toeppen and
TOYS "R" US for a toy store in Toys "R" Us v. Akkaoui.394
388 The dissenting opinion of Circuit Judge Barry in the Times Mirror case rejected the niche-market
theory. He strongly feels that Congress intended the Dilution Act only to apply to a narrow category of
truly famous marks.
389 The first four and the last factor all weighed in favour of finding the mark distinctive. The fifth, sixth
and seventh factors were not explicitly addressed by the district court. The Act, nevertheless, does not
require the court to strictly apply every factor.
390 Wawa, Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1629 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
391 Port (2000) 879 holds the view that the appropriate cause of action should have been trade-mark
infringement and not dilution.
392 A recognition survey was used by the plaintiff to show the fame of the WA WAmark. The court,
however, did not discuss the results of the surveyor even whether the survey helped them in reaching
their conclusion. See Pokotilow SB & Fefferman SA "FTDA Survey Evidence: Does Existing Case
Law Provide Any Guidance for Constructing a Survey?" (2001) 91 The Trademark Reporter 1150 at
1157-1158.
393 Again Port (2000) 879 differs from the court. He says that WA W A is not famous under the clear
language ofs 43(c) and that the court applied the least legitimate view of fame, namely regional fame.
394 These examples are taken from McCarthy (1998) 594-595. Most of these cases are discussed in this
Chapter and all the references also appear in the Bibliography.
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Klieger strongly feels that most of the cases discussed above undermine the importance
of the fame requirement. The courts did not even try to limit protection to truly famous
marks as envisaged by the Trademarks Act. In most of these cases the eight-factor test
for fame of a mark was not even mentioned. This can lead to the situation were
trademark rights in gross are created.395 It must be kept in mind that in cases where the
goods are non-competing, the level of fame required must be higher, because the mark
must be sufficiently well known to the general public that blurring will occur across
product lines, regardless of the absence of competition.i'"
In the decisions discussed above the courts used one of two conflicting judicial theories,
either the niche-market theory or the general-public theory, as a mechanism for
identifying famous trade marks eligible for dilution protection.i'" The niche-market
theory applied to the dilution doctrine means that a trade mark can be famous enough to
merit dilution protection, although it is only well known in a niche market limited to a
specific consumer group, geographic area, product feature or price-quality level, and not
famous to the general public. The niche-market theory is rooted in one of the fame
factors, namely "the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels
of trade of the mark's owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought".398
This theory found support in dilution cases especially where the trade marks are used on
competing products. Cases where the niche-market theory gained support are the
Nabisco case,399 the Syndicate Sales case400 and the Times Mirror case.401 The general-
public theory requires the plaintiff "to establish fame on a national or even a global scale
395 Klieger (1997) 850-851.
396 Kostello (200 I) 1143.
397 See article by Belongia (2002) 1159-1213 for a complete discussion of these two theories in trade-mark
dilution law.
398 Kostello (2001) 1137, with reference to § 43(1)(c)(F).
399 Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, lnc., 191 F.3d 208, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20786, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1882 (2nd Cir. 1999). The court found Pepperidge Farm's GOLDFISH trade mark to be famous. See
the discussion of the case in Chapter 4.10.4 "Likelihood of Dilution vs Actual Dilution" infra.
400 Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corporation 192 F.3d 633,1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 21884, 52
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1035 (th Cir. 1999) discussed supra in this section.
401 Times Mirror Magazines Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, 212 F.3d 157,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 8553
(3rd Cir. 2000). See the discussion of the case in Chapter 4.10.4 "Likelihood of Dilution vs Actual
Dilution" infra.
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for a substantial segment of the public,,.402 This theory was followed in the cases of
Mead Data403 and J.P. Lund. 404
Protecting trade marks which are famous in a niche market is consistent with the idea of
protecting the proprietary interest of the trade-mark owner. This will also be to the
benefit of small and medium-size businesses, which often operate in a niche market. In
spite of these and other arguments in favour of the niche-market theory,405 Belongia
reasons that this theory relies solely on a judge's discretion, who must define the
boundaries of the specialised market406 and also has the potential to create exclusive
rights in gross for trade marks.407 For these reasons it should not be used. She perceives
that the general-public theory is more consistent with congressional intent, the language
of the Federal Act and legislative history.l'" Another question is whether the dilution
theory is necessary or even appropriate in niche-market circumstances where the parties
operate in the same or related markets and the marks are the same or similar. The reason
is that in such circumstances there will nearly always be a likelihood of confusion, which
means that the traditional infringement remedies are available.409 Kostello, however,
explains that even where the parties are in direct competition in the same niche market,
there may not be a likelihood of confusion. Thus there will be a gap in protection if the
dilution theory cannot be used.4lo
Besides determining whether a trade mark can be famous within a niche market, the
courts have to decide whether fame within a particular geographic area will be acceptable
in terms of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act. One of the eight factors is "the
402 Belongia (2002) 1186.
403 Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc 875 F.2d 1026, 1032, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1961
(2nd Cir. 1989). For a detailed discussion see Chapter 4.3.3.1 "Second Circuit Cases" supra.
404 lP. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co. 163 F.3d 27, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225 (t" Cir. 1998). The court
decided that the VOLA trade dress, although renowned in the world of interior design and high-end
bathroom features, did not possess the degree of fame required under the Federal Act.
405 See Belongia (2002) 1194-1 199.
406 Belongia (2002) 1207.
407 Belongia (2002) 1204.
408 Belongia (2002) 1199-120 I.
409 Kostello (2001) 1140.
410 Kostello (2001) 1142. He uses the example of Syndicate Sales, discussed supra in this section at fn 383
and accompanying text.
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geographical extent of the trading area in which the [plaintiffs] mark is used". This
suggests that nationwide fame is not required.411 The House Report, however, makes it
clear that the geographic fame of the mark must extend throughout a substantial portion
of the United States.412
Belongia suggests that the following factors should be used in conjunction with the
existing statutory factors to determine the fame of a trade mark:413 the quantitative and
qualitative advertising efforts employed by the plaintiff.l'" the strength of the mark,415
consumer surveys'i" and the number and diversity of products on which the trade mark
appears.
Swann suggests a rather different way to determine the fame of a trade mark.417 He sees
the fame factors in dilution cases as only the starting point. He pleads for an intuitive
approach by the courts. A symbol which in itself "identifies.t'" informs419 and
idealizes'f" - that singularly?" stimulates and sells - is intuitively of incalculable
value ... ".422 Such a symbol, he reasons, has "actual fame". To prove actual fame one
411 Kostello (2001) 1146-1148. See Star Markets, Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc. 950 F.Supp. 1030 (D. Haw. 1996)
[use in one state not enough]; WAWA Inc. v. Haal, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629 (E.D. Pa. 1996) [use in
five states for 90 years sufficient]; The Gazette Newspapers Inc. v. The New Paper Inc., 934 F.Supp.
688, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1900 (D. Md. 1996) [use in two counties enough]. See also Chapter 4.7.2
"Discussion of the Different Factors" supra.
412 HR Rep No 104-373, 7 (1995). See also the discussion of fame in the proposed Trademark Dilution
Revision Act of2005 infra in this section.
413 Belongia (2002) 1210-1213.
414 Quantitative advertising can be measured by looking at the sales figures - the higher the sales figures
the more effective the advertising. The qualitative advertising refers to how and where the goods were
promoted, for example to a large audience at an international sports event.
415 Ranging from arbitrary or fanciful marks, which are strong, to descriptive marks which require
secondary meaning.
416 Belongia (2002) 1211 advocates that a minimum of fifty percent of the general public should recognise
the plaintiffs trade mark to establish fame.
417 Swann JB" An Intuitive Approach to Dilution" (1999) 89 The Trademark Reporter 907-917.
418 Swann (1999) 910-911. A famous trade mark identifies with almost absolute clarity.
419 This function of the mark entails that it gives a complete picture of a product and its attributes. See
Swann (1999) 911-912.
420 Swann (1999) 912-913. This function refers to the emotional component ofa trade mark. A famous
trade mark has its "own persona" which conveys an image, life style or pleasant experience.
421 A famous mark must function as a singular symbol. For example, a mark such as AMERICA, is a
component of at least 4708 registrations and therefore can never be a singular symbol and for this
reason cannot be diluted. See Swann {I 999) 911.
422 Swann (1999) 913.
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can search the owner's marketing files for awareness studies, marketing plans, requests
for licensing agreements and more.423 If a mark is actually famous one needs no more
positive proof of dilution, as it intuitively suggests injury from third-party use.424
Moskin pleads for a federal registry of famous marks.425 Those who believe their marks
are famous should prove it and also pay for the honour and accompanying rights. Greater
certainty will be created for businesses which adopt a mark for the first time.
Some certainty on the scope of the fame requirement will be brought about by the
proposed new Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005.426 This legislation expands the
threshold of "fame" and thereby denies protection to marks that are famous only in niche
markets. The Act determines that a mark is famous "if it is widely recognized by the
general consuming public of the United States as a designation of the source of the goods
or services of the mark's owner." Although the courts may consider "all relevant
factors", the specific factors listed in the Act are reduced to the following three: firstly,
the duration, extent and geographic reach of advertising and publicity of the mark,
whether advertised or publicized by the owner or by third parties; secondly, the amount,
volume and geographic extent of sales of goods or services offered under the mark; and
finally, the extent of actual recognition of the mark. This last factor reminds one of
Swann's proposition that a mark must have actual fame before it can be protected against
dilution.427
Courts would still be able to use most of the fame factors listed in the present Act to
determine whether a mark is famous under the new Act, as it states that "all relevant
factors" may be considered. The only exception will be the sixth factor, namely "the
423 See Swann (1999) 915-916 for discussion and examples.
424 Swann (1999) 909.
425 Moskin JE "Victoria's Big Secret: Whither Dilution Under the Federal Dilution Act?" (2003) The
Trademark Reporter 842 at 858 and see his proposed legislation for "Certification of Famous Marks" at
863-865 of the same article.
426 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005 HR Rep No 683, (9 February 2005). This Act was
introduced after the cut-off of 31 December 2003 for this dissertation, but due to its importance some
remarks are included. See also concluding paragraphs of Chapter 4.10.4 "Likelihood of Dilution vs
Actual Dilution" infra.
427 See Swann (1999) 907-917 and fn 417 supra and accompanying text.
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degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of trade of the mark's
owner and the person against whom the injunction is sought",428 which is rooted in the
niche-market theory. By denying protection for trade marks which are only famous in a
niche market, small and medium-size businesses may be prejudiced. As Kostello
explains, where the parties are in direct competition in the same niche market, there may
not be a likelihood of confusion. Thus there will be a gap in protection if the dilution
theory cannot be used.429 But, more importantly, by prohibiting protection for marks
only famous in a niche market, the proposed Act expressly chose against the protection of
the proprietary interest of the trade-mark owner.
4.10.4 LIKELIHOOD OF DILUTION VS ACTUAL DILUTION
Courts interpreting the Federal Trademark Dilution Act have given conflicting judgments
on the words "causes dilution" used in the Act. This disagreement has resulted in a
circuit split. Some courts require proof of actual dilution, while others find a likelihood
of dilution sufficient. While it just seems to be a question of interpretation, this
controversy in fact reaches to the core of the ongoing dilution debate.43o As an overboard
interpretation would in effect give trade-mark owners a property right in gross, while an
overly-restrictive construal would provide no remedy at all, it is of the utmost importance
to find a proper balance.?" Even in decisions under state dilution laws, which generally
require a "likelihood of dilution", the courts remain divided as to whether actual harm
must be demonstrated or not.432 It was hoped that the Supreme Court in Moseley v V
Secret433 would resolve the split in the circuit courts' application of the Federal Act.
428 § 43(1)( c)(F).
429 Kostello (2001) 1142. He uses the example of Syndicate Sales, discussed supra in this section at fn 383
and accompanying text.
430 Voss (2000) 265. See also Chapter 3.5.3 "Role of the Status of the Trade-Mark Proprietor's Right in
the Dilution Debate" supra.
431 See Voss (2000) 266. He describes dilution as a potentially exclusionary right, thereby stressing the
importance of finding a balance. See also Lee (2002) 706.
432 Garcia (1995) 515. See also Chapter 4.3.1 "Protection and Related Problems" supra.
433 Moseley v. VSecret Catalogue Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003). See the discussion infra in this section.
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The Federal Act is furthermore silent as to the factors to be considered in determining
whether or not a junior user's mark "causes dilution". The six-factor "Sweet Test",
formulated in the concurring opinion in the Mead Data case,434 was accepted as the
leading test for dilution for the first few years of the Federal Act's existence.l" As will
be seen in the cases discussed below, this test was rejected in several recent judgments,
each formulating its own test for dilution.
The first two important decisions in federal courts regarding the likelihood of
dilution/actual dilution dispute were Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows,
Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Developmentt'" decided by the Fourth Circuit and
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc,437a Second Circuit decision. In Ringling Brothers v.
Utah, the Fourth Circuit court ruled that the defendant did not dilute the famous mark of
the plaintiff, because the plaintiff failed to demonstrate that it had suffered "actual
economic harm" caused by the defendant's use of the mark.
The Division of Travel Development of the State of Utah had used the slogan THE
GREATEST SNOW ON EARTH as an advertisement for Utah's winter sports attractions
since 1962. It was registered in Utah in 1975 and federally in January 1997. Ringling
Brothers had, however, since 1872 used the slogan THE GREATEST SHOW ON
EARTH to describe their well-known circus and it was registered as a federal trade mark
in 1961. Ringling Brothers commenced with this action for dilution of their mark under
the Federal Act in June 1996 in the Virginia District Court, after unsuccessfully opposing
Utah's federal registration of its mark.
434 Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Safes, U.S.A., fnc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1032, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1961
(2nd Cir. 1989). See Chapter 4.3.3.1 "Second Circuit Cases" supra for a detailed discussion.
435 Shire HJ "Varying Standards for Assessing whether there is Dilution under the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act" 91 (2001) The Trademark Reporter 1124 at 1125.
436 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc., v.. Utah Division of Travel Development 935
F.Supp. 763, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13304,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1303 (E.D. Va. 1996); 955 F.Supp.
605,1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2116, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (E.D. Va. 1997); affd. 170 F.3d 449,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4179, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065 (4th Cir. 1999). See the case note by Seitz (1999)
113-159 and also the discussions by Lee (2002) 707-710 and Garde TV "The 'Whittling Away' of the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act" (2003) International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright
Law 614 at 621-622.
437 Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20786, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1882 (2nd Cir. 1999).
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The district court found that Ringling's mark was famous and adopted by Utah after it
had become famous. The only remaining question was whether there had been dilution
of the mark. The court was of the opinion that this can be shown by proof that the use of
the mark by the junior user caused less of a demand for the products or services bearing
the famous mark. Ringling admitted that a lessening of demand did not occur. They
used survey evidence to show a mental association between the two marks as proof of
dilution.438 The court, however, held that a mental association alone will not be enough
for a finding of dilution. The court further said that the survey provided no direct
evidence that Ringling's mark had actually been diluted and did in any case not support a
finding of dilution. The district court also rejected their claim under the "Sweet Test".
Ringling Brothers appealed to the Circuit Court. This court basically agreed with the
district court's findings. It required proof of (1) a sufficient similarity between the marks
to bring about an instinctive mental association which (2) is the effective cause (3) of
actual harm to the famous mark's economic value or in other words a lessening of the
mark's selling power.439 The court thus required actual dilution and not merely a
likelihood of dilution. What it was looking for was actual harm to the senior mark's
selling power. The court noted that state statutes generally speak of likelihood of
dilution, while the federal law does not. The state courts thus required only a likelihood
of a mental association and/or resulting harm for a finding of dilution.44o Section 43(c) of
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act declares that the owner of a famous mark shall be
438 See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division ofTravel955 F.Supp. 605
at 616, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2116, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (E.D. Va. 1997). The survey used
here is described by Barber WO "How To Do a Trademark Dilution Survey (or Perhaps How Not To
Do One)" (1999) 89 The Trademark Reporter 616 at 624 as "the best-reasoned and most instructive
guidance to date on how to properly design a dilution survey". For detail on the survey used, see
Pokotilow & Fefferman (2001) 1163-1165.
439 Ringling Bros-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel 170 F.3d 449 at 453,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4179, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065 (4th Cir. 1999).
440 Different approaches to solve the problem of proof were used by state courts. Firstly, some courts
required proof of consumer confusion, although this is against the exact language of the statutes.
Secondly, factors such as those formulated in the "Sweet Test" were used to determine the likelihood of
dilution. In the third place, likelihood of harm was presumed if there was sufficient similarity of the
marks. The last approach, which only required "sufficient similarity" interpreted the state statutes as
creating property rights in gross in trade marks. See Ringling Bros-Barnum & Bailey Combined
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entitled to an injunction against another's use of the mark, "if such use .... causes dilution
of the distinctive quality of the famous mark .... " Hence, according to the court, the
federal law requires "actual dilution". Furthermore, by defining dilution441 as "the
lessening of the capacity of a famous mark, to identify and distinguish goods or services",
the Act makes it clear that its aim is to protect against the loss of the selling power of the
mark and not against loss of distinctiveness, unlike the state statutes.442 To protect only
distinctiveness would amount to giving a property right in gross for certain trade marks,
according to the court, because commercial use will be enjoined simply on the basis of
similarity of marks. The court also saw itself bound to the Supreme Court's "plain
meaning" rule.443
The court also looked at the arguments of those who believe that the Federal Act requires
only a threat of future economic harm. This contention focuses on the word "capacity" in
the definition of dilution. The argument runs that the word "capacity" indicates the
ability of the mark to identify and distinguish over future time, even if there was not yet
any lessening of that capacity. This, according to the court, contradicts the meaning and
use of the word in the Act.444 It held that "capacity" in its context refers to "former
capacity". The words "will" or "may" is nowhere used and furthermore the Act also
Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel 170 F.3d 449 at 457, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4179, 50
U.S.P.Q.2d 1065 (4th Cir. 1999).
441 Lanham Act § 45,15 USC § 1127. See Chapter 4.7.1 "Definition of Dilution in the Act" supra.
442 Kim (2001) 757 and Edgecombe (2002) 1264 also believe that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
protects the selling power of the mark rather than its distinctiveness. Ruwe (2002) 1196 criticises this
statement. She believes that this claim is not found within the text of the Act. Kera DJ & Davis TH
"Annual Review: A. United States: The Fifty-Second Year of Administration of the Lanham
Trademark Act of 1964" (2000) 90 The Trademark Reporter 126 at 131 also note that this theory is
"without foundation in the Act's express text".
443 The "plain meaning" rule states that "[I]f words convey a definite meaning, which involves no
absurdity, nor any contradiction of other parts of the instrument, then that meaning, apparent on the face
of the instrument, must be accepted." Voss (2000) 276-277, however shows that by creating an
uncompensable injury, by requiring actual harm, while the Act only provides for damages in the rare
cases where there was willful dilution, the court's interpretation leads to an absurdity. The court also
required evidence of economic harm, but acknowledged that this might be impossible, thereby leaving
the plaintiff with no remedy. This is also an absurd result. Therefore the "plain meaning" rule should
not be followed. The court's approach is also called the "Textualist Approach". The court believed that
"a purely textual interpretation of the FTDA carries the greatest interpretative weight". See Lee (2002)
714.
444 See Ringling Bros-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division ofTravel170 F.3d 449 at
460,1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4179, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065 (4th Cir. 1999).
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makes provision for monetary relief, not only injunctive relief.
The Fourth Circuit court also rejected the "Sweet Test" to prove dilution under the
Federal Act, as the test was formulated to prove "likelihood of dilution", not actual
dilution. It nevertheless recognised that factors such as mark similarity and degree of
renown of the senior mark may be relevant under the Federal Act.445
According to the court evidence of quantifiable economic harm and causation of that
harm is required by the federal statute. The court continued to describe how actual
dilution could be proved, as actual harm cannot be presumed.l" The most obvious proof
will be proof of actual loss of revenues due to repeating use by the junior user. A
skillfully constructed consumer survey can also be used, but there must be consumer
impressions from which actual harm and cause might be rationally inferred.l'" Indirect
evidence can be attained from relevant contextual factors such as similarity of marks, the
renown of the famous mark and the extent of the junior mark's coverage.l" Ringling
Brothers survey evidence was designed only to show mental association and not actual
economic harm and therefore failed to prove damage to their selling power. The Fourth
Circuit concluded that this concept of "actual dilution" is a "substantively viable one".
Some other courts have adopted the Ringling standard, but in other decisions it was
rejected. The Seventh Circuit, in the case of Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper,449
apparently adopted the Ringling standard. They required, inter alia, that there must be
sufficient evidence that "the infringer diluted the mark" to succeed on a dilution claim,
445 See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows. Inc. v. Utah Division ofTravel170 F.3d 449 at
463,1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4179, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065 (4th Cir. 1999).
446 The court admitted that it could be difficult to prove actual harm, but that is no reason for a presumption
that it has occurred. See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of
Travel170 F.3d 449 at 460, 464-465,1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4179, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065 (4th Cir. 1999).
447 Kim (200 I) 748-750 also proposes the use of a reliable consumer survey and proof of loss of revenues
to prove actual dilution Edgecombe (2002) 1270 says that "mark holders can use survey data quite
effectively to show proof of dilution". Contrary to this viewpoints, Lee (2002) 716 avers that these
methods are inappropriate as they are "inaccurate, expensive, and prone to manipulation".
448 These factors are suspiciously similar to the "Sweet Factors" rejected by the court.
449 Syndicate Sales. Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corporation 192 F.3d 633, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 21884, 52
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1035 (7th Cir. 1999). See Chapter 4.10.2 "Famous Marks" supra for the facts of this
case.
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then citing, amongst others, Ringling Brothers v. Utah.45o Also the Fifth Circuit endorsed
the requirement of actual harm in the case of Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings,
Inc.451 PRL was founded by Ralph Lauren in 1967 and the well-known POLO trade
marks were registered. The POLO magazine was founded by Fleet Street in 1975 and
registration was granted for the POLO mark in 1992. Ralph Lauren and PRL knew of the
magazine and even advertised in it. Fleet Street began a second publication under the
title POLO LIFE in 1989 and also gained registration for that mark. Westchester
purchased the assets of Fleet Street in 1997 and changed the "old" POLO magazines, as
the court referred to them, into a "new" POLO magazine, with the tagline "Adventure·
Elegance· Sport". Westchester advertised the magazine as "not about the sport, but
rather about an adventurous approach to living life". PRL objected to the title of the
"new" POLO magazine. Westchester filed a declaratory judgment action before the US
District Court for the Southern District of Texas requesting a determination that its use of
the POLO mark for its magazine did not infringe PRL's POLO trade mark for wearing
apparel, accessories, home furnishings and fragrances. PRL counterclaimed for trade-
mark infringement and dilution.
Infringement was found by the lower court and affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. The lower
court issued a permanent injunction requiring Westchester to cease publishing the
magazine under the POLO trade mark, but the Fifth Circuit remanded the case for the
district court to review the injunction. They thought that a disclaimer on the magazine
would be efficient.452 Regarding the dilution claim, it was accepted that the POLO mark
was famous and distinctive and had become famous before Westchester adopted the
mark. Regarding the standard of proof required for dilution, the Fifth Circuit followed
the ruling of the Fourth Circuit in the Ringling Brothers case and required proof of actual
dilution.l'" They indicated that this standard accorded with the plain meaning of the
450 See also Seitz (1999) 136. He cites the Syndicate case as strong authority for the Ringling standard.
451 Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000).
452 For the suitability of a disclaimer as remedy in the case of a dilution claim, see Chapter 4.8 "The
Trademark Amendments Act of 1999" and especially fn 327 supra.
453 Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc. 214 F.3d 658 at 670 (5th Cir. 2000). This standard was
echoed by the judge in the case of Advantage Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Enterprise Rent-A-Car, Co., 238 F.3d
378 at 380 (5th Cir. 2001). Gunn ML "United States: First Amendment Concerns Regarding Magazine
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statute and also distinguish it from the "likelihood of dilution" phraseology of the state
statutes. PRL presented no evidence of actual harm and therefore the court found no
dilution of the POLO trade mark.
Some district courts also adopted the requirement of "actual dilution".454 If this "actual
dilution" interpretation prevails, it is certain that the future application of dilution will
differ greatly from that seen under state dilution laws over the past five decades.
The Second Circuit Court, in the case of Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.,455 however
rejected the interpretation of the Ringling court that actual harm is required for a finding
of dilution. Pepperidge Farm, the defendant has a trade mark for an orange, bite-sized,
cheddar cheese-flavoured, goldfish-shaped cracker. In 1998 Nabisco, the appellant,
entered into an agreement with Nickelodeon Television Network for a joint promotion of
their new "CatDog"-cartoon. Nabisco developed a CatDog snack consisting of small
orange, cheese-flavoured crackers in the shape of the CatDog character, a bone and a
fish. The fish-shaped crackers, although somewhat larger and flatter, closely resembled
those of Pepperidge Farm's GOLDFISH crackers. The district court, after applying the
"Sweet Test", found for Pepperidge on the dilution claims and Nabisco appealed to the
Second Circuit.
The Nabisco court interpreted the Act simply to require a "likelihood of success" that the
plaintiffs mark will be diluted, using an expansive multi-factor test. They constructed a
Titles and Actual Harm Required for Dilution - The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Takes a Stand"
(2001) 1 European Intellectual Property Review 51 at 53 calls this "an additional stringent element to
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act .... "
454 See the discussion in Seitz (1999) 137-143. He cites the following cases: Carnival Corp. v. SeaEscape
Casino Cruises, Inc., 74 F.Supp.2d 1261 (S.D. Fla. 1999); World Gym Licensing, Ltd. v. Fitness World,
Inc. 47 F.Supp.2d 614 (D. Md. 1999); American Cyanamid Co. v. Nutraceutical Corp., 54 F. Supp.2d
379 (D. N.J. 1999); Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp., 55 F. Supp.2d 1070
(C.D. Cal. 1999); National Footbal! League Properties, Inc. and Green Bay Packers, Inc. v. Prostyle,
Inc., 57 F.Supp.2d 665 (E.D. Wis. 1999). See also the short discussion of the American Cyanamid and
Playboy cases in Ruwe (2002) 1181-1183.
455 Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20786, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1882 (2nd Cir. 1999). See futher on this case Seitz (1999) 143-146; Voss (2000) 273-275; Lee (2002)
710-712; Garde (2003) 623-624.
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non-exhaustive, non-exclusive ten-factor test for establishing a likelihood of dilution.456
An eleventh factor, whether the junior user acted with predatory intent, was also
considered later in the opinion.457 Disagreeing with the interpretation of the Federal Act
in Ringling Brothers v. Utah, the Second Circuit made the following comments. To
require evidence of "actual loss of revenues,,458 or "skillfully constructed consumer
surveys,,459 as proof of actual dilution, places "an arbitrary and unwarranted limitation on
the methods of proof'. The Nabisco court held the opinion that dilution can be inferred
from circumstantial evidence or "contextual factors", such as similarity of marks.
Contextual factors have already been used to establish infringement for a long time.46o
To the extent that the Ringling court in addition required that the junior user must already
be established in the market before the senior user could seek an injunction, the Nabisco
court also disagreed. Although the Act uses the present tense "causes dilution", the
456 The factors considered by the court were the following: distinctiveness; similarity of the marks;
proximity of the products and likelihood of bridging the gap; interrelationship among the
distinctiveness of the senior mark, the similarity of the junior mark and the proximity of the products;
shared consumers and geographic limitations; sophistication of the consumers; actual confusion;
adjectival or referential quality of the junior use; harm to the junior user and delay by the senior user;
and effect of senior's prior laxity in protecting the mark. The court rejected the "Sweet Test" used by
the district COurtas being too much of a limitation in the early interpretation of the Federal Act. "We
believe it is by far premature for federal courts to declare and close the list of factors that will be
deemed pertinent in cases under the new Federal Act." See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d
208 at 217-222, 227,1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20786,51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1882 (2nd Cir. 1999). Voss
(2000) 267 criticises the inclusion of likelihood of confusion factors in this test, because this would
mean that dilution would only serve as a fallback for those who cannot meet the traditional likelihood of
confusion test.
457 The Nabisco-factors was also considered and applied in another Second Circuit case, Federal Express
Corp. v. Federal Espresso, Inc., 201 F.3d 168,53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1345 (2nd Cir. 2000).
458 The court explained that in the case of a famous mark, which has been continually diluted for a
prolonged period of time, it would be extremely difficult to show diminished revenues. There would be
no way to measure what the revenues would have been if the mark had not been diluted. Itwould also
be difficult to prove that the loss of revenues was due to the dilution of the mark by the junior user, as
there might be other influences as well. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 at 223-224,
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20786, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1882 (2nd Cir. 1999). Seitz (1999) 155-156,
however, suggests that one can look back at revenues during the time period when the junior user first
appropriated the famous mark and if there is a gradual shift in revenue from the senior user to the junior
user, it would indicate dilution.
459 Consumer surveys were regarded as expensive, time-consuming, easily manipulated and unreliable.
Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 at 223-224, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20786, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1882 (2nd Cir. 1999). Again Seitz (1999) 156 differs. According to him surveys
carried out by independent third parties and conducted properly will be accepted by courts.
460 The court, however, ignores the significant differences between the state dilution statutes and the
Federal Act, by simply assuming that they set the same requirements, despite differences in language.
See Voss (2000) 280.
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Nabisco court felt that such a literal interpretation would in the first place defeat the
object of the statute. The court read the statute as intending to provide for an injunction
to prevent the harm before it occurs.f" Secondly, it would leave the senior user unable to
obtain compensation. The statute only provides for injunctive relief and no damages,
unless there was willfulness, thus leaving the senior user in most cases with an injury that
can never be compensated. In the third place, the junior user would also be left in a
rather disadvantageous position. He will have to invest huge amounts of money to
launch and put his product on the market, without knowing whether his use will be
enjoined later.462 The court does not foresee that their interpretation would create a
property right in gross in trade marks.463
The ruling in Nabisco was followed by another Second Circuit Court in Federal Express
Corp. v. Federal Espressol'" as well as by the Third Circuit Appeal Court in the Times
Mirror case.465 Also the Sixth Circuit, in V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley,466and the
Seventh Circuit in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc.467 followed the Nabisco
ruling, although in the latter case only some of the reasoning was adopted.
461 Seitz (1999) 155 criticises the court on this point. He believes that the Nabisco court ignores the
language of the statute.
462 Seitz (1999) 156 feels that an "actual dilution" provision would rather benefit the junior user, as he now
gets the opportunity to place his mark in commerce. Only if it actually dilutes a famous mark, will it be
enjoined. Under the likelihood of dilution standard many marks that may not actually dilute, can be
enjoined. This view is supported byKim (2001) 758-759.
463 Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 at 224 fn 6, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20786, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1882 (2nd Cir. 1999).
464 Federal Express Corp. v. Federal Espresso, Inc., 201 F.3d 168, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 96, 53
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1345 (2nd Cir. 2000). An overnight shipper, doing business under the FEDERAL
EXPRESS trade mark brought action alleging inter alia dilution against operators of a coffee shop,
using the name FEDERAL ESPRESSO. The Circuit Court, after discussing the application of the ten
factor test in Nabisco, found that Federal Express "may well ultimately prevail on its dilution claim, and
therefore be entitled to a permanent injunction". However, this does not mean that it was
"presumptively entitled to a preliminary injunction". The court said that dilution (irreparable harm) was
not imminent and that a preliminary injunction was thus not needed. There are also a number of cases
decided by district courts in the Second Circuit, which followed the Nabisco case.
465 Times Mirror Magazines Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, 212 F.3d 157,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 8553
(3rd Cir. 2000). District courts in the Seventh and Eleventh Circuit also followed the Nabisco ruling.
466 V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001), but see Moseley v. V Secret
Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003), discussed infra.
467 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc. 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000).
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In Times Mirror468 the plaintiff used the mark THE SPORTING NEWS as the title of its
weekly sports publication. The defendant published a magazine on sports wagering and
started to use the title LAS VEGAS SPORTING NEWS.469 A claim was filed inter alia
for trade-mark dilution. The Circuit Court affirmed the preliminary injunction granted by
the district court. The court agreed with the six factor "Sweet Test", but incorporated the
additional factors formulated in the Nabisco case.470 The court concluded that irreparable
harm may be proven without showing actual dilution.
The V Secret case was a classic example of tarnishment.l" Victoria's Secret instituted
action for infringement and dilution of the VICTORIA'S SECRET trade mark for
women's lingerie, clothing and accessories by the mark VICTOR'S LITTLE SECRET
used 011 inter alia sex toys. The court believed that an injunctive remedy is needed
before the harm occurs, as dilution is an infection, which, if allowed to spread, would
destroy the mark's value.472 The court also found that consumers would make a mental
association between the two stores. After a detailed discussion of both the Ringling
Brothers case and the Nabisco case, the Circuit Court adopted the Nabisco test.473
TnEli Lill/74 the court also accepted that a likelihood of dilution was a sufficient level of
proof under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act. Eli Lilly sells the popular prescription
drug, PROZAC. Natural Answers develops herbal dietary supplements and sells them
exclusively 011 their website. They specialise in natural alternatives for well-known drugs
468 Times Mirror Magazines Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, 212 F.3d 157,2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 8553
(3rd Cir. 2000).
469 Previously the title was LAS VEGAS SPORTS NEWS, but when defendant took over as publisher, it
opted to change the title.
470 The district court only used the "Sweet Factors". See the summary at 169 of the Circuit Court's
decision.
471 VSecret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1092 (W.D. Ky. 2000); VSecret Catalogue, Inc. v.
Moseley, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 200 I); Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. IllS (2003).
See Chapter 4.10.7 "Cases on Tarnishment" infra for the facts of this case.
472 VSecret Catalogue, Inc. v.Moseley, 259 F.3d 464 at 476 (6th Cir. 200l). Compare this to the reasoning
of the court in the Federal Express case, where the court said that although the gradual erosion of a
mark should be prevented, the "likely pace of such an erosion" should be taken into account. The
products, coffee and an overnight delivery service, were dissimilar, there was little likelihood of
confusion, plaintiff was a vast organisation, while defendants were three people owning two coffee
shops. The court thus decided that dilution was not imminent and denied a preliminary injunction.
473 But see Moseley v. VSecret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. IllS (2003), discussed infra in this section.
474 Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456 (th Cir. 2000).
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and started to sell HERBROZAC. The district court, as well as the Circuit Court found
that the plaintiff was not required to show actual dilution and found that there was a
likelihood of dilution of the PROZAC mark. Only two factors were used to determine
the likelihood of dilution, namely the similarity between the two marks and the renown of
the senior mark. The court considered the Nabisco factors, but rejected most ofthem.475
In two earlier decisions the requirement of actual harm was also rejected. The First
Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the issue in lP. Lund v. Kohler CO.476The district
court enjoined Kohler from selling the Kohler Falling Water faucet as it diluted the trade
dress of the VOLA faucet of the plaintiff, Lund, on the basis that Lund fulfilled the
requirement of the Federal Act to show that Kohler's product caused a lessening of
demand for its product. The appeal court rejected this requirement that a "lessening of
demand" must be shown. It reasoned that showing of actual harm was not required.477
The "Sweet Factors" were also rejected and as in the Eli Lilly case, the court focused on
the similarity of the marks and the fame of the senior mark.478 The court found no
likelihood of success under the dilution claim and remanded the case. In the Ninth
Circuit decision of Panavision v Toeppen,479 the court defined dilution by blurring as
"creating the possibility that the mark will lose its ability to serve as a unique identifier",
thereby also rejecting the requirement of actual dilution. Seitz, however, noted that the
court relied upon cases decided under state dilution laws.48o The court in Avery Dennison
Corp. v. Jerry Sumpton'" in turn cited Panavision v. Toeppen as authority for a finding
that the Federal Act requires only a "likelihood of dilution".
475 See the short discussion in Shire (2001) 1128.
476 J.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co. 163 F.3d 27, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225 (1st Cir. 1998).
477 The court was also concerned that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act might not even be applicable to
product design trade dress.
478 The court emphasised that the Dilution Act requires a "heightened fame standard". The court found at
47 that, although probably famous in the niche market of interior design and high-end bathroom
fixtures, the VOLA faucet did not have sufficient fame to meet the burden set by the Act. The Lund
approach was followed in Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F.Supp.2d 117,52 U.S.P.Q.2d 1402
(D. Mass. 1999), affd. 232 F.3d 1,56 U.S.P.Q.2d 1766 (Ist Cir. 2000).
479 Panavision Int'!, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 7557; 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1511 (9th Cir. 1998). The judgments in both the Panavision and Lund cases are criticised by Marroletti
(1999) 677-680; 685-687.
480 See Seitz (1999) 148.
481 Avery Dennison Corporation v. Jerry Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868; 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 19954; 51
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801; 99 Cal. Daily Op. Service 6795; 99 Daily Journal DAR 8723 (9th Cir. 1999).
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Scholars commenting on the interpretation of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of
1995 also hold different views on the requirements for a finding of dilution. Seitz
supports the view of the Ringling court. He concludes that "[w]hile this standard may be
difficult to satisfy, it is the correct one as dictated by FTDA's language and history.,,482
He sees this as the proper standard intended by Congress. He stresses that the Act uses
the words "causes dilution". According to him, Congress deliberately left out the word
"likelihood", as they had the examples of numerous state laws requiring "likelihood of
dilution" before them when they drafted the Federal Act.483 The Federal Act in section
45, defines dilution as a "lessening of the capacity of a famous mark". To read into this
phrase the word "future capacity" will, according to Seitz and Kim, take it too far from
the plain meaning of the statute.484 They argue that the Act refers to "present capacity"
and that this language is in line with the "causes dilution" language of the Act.485 Seitz
also criticises the interpretation and findings of the Nabisco court.486 Furthermore, he
states that many cases supporting the "likelihood of dilution" requirement "improperly"
relied on state dilution cases decided under state laws.487
Although Edgecombe also supports the actual dilution standard of the Ringling court,488
he notes that the legislative history of the Act suggests that Congress may have intended
a likelihood of dilution standard.489 The House Report490 explains that the dilution
482 Seitz (1999) 153. Another commentator who without reservation agrees with Seitz in his reasons for
accepting the actual harm requirement, is Kim (2001) 720, 747-760. See also Edgecombe (2002) 1261-
1263,1267-1269.
483 See also Kim (2001) 752. Edgecombe (2002) 1267 emphasises the use of the words "causes", the
present tense active form of "cause" and "lessening" the present tense of "lessen". He also indicates at
1268 that while the statute speaks of a "likelihood of confusion" it never uses the phrase "likelihood of'
to modify "dilution". The implication is that the phrase "causes dilution" means just that and cannot be
interpreted to mean "likelihood of dilution".
484 Seitz (1999) 154; Kim (2001) 753-754.
485 In Ringling Bros. at 460 "capacity" was interpreted as "former capacity", taking it perhaps too far in the
opinion of Edgecombe (2002) 1267 ("reading the text of the FTDA to require past harm stretches the
language almost as much as does reading it to require future harm.")
486 See discussion of the Nabisco case supra and Seitz (1999) 155.
487 Seitz (1999) 157. He specifically refers to Panavision v. Toeppen supra which cited Ringling Bros. v.
BE Windows, which in turn cited Deere v. MTD Products, decided before the passing of the Federal
Act.
488 Edgecombe (2002) 1272.
489 Edgecombe (2002) 1269.
490 HR Rep No 104-373,3 (1995).
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concept recognises the "substantial investment" the owner has made in the "commercial
value and aura of the mark itself'. The "aura of the mark itself' refers to the
"uniqueness" of the mark, which is protected by the likelihood of dilution standard. The
Report further states that "dilution is an infection, which if allowed to spread, will
inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark". This excerpt indicates that a
dilution action could be initiated before any harm has occurred. But Edgecombe
contends that this may contemplate that some initial harm, however small, might be
necessary to initiate an action."? He believes that an actual harm standard will prevent
dilution from destroying the infringement doctrine. There should be no overlap between
the two actions.492
Marroletti493 also strongly supports the Ringling Bros. case, which inter alia required
proof of actual dilution. He recommends a well-crafted survey as proof of actual
dilution.494 He feels that the court "created a workable standard for the practical
application of a notoriously elusive concept". The cost of relief, if granted in cases of a
likelihood of dilution, outweighs the benefit to the small number of plaintiffs who really
should succeed with a dilution c1aim.495 According to Marroletti the granting of a
preliminary injunction under a likelihood of dilution standard in effect prevents
competitors from entering the market.496
491 Edgecombe (2002) 1269.
492 Edgecombe (2002) 1274.
493 Marroletti (1999) 687-688.
494 Marroletti (1999) 689, 690. He admits that such survey evidence would likely be difficult to obtain.
Kim (2001) 748-749 also believes actual dilution can be shown through a reliable consumer survey. In
the case of blurring a survey can be evidence of a mental association between the senior and junior
mark. It must also show "further consumer impressions from which actual harm and cause might
rationally be inferred". Barber (1999) 629-631 suggests that a survey comparing "the strength or
association of the plaintiffs mark absent the alleged diluting use with its strength/association in the
presence of the alleged diluting use will give the best indication of whether there was dilution or not".
(emphasis added) He calls it a Comparison Test. See also Pokotilow & Fefferman (2001) 1150-1183
for a detailed analysis of survey evidence in case law and suggestions for the future use of survey
evidence in trade-mark dilution cases. They are in favour of a recognition survey to determine trade-
mark fame. See 1156-1157.
495 Marroletti (1999) 688.
496 See his explanation on (1999) 689. See also Kim (2001) 757-759.
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He strongly criticises the cases of Panavision v. Toepen497 and lP. Lund.498 In his view,
the court in the Panavision case based its reasoning on a traditional infringement
analysis, which required consumer confusion as to source of origin. In this case,
Marroletti argues, there was classic source confusion, which did not require the use of the
dilution theory.499 With regard to the Lund case, he criticises the use of the six-factor
"Sweet Test" to determine dilution as these factors are more indicative of whether or not
there is a likelihood of confusion.Y" The "Sweet Factors" were moreover established in a
case under the New York dilution statute, which differs in several respects from the
Federal Trademark Dilution ACt.501
McCabe describes the requirement of actual harm as one of the most "egregious
misapplications of dilution law".502 He believes that the Ringling Bros. court erred in
requiring actual harm to prove the dilution claim. To require actual harm implies that
dilution results in immediate injury, which is not true. He also feels that the court read
the dilution statute too literally.Ï'" He also criticised the Nabisco decision for their
finding that although confusion was not necessary for a finding of dilution, it could be
"highly probative" of dilution.i'" Dilution and traditional infringement, which require
evidence of consumer confusion, require two separate states of mind. The insertion of a
confusion element into a dilution claim blurs the distinction between the two.
Shire also submits that the test used in Nabisco and subsequent cases is wrong, because it
virtually equates the tests for dilution and infringement.i'" Dilution and infringement
address two different harms and furthermore the Act provides that competitive proximity
and likelihood of confusion should be irrelevant to the dilution inquiry. If the tests for
497 Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1998 U.S. App. LEXlS 7557; 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1511 (9th Cir. 1998).
498 J.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co. 163 F.3d 27, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225 (I st Cir. 1998).
499 Marroletti (1999) 685-686.
500 Marroletti (1999) 686-687; Ruwe (2002) 1194-1195.
501 See Ruwe (2000) 1194.
502 McCabe (2000) 1860.
503 McCabe (2000) 1861.
504 McCabe (2000) 1864.
505 Shire (2001) 1130.
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dilution and infringement are basically the same, he questions the need for the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act.506 Shire therefore strongly supports the two-factor Eli Lilly test.
Voss also criticises both the Ringling and Nabisco approaches.i'" Neither approach
properly balances the need for a dilution remedy with the need for adequate limitations.
He sees the "actual harm" requirement of the Ringling case as a "barrier insurmountable
by all but the strongest''r'" He criticises the application of the "plain meaning" rule509 in
the interpretation of the dilution section, and views the outcome as being in conflict with
the intent and purpose of the Act.5ID He finds the results reached by the court's "plain
meaning" interpretation absurd, leaving the plaintiff with a substantial uncompensated
injury and even no remedy at all.511 The gradual type of harm caused by dilution is,
according to him, not cured by requiring proof of actual harm.512 In the light of this
absurdity, he also supports the interpretation of "capacity" as "future capacity".513 In his
final conclusion, he, however, leaves room for the application of the dilution remedy in
cases of actual harm proved by evidence of actual economic IOSS.514 The test in Nabisco,
on the other hand, he views as one which "unnecessarily lengthens and obfuscates the
dilution inquiry", but which is still a significant improvement over the Ringling test.515
The use of multiple relevant factors avoids the problem of no remedy and also
emphasises the fact that the dilution concept is dynamic, by signifying that different
factors may be relevant in different cases. The court's emphasis on distinctiveness is also
506 Shire (2001) 1131.
507 Voss (2000) 275-276 and also 267.
508 Kim (2001) 760 believes exactly the opposite. He sees the actual harm requirement as preventing the
"'causing dilution' requirement in the FTDA from becoming a malleable standard that can be loosely
applied at the will of the judiciary".
509 For the definition of the "plain meaning" rule, see fn 443 supra and Voss (2000) 276-277.
510 He shows that nowhere in the legislative history of the 1988 dilution bill, the Dilution Act, the reports
of the Trade Mark Commission or the House Report of Congress is there any suggestion that actual
consummated harm must be proved. Only the fame and distinctiveness requirements are discussed
repeatedly. See Voss (2000) 278-279. See also S. Rep. No. 100-515,41-45 (1988) which uses the
following words: "reduces the public's perception that the mark signifies something unique, singular or
particular" ... " .
511 See also Lee (2002) 715.
512 See Voss (2000) 277. See also the criticism of McCabe (2000) 1861 discussed supra, but compare Kim
(2001) 755-759.
513 Voss (2000) 278.
514 Voss (2000) 287.
515 See Voss (2000) 276, 279-282.
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more In line with the plain meaning of the statute and the history of the concept.
However, the confusion factors used in the Nabisco test are irrelevant to dilution and
frustrate the inquiry.i'" It is also disturbing, because it makes dilution seem as a fallback
for traditional infringement, which it was never intended to be.
Voss then argues for an approach "which rigorously applies the key dilution inquiries
into fame, distinctiveness, similarity, and mental association't.I'" This entails the use of a
relevant set of contextual factors, from which dilution can be inferred. This is consistent,
according to Voss, with the meaning, intent and purpose of the Act. He stressed the
importance of the fame requirement to prevent over-protection of trade marks. Only truly
famous marks should get dilution protection. As distinctiveness is the very attribute that
the dilution statute seeks to protect, it is also an important factor.t"
Another scholar supporting the "likelihood of dilution" standard is Ruwe, who believes
this is the optimum standard to apply, because "it best carries out the goals and purpose
of the FTDA and can be more easily reconciled with the nature of dilution itself,.519 She
supports the ten factor test of the Nabisco decision, because it is merely a suggested list,
and not a fixed set of factors that must be applied in every case, but the courts should
mold it over time and it strikes a balance for both courts and plaintiffs.Y"
516 It is especially alarming in the context of trade dress, the context of the Nabisco case. See Voss (2000)
280 and fn 101. See also Chapter 3.3 "Traditional Infringement contrasted with Dilution" supra, where
it is stressed that it is impossible to cause both confusion and dilution in the mind of anyone person at
the same time. The ten-factor test uses virtually the same factors formulated in the Polaroid case and
used to determine the likelihood of confusion in traditional trade-mark infringement cases. This,
according to Shire (2001) 1126, diminishes the significance of the Federal Act. See further the
comparison of the Nabisco and Polaroid factors in Shire (200 I) 1126-1128.
517 Voss (2000) 283-288.
518 Voss applies his criteria to both the Ringling and Nabisco cases. In Ringling he finds against dilution
as, although the Ringling mark was sufficiently famous and possibly sufficiently distinctive, the junior
mark was not similar enough to it and there was only a weak-to-moderate showing of mental
association. He also feels that the Nabisco court could have found against dilution, given the low-to-
moderate distinctiveness of the goldfish design, the moderate degree of similarity and lack of evidence
of mental association.
519 Ruwe (2002) 1176, 1197-1199.
520 Courts have some flexibility as to which factors they apply and plaintiffs have some general guidelines
when bringing a claim. See Ruwe (2002) 1199.
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Others also see the "actual dilution" test as an exceptionally strict standard for dilution.52!
It makes it practically impossible to establish dilution in all but the most extreme cases.522
To prove actual dilution, thus, economic harm to the selling power of a mark, may be
extremely difficult. The owner of the famous mark will have to show that the use of the
other mark has lessened the capacity of the famous mark to identify and distinguish.
Gilson also speculates that a consumer survey could be used for this purpose or that the
owner of the famous mark could perhaps show loss of revenues, but both will be
difficult.523 He concludes that this standard proposed by the Fourth Circuit is probably
just too high.
McCarthy524 reads the Federal Act as not requiring proof of an actual lessening of the
strength of the famous mark. All that is needed is a lessening of the capacity or the
ability of the mark to serve as a strong commercial symbol or identifier. He,
unfortunately, does not provide further analysis of this statement. For that reason his
viewpoint was also rejected by the Ringling court.525 Other writers coming to the same
conclusion as McCarthy, are Reichmarr't" and Klieger.527 Reichman states that the
Federal Act requires actual dilution "on its face", but due to the use of the word
"capacity", showing of a likelihood of dilution will be adequate for a finding of dilution.
The mere ability of the junior user's mark to dilute the famous mark is according to him
actionable. Klieger also says that according to the plain meaning of the Act, actual
dilution is required. But he continues to argue that this will erect an "impenetrable
521 See Gilson (1999) § 5.l2[1][f][v][A] & [B]. Garcia (1995) 515 explains that it is in general more
difficult to prove blurring than tarnishment and that to prove actual harm in a blurring context, may be
impossible. Swann (1999) 907 fn 4 submits that the actual dilution requirement in Ringling Bros. will
become the exception to the, what he calls, "better reasoned rule" formulated in Nabisco. Kera & Davis
(2000) l31 believe that the Fourth Circuit's formulation "turns the entire purpose of the FTDA on its
head". They say Congress intended to provide a special degree of protection to famous and distinctive
marks.
522 See Voss (2000) 267. Seitz (1999) 153 also notes that no court using the "actual dilution" requirement
has found for the plaintiff.
523 Gilson (!999) § 5.12[!][f][v][B].
524 McCarthy (1996) § 24:90 fn 21.
525 Ringling Bros-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division ofTravel!70 F.3d 449 at 461
fn 6, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4!79, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d I065 (4th Cir. 1999).
526 Reichman CL "State and Federal Trademark Dilution" (1998) 17 Franchise Law Journal!!1 at 132.
527 KIieger (1997) 840-84!.
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barrier" to any federal dilution claim.528 He then says: "[o]f course, Congress did not
intend to require ... a showing of actual dilution." He states that the actual dilution
language of the Act, "reveals the degree to which dilution and misappropriation have
become virtually indistinguishable in result if not in aim.,,529 As can be seen from the
Ringling case, the court agreed with the plain meaning interpretation of both Klieger and
Reichman, but the court sees itself bound to the Supreme Court's "plain meaning" rule530
and thus actual dilution was required.
Lee believes that the two approaches can be reconciled and used together to show the true
meaning of dilution.t" This was also the position in state courts prior to the Federal Act.
Where dilution had been occurring for some time, evidence of past harm could be
accepted. Where dilution was imminent, a showing of future harm will suffice. A
remedy can be developed for both past and future harm. He initially criticises both the
textualist approach of the Ringling court and the realist approach of the Nabisco court.532
Concerning the textualist approach he notes the following. First, to read the statute as
requiring proof of past economic harm, rather than future harm, would lead to an absurd
reading of the statute. Secondly, a plaintiff may never be able to recover economic loss
as damages can only be claimed in the instance of willful intent. Thirdly, economic harm
is extremely difficult to prove. Fourthly, the textualist approach leads to absurd results if
taken away from the fact pattern of the Ringling case and applied in cases such as
Nabisco. Finally, this approach undermines the essence of dilution as it implies that
passage of time is required before there can be a remedy against dilution. The realist
approach used in Nabisco looks at the intent of Congress and the legislative history of the
Act. He indicates that there are also problems with the realists' ten-factor test as it
includes trade-mark infringement terminology.Y' Even worse, it may create a
monopolistic right in trade marks and thus stifle competition.
528 But see Kim (2001) 760.
529 Klieger (1997) 840.
530 See fn 443 supra for a definition.
53 I Lee (2002) 724-725. This was according to him also the intention of Congress.
532 See Lee (2002) 715-718, 719-723.
5JJ Lee (2002) 720-722.
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Another point of view is expressed in a note published in the Harvard Law Review.534
The author reasons that since a single incident oftarnishment immediately diminishes the
selling power of a mark and is more likely to cause harm to a plaintiffs mark, it is much
more dangerous than blurring and therefore a showing of likelihood of harm would
suffice. Blurring, on the contrary, is less harmful, occurring over a longer period of time
and therefore evidence of actual harm should be required for a finding of dilution.535
Formal reaction first came from the House Committee on the Judiciary. They met early
in 2002 to discuss whether the courts were interpreting the Federal Act properly
according to congressional intent.536 A draft bill, which was intended to clarify the
standard for dilution, was circulated beforehand. This bill stated that the standard should
be a "likelihood of dilution", being more in line with the intent of the original dilution
statute. This was also the viewpoint of various interest groups. Action on the bill was
nonetheless suspended after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Moseley case.537
In 2003 the whole debate was then brought to a head by the Supreme Court's decision of
Moseley v V Secret Catalogue.538 The court held that the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act unambiguously requires a showing of actual dilution.539 The mere fact that
consumers mentally associate the junior user's mark with the famous mark, is not a
sufficient ground to establish actionable dilution. The court found that "whatever
534 Note "Trademark Law - Federal Trademark Dilution Act - Sixth Circuit Holds that Plaintiffs Need not
Show Actual Harm to Prove Dilution - V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir.
2001)" (2001) 115 Harvard Law Review 731 at 734-736.
535 The writer of the note criticises the court's decision in V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d
464 (6th Cir. 2001) (see fn 471 and accompanying text supra and fn 589 and accompanying text infra)
for not distinguishing between dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishment. The writer believes that
the court correctly accepted a showing of likelihood of harm in this case as it was a tarnishment issue.
But by not limiting its decision to tarnishment cases the court "invited a glut of blurring cases that
threatens to stifle commercial speech".
536 Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the Committee of
the Judiciary, 107''' Congress 2d Session, 14 February 2002. See Garde (2003) 625-626.
537 Certiorari was granted on the specific question of whether "objective proof of actual injury to the
economic value of a famous mark is a requisite for relief under the FTDA". See Edelman S "Preface"
(2003) 93 The Trademark Reporter 1.
538 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003). See Chapter 4.10.7 "Cases on
Tarnishment" infra for the facts of this case.
539 Moseley v. VSecret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115 at 1124 (2003). The court compared the language
of the federal statue with the "likelihood of harm" language in the state statutes.
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difficulties of proof that may be entailed [in demonstrating actual dilution], they are not
an acceptable reason for dispensing with proof of an essential element of a statutory
violation.Y'" The court then, however, said that actual loss of sales or profits need not be
proved. It also agreed that evidence of actual dilution through consumer surveys and
other means is expensive and often unreliable.i" but the court said that this would not be
necessary if actual dilution can be proved through circumstantial evidence.542 The court
referred to the decision of Ringling Bros.,543 as well as to the case before it. From these
examples it appears that the plaintiff, to prevail on a trade-mark dilution claim, must
show some actual adverse impact on its mark, such as a diminishment in the mark's
identifying capacity or negative associations with the mark.544
Although there was evidence of the enormous value of respondents' trade mark, there
was no evidence of any impact of petitioners' use of the name VICTOR'S LITTLE
SECRET on that value.545 Therefore, the court held that there was no actual dilution and
the judgment of the circuit court was reversed.
The Supreme Court's decision is rightly regarded as "one of the most important and
potentially controversial decisions in the history of trademark law".546 The decision
answered a few questions.r'" but left numerous issues in the Federal Act unresolved. The
540 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. l l l S at 1125 (2003).
541 Ethan Horowitz, a practitioner said before the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual
Property that "surveys or other means of showing actual harm have been attempted but were not
successful." Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the
Committee of the Judiciary, lOt" Congress 2d Session, 14 February 2002. In the case of non-identical
marks, direct evidence, such as consumer surveys, is a necessary means of proof. See Higgins &
Duvall (2003) 828.
542 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. l l l S at 1125 (2003). The obvious case, according to
the court, is one where the junior and senior marks are identical. See Higgins & Duvall (2003) 828;
Cendali OM, Matorin CM & Maltby J "Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.: One Answer, Many
Questions" (2003) 93 The Trademark Reporter 833 at 835.
543 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division ofTravel170 F.3d 449, 1999
U.S. App. LEXlS 4179, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065 (4th Cir. 1999).
544 See Edelman (2003) III.
545 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115 at 1120 (2003).
546 Higgins & Duvall (2003) 831. See also Moskin (2003) 851-855 for a discussion of the Moseley
decision.
547 Higgins & Duvall (2003) 816 listed seven issues in which the court's opinion has given insight, namely
"(I) the authority of Frank Schechter's famous law review article; (2) the role of traditional trademark
law vis-a-vis dilution law; (3) the FTDA's "causes dilution" liability standard; (4)"tarnishment" as an
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court clarified what suffices as dilution under the Federal Act, but failed to provide
guidance on what proof must be offered to show actual dilution. The author believes, as
can be seen from the criticisms that follow, that this failure creates more problems rather
than solving the issue. Garde548 also criticises what she called the court's "middle of the
road approach". Justice Kennedy in a concurring opinion,549 proposed that dilution may
be proved when a mark erodes or lessens "the power of the famous mark to give
customers the assurance of quality and the full satisfaction they have in knowing they
have purchased goods bearing the famous mark.,,55o According to Garde, Justice
Kennedy blurred the distinction between a dilution analysis and a likelihood of confusion
analysis by focusing on consumer confusion.f" Garde emphasises that the issue in a
dilution action is the "lessening of the capacity of the mark to identity the famous brand".
The court's remark that actual dilution can be proved through circumstantial evidence,
the obvious case being where the junior and senior marks are identical, severely limits the
reach of the dilution statute.552 It is also inconsistent of the court to require that actual
harm be shown without the availability of monetary damages (in the absence of
willfulness). According to Garde the underlying motivation for the court's decision is a
fear of granting property rights in gross to trademarks.Y' She concludes that the
"unfortunate result of the Supreme Court's interpretation" is that it "returns trademark
law to the state it held prior to Schechter's revolutionary concept of dilution" and thus
undermines the purpose of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.554
Cendali, Matorin & Maltby555 do not view the Moseley decision in such a negative way.
They first establish that mental associations and perceptions are the essence of dilution.
FTDA cause of action; (5) the relationship of mental association with actionable FTDA dilution; (6)
proof of actionable FTDA dilution; and (7) the role of identity of the marks at issue under the FTDA."
548 Garde (2003) 626-632.
549 Higgins & Duvall (2003) 829 named Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion "a masquerade in lieu of a
dissent". His opinion, for example, purports to agree with the court on matters not stated in the Opinion
of the Court.
550 Moseley v. VSecret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115 at 1125-1126. (2003).
551 Garde (2003) 627.
552 Garde (2003) 629.
553 Garde (2003) 630.
554 Garde (2003) 632.
555 Cendali, Matorin & Maltby (2003) 836-839.
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They reason that the court in Moseley did not find evidence that established "the right
kind of association" and therefore said that mere mental association is not sufficient to
establish actionable dilution. The writers then define "the right kind of association" as "a
showing of actual dilution [which] requires evidence that when consumers see the senior
mark, they also think of the junior mark.,,556 Thus, although a junior mark reminds
consumers of a senior mark, as in the Moseley case, it does not follow that when
consumers see the senior mark in independent circumstances, they will necessarily think
of the junior mark as well. The Moseley decision, therefore, did not say that a mere
mental association is not enough, but rather that the mental association must run in the
right direction: the question is not whether people associate the junior mark with the
famous mark, but whether the senior mark reminds people also about the junior mark.
Seen in this way, the Moseley decision does not have the huge impact on trade-mark
dilution law as appears at first sight.
On 25 March 2003, only three weeks after the Moseley decision, the International
Trademark Association (INTA) announced the formation of a committee on the FTDA.557
Nearly two years later on 9 February 2005558 a bill was introduced in the House of
Representatives to amend the Trademark Act of 1946 with respect to dilution by blurring
or tarnishment.Y" It was passed by the House of Representatives with an overwhelming
majority560 on 19 April 2005 and was referred to the Senate the next day. The present'?'
status of the bill is that it has been received in the Senate, read twice and referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary.
If it is enacted by both houses of Congress, many controversial issues that flowed from
different interpretations given to the 1995 version of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
556 Cendali, Matorin & Maltby (2003) 837. See also Moskin (2003) 851.
557 Moskin (2003) 855 fn 52.
558 As stated earlier, this bill was introduced after the cut-off date of 31 December 2003 for this
dissertation, but some comments are included in the light of the importance of this bill for the
development of the dilution concept in the USA.
559 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of2005 HR Rep No 683, (9 February 2005).
560 The Final Vote Results were 411 in favour to 8 against with 15 members not voting. See
http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2005/rolll 09.xm I.
561 Internet search on 30 August 2005. Http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquerylz?d 109:h.r.00683:.
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by different courts will be of academic interest only. It is also clear that the Act was
drafted directly in response to the Moseley decision of the Supreme Court in 2003. The
split in the circuit courts and Supreme Court on the likelihood of dilution vs actual
dilution issue will be settled by the Act explicitly defining dilution as use of a mark
"likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tamishment". Actual harm is therefore
not a prerequisite to injunctive relief. It is also stated that the "presence or absence of
actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury" makes no
difference when deciding the dilution question. Dilution by blurring562 and dilution by
tamishrnenrf" are then defined. A new definition for famous marks is also included.564
4.10.5 "CONFUSION" UNDER THE FEDERAL ACT
Even after acceptance of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act courts still struggle to keep
the notion of dilution apart from infringement. They continue to require a showing of
confusion for a finding of dilution. As has been said, dilution and traditional
infringement have separate states of consumer perception. In a few recent court decisions
it was fortunately recognised that dilution requires a different state of mind.565 McCabe
identifies the following reasons for the courts' ongoing reliance on confusion.i'" There is
a very strong precedent in the state courts for consumer confusion. It is just easier and
more efficient for the federal courts to apply existing trade-mark law, rather than to
invent new standards for dilution infringement. Another reason may be that the outcome
of the cases is more predictable when applying the well-known existing standards. There
is also still a lot of misapprehension regarding the concept of dilution in many courts.
Another reason he mentions is that there is the perception that dilution grants too much
562 '''Dilution by Blurring' is association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a
famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark." (It is stated expressly that a mark
can be inherently distinctive or can acquire distinctiveness.) Certain factors are listed to determine
dilution by blurring. See Chapter 4.10.6 "Cases on Blurring" infra.
563 "'Dilution by tarnishment' is association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a
famous mark that harms the reputation of the famous mark." See also Chapter 4.10.7 "Cases on
Tarnishment" infra.
564 See the last two paragraphs of Chapter 4.10.3 "Famous Marks" supra.
565 J.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27 at 48-49 (1 st Cir. 1998); Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands,
Inc., 191 F.3d 208 at 219 (2nd Cir. 1999).
566 McCabe (2000) 1858.
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exclusivity to a mark, which together with the subtlety of the injury causes judicial
reluctance to enforce dilution law. McCabe also feels that even the "Sweet Test" is
merely a recreation of the infringement standard and therefore not very helpful in the
determination ofa dilution claim.567
4.10.6 CASES ON BLURRING568
Blurring is the classic type of dilution as envisaged by Schechter and others. It presumes
some kind of mental association in the minds of reasonable consumers between the two
parties and the mark, although there is no confusion as to source or sponsorship or
affiliation.569 It definitely fits under the phrase "lessening of the capacity of a famous
mark to identify and distinguish goods or services" in the new Act. The challenge will be
to gather evidence in court to prove that blurring occurred.V"
As already said, the case law following the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, rely heavily
on state law precedent. For example, since the definition of dilution in the Lanham Act
does not give much help to determine the "lessening of the distinctiveness" of a famous
trade mark, the courts have to use other means. The well-known "Sweet Test" for
determining dilution by blurring, was, as a result, adopted by several courts, some
recognising criticism against the test. This test was formulated by Judge Sweet in his
opinion in the Mead Data case571 under the New York dilution statute in 1989. The
Deere case referred to this test as the "traditional six-factor test".
One of the first cases where the new statute had to be applied was Ringling Bros. v. B.E.
Windows.572 The well-known circus owner instituted action under both the federal
dilution statute and the New York dilution statute to protect its slogan THE GREATEST
567 See McCabe (2000) 1858-1859 and other commentators cited there.
568 See Chapter 3.4.1 "Blurring" supra for a definition and examples.
569 Pokotilow & Fefferman (2001) 1153.
570 McCarthy (1998) 591-592.
571 Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1961 (2nd
Cir. 1989). See the discussion in Chapter 4.3.3.1 "Second Circuit Cases" supra.
572 Ringling Bros-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Inc., 937 F.Supp. 204, 40
U.S.P.Q.2d 1010 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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SHOW ON EARTH from the use of the slogan THE GREATEST BAR ON EARTH by a
New York restaurant for its bar on top of the World Trade Centre. The court5?3 applied
the "Sweet Test" and came to the conclusion that the plaintiffs mark was not likely to be
diluted. The court recognised that plaintiffs mark was indeed famous5?4 and the fact that
its customer base was not sophisticated also favoured the plaintiff. But the plaintiff did
not show predatory intent on the part of the defendant. The defendant's mark was also
not nationally renowned.
The "Sweet Test" was rejected in the following appeal decisions interpreting the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act. In lP. Lund Trading Aps v. Kohler CO.,575 the First Circuit
abandoned this test. The court found it "inappropriate" in determining whether dilution
has occurred. It instead required an "inquiry ... into whether target customers are likely
to view the products as essentially the same".576
Also the Fourth Circuit in Ringling Bros. v. Utah,577 criticised the "Sweet Factors" by
finding them "simply ... not appropriate for assessing a claim under the Federal Act".
The court noted that only mark similarity and maybe the renown of the senior mark, can
be relevant under the Federal Act. To use factors such as consumer sophistication and
predatory intent to infer actual harm and effective causation was regarded as "a chancy
process at best".
The proposed Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005578 will probably make it easier
for courts to determine whether dilution by blurring has occurred. Blurring is defined as
573 After reaching the conclusion that the plaintiffs claims are the same under either statute, because the
Federal Act was intended to coexist with the state dilution statutes.
574 The court, however, did not discuss the fame requirement. It barely stated that the mark is famous as
contemplated by the Act. See also Klieger (1997) 849 fn 356.
575 J.P. Lund Trading Aps v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225 (Ist Cir. 1998).
576 lP. Lund Trading Aps v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27 at 50, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225 (I" Cir. 1998).
577 Ringling Bros. -Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development 170
F.3d 449 at 464,50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065 (4th Cir. 1999). This went contra the decision in the district court
Ringling Bros-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development 955
F.Supp. 605 at 618-621, 1997 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 2116, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (E.D. Va. 1997),
where these factors were applied.
578 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005 HR Rep No 683, (9 February 2005). See Discussion in the
last two paragraphs of Chapter 4.10.4 "Likelihood of Dilution vs Actual Dilution" supra.
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"association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark
that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark".579 It will also bring more certainty
as the Act, although stating that "all relevant factors" may be considered, specifically lists
the following factors to determine whether the distinctiveness of the famous mark was
impaired:
"(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous mark;
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark;
(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially exclusive
use of the mark;
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark;
(v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an association with the
famous mark;
(vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade name and the famous mark."
4.10.7 CASES ON TARNISHMENT580
Tarnishment is seen as one of the two traditional types of trade-mark dilution, but not
everyone is of the opinion that it is covered by the Federal Act.58l However, it appeared
to be the intention of Congress that it is. It is stated in the House Reports that the Federal
Act is intended "to protect famous marks from subsequent uses that blur the
distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it.,,582 The case law, before 2003, has
also accepted that tarnishment is covered by the Act. But the Supreme Court in Moseley
v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., cast doubt on this. The court noted that tarnishment may not
be "embraced by the statutory text".583 This conceivable lacuna in the Act is clarified by
579 § (c)(2)(B).
580 See Chapter 3.4.2 "Tarnishment" supra for the definition of this concept and examples.
581 Denicola (1996) 88-90 argues that the Act is and should be limited to a loss of distinctiveness through
the subsequent use of a mark to identify another's goods. He gives an analysis of both the genealogy of
the federal legislation and its plain meaning to substantiate his view. See also Alexander MJ &
Heilbronner MK "Dilution under Section 43(c) of the Lanham Act" (1996) 59 Law and Contemporary
Problems 93 at 124-125 and the commentary by McCarthy (1998) 593.
582 HR Rep No 104-373, 3 (1995), quoted in Ringling Bros-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows. Inc. v.
B.E. Windows Inc., 937 F.Supp. 204, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d IDIO (S.D.N.Y. 1996) and Toys "R" Us Inc. v.
Akkaoui, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17090,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
583 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue. Inc .. 123 S. Ct. Il 15 at I 124 (2003). The court said "the contrast
between the state statutes, which expressly refer to both "injury to business reputation" and to "dilution
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the Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, which unequivocally includes dilution by
tarnishment. 584
One example where the court issued a temporary restraining order ("TRO") to protect a
trade mark from tarnishment under the Federal Act, is Anheuser-Busch, Inc., v. Andy's
Sportswear, Inc.585 Plaintiff, a brewing company averred that the T-shirts sold by the
defendant, a sportswear manufacturer diluted its BUDWEISER trade mark. The
defendant manufactured and distributed BUTTWrSER T-shirts. The court recognised
that plaintiffs trade mark was "unquestionably famous" which the defendant apparently
conceded. The court accepted that the plaintiff had at least raised serious questions about
the negative effect of the defendant's T-shirts on its trade mark and then granted the
order.
Also in Hasbro586 the plaintiff was successful in protecting his trade mark, CANDY
LAND, against tarnishment. The court concluded that Hasbro had shown that the use of
the name CANDYLAND and the domain name "candyland.com" for a sexually explicit
Internet site, was causing irreparable harm to its federally registered trade mark for
children's games. This harm outweighed any inconvenience that the defendant would
experience if they were ordered to stop using the name. It would also be in the public
interest to grant a preliminary injunction. Unfortunately the court made no mention of
the requirement that CANDY LAND must be famous before it can qualify for dilution
protection.i'"
of the distinctive quality of a trade name or trademark," and the federal statute which refers only to the
latter, arguably supports a narrower reading of the FTDA". See also Moskin (2003) 855. However, in
reaction to Moseley, Cendali, Matorin & Maltby (2003) 840-841 argue that the TFDA's definition of
dilution is broad enough to include tarnishment.
584 See § 2 which replaces § 43(c) of the Trademark Act of 1946. Dilution by tarnishment is defined in §
(c)(2)(C) as "association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark
that harms the reputation of the famous mark", (Emphasis added.) See the discussion in the last two
paragraphs of Chapter 4.10.4 "Likelihood of Dilution vs Actual Dilution" supra.
585 Anheuser-Busch, Inc., v. Andy's Sportswear, Inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1542 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
586 Hasbro, Inc. v. Internet Entertainment Group, Ltd., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1479 (W.O. Wash. 1996).
587 See the criticism ofKlieger (1997) 849.
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Another case within the same parameters, is Toys "R" Us v. Akkaoui.588 The defendant
commenced a business under the name "Adults "R" Us" and registered the domain name
"adultsrus.com" for its web site selling sexual devices and clothing. Plaintiff owns an
array of trade marks ending with the words "R Us." The court, after applying the eight-
factor test of the Federal Act, found that the Toys "R" Us family of marks are famous and
distinctive. The inherent peculiarity of the mark, duration and extent of use and
advertising and the fact that both parties used the Internet to promote their goods were
taken into account. The judge then turned to the definition of dilution in the Federal Act
and concluded that ADULTS "R" US tarnished the "R" US family of marks by
"associating them with a line of sexual products that are inconsistent with the image Toys
"R" Us has striven to maintain for itself'.
In the V Secret case Victoria's Secret instituted an action against Victor and Cathy
Moseley for infringement and dilution of the VICTORIA'S SECRET trade mark for
women's lingerie, clothing and accessories. The Moseleys owned a retail store in a strip
mall that sold lingerie, adult videos and sex toys, which they named VICTOR'S LITTLE
SECRET.589 The respondents own the VICTORIA'S SECRET trade mark and operate
over 750 VICTORIA'S SECRET stores which sell moderately priced, high quality and
attractively designed lingerie. The district court590 found that the Moseleys' use of the
name VICTOR'S LITTLE SECRET had a tarnishing effect upon the VICTORIA'S
SECRET mark and enjoined the defendant from using it.59l The circuit court affirmed
the decision.592 The defendant petitioned for certiorari, which was granted. The
Supreme Court then reversed the decision of the circuit court. The Supreme Court first
588 Toys "R" Us Inc. v. Akkaoui, 1996 U.S. Oist. LEXIS 17090,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1836 (N.D. Cal.
1996).
589 Originally they named it VICTOR'S SECRET, but changed the name after protest from Victoria's
Secret. The word "Little" was, however, so much smaller than VICTOR'S and SECRET and written in
above the original logo, that the court found the two marks to be substantially similar for purposes of
the dilution claim.
590 VSecret Catalogue, Inc. v.Moseley, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1092 (W.O. Ky. 2000).
591 The court concluded that "while the defendants' inventory may not be unsavory to all, its more risque
quality widely differentiates it from that of the plaintiffs". To comply with the injunction the Moseleys
changed the name of the store to CATHY'S LITTLE SECRET, but also appealed the injunction to the
circuit court.
592 VSecret Catalogue, Inc. v.Moseley, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001). The court found that the marks were
sufficient similar to cause "dilution-by-blurring and dilution-by-tarnishment".
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questioned whether tarnishment was actually covered by the wording of the federal
statute but then refused to enjoin the defendant from using the name on the basis that the
clear wording of the statute required actual dilution, rather than a likelihood of
dilution.593
There are also examples where the courts came to the conclusion that there was no
likelihood of dilution through tarnishment. This was decided in the cases of Ringling
Bros. v Utah594 and Clinique Lab., Inc. v. DEP Corp.595
4.10.8 RETROACTIVITY OF THE ACT
The retroactive application of the Dilution Act is still one of the unsettled aspects of this
law.596 In a landmark case on the retroactive application of federal law, the Supreme
Court in 1992 in Landgrafv. USI Film Productst" formulated a two-pronged analysis,
the so-called "Landgraf Test". Firstly, determine whether Congress clearly intended the
legislation to act retrospectively and secondly, if there was no such clear congressional
intent, there is a presumption against retrospective application of the statute if such
application would have a genuine retroactive effect.598 The Dilution Act shows no clear
congressional intent to apply it retroactively, either in its language or in its legislative
history.599
593 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003). See the discussion in Chapter 4.10.4
"Likelihood of Dilution vs Actual Dilution" supra.
594 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development 935
F.Supp. 763,40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1303 (E.D. Va. 1996), affd. 170 F.3d 449,50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065 (4th Cir.
1999). The court decided that the defendant's slogan THE GREATEST BAR ON EARTH did not
tarnish the plaintiffs trade mark THE GREATEST SHOW ON EARTH, simply because alcohol was
served by the defendant. The plaintiff also served alcohol at some venues, as did some of its sponsors.
595 Clinique Laboratories, Inc., v. Dep Corp., 945 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). No tarnishment of the
CLINIQUE trade mark was found by the use of the BASIQUE mark by the defendant on a cheaper
range of skin products. The plaintiffs mark would suffer no negative associations.
596 For a detailed discussion of the retroactivity of the Act and case law on this subject see Speiss Tl "Is the
Trademark Dilution Act Retroactive?" (2001) 91 The Trademark Reporter 937-963.
597 Landgrafv. USI Film Products, 511 US 244, 265 {I994), affg 968 F2d 427 (5th Cir. 1992).
598 To determine whether the Act under scrutiny has a "genuine retroactive effect", the court should base
its decision on the particular statutory provision in question as it relates to the facts of the case. If the
new law attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment, such as impairing
rights a party possessed when he acted, increasing a party's liability for past conduct or imposing new
duties with respect to transactions already completed, it has genuine retroactive effect.
599 Speiss (2001) 947.
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The second prong was addressed in several cases.600 In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v.
OfficeMax, Inc.601 the court decided that under the Landgraf Test the imposition of even
injunctive relief would be impermissibly retroactive.602 Moreover, in the case of Fuente
Cigar, Ltd. v. Opus One603 the court found that the Dilution Act does not have "genuine
retroactive effect".
This issue came under scrutiny for the first time in a Court of Appeals in the Eighth
Circuit's judgment in Viacom v. Ingram Enterprises.t" The court expressly disagreed
with the judgment in Circuit City and reached the conclusion that the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act does have retroactive effect. The court emphasised the difference between
the retroactive effect of damages and the retroactive effect of injunctive relief. It then
stated that injunctive relief imposed by a statute does not have genuine retroactive effect,
only a prospective effect. The court further emphasised that such relief depends on the
equitable considerations of the case itself. 60S Speiss supports the Viacom decision that
"relief is permissible as a matter of law to enjoin ongoing post-enactment use of a
diluting mark.,,606
The issue was then addressed in Nike Inc. v. Nike Securities,607 where the district court
declined to apply the Dilution Act retroactively. The court relied heavily on "principles
of equity".
600 See the discussion of these cases in Speiss (2001) 948-958.
60J Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Officelv1ax, Inc., 949 F. Supp. 409, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1194 (E.D. Va. 1996).
This was the first case considering retroactivity after enactment of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.
602 The issuing of an injunction against further use would impose new legal consequences on the pre-
enactment-user. The pre-enactment user's post-enactment use was not illegal under federal law before
the effective date of the Dilution Act. The same conclusion was inter alia reached in Resorts of
Pinehurst, Inc.v. Pinehurst National Development Corp., 973 F.Supp. 552,43 U.S.P.Q.2d 1746 (M.D.
N.C. I997).
603 Fuente Cigar, Ltd. v. Opus One, 985 Supp. 1448 (M.D. Fla. 1997). This court disagreed with the
Circuit City court on several aspects. See Speiss (2001) 953.
604 Viacom Inc. v. Ingram Enterprises Inc., 141 F.3d 886, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1473 (8th Cir. 1998).
605 See Speiss (2001) 961. There are two considerations: the fairness to take away his investment in the
diluting mark from the pre-enactment user versus the amount of dilution the other mark is likely to
suffer. Speiss (200 I) 963 believes that the second consideration must "significantly outweighs" the first
before injunctive relief is imposed.
606 Speiss (2001) 961.
607 Nike Inc. v. Nike Securities L.P., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1202 (N.D. III. 1999).
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Several district and Circuit Courts followed the judgment in Viacom.608 In Medic Alert
Foundation United States, Inc. v. Corel Corp.609 the court decided that injunctive relief is
available under the Act, "even if the original violation began prior to the effective date of
the Act. ... " But the court refused to issue an injunction, because "principles of equity"
weighed against it.
4.11 REFORMING THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT?
In 1995 the Federal Trademark Dilution Act was most welcomed by the trade-mark
community. It was seen as a solution to what has been described as the "patch-quilt
system" for protection offered under state dilution laws.610 It was hoped that the Federal
Act would bring clarity and eliminate the inconsistencies in state decisions. However,
from the discussion of cases decided under the Federal Act, it appears that the "patch-
quilt" remains, as will forum-shopping.611 The decisions in the different circuits have
been inconsistent on several issues, sometimes creating more confusion than resolution.
Some scholars feel quite strongly about this. As Kostello put it: "[t]he widely divergent
interpretations of the Act .... have only provided more fodder for the theory's critics and
deepened the debate over its wisdom.,,612
One suggestion to overcome these inconsistencies in the interpretation of the Federal Act,
is for Congress to amend the Act. Edgecombe suggests the following amendments.V''
608 See Hasbro, Inc. v. Clue Computing, Inc., 66 F.Supp.2d 11752, U.S.P.Q.2d 1402 (D. Mass. 1999), affd.
232 F.3d 1 U.S.P.Q.2d 1766 (I st Cir. 2000); Sporty's Farm L.L.C v. Sportsman's Market Inc. 202 F.3d
489,53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1570 (2nd Cir. 2000) [dilution is a continuing harm; the injunction provided only
prospective relief, since it did no more than avoid the continuing harm]; Westchester Media v. PRL
USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1225 (5th Cir. 2000); Bunn-O-Matic Corp. v. Bunn
Coffee Service 88 F.Supp.2d 914, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d 1012 (C.D. Ill. 2000).
609 Medic Alert Foundation United States, Inc. v. Corel Corp. 43 F.Supp.2d 933 at 941, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d
1024 (N.D. Ill. 1999). See Kera & Davis (200 I) 135 for a short discussion.
610 Shire (2001) 1124. See also Chapter 4.3.1 "Protection and Related Problems" supra for a discussion of
the problems under the state dilution laws.
611 See Editor's Note "Dilution Law: A 'Patch-Quilt' of Judicial Interpretation of the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act" 91 (200 I) The Trademark Reporter 1123; Lee (2002) 704-705, 726.
612 Kostello (2001) 1134.
613 Edgecombe (2002) 1274-1280.
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Firstly, the actual harm requirement should be made explicit.t'" Secondly, protection
should be offered only to highly distinctive marks.615 Thirdly, dilution protection should
be unavailable in the case of competing goods or where there is product confusion.616
Finally, the concepts of blurring and tarnishment should be eliminated from the ACt.617
The goals he contemplates to accomplish are to prevent the over-expansion of the
dilution doctrine to the detriment of traditional infringement and to prevent the
dissolution of the consumer protection model;618 to protect the public interest and to
provide necessary protection to a specific class of marks.619 These suggestions are
obviously controversial and it still remains to be seen what will happen to the ACt.620
4.12 SYNOPSIS
Protection against trade-mark dilution has come a long way in the United States since it
was born in 1927 as the brainchild of Professor Frank Schechter. From the start the
dilution thesis was shrouded in controversy as it stands in sharp contrast to trade-mark
law in general, which was developed to protect the consumer public from confusion.
614 Congress should also enact the forms of proof sufficient to prove dilution. Edgecombe (2002) 1274-
1275.
615 See Chapter 4.10.2 "Distinctiveness" supra. Edgecombe (2002) 1276-1278 argues that only fanciful
marks merit dilution protection, since they are "the only marks which have a distinctive quality that is
sufficient enough to deserve protection". There is also no significant public interest in the use of
fanciful marks as in the case of descriptive, suggestive and arbitrary marks, which can be used in other
contexts, because fanciful marks have been added to the human vocabulary.
616 The dilution rationale was not intended to substitute the likelihood of confusion test where the parties
are in direct competition. It was rather created to fill the gap in trade-mark protection. There are,
however, a small percentage of cases where the parties are in direct competition, but confusion is
absent. The senior user would be without a remedy in the absence of dilution protection.
617 Tarnishment does not fit in the definition of dilution as "the gradual whittling away of a mark's selling
power" as the harm caused by tarnishment causes an immediate injury to the mark. Blurring describes
"a loss of uniqueness", while the Act protects the loss of selling power. Therefore it is not an accurate
term, according to Edgecombe (2002) 1279. He sees dilution as protecting the selling power of the
mark, as did the Ringling court.
618 He sees the consumer protection model as the only legitimate reason for protecting trade marks, as this
model is the foundation for American trade-mark law.
619 Edgecombe (2002) 1273.
620 As have been discussed in the last two paragraphs of Chapter 4.10.4 "Likelihood of Dilution vs Actual
Dilution" supra, Congress is in the process of amending the FTDA. The Trademark Dilution Revision
Act of2005 will set the standard for dilution explicitly as a likelihood of dilution. Furthermore dilution
is defined as dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment. It is also stated that dilution can take place
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The first statutory recognition for dilution took place in 1947, when the state of
Massachusetts enacted a statute prohibiting dilution. Over time more than half of the
states adopted statutory protection against dilution, mostly following the wording of the
dilution provision in §12 of the Model State Trademark Bill of 1964. Protection was
generally given to distinctive or strong trade marks where a similar mark was used on
dissimilar goods in such a way that the business reputation or distinctive quality of the
senior mark was injured or diluted. The dilution doctrine, however, also found
application in cases where the goods were competing.
A few important dilution cases were decided under state laws. Between 1930 and 1977
the most significant case was Polaroidr" acknowledging that dilution is a substantially
different action from infringement. The 1977 Allied Maintenance case,622 in which the
court broke with the longstanding judicial reluctance to apply the clear language of the
dilution statutes, was considered as a landmark case. In this case it was recognised that
the dilution doctrine was designed to provide protection above and beyond the traditional
trade-mark protection for infringement or unfair competition. It was also stated that
likelihood of confusion and competition was not part of a dilution claim. The two-
pronged Allied test was formulated: The senior mark had to be distinctive and there had
to be a likelihood of dilution.
Another very important case decided under state laws, was Mead Data v. Toyota Motor
Sales.623 The Allied test was extended to include also similarity of marks. The court
accurately defined dilution as requiring some mental association between the marks. The
controversial "Sweet Test" for determination of a likelihood of burring was also
in the "presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic injury".
Thus clarifying many issues raised by inconsistent circuit court decisions and various commentators.
621 Polaroid Corporation v. Polaraid Inc., 319 F.2d 830, 1963 U.S. App. LEXIS 4810, 138 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 265 (7th Cir. 1963). See Chapter 4.3.3.2 "Seventh Circuit Cases" supra.
622 Allied Maintenance Corporation v. Allied Mechanical Trades, Inc., 42 N.Y.2d 538, 369 N.E.2d 1162,
1977 N.Y. LEXIS 2429, 399 N.Y.S.2d 628, 198 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 418 (1977). See Chapter 4.3.3.1
"Second Circuit Cases" supra.
623 Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1032, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1961
(2nd Cir. 1989). See Chapter 4.3.3.1 "Second Circuit Cases (viii) Comments on the 'Sweet Test'"
supra.
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formulated by Judge Sweet in his concurring opinion. These factors624 have been
adopted by virtually all state and even federal courts hearing subsequent blurring claims.
However, criticism against the "Sweet Test" is widespread, particularly because it raises
issues which are more appropriate when an infringement based confusion, as opposed to
dilution, is alleged.
In the Deer case625 the court upheld a dilution-based injunction by deciding that the use
of an altered version of a distinctive trade mark to identify a competitor's product in
comparative advertising can constitute trade-mark dilution. The court thus recognised
that blurring and tarnishment are not the only bases for dilution.
However, the ambiguous language of some early statutes, fears of monopolisation,
judicial antipathy, confusion with the established infringement doctrine and lack of
uniformity and consistency in application unfortunately led to the conclusion that the
employment of the dilution concept by the states had been largely unsuccessful.
However even after the enactment of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act the state
dilution laws will continue to be important as the federal law does not pre-empt the
existing state laws.
There were a few notable cases decided in federal courts before the enactment of the
Federal Trademark Dilution Act in which the court had implicitly relied on the dilution
doctrine to protect trade marks. The most renowned case of this era is probably Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders v. Pussycat Cinema.626
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act627 of 1995, which amended the Lanham Act, was
signed into law on 16 January 1996. This law provides that the owner of a famous mark,
624 The similarity of marks, the similarity of the products covered by the marks, the sophistication of the
consumers, predatory intent, the renown of the senior mark and the renown of the junior mark.
625 Deere & Co. v. MTD Prod., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, U.S.P.Q. 2d 1936 (2nd Cir. 1994). See Chapter 4.3.3.1
"Second Circuit Cases" supra.
626 Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200, 203 U.S.P.Q. 161 (2nd Cir.
1979). See Chapter 4.4 "Federal Dilution Protection Before the Federal Act" supra.
627 The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (1995) (codified as
amended at 15 USC § 1125, 1127 (West 1996)).
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federally registered or unregistered, shall be entitled to an injunction against another
person's use in commerce of a mark, if that use commences after the senior mark has
become famous and that use causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the senior mark.
The section continues to give a non-exclusive list of eight factors,628 which the courts
may use in determining whether or not a mark is distinctive and famous. Dilution is
defined in the Act as "the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to identify and
distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or absence of (1) competition
between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion,
mistake, or deception". Despite this clear language courts still struggle to distinguish
clearly and consistently between the notion of dilution and infringement.r'" According to
the House Report, accompanying the Act, dilution is "designed to encompass all forms of
dilution recognized by the courts, including dilution by blurring, dilution by tarnishment
and disparagement, and by diminishment". The remedies provided besides an injunction
are an award for damages, including treble damages for willful dilution, attorneys' fees
and destruction of diluting material. Exceptions to which the Act does not apply are fair
use in comparative advertising, non-commercial uses and news reporting and
commentary.
Several issues arising from the Federal Act have been addressed in case law. Some
issues have been settled, some only partially settled and others still remain controversial.
The degree of similarity required of the conflicting marks is not defined in the Act. This
issue was settled in part in the case of Ringling Bros-Barnum v. Utah Division of
Travel,63o where the Court of Appeal confirmed the district court's approach that on the
plain and unambiguous language of the Act both identical and similar marks are included
in the dilution provision. It seems that the test of substantial similarity may be used to
determine the degree of similarity, but the question still remains how similar the
conflicting marks must be.
628 See Chapter 4.7.1 "Definition of Dilution in the Act" supra for § 43(c)(I) and Chapter 4.7.2
"Discussion of the Different Factors" supra.
629 See Chapter 4.10.5 '''Confusion' under the Federal Act" supra.
630 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows v. Utah Division of Travel, 935 F.Supp. 763, 40
U.S.P.Q.2d 1303 (E.D. Va. 1996), affirmed. 170 F.3d 449,50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065 (4th Cir. 1999). See
Chapter 4.10.1 "Identical or Similar Mark?" supra.
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Distinctiveness is also an essential element of a dilution claim. This issue has been
addressed in a few cases631 and can be summed up as follows. In spite of contrary
decisions it seems that distinctiveness is something different from fame and that it refers
to inherent as well as acquired distinctiveness. The more distinctive the mark, the greater
the interest in protecting it and the better the chances of a finding of dilution.
The application of the dilution remedy is limited by requiring a famous mark. To
determine the fame of a mark the Act gives an eight-factor test, but only a few courts
applied this test and then with Iittle analysis and little real understanding of the Act. The
best discussion of the fame factors is found in the Star Markets case.632 In most cases the
courts used one of two conflicting judicial theories for identifying famous marks, the
niche-market theory and the general-public theory. According to the niche-market
theory, used especially in the case of competing products, a mark can be famous although
it is only well known in a niche market limited to a specific group, geographic area,
product feature or price-quality level. The general-public theory requires a mark to be
famous on a national or even global scale for a substantial segment of the public. More
clarity on the fame requirement will be brought by the proposed Trademark Dilution
Revision Act of 2005. Protection is denied for marks that are only famous in a niche
market and the fame factors are reduced to three, although "all relevant factors" may be
considered to determine whether a mark is famous or not.
The most controversial issue arising from the 1995 Act is the interpretation of the words
"causes dilution". Some courts require proof of actual dilution, while others find a.
likelihood of dilution sufficient. The two leading circuit court cases are Ringling Bros.
Barnum v. Utah Division of Travel, where the court required actual economic harm and
Nabisco v. PF Brands, which rejected this interpretation.t" In a decision based on the
631 See Chapter 4.10.2 "Distinctiveness" supra.
632 Star Markets, Ltd. v. Texaco, Inc. 950 F.Supp. 1030 (D. Haw. 1996). See Chapter 4.10.3 "Famous
Marks" supra.
633 Ringling Bros-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of Travel Development 935
F.Supp. 763,1996 U.S. Oist. LEXlS 13304,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1303 (E.D. Va. 1996); 955 F.Supp.
605,1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2116, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (E.D. Va. 1997); affd. 170 F.3d 449,
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difference in wording between the state statutes and the Federal Act the court in Ringling
held that there must (1) be a sufficient similarity between the marks to bring about an
instinctive mental association, which is (2) the effective cause of (3) actual harm to the
famous mark's economic value. They looked for actual harm to the mark's selling
power, which can be proved by actual loss of revenues. The court in Nabisco construed
an expansive, non-exhaustive, non-exclusive ten-factor test to establish a likelihood of
dilution. The reasoning behind only requiring a likelihood of dilution, is that dilution is
an infection, which, if allowed to spread, would destroy the mark's advertising value and
ability to serve as a unique identifier. Much criticism was leveled against both cases and
scholars commenting on the interpretation of the Federal Act were divided on this issue.
Tn 2003 the debate was brought to a head by the Supreme Court's decision of Moseley v
V Secret Catalogue't" The court held that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
unambiguously requires a showing of actual dilution. The mere fact that consumers
mentally associate the junior user's mark with the famous mark, is not a sufficient ground
to establish actionable dilution. The decision was quite controversial and left more
questions than answers. Congress reacted with the introduction of the Trademark
Dilution Revision Act of 2005, which is not enacted yet. Use of a mark "likely to cause
dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment" of a famous mark is made actionable.
Blurring and tarnishment are the types of dilution which arise most frequently in the case
law. In the proposed Trademark Dilution Revision Act of2005 dilution is also defined in
terms of blurring and tarnishment. Blurring is seen as the classic type of dilution. It
presumes some kind of mental association in the minds of reasonable consumers.
However, there is still no quick formula to determine whether dilution by blurring has
occurred. In some cases the well-known "Sweet Test" is still accepted as a means to
determine blurring, while in other cases it is rejected as totally inappropriate. Again
some clarity will be brought by the Revision Act, which lists six specific factors that may
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4179, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065 (4th Cir. 1999) and Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.,
191 F.3d 208,1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20786, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1882 (2nd Cir. 1999). See Chapter
4.10.4 "Likelihood of Dilution vs Actual Dilution" supra and other cases discussed there.
634 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003). See Chapter 4.10.4 "Likelihood of
Dilution vs Actual Dilution supra.
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be used to determine blurring.
The retroactive application of the Dilution Act is also one of the unsettled aspects of the
law. After some conflicting district court decisions, the issue was addressed by the
Eighth Circuit Court in Viacom v. Ingram Enterprises,635 where the court concluded that
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act has retroactive effect, but only in the context of
injunctive relief.
The above synopsis shows how trade-mark dilution law in the United States has
developed over the past seventy-six years. The concept started in theory, was further
developed in state statutes in approximately half of the states and finally became part of
federal statutory law by way of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act. Although there are
still controversial issues regarding the application of this Act, trade-mark dilution law has
reached the point where trade-mark proprietors can protect their most valuable asset
against the dilution of its distinctive quality.
635 Viacom Inc. v. Ingram Enterprises Inc., 141 F.3d 886, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1473 (8th Cir. 1998).
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CHAPTERS
EUROPEAN UNION LAWI
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The first statutory dilution protection for trade marks in Europe, is found in the Uniform
Benelux Trade Marks Act' of the Benelux Countries;' which came into effect on 1
January 1971. In the Claeryn/Klarein case" of 1975 the Benelux Court of Justice
interpreted this provision so as to protect trade marks from uses on non-similar products
even when there was no likelihood of confusion.5 But there was still a long road ahead
before dilution protection would be given its full effect in the Member States of the
European Union.
The European Economic Community (EEC) was formed in 1957 by the Treaty ofRome.6
The purpose was to create a unified economic Europe. In 1993 the European Union
emerged from the EEC.7 The European Commission, one of the institutions established
Until 1 May 2004 the following countries were members of the European Union: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. On 1 May 2004 the following states also joined the European
Union: Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Slovenia and
Malta. See http://europa.eu .intlinstitutions/councillindex _en.htm.
2 Art. 13A(2).
3 The Benelux Economic Union was founded on 3 February 1958 between Belgium, the Netherlands and
Luxembourg. See further on trade-mark law in the Benelux Countries Chapter 5.7.1 "Benelux Law"
infra.
4 Colgate-Palmolive BV v NV Koninklijke Distileerderijen Erven Lucas Bols, BCl 1 March 1975 [1975]
N.J.472.
5 See the discussion in Chapter 5.7.1.5 "Article 13A(2) of the Uniform Benelux Trade Marks Act" infra.
See further Vuk WT "Protecting Baywatch and Wagamama: Why the European Union Should Revise
the 1989 Trademark Directive to Mandate Dilution Protection for Trademarks" (1998) 21 Fordham
International Law Journal 861 at 864.
6 Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 25 March 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr.
Brit. T.S. NO.1 (Cmd. 5179-TI). See Chapter 5.4 "The European Economic Community" infra.
7 Maastricht Treaty or Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, art.G.,O.J. C224/1, at 5 [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. at 719,31 I.L.M. 247. See also Vuk (1998) 883 fn 110.
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by the then EEC, enacted the Trademark Directive8 in 1989. Two of the provisions
appear to afford trade marks protection for uses that cause dilution." Five years after the
enactment of the Trademark Directive, the European Council issued the Community
Trade Mark Regulation (CTMR)IO on 20 December 1993. This regulation, unlike the
Directive, has immediate effect within the Member States from the date of
commencement, namely 15 March 1994. The two previously mentioned provisions on
dilution were also incorporated into the CTMR.
Both "dilution" provisions from the Trademark Directive were also incorporated into the
United Kingdom's Trade Marks Act of 1994.11 These sections were first interpreted by
the English Chancery Divisionl2 and after that, also by the Court of Justice of the
European Communities.13
This Chapter will examine trade-mark dilution law as it developed in the European Union
with specific reference to the Trademark Directive and decisions by the Court of Justice
of the European Communities. The law of four Member States of the European Union
was also chosen to show how the Trademark Directive was incorporated into national law
and interpreted by national courts. The law of the three Benelux countries was chosen,
because the first statutory dilution protection for trade marks in Europe is found in the
Benelux. The other Member State chosen is the United Kingdom. Historically, South
Africa has strong bonds with the United Kingdom. The South African Trademark
Statutes for many years also closely followed their British counterparts. The United
8 First Council Directive 89/1 04 of 21 December 1988 to Approximate the Laws of the Mem ber States
Relating to Trade Marks. See Davies 1M (general editor) Sweet & Maxwell's European Trade Mark
Litigation Handbook (1998) Sweet & Maxwell London 695-706 Appendix A for the text. See also
Chapter 5.5 "The European Union and The Trademark Directive" infra.
9 Art. 5(1) & (2) "Rights conferred by a trade mark". See Vuk (1998) 864, 884. See further Chapter
5.5.3 "Dilution Provisions" infra.
10 Council Reg. No. 40/94 on the Community Trade Mark, [1994] 0.1. Ll1/1 [1995] O.J. O.H.LM. 50;
[1995] 0.1. O.H.I.M. 511. See Davies (1998) 707-776 Appendix B for the text of this Regulation. See
also Chapter 5.6 "The Community Trade Mark" infra.
II S 10(2) & (3). See Chapter 5.7.2 "The United Kingdom" infra.
12 Wagamama Ltd v City Centre Restaurants pic. [1995] F.S.R. 713; [1996] E.T.M.R. 23 and Baywatch
Productions Co. Inc. v Home Video Channel Ltd. [1997] F.S.R. 22, discussed in Chapter 5.7.2.3 "Cases
on Section 10(2)" and Chapter 5.7.2.4 "Cases on Section 10(3)" infra.
13 See Case C-251/95, SABEL B. V v Puma A.G. [1998] E.T.M.R. 1 and other cases discussed in Chapter
5.8 "Judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Communities" infra.
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Kingdom law is also interesting from a different perspective. The application of dilution
law in the United Kingdom was initially interpreted very conservatively, especially when
compared to that of the Benelux Countries.
5.2 STATUTORY DEVELOPMENT OF TRADE-MARK LAW IN EUROPE
In the United Kingdom the first Act that provided for a registration system in trade-mark
law was the Trade Marks Registration Act of 1875.14 This Act was preceded by
investigations of a Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1862.15 The Act did
not replace the common-law system, but rather added to it the formal protection given to
registered trade marks. Provision was made for the registration of trade marks in respect
of goods. This registration served as prima facie proof of the proprietor's title and was
made a condition for the institution of infringement proceedings." Use of this
registration process led to nation-wide protection. The scope of the monopoly was,
however, limited in several ways. One way was by just allowing registration in respect
of goods upon which the applicant used the mark or intended to use the mark.17 Primary
emphasis was also placed on distinctiveness. The mark had to consist of one of the
following essential particulars: the name of an individual represented in a particular and
distinctive manner, the signature of an individual or firm or any distinctive device, mark,
heading, label or ticket."
The 1875 Act was repealed and replaced in 1883 by the Patents, Designs and Trade
Marks Act,19 which was in essence just a rephrasing of the previous Act, but for the
expansion of the essential particulars. Interpretation difficulties led to the enactment of
14 38 and 39 Viet, c 91; Beier F-K "Basic Features of Anglo-American, French and German Trademark
Law" (1975) international Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law 285 at 288.
15 Webster CE & Morley GE Webster & Page South African Law of Trade Marks, Unlawful Competition,
Company Names and Trading Styles 4th ed (1997) Butterworths Durban par 1.2.
16 Webster & Page (1997) par 1.2. The term "owner of a trade mark" is sometimes used synonymously
for "proprietor" in the law of the United Kingdom. See for example Davies (1998) 574, 575.
17 Wheeldon R "Trade Mark Dilution - What is it?" Lecture notes 6.
18 Webster & Page (1997) par 1.2.
19 46 and 47 Viet, c 57.
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yet another Act in 1888.20 The next important development was the introduction of the
Trade Marks Act of 1905,21 which for the first time defined a trade mark. In terms of the
definition it was now also possible to register trade marks "proposed to be used", and not
only marks already in use. The most important feature of the 1919 Amendment Act, was
the division of the register in Parts A and 8.22
An important shift in the whole approach to trade marks took place in 1938. The
possibilities of assigning the rights in a trade mark without the goodwill and of licensing
the use of registered marks was incorporated into the Trade Marks Act of 1938.23 This
indicated a departure from the narrow view of the function of a trade mark as indicating
only the origin of the goods. Defensive registrations" were also introduced by this Act,
making it possible for a proprietor, under certain conditions, to register his mark for
goods in relation to which he did not intend to use it.
To fulfil its obligations in terms of the European Directive25 and the Madrid Protocol
Relating to the International Registration of Marks, the United Kingdom adopted a new
Trade Marks Act in 1994_26 This has profound implications for the development of
British trade-mark law, as the United Kingdom, with the exception of Scotland, has a
common-law system in contrast with the European civil-law tradition."
For example, the French trade-mark system, being a civil-law system, differs to a great
extent from the Anglo-American system. Trade marks form the subject of an absolute
property right, which can be acquired by use or registration. Interestingly enough,
20 51 and 52 Viet, c 50. See Webster and Page (1997) par 1.2 for more detail.
215Edw7c16.
22 Part B afforded limited protection to marks, which were not distinctive, but were nevertheless capable
of distinguishing through use. The question whether a mark is inherently capable of distinguishing is a
question of fact. See Webster & Page (1997) par 1.2; 3.40 - 3.49A.
23 1 and 2 Geo 6 c 22. Webster & Page (1997) par 1.2.
24 See Chapter 6.2.2 "Defensive Registrations" infra for a discussion.
25 First Council Directive of 21 December 1988 (Directive 89/104) to Approximate the Laws of the
Member States Relating to Trade Marks. See Chapter 5.5 "The European Union and The Trademark
Directive" infra.
26 See Chapter 5.7.2 "The United Kingdom" infra.
27 See Welkowitz DS "Protection against Trademark Dilution in the U.K. and Canada: Inexorable Trend
or Will Tradition Triumph?" (2000) 24 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 63 at 70.
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registration takes place without examination and no requirement of use exists. The mark
is furthermore an independent asset of the business and also separate from the goodwill
of the business and, therefore, freely assignable." Licensing is also possible. The mark
then no longer fulfils its functions to designate and to distinguish in the course of trade.
French law was from the beginning characterised by both unfair competition and
registration rights. This led to the problem of the relationship between first use and
registration. The solution inevitably given by the legislature was that in cases where
there was conflict between marks, the first user had priority over the first registrant.
Registration thus only had a declaratory effect. If a mark was, however, first registered
and subsequently used by another, the registrant would get the better right. This system
was called "priority of occupation'v"
Fundamental reform of the French trade-mark system took place and culminated in the
Trademark Act of 31 December 1964. Beier30 noted two fundamental changes. First, a
requirement of use was instituted. Non-use of a registered mark for more than five years
leads to the loss of trade-mark rights. Secondly, exclusive trade-mark rights can now
only be obtained by registration. The principle of first use was abandoned. Provision is
however made for notorious marks. If a mark has become notorious as a result of
increasing and widespread use, the proprietor may request that the registration of a
confusingly similar mark be invalidated, but the proprietor must however first register
his notorious mark. The influence of article 6bis of the Paris Convention is clear,
although this section does not require registration before injunctive relief is sought."
28 Beier (1975) 295, 296
29 Beier (1975) 296.
30 Beier (1975) 297.
31 Beier (1975) 298. Article 6bis of the Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property of
1883, as revised, provides the following: "(1) The countries of the Union undertake, ...... , to refuse or
to cancel the registration, and to prohibit the use, of a trade mark which constitutes a reproduction, an
imitation, or a translation, liable to create confusion, of a mark considered by the competent authority of
the country of registration or use to be well-known in that country as being already the mark of a person
entitled to the benefits of this Convention and used for identical or similar goods .... " See Webster &
Page (1997) Appendix 6 for a copy of the text. See also Chapter 6.3.4.1 "The Paris Convention" infra.
201
The first German Trade-Marks Act was promulgated in 1874, one year before its British
counterpart. They had no common-law system of unfair competition or passing off
before that date. A strict registration system was thus followed. The first applicant had
the better right, even if someone else had previously used the mark extensively. This
formalistic approach led to many reserve and defensive marks being registered, without
any actual use or an intention to use. Unfair competition principles were only introduced
in German law after 1900. As a result registration alone was no longer the only means of
acquiring trade-mark rights. Substantial use resulting in goodwill or reputation was an
independent basis for acquiring trade-mark rights. A statutory requirement of use within
five years was only introduced as a condition for registration in 1968.32
5.3 EARL Y ORIGINS OF DILUTION IN EUROPE
The dilution doctrine apparently originated in Germany in 1924.33 The court actually
created the concept of dilution when finding that trade-mark infringement had occurred
by the use of an identical trade mark on dissimilar products. The trade-mark owner
applied for the cancellation of the registration of ODOL for steel products. He held the
trade mark ODOL for mouthwash. The Elberfield court noted that the trade mark ODOL
was famous and had acquired selling power." The court found that consumers would
think of the mouthwash whenever they were exposed to ODOL on steel products and
would assume that the steel products were also of a high quality. The ODOL trade mark
on mouthwash would therefore be diluted." Any lessening of the value of the trade mark
32 Beier (1975) 299-302.
33 Civil Court, Elberfield, 25 Juristische Wochemschrift 502; XXV Markenshutz Und Wettbewerb 264, Il
September 1925 (Germany). Some writers, for example, Derenberg WJ "The Problem of Trade-mark
Dilution and Anti-Dilution Statutes" (1956) 44 California Law Review 439, 448-449, state that the
dilution concept was first developed in the English case of Eastman Photographic Materials Co. v John
Griffith Corp., 15 R.P.C. 105 (UK) (1898) and also Walter v Ashton [1902] 2 Ch 282. But according to
Vuk (1998) 893 fn 170 the Eastman case does not establish dilution, because the court specifically finds
a likelihood of confusion, although it involved different goods. See also Martino T Trademark Dilution
(1996) Clarendon Press Oxford 4 fn 1 where he states that both these English decisions were couched in
the language of passing off, with explicit findings of likelihood of confusion. Martino says that the
courts "were proscribing the harm of dilution under a traditional likelihood of confusion rationale".
34 Martino (1996) 4. This case is also briefly mentioned in Chapter 3.1 "The Development of Dilution as
a Legal Concept" supra.
35 The court used the word verwássert, meaning diluted and not dilution (verwdsserung). See Martino
(1996) 5 fn 21.
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would negatively affect the ability of the trade-mark owner in competing with other
mouthwashes. The decision was, however, not based on any particular theory of German
trade-mark registration, but upon general principles of fair trade."
5.4 THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
5.4.1 BACKGROUND AND AIM
In 1951 the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was founded by Belgium,
France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands to regulate production and to
promote free trade in the coal and steel industries.Y The six ECSC members were
prompted by the success of this initiative to sign the Treaty of Rome in 1957,38 which
established the European Economic Community (EEC). The purpose of this organisation
was the establishment of criteria for political and economic integration of the Member
States. The Member States agreed to give up national sovereignty in certain areas
covered by the Treaty in an attempt to further the idea of a unified economic Europe.39
5.4.2 COMPOSITION AND FUNCTIONS
The European Commission, the Council of Ministers and the European Court of Justice
(ECJ), now the Court of Justice of the European Communities (CJEC), were all
established by the Treaty of Rome. The Commission acts as the executive body of the
European Union.4o It is the role of the Commission to ensure that Member States
introduce and enforce legislation to comply with the European Community Treaty and it
36 Vuk (1998) 863, 892.
37 Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 18 April 1951,261 U.N.T.S. 140. See
Vuk (1998) 885.
38 Also known as the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, 25 March 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. Il, 1973 Or. Brit. T.S. NO.1 (Cmd.5179-II), as amended by Single European Act, OJ. L
169/1 (1987), [1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741.
39 Vuk(1998) 885.
40 Treaty Establishing the European Community, 7 February 1992, art. 155, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 682.
Vuk (1998) 886.
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also has the power to institute proceedings before the Court of Justice of the European
Communities should a Member State not fulfil its obligations."
Each country is represented on the Council of Ministers, the legislative body of the
European Union.42 This Council is mainly responsible for the harmonisation of the
national laws of the different Member States. The Council operates by the issuing of
directives that are binding as to the result to be achieved.43 Each member, therefore, has
the freedom to choose its own form and method to achieve these results. They are, for
example, allowed to freely interpret the provisions in the Trademark Directive. This has
resulted in one Member State, the United Kingdom, not offering trade marks full
protection from dilution under either of the two provisions in the Trademark Directive
which appear to provide for dilution protection."
The CJEC is logically the judicial branch of the European Union and was prior to the
recent expansion, comprised of fifteen judges, one from each Member State, and nine
Advocate-Generals." The CJEC has jurisdiction in disputes where the Commission or a
Member State takes action due to the alleged failure of another Member State to comply
with its Treaty obligations. The Court must also give guidance on the interpretation of
the Treaty, if requested to do so by the court of a Member State. The national court must
then apply such an interpretation to the case before it.46 In this sense the relationship
between the CJEC and the national court can be viewed as a partnership. The CJEC's
ability to give guidance is entirely dependent on the information given and questions put
forward by the referring national court.47 The role of an Advocate-General can be
41 See art. 169 of the EC Treaty at 686.
42 Art. 145, 146 of the EC Treaty at 679-680.
43 Art. 100 of the EC Treaty at 633 and Treaty on the European Union, 7 February 1992, art. 189 0.1.
C224/I, at 65 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. at 693-94.
44 Vuk (1998) 906; Welkowitz (2000) 69. See also discussion in Chapter 5.7.2.3 "Cases on Section
10(2)" and 5.7.2.4 "Cases on Section 10(3)" infra.
45 Art. 164-187 of the EC Treaty at 684-691.
46 See for example Case C-342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co GmbH v Klijsen Handel B. V [1999]
E.C.R.1-3819; [1999] E.T.M.R. 690 par Il.
47 Norman H "Perfume, Whisky and Leaping Cats of Prey: A UK Perspective on Three Recent Trade
Mark Cases before the European Court of Justice" (1998) 8 European intellectual Property Review 306.
See, for example, the SABEL B. V v Puma A.G.-case discussed in Chapter 5.8.1 "The Interpretation of
Articles 4( 1)(b) and 5( 1)(b)" infra.
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described as follows." He presents an advisory opinion prior to the court's decision to
aid the judges of the court. His role has been described as analogous to that of an
individual judge (under the civil-law system) charged with the preparation of the case.
He remains separate from the judges deciding the case.
From 1978 until 1993 the ECSC, the EEC and the European Atomic Energy Community
were collectively referred to as the European Community." In 1993 the term "European
Community" was replaced with "European Union" by the Maastricht Treaty or Treaty on
European Union.50
5.5 THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE TRADEMARK DIRECTIVE
5.5.1 BACKGROUND TO THE DIRECTIVE
Already in 1959 a decision was taken by the European Commission to harmonise and
unify intellectual property law in Europe." The aim was to create unitary intellectual
property laws, which could supplement the national laws of Member States. The idea
was that these national laws would continue to exist. As a result, the first draft of a
Convention for a European Trade Mark was completed in 1964. Discussions on this
document only started in 1973 and after another three years the Memorandum on the
creation of an EEC mark was published. The advantages of a European trade-mark
system were expressly highlighted. The Commission however realised that national
trade-mark laws would continue to exist. This could create serious obstacles for a
European trade-mark system as the Member States' protection for trade marks would not
be uniform and would contain disparities.Y For this reason they decided to create a
48 See Welkowitz (2000) 80 fn 80.
49 Vuk (1998) 885.
50 Maastricht Treaty or Treaty on European Union, 7 February 1992, art.G.,OJ. C224/1, at 5 [1992]
C.M.L.R. at 719, 311.L.M. 247. See also http://europa.eu.int/institutions/council/index_en.htm.
51 Gielen C "Harmonisation of Trade Mark Law in Europe: The First Trade Mark Harmonisation
Directive of the European Council" (I992) 8 European Intellectual Property Review 262.
52 See Vuk (1998) 887; Gielen (1992) 262.
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mechanism for the approximation of national trade-mark laws.
At first the idea was to introduce a Community Trade Mark simultaneously with the
implementation of a Directive to harmonise trade-mark law. This idea was abandoned in
1988 in view of the political problems of finding a place of establishment for the
Community Trade Mark Office and the official languages to be used.53 Drafts of the
Directive were published in 1979, 1980, 1985 and 1986. On each draft opinions were
given and changes suggested. This last version was the topic of much discussion and
negotiations in the working group. The Dutch delegation went out of its way to convince
the other delegates to incorporate the infringement criteria of the Benelux Trade Mark
Act into the Directive.54 This was done in the version of 15 December 1987.
5.5.2 FINAL ADOPTION AND AIM
After the advice of the Economic and Social Committee and the opinion of the European
Parliament had been considered, the Trademark Directive was finally adopted by the
Council on 21 December 1989.55 The aim of this important document was to harmonise
the legal protection afforded by Member States to trade marks in order to avoid
disparities which could impede the free movement of goods or the freedom to provide
servicea." The motivation behind the Directive was that an internal economic market
such as the European Union should not have different laws to protect trade marks.57
Partly because of the expanding membership of the European Union in the years leading
up to the implementation of the Directive, it became clear that it would take some time
for harmonisation to take place." It must be noted that the purpose of the Trademark
Directive was not to bring "full scale approximation", but only to harmonise "those
53 Gielen (1992) 262.
54 See the discussion in Chapter 5.5.4 "Influence of the Benelux Law" infra.
55 First Council Directive 89/104 of 21 December 1988 to Approximate the Laws of the Member States
Relating to Trade Marks; Gielen (1992) 262.
56 Turner-Kerr PM "Confusion or Association under the European Trade Mark Directive" (2001) 1
European Intellectual Property Review 49; Marroletti W "Dilution, Confusion, or Delusion? The Need
for a Clear International Standard to Determine Trademark Dilution" (1999) 25 Brooklyn Journal of
International Law 659 at 667.
57 Gielen C "Likelihood of Association: What Does it Mean?" (1996) Trademark World 20.
58 Compare Davies (1998) 31.
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national provisions of law which most directly affect the functioning of the internal
market".59 The Directive further applies only to registered or deposited trade marks.
Member States were required to incorporate the Trademark Directive into their own
trade-mark laws by 31 December 1992.60
5.5.3 DILUTION PROVISIONS
Member States must, inter alia, give protection against infringing uses of a trade mark
that cause a likelihood of confusion directly or through a likelihood of association."
Furthermore the Directive states that Member States may provide trade-mark protection
against infringing uses which take unfair advantage of, or are detrimental to, the
distinctive character or repute of the trade mark.62
The two previously mentioned provisions of the Trademark Directive that are important
for this study, because they appear to provide dilution protection, are article 5(1) and 5(2)
which read as follows:63
"( I) The registered trade mark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive rights therein. The
proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using
in the course of trade:
(a) any sign which is identical with the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are
identical with those for which the trade mark is registered;
(b) any sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the trade mark and the
identity or similarity of the goods or services covered by the trade mark and the sign,
59 See Recital I of the Trademark Directive No L401l at I; Gielen (1992) 262-3; Turner-Kerr (2001) 49.
60 Trademark Directive art.16(1) & (2), O.J. L4017. The date originally stated in article 16( I), 28
December 1991, was amended by Council Decision 92/10 in accordance with art. 16(2). See Davies
(1998) 706 Appendix A. By the middle of 1992 it appeared that the process would take even longer and
that probably only Denmark, France, Spain and Greece would complete the implementation of the
Directive in time. See Gielen (1992) 262, 263.
61 Trademark Directive art. 5( I)(b), Official Journal of the European Communities (OJ.) L40/4. See also
art. 4(1 )(b) which uses a similar provision as a refusal or invalidity criterion.
62 Trademark Directive art. 5(2), OJ. L40/4 and see also art. 4(3) and 4(4)(a), which are again the refusal
and invalidity provisions.
63 Art. 5(1) & (2) "Rights conferred by a trade mark".
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there exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the
likelihood of association between the sign and the trade mark.64
(2) Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all
third parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade any sign which is
identical with, or similar to, the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are not
similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, where the latter has a reputation in
the Member State and where use of that sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of,
or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark."
Protection is thus specifically required where there exists a likelihood of confusion
"which includes the likelihood of association" between the sign and the trade mark. The
Trademark Directive does, however, not specifically mandate the Member States to give
protection against uses that dilute the distinctiveness of a trade mark, but leaves the
option open. It states that they "may provide" trade marks that have reputations with this
additional protection.f The purpose of Article 5(2) is set out in Recital 9 of the
Directive, namely to provide "extensive protection to those trademarks with a
reputation". Since it was optional and also because each Member State had to implement
the directive in its own legislation with its own interpretation, protection for trade-mark
dilution has been applied inconsistently.i" All the provisions in the Directive, both
mandatory and optional, are, however, exhaustive, meaning that the Member States have
no power to alter them."
It is clear from the structuring of the infringement provrsions that dilution is not a
separate remedy in the Directive. On the contrary, it is written into the general trade-
mark infringement section and interwoven with notions of traditional trade-mark
infringement. This spells problems for the implementation and interpretation of these
64 Most language versions of the Directive use the notion of "risk" or "danger" of confusion or
association. The Dutch and Swedish versions use the concepts of possibility of confusion and risk of
association. The English version uses the notion of likelihood of confusion or association. See Case C-
425/98, Marca Mode evv Adidas A.G. and Adidas Benelux B. V, [2000] E.C.R. 1-4861 par 4.
6S Vuk (1998) 868. See also the discussion of these provisions in Chapter 5.6 "The Community Trade
Mark" infra.
66 Marroletti (1999) 668.
67 Gielen (1992) 264.
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provisions, especially by the courts of Member States.
5.5.4 INFLUENCE OF THE BENELUX LAW
The first proposal for the Directive in 1980 was very restrictive and used words such as
"serious risk of confusion" and also stated that the only function of a trade mark is that of
an indicator of origin.i" The rationale was that there must be a serious likelihood of
confusion before impediments to the principle of free movements of goods will be
allowed. The protection of well-known or reputed marks was totally excluded.ï" The
Benelux countries feared that by these restrictive provisions protection of trade marks in
the Benelux countries would be seriously weakened. In the 1985-version the word
"serious" was deleted, but there was still no protection for trade marks in cases where
similar marks were used on non-similar goods. The Benelux nations' delegates had an
extremely difficult task in persuading the European Commission and the other delegates
to widen the infringement criteria. In the end they succeeded and the concept of risk of
association was included in the final version of the Trademark Directive as the
"likelihood of association", although as a comprornise.Ï" The wording of article 5(2) was
changed from reading that the mark needed to be famous to qualify for protection to that
it merely needed to have a reputation." Article 5(5) was also added to reflect Benelux
practice.f In the end it can be said that the Directive was heavily influenced by Benelux
law." Still, it is an adaptation of the Benelux law and also reflects other European
68 Gielen (1996 TW) 21; Gielen (1992) 266.
69 Gielen (1992) 266. The first draft of the Community Trade Mark Regulation also used the words
"serious risk of confusion", although it incorporated protection for well-known marks.
70 Harris PA "Wagamama: Confusion Still Reigns in the UK" (1995) Trademark World 13; Gielen (1992)
266; Harris PA "UK Trade Mark Law: Are You Confused?" (1995) 12 European Intellectual Property
Review 601-602, Schmidt HKS "'Likelihood of Confusion' in European Trademarks - Where are we
now?" (2002) 10 European Intellectual Property Review 463; Marroletti (1999) 670; Carty H "Do
Marks with a Reputation Merit Special Protection?" (1997) 12 European Intellectual Property Review
684 at 685.
71 For the possible interpretations of this concept, see Chapter 5.7.2.5 "The Key Concepts of Section 10(3)
(iv) Reputation" and Chapter 5.8.2 "The Interpretation of Article 5(2)" infra.
72 Kamperman Sanders A "The Return to Wagamama" (1996) 10 European Intellectual Property Review
521 at 523. Art. 5(5) deals with the protection against use of a mark other than for the purposes of
distinguishing goods and services. Thus, the Benelux law did not have to change in this respect. This
provision was included as art. 13A{I){d) of the new Benelux Trade Mark Law.
73 Gielen (1992) 264. See also Schwartz D & Morfesi D "Dilution Comes of Age: the United States,
Europe and South Africa" (1997) 87 The Trademark Reporter 436 at 449.
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systems, which have always been reluctant to grant too much protection to trade marks.
The Directive will also be applied by a European court, which also implies a different
approach from those of the Benelux courts.Ï"
5.5.5 MEANING OF "LIKELIHOOD OF ASSOCIATION"
Unfortunately, there was no explanatory memorandum accompanying the Directive (or
the Regulation) as to what is meant with the words "likelihood of association". There
are, however, some indications in the preamble at the beginning of the text of the
Trademark Directive (and the CTMR).75 The paragraph in which there is a reference to
the "risk of association" states the following:
"[W]hereas the likelihood of confusion, the appreciation of which depends on numerous elements
and, in particular, on the recognition of the trademark on the market, of the association which can
be made with the used or registered sign, of the degree of similarity between the trademark and the
sign and between the goods or services identified, constitutes the specific condition for such
protection; ... "
This does, however, not explain how the notion "likelihood of association" must be
interpreted. Professor Gielen firmly believes that the European Directive offers the
possibility of using the concept as developed under Benelux law." He also believes that
this interpretation is needed for the functioning of trade marks in the modern day-to-day
market reality." He gives the following motivation for his point of view. In the first
place, the function of a trade mark is indicated in the preamble to the Trademark
Directive (and the CTMR) as being "in particular to guarantee the trade mark as an
74 Casparie-Kerdel S "Dilution Disguised: Has the Concept of Trade Mark Dilution Made its Way into
the Laws of Europe?" (2001) 4 European Intellectual Property Review 185 at 191. At 194 she says:
"[T[he already very ambiguous provisions of the Benelux infringement section have further been
modified, turning them into a new provision in the Directive which is unclear both linguistically and
logically."
75 Tenth recital to the Trademark Directive and seventh recital to the CTMR; Gielen (1996 TW) 21.
76 In the Benelux law the notion of dilution was thought to be incorporated in the Act through the concept
of association, as will be explained in Chapter 5.7.1.3 "'Likelihood of Association' in the Benelux
Law" infra.
77 Gielen (1996 TW) 22, 23; Gielen (1992) 267. The development of the concept under Benelux law is
explained in Chapter 5.7.1.3 '''Likelihood of Association' in the Benelux Law" infra.
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indication of origin", which opens up the possibility that a trade mark can fulfil other
functions as well.78 Other functions, such as the communication, publicity and goodwill
functions, are in fact protected by the Directive in the wording of the so-called dilution
provisions in articles 4(3), 4(4)(a) and 5(1)(b).79 Secondly, the words "likelihood of
association" are included in the infringement provision as "likelihood of confusion,
which includes the likelihood of association". The way in which it was structured, is
rather strange and described as contradictory, ambiguous and even linguistically
incorrect.t" because the likelihood of association concept is much wider than the
likelihood of confusion. Gielen, however, sees this structuring as leaving the room open
for a very broad interpretation of the "likelihood of confusion"-concept, as applied under
Benelux law" If a risk of confusion is, for example, established in Benelux law, the risk
of association is taken as given.82
Gielen also find support for his point of view in two documents called "Statements for
entry in the Minutes of the Council Meeting" at which the Directive and CTMR were
adopted.f As these Statements were partly meant to clarify certain provisions in the
documents mentioned, they could have an interpretative value.84 The European Council
notes in these Statements, that '''likelihood of association' is a concept which in
78 Tenth recital to the Trademark Directive. Emphasis added. See also Chapter 2 "The Socio-Economic
Functions of Trade Marks" supra.
79 This is clearly indicated by Gielen (1996 TW) 21.
80 Davies (1998) 154; Harris (1995 EIPR) 602; Casparie-Kerdel (2001) 191. See too Kamperman
Sanders (1996 EIPR) 521 who also uses the word "ambiguous" to describe the equivalent s 10(2) in the
United Kingdom Trademarks Act of 1994.
81 Gielen (1992) 267. Kamperman Sanders (1996 EIPR) 521 also sees it in this way. He goes even
further by holding that this article expressly provides for the dilution doctrine. He finds justification for
this point of view in the internal structure of the infringement provisions, as discussed in Chapter
5.7.2.3 "Cases on Section 10(2)" infra under the Wagamama judgment. See also Kamperman Sanders
A "The Wagamama Decision: Back to the Dark Ages of Trade Mark Law" (1996) 1 European
Intellectual Property Review 4-5.
82 Davies (1998) 154; Gielen (1992) 267.
83 Gielen (1996 TW) 22; Gielen (1992) 267. See also Harris (1995 EIPR) 602; Annand RE "Lookalikes
under the New United Kingdom Trade Marks Act 1994" (1996) 86 Trademark Reporter 142 at 154.
84 These statements are not intended to form part of the legal instruments themselves (the Directive or
Regulation), and therefore cannot be added as separate legislative texts to the instruments. But they
certainly have a function. The usefulness of these statements in interpreting the provisions of the
Directive and Regulation will however depend on aspects such as the nature of the statement and who
made the statement, for example was it unilaterally made by one or more of the member countries or
was it a common statement made jointly by the Commission and Council. See Gielen C "European
Trade Mark Legislation: The Statements" (1996) 2 European Intellectual Property Review 83 at 83, 87.
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particular has been developed by Benelux case-law".85 This seems clear enough to make
it possible to consult Benelux case-law for the interpretation of the phrase, rather than
German law where this concept also exists, but with a different meaning.t"
However, in the Wagamama case in the United Kingdom Justice Laddie of the High
Court was not prepared to accept this possibility.V One of the reasons was that the
Minutes of the Council Meeting, in which the Statements were incorporated, were
considered privileged information and not available to the public. Although that was true
at that stage, this argument is no longer relevant as the Statements now have been
published.I" It was thought that to apply a mere test of association to compare the mark
and the sign would stretch the scope of protection too far.
5.6 THE COMMUNITY TRADE MARK
As said in the Introduction, the Community Trade Mark Regulation (CTMR) was enacted
by the European Council in 1993.89 The Office for Harmonisation of the Internal Market
(OHIM) was established by this Regulation. After years of debate it was finally decided
that this office will be located in Alicante, Spain. This Council Regulation creates the
possibility that a trade-mark owner can apply for a uniform trade-mark right. This means
that he can, on the basis of one registration, get an exclusive right covering the whole
territory of the European Union. This system will function next to the national trade-
mark system, which will continue to exist.9o OHIM's function is the registration and
administration of Community trade marks. It became operative on 1 April 1996 and by
31 December 1996 OHIM had already received 43 000 applications for the registration of
85 Statement 5(b) Directive and Statement 6 Regulation [1996] O.J. O.HJ.M. 607. Copies of both these
Statements are also annexed to an article written by Gielen as Appendix 1 and Appendix 2. See Gielen
(1996 EIPR) 87-89.
86 Davies (1998) 153; Gielen (1996 TW) 22; Gielen (1996 EIPR) 87; Harris (1995 TW) 13.
87 See discussion in Chapter 5.7.2.3 "Cases on Section 10(2)" infra.
88 [1996] OJ. O.H.I.M. 607. Official publication of the Statements was, for various reasons, strongly
promoted by Professor Gielen. See Gielen (1996 TW) 22-23; Gielen (1996 EIPR) 87.
89 Council Reg. No. 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community Trade Mark, [1994] O.I. LI III
[1995] O.J. O.HJ.M. 50; [1995] O.J. O.HJ.M. 511. See Davies (1998) 707-776 Appendix B for the
text of this Regulation.
90 Gielen (1996 TW) 20; Gielen (1992) 263.
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Community trade marks." The European Commission also made several other
regulations concerning the functioning of the OHIM.92 Additional procedural provisions
are contained in various decisions of the President of the OHIM, which are published in
its Official Journal.
Binding decisions of the OHIM can be contested by means of an appeal filed with the
OHIM. Actions against the decisions of the Board of Appeal may then be brought before
the Court of First Instance at Luxembourg." These decisions can be contested further in
an appeal brought before the CJEC.94 This appeal can only be based on a point of law
and no new facts can be brought before the court. The CJEC can also only annul, not
alter, the judgment of the Court of First Instance.95
The CTMR is essentially a supranational instrument of trade mark protection." One of
the most important aims of the Community trade mark was to create a mechanism to
overcome the barrier of territoriality on the rights conferred to proprietors of trade marks
and also to further unrestricted economic activity in the Common Market." It is clear
from article 6 that a CTM can only be obtained by registration.
Where the trade marks and or the goods are similar and there is the likelihood of
confusion, which includes the likelihood of association, the earlier trade mark is
protected." This article was inspired by the Benelux law, but is interpreted differently in
91 Davies (1998) 33; Gielen (1996 TW) 20. Filing of applications was already permitted from I January
1996. See also Rangel-Ortiz H "Well-Known Trademarks Under International Treaties: Regional Trade
Agreements - Part 2" (1997) Trademark World 28.
92 For example, the Implementing Regulation (IR) Reg. 2868/95 implementing Council Regulation 40/94
on the CTM, 0.1. L303/1, [1995], containing additional and more specific procedural provisions; the
Commission Regulation 216/96 laying down the rules of proceedings of the Board of Appeal of the
OHIM (Trade Marks and Designs), 0.1. L28/11 [1996] 0.1. O.H.LM. 399 and the Fee Regulation,
Commission Reg. 2869/95 0.1. L303/33 [1995] 0.1. O.H.l.M. 415.
93 See art. 63 of the CTMR.
94 Art. 168a(l) of the EC Treaty; art. 49 of the Statutes of the CJEC.
95 See in general Davies (1998) 79-85.
96 Davies (1998) 34.
97 Third Recital of the Regulation. See also art. 1(2) where it is stated that a Community trade mark shall
have a unitary character, with effect throughout the Union.
98 Art. 9( 1)(b) of the CTMR, which corresponds to art. 5(1)(b) of the Trademark Directive. See also art.
8(1)(b) and 52(a)(a) of the CTMR which correspond to art. 4(1)(b) of the Directive.
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European Union law.99 Where the marks are identical or similar, but the products are
dissimilar, the protection of article 8(5) can be invoked, if the requirements are met.IOO
This provision, unlike the corresponding section in the Trademark Directive.i'" which
may be incorporated into national law, is enforceable throughout the Union. It must be
noted that "reputation" in article 8(5) does not have the same meaning as "well known"
in Article 6bis of the Paris Convention or as the word "famous", which are interpreted in
Germany as to mean 70-80% of the public.lo2 To ascertain whether a trade mark has a
reputation, the relevant consumers and the specialisation of the market will probably be
the most important factors. Reputation does not only relate to quantity; it must be
something worthy of protection.l'"
The requirement that the defendant's use must take unfair advantage of or be detrimental
to the distinctive character or repute of the mark, basically requires a showing of a
likelihood of dilution, either by blurring or tamishment.104
From the wording of article 8(5) "in relation to goods or services which are not similar to
those for which the trade mark is registered ... ", it seems clear that this article is only
applicable in the case of dissimilar goods. However, the decisions of the ClEC in the
cases of Davidoff v Gojkid and Adidas v Fitnessworlio5 may have an influence on the
future interpretation of this phrase in articles 8(5) and 9(1)(c). These decisions imply that
these articles will also cover situations where the goods are identical or similar and not
99 See the discussion in Chapter 5.8.1 "The Interpretation of Article 4(1)(b) and 5(1)(b)" infra.
100 Art. 8(5) of the CTMR corresponds to art. 5(2) of the Trademark Directive, quoted in Chapter 5.5.3
"Dilution Provisions" supra. The criteria laid down in the CTM are "not entirely dissimilar" to those in
art. 16(3) of TRIPS concerning the requirement of damage to the proprietor. See Chapter 6.3.4.2 "The
GATT Agreement on the Trade Related Aspects ofIntellectual Property Rights (iii) Dilution Protection
in the TRIPS Agreement". See also Rangel-Ortiz (1997) 28-29.
101 Art. 5(2) of the Trademark Directive.
102 Davies (1998) 41-42 and fn 26; Schwartz & Morfesi (1997) 456.
103 See the discussion of the term "reputation" in Chapter 5.7.2.5 "The Key Concepts of Section 10(3) (iv)
Reputation" and Chapter 5.8.2 "The Interpretation of Article 5(2)" infra.
104 Schwartz & Morfesi (1997) 455.
105 Case C-292/00, Davidoff & eie and Zino Davidoff SA v Gojkid Ltd., 9 January 2003; Case C-408/01,
Adidas-Salomon A.G., formerly Adidas A.G., Adidas Benelux B. V v Fitnessworld Trading Ltd., 23
October 2003.
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only cases where the goods are non-similar, as appears on its face. Morcom sees this as
notionally rewriting these provisions.i'"
5.7 LAWS OF SELECTED MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
5.7.1 BENELUX LAW
5.7.1.1 GENERAL
Even before 1 January 1996, when the amendments effected pursuant to the Trademark
Directive took effect, protection for trade marks against dilution was granted by the
courts in the Benelux countries on the wording of article l3A of the Uniform Benelux
Trade Marks Act of 1971.107 This article provides that:
"[T]he proprietor of a mark may, by virtue of his exclusive rights, oppose:
any use made of the mark or a similar sign for the goods or services in respect of which
the mark is registered, or for similar goods or services;
2 any other use, in the course of trade, of the mark or a similar sign made without due cause
under circumstances likely to cause damage to the proprietor of the mark.,,108
The Benelux Trade Marks Act came into operation on 1 January 1971 and was added as
an annex to the Benelux Treaty of Trade Marks.109 This Act provided Belgium, the
I 110Netherlands and Luxembourg with one system of trade-mark aw. Before its
implementation these countries had different trade-mark laws. All three countries
enacted the Benelux Trade Marks Act pursuant to article 1 of the Benelux Treaty of
Trade Marks which required them to include this Act in their legislation. They thus did
away with their old national trade-mark laws. For the enforcement of this joint Act, a
106 See the discussion in Chapter 5.8.2 "The Interpretation of Article 5(2)" infra and also Morcom C
"Extending Protection for Marks Having a Reputation - What is the Effect of the Decision of the
European Court of Justice in Davidoff v Gofkidl" (2003) 6 European Intellectual Property Review 279
at 281.
107 Vuk (1998) 906-907; Kamperman Sanders (1996 EIPR) 523; Casparie-Kerdel (2001) 195.
108 Emphasis added.
109 Dated 19 March 1962.
110 Casparie-Kerdel (2001) 188; Gielen (1992) 262.
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supranational court, the Benelux Court of Justice came into being. I I I As the Uniform
Benelux Trade Marks Act was implemented into the national laws of these countries,
judgments of national courts also apply to the whole Benelux territory, unless otherwise
stated. It is important to remember that protection in terms of this Act is only given to
registered (or deposited) trade marksll2 and that no exclusive rights can be acquired on
the basis of use. The most striking feature of the new infringement provision was its
subdivision into two parts, each with its own conditions and requirements.l+' Article
l3A(I) covers the situation where an identical or similar mark is used on the same or
similar goods. In Article l3A(2) protection is given against "any other use, in the course
of trade" of an identical or similar mark. Dilution is covered in both sections. Thus, in
the Benelux countries full protection for trade-mark dilution is offered, including any
situation where a junior user's mark calls to mind the senior user's mark, regardless of
whether the consumer will be confused as to the source of origin of the goods.'!"
Although the Benelux-system is praised for its early recognition of the dilution principle
and the protection of the modern functions of a trade mark, it is at the same time
criticised for the way in which dilution was incorporated in the Act as part of the
traditional infringement sections. I IS
5.7.1.2 COURT SYSTEM IN THE BENELUX
Most trade-mark cases are heard by District Courts in the Netherlands and by the
Tribunal of Commerce in Belgium, which is also a district court. An appeal from a
decision of the District Courts can be brought before a (national) Court of Appeal and a
final appeal before the Supreme Court in The Hague, Brussels or Luxembourg. The
Benelux Court of Justice (BCJ) can hear prejudicial questions on matters of interpretation
of the Benelux Trade Marks Act. The district courts and court of appeal may and the
III See Davies (1998) 139-200 for an extensive discussion of Benelux law. See also Gielen (1996 TW) 20;
Vuk (1998) 907.
112 Davies (1998) 139.
113 According to Casparie-Kerdel (2001) 188.
114 Marroletti (1999) 669. This is known as the "classical" theory of dilution: the mark, simply being
called to mind, will lose its distinctiveness and its power to signify goods.
115 Casparie-Kerdel (2001) 193-194.
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supreme courts have to put prejudicial interpretation questions to the BCJ. Prejudicial
questions on interpretation can also be referred directly or by a national court to the
CJEC. The relationship between questions being put to the BCJ and the CJEC is,
however, still unclear.116
5.7.1.3 "LIKELIHOOD OF ASSOCIATION" IN THE BENELUX LAW
The "likelihood of association" criterion was never used in the Uniform Benelux Trade
Marks Act, but this concept developed from Article l3A( 1) of the Act. The yardstick
used by the Benelux countries was whether a mark or sign was "similar" to the mark as
registered. This had to be decided on a case-by-case basis in the courts. In the Monopoly
case, 117decided by the Dutch Supreme Court, some light was shed on this provision. The
trade mark ANTI-MONOPOL Y was used for a game, which showed some likeness to the
MONOPOL Y game, but was totally anti-capitalistic. The court found that the
MONOPOL Y mark was infringed by the parodic use of the mark ANTI-MONOPOLY.
Although there was no risk of confusion as to source, since the two words were the
opposite of each other, the simple fact that the one would call to mind the other was
enough under the Benelux practice to find the necessary "similarity" between the
marks.118
The concept of "risk of association" was born in the famous case of Union v Union
Soleurel19 in which the BCI had to interpret the phrase "similarity of marks". The court
adopted a definition of similarity that was to become "the magic formula in all later
cases".120 The court decided that similarity can be present taking into account the
116 Davies (1998) 174-176, 196. See Chapter 5.8.2 "The Interpretation of Article 5(2)" infra for a
discussion of the Case C-337/95, Parfums Christian Dior vEvora B. V, 4 November 1997 [1998]
R.P.C. 166 in which a question was referred by the Netherlands Court of Appeal to the CJEC.
117 Monopoly/Anti-Monopoly, Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), 24 June 1977 [1978] N.J. 83; [1978]
BJ.E.39. See Gielen (1992) 267; Harris (1995 EIPR) 601.
118 Casparie-Kerdel (2001) 188.
119 Union/Union Soleure, Benelux Court of Justice, 20 May 1983 [1984] N.J. 72; [1984] B.LE. 137. See
Davies (1998) 153-154; Gielen (1996 TW) 21; Gielen (1992) 266; Harris (1995 TW) 13; Harris (1995
EIPR) 601; Annand (1996) 155. See also Regina v Procter & Gamble, Court of Appeal Brussels, 27
May 1993, LE.R. 1993,112 (The Always/Regina-case).
120 Casparie-Kerdel (2001) 188-189.
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particular circumstances of a case, for example the distinctive power of the mark,
whether the mark and the sign, compared as a whole and in correlation, show such a
resemblance phonetically, visually or conceptually that by this resemblance alone
associations between the sign and the mark arise. It is, however, interesting to note that
mere association is not enough, but that other circumstances must also be taken into
account, particularly the distinctive power, which relates to the repute of the mark.121
Likelihood of association in the Benelux countries, as defined above, will include the
following situations: 122 direct confusion or association, indirect confusion, as well as
association in the strict sense, where the public makes a subconscious connection or
association based on the resemblance of the mark and the sign, but is not confused.
According to Gielen123 the last situation also covers the likelihood of dilution in the case
of similar goods or services. The following basic principles are then applied to determine
the likelihood of association in a particular case. The mark as registered is compared to
the sign as used and sometimes even non-registered elements may be taken into account.
The mark and sign are compared as a whole. More attention is, however, paid to
similarities than to differences as it is mainly through the similarities that associations are
made. Any similarity in visual or phonetic or conceptual respect will then be sufficient
for a finding of a risk of association.
The intention of the court was evidently to give trade-mark owners the broadest possible
protection. This means protection not only against confusion, but also dilution of the
trade mark. It was generally understood that dilution was also a basis for an action
regarding the provision governing use of a trade mark on competing goods, through the
f .. 124concept 0 assoctation.
121 See Gielen C "A Benelux Perspective" (1998) 3 European Intellectual Property Review 110.
122 See Davies (1998) 155; Gielen (1996 TW) 21-22; Casparie-Kerdel (2001) 189 and also the discussion
of the SABEL-case in Chapter 5.8.1 "The Interpretation of Article 4(l)(b) and 5(1)(b)" infra.
123 Gielen (1996 TW) 22.
124 Casparie-Kerdel (2001) 189.
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The following three important conditions, concerning the "concept of association", were
subsequently read into the Act: 125
1. The degree of distinctiveness IS an important factor. The more distinctive the
mark, the more likely its ability to evoke associations in the mind of the public.126
2. The mark's reputation is also one of the particular circumstances. A strong
reputation is an indication of distinctiveness, which can evoke the required
association.
3. For a finding of conceptual similarity, there must also be a degree of visual or
auditive resemblance between the two marks.
5.7.1.4 "USE IN RELATION TO GOODS AND SERVICES"
An important phrase in the pre-1996 Benelux Trade Marks Act, which is also to be found
in the Trademark Directive, the new version of the Benelux Act and also the South
African Trade Marks Act,127is "use in relation to goods and services". This phrase was
of much importance in the Benelux countries, as article 13A(l) of the original legislation
was applicable in the case of "any use" in relation to identical or similar goods a'nd
services and article 13A(2) in the case of "any other use", meaning any use not in relation
to goods and services or in relation to dissimilar goods and services.128 The conclusion
drawn from Benelux case law by Davies129 is the following: use of a mark or sign will
not be considered "use in relation to goods and services" where it is, in the first place,
used merely as a trade name (name of a company) or in a slogan and not giving the
impression that it is used to distinguish the goods of the company, and secondly, use in,
for example, comparative advertising.
125 Identified by Casparie-Kerdel (2001) 189.
126 This point was illustrated by the case of Juicy Fruit, Benelux Court of Justice, 5 October 1982 [1984]
N.J. 71. The owner of the JUICY FRUIT trade mark for chewing gum tried to stop a competitor from
using the same mark. He failed, because the distinctiveness of the JUICY FRUIT mark was not such
that it would evoke strong associations in the minds of the public.
127 Discussed in Chapter 6.4.2 "The Dilution Provisions" infra.
128 Davies (1998) 151-152; Casparie-Kerdel (2001) 189.
129 Davies (1998) 152. The most important case mentioned by her is the Omnisport case, [1989] N.J. 300.
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5.7.1.5 ARTICLE 13A(2) OF THE UNIFORM BENELUX TRADE MARKS ACT
As said in the Introduction above, Benelux trade-mark law was one of the first to give
protection to trade marks outside the scope of protection for identical or similar marks or
goods. Article 13A(2) makes provision for protection against "any other use, in the
course of trade". This phrase has been interpreted to contemplate use of an identical or
similar sign for dissimilar or unconnected goods and also use of a mark or sign for
purposes other than to distinguish the goods, thus non-trade-mark use.!30 Use in
comparative advertising or the use of a trade name or slogan or use in the media'<' would
be found under the last mentioned category. In these cases under article 13A(2) mere
similarity of marks is, however, not sufficient and other criteria have to be met. 132 Under
Benelux trade-mark law even trade marks that did not posses a certain reputation were
also protected. However, if the trade mark had a certain reputation, the court would more
easily find that damage was caused to the trade mark by the use of a similar sign on
dissimilar goods.!33 Reputation could thus influence the assessment of the likelihood of
damage.
Probable the most famous case decided by the BCI under section 13A(2) is the case of
Claeryn/Klarein.r" The court found that the use of the KLAREIN trade mark for all-
purpose cleanser diluted the CLAER YN trade mark for gin. It was restated in this case
that trade marks did not have to be deemed famous, or have a reputation, to receive
protection under this provision in the Benelux Act. The court had the opportunity to
define the concept of "damage" in more detail. The two traditional grounds of damage
was identified, namely customer confusion and taking advantage of the trade mark's
goodwill and reputation. A third ground was also identified as "the negative influence on
the mark's ability to invoke an inclination to buy amongst the consuming public". This
130 Davies (1998) 157; Casparie-Kerdel (2001) 189.
131 See Casparie-Kerdel (2001) 190 for examples and discussion.
132 See art. 13A(2). These criteria are use in the course of trade, without due course and likely to cause
damages to the trade-mark owner.
133 Kamperman Sanders (1996 EJPR) 523; Gielen (1992) 266.
134 Colgate-Palmolive B. V v NV Koninklijke Distileerderijen Erven Lucas Bols, BCJ 1March 1975 [1975]
N.J.472; Vuk (1998) fn 266; Kamperman Sanders (1996 EJPR) 3; Casparie-Kerdel (2001) 189.
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could occur in two instances: where the mark's exclusivity and uniqueness are impaired
so that it is no longer capable of giving immediate association with the goods and where
inappropriate associations were evoked by the goods for which the infringing sign IS
used.135 The capacity to stimulate people to buy the product to which the mark is
attached, referred to by the court, is naturally the advertising function of a trade mark. In
the Claeryn case negative associations were definitely evoked by the use of the
KLAREIN mark. The court said that it would not be amusing drinking a glass of
CLAERYN Dutch gin, while thinking of a cleaning agent! The court thus used the
association criterion to protect a similar sounding mark. (The names were identically
pronounced in Dutch.) The phrase "due cause" was also interpreted by the court. "Due
cause" could only be assumed if there was such a necessity on the part of the alleged
infringer to use the mark, that he could not reasonably be required to abstain from its
use.l36 In this case, and other cases decided under this provision, the risk of confusion
played no rote.!"
In conclusion it can be seen that Benelux law offered a broad infringement criterion,
which is based on a modem approach to the functioning of trade marks. The Benelux
nations have essentially accepted that the functions of a trade mark are not limited to that
of an indicator of the source or origin or as an indication as to quality, but that a trade
mark can also acquire its own goodwill by means of publicity.l'" This means that the
trade mark will have a goodwill independent both of the source or origin of the goods and
their quality. The mark can thus continually be kept in the minds of the public.
The following components of the dilution principle can be identified in Benelux law.139
Although not mentioned in the statutory law, confusion is not required. This can be
deduced from case law and academic writings. Blurring and tamishment are not
identified as such, but can be inferred from the description of what constitutes "damage".
135 These wording has a certain analogy to the concepts of blurring and tamishment, used in the United
States dilution law, discussed in Chapter 4 supra. This was also noted by Casparie-Kerdel (2001) 190.
136 See Casparie-Kerdel (2001) 190.
137 See Gielen (1992) 267 for the Claeryn/Klarein case and other examples.
138 Harris (1995 TW) 13; Harris (1995 EIPR) 601.
139 Casparie-Kerdel (2001) 190.
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There is no reference to the fact that marks must be famous to qualify for protection.
Distinctiveness is thought to be an important factor. There is a limitation to protection
built into the concept of "due cause". Casparie-Kerdel strongly feels that although the
characteristics of the US dilution doctrine can be traced in Benelux law, the way in which
the doctrine appears in the law is completely different. She also feels that it can even be
concluded that there "is no such thing as a dilution doctrine under Benelux law", as it is
not defined as SUCh.140 One main point of criticism against the way in which the dilution
concept is used in Benelux law, is that it is not a separate action, but submerged in the
general trade-mark infringement section. The result is that it has never had the chance to
develop in its own right.
5.7.1.6 INFLUENCE OF THE TRADEMARK DIRECTIVE ON BENELUX LAW
As explained above the Benelux Trade Marks Act, considered to be one of the most
modern trade-mark laws in the world, to a great extent inspired the Trademark
Directive.141 For this reason the Trademark Directive did not really alter the Benelux
Trade Marks ACt.142 In the Always/Regina casel43 the Brussels Court of Appeal
confirmed that in cases involving similar products, the association criterion remains part
of the Benelux law. In this case the plaintiff was the proprietor of a number of registered
trade marks for its distinctive coloured packaging for sanitary towels. The defendant then
marketed its products in packaging that was considered to be similar to that of the
plaintiff. The plaintiff instituted action on the basis of its reputation and the fact that
there was a risk of association. The defendant argued that in the light of the Directive
there must now be confusion as to origin before trade-mark infringement could be found.
The Brussels Court of Appeal, however, rejected this proposition. Infringement was
found on the basis of a likelihood of association, because of the overall similarity of the
products and despite the fact that the word marks were completely different. The reasons
140 See Casparie-Kerdel (2001) 190 for a more detailed discussion.
141 Davies (1998) 139; Gielen (1996 TW) 20; Gielen (1992) 264; Harris (1995 EIPR) 601.
142 Vuk (1998) 907.
143 Regina v Procter & Gamble, Court of Appeal Brussels 27 May 1993, I.E.R. 1993, 112. See Harris
(1995 EIPR) 602 for a short discussion of the case. See also Annand (1996) 156.
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given were, firstly, that it was stated in the Directive that the likelihood of confusion
includes the likelihood of association; and, secondly, that the Benelux nations'
governments did not see it as necessary to include "likelihood of confusion" in the
amendments affected to incorporate the Directive into national laws.
Even after the Puma v SABEL case,144 on the interpretation of likelihood of association
by the CJEC, it is unlikely that the Benelux practice will change. If the Monopoly/Anti-
Monopoly casel45 were to be decided under the broad concept of confusion formulated in
the SABEL case, it would have resulted in the same decision, according to Gielen.146
In cases concerning dissimilar products, some changes to the law were, however, needed.
The most important change is that it will now be necessary in these cases to show a
sufficient level of reputation,147 although, according to Gielen, reputation is not a very
important criterion.148 A description of the type of damage protected against, namely
uses that damage the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark must also be
added to this provision.F" To prove "reputation" the owner must show that his trade
mark is genuinely used in a normal commercial way and that it has become known within
interested circles. That means that the mark must have a reputation among a relevant part
of the public, which means some 30 to 50 per cent.150 It is accepted that this is a lower
standard than that required by article 6bis of the Paris Convention, which refers to "well
known". Reputation would only mean "known".
144 Case C-251/95, SABEL B. V v Puma A.G., Rudolf DassIer Sport [1997] E.C.R. 1-6191; [1998] E.T.M.R.
I. (Judgment of 11 November 1997), discussed in Chapter 5.8 "Judgments of the Court of Justice of the
European Communities (CJEC)" infra.
145 Monopoly/Anti-Monopoly, Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), 24 June 1977 [1978] N.J. 83; [1978]
B.l.E.39. See Chapter 5.7.1.3 '''Likelihood of Association' in the Benelux Law" supra.
146 Gielen (1998) 110.
147 Kamperman Sanders A "Some Frequently Asked Questions about the 1994 UK Trade Marks Act"
(1995) 2 European Intellectual Property Review 72; Prescott P "Has the Benelux Trade Mark Law
Been Written into the Directive?" (1997) 3 European Intellectual Property Review 99 at 101.
148 Gielen (1992) 267. See also the discussion of the term "reputation" in Chapter 5.7.2.5 "The Key
Concepts of Section 10(3) (iv) Reputation" infra.
149 Kamperman Sanders (1996 EJPR) 4; Kamperman Sanders (1996 EIPR) 523. Art. 13A(I)(c) of the
current Benelux statute states that" ... the trademark holder may oppose against: (c) any use in the
course of trade, where the mark or similar sign has a reputation in the Benelux, in relation to goods,
dissimilar to those for which the mark is registered, if this use can lead to the unfair taking of advantage
of, or detriment to the distinctive character or repute of the mark."
ISO Davies (1998) 158 and fn 58. Gielen (1992) 267 is of opinion that even 30 to 40% will be enough.
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5.7.1.7 THE NEW BENELUX TRADE MARKS ACT151
The new Act was promulgated in 1992 pursuant to the Trademark Directive and became
effective on 1 January 1996. Article 13A( 1)(c) provides that the proprietor of a mark
may prohibit any use of a mark or similar sign on non-similar goods, in the course of
trade without due cause, where the senior mark has a reputation in the Benelux and such
use takes unfair advantage of or is detrimental to the distinctive character or repute of the
mark. Reputation need not be established among the public at large. It must only be
shown that the mark is used in a normal commercial way and has become known within
interested circles. It will be sufficient to find that the mark has a reputation in the
relevant concerned sector.152 The courts are very reluctant to find due cause for an
unauthorised use. Due cause will only be found where the mark is especially suited for
the goods for which it is used or where the proprietor had in the past used the mark for
similar goodS.153
Article 12 determines that a mark must be registered to receive any protection under the
Act. The remedies provided for are injunctive relief and damages. Upon a showing of
bad faith an accounting and transfer of profits and seizure of any related movable
property could be requested.l'"
5.7.2 THE UNITED KINGDOM
5.7.2.1 GENERAL
Under the common law the action for passing-off, which is grounded in deceit or at least
some sort of confusion, gives protection to trade marks against infringing uses.
Nevertheless, in some of these passing-off cases "dilution-like arguments" are used. One
151 See Schwartz & Morfesi (1997) 450-452.
152 Schwartz & Morfesi (1997) 450.
153 Schwartz & Morfesi (1997) 451.
154 Schwartz & Morfesi (1997) 451.
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of the best known of these cases, mentioned by We Ikowitz, 155 is Taittinger v Alibev.156 In
this case the producers of French champagne from the Champagne district sued the
maker of a sparkling non-alcoholic drink called "Elderflower Champagne". They relied
on the common-law action of passing off. All three judges referred to the dilution or
blurring or erosion of the exclusive connotation of the term "champagne" with wine from
the French Champagne district as the essence of the claim. They referred to the threat to
the plaintiffs' goodwill and the lost of the exclusive reputation they would suffer.
Welkowitz noted that "the language is that of dilution, not traditional confusion" .157
The first apparent statutory protection against dilution in the United Kingdom was in
terms of the Trade Marks Act of 1994, which came into force on 31 October 1994.158
This Act was introduced in the United Kingdom to comply with its international
obligations.l'" but also to meet the inadequacies of the 1938 Act to cope with changes in
trading practices.l'" The Act implemented the Trademark Directive and also
incorporated the Community Trade Mark Regulation's unitary system of registration of
trade marks within Europe. The Madrid Protocol system was also incorporated and the
Act also gave effect to the United Kingdom's obligations under the Paris Convention and
the TRIPS Agreement of 1993.161
155 Welkowitz (2000) 71-73.
156 Taittinger SA. vAllbev, Ltd., [1994] 4 All E.R. 75, [1993] F.S.R. 641 (C.A. (Civil) 1993).
157 Welkowitz (2000) 72. The judge had already concluded that traditional confusion exists, but continued
with a dilution-like discussion to demonstrate potential damage to the goodwill of the trade mark. The
rationale of the Taittinger case, the concept of damage to goodwill as sufficient proof of confusion, was
however not followed in Harrods, Ltd. v Harrodian School Ltd., [1996] R.P.C. 697 (CA), where the
well-known department store Harrods sued a private school called the Harrodian School. The court
denied relief. See Welkowitz (2000) 72-73.
158 SlO. The common-law action for "passing off' still exists and provides protection for trade marks that
are not registered under the 1994 Act. See Welkowitz (2000) 97-99.
159 Especially the European Directive. Member States were required to comply with the Directive not later
than 28 December 1991. This date was postponed (in terms of art. 16(2) of the Directive) to 31
December 1992. The United Kingdom did not comply with either of these dates, but the Directive
provided no sanctions for failure to comply with these dates. See Welkowitz (2000) 73 and fn 46.
160 Briggs N "Infringement under Section 10(2) and 10(3) of the 1994 Trade Marks Act in Perspective"
(2000) 9 European Intellectual Property Review 429. See also the Mathys Committee "Report of the
Mathys Committee on British Trade Mark Law and Practice" (1974) Cmnd 5601.
161 Annand (1996) 142. For a general discussion see Davies (1998) 563. The TRIPS agreement is dealt
with in Chapter 6.3.4.2 "The GATT Agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights" infra.
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The section relevant to infringement reads as follows:
"10(1) A person infringes a registered trade mark if he uses in the course of trade a sign which is
identical with the trade mark in relation to goods or services which are identical with
those for which it is registered.
(2) A person infringes a trade mark ifhe uses in the course of trade a sign where because-
(a) the sign is identical with the trade mark and is used in relation to goods or
services similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, or
(b) the sign is similar to the trade mark and is used in relation to goods or services
identical with or similar to those for which the trade mark is registered, there
exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the
likelihood of association with the trade mark.
(3) A person infringes a registered trade mark ifhe uses in the course of trade a sign which-
(a) is identical with or similar to the trade mark, and
(b) is used in relation to goods or services which are not similar to those for which
the trade mark is registered,
where the trade mark has a reputation in the United Kingdom and the use of the sign,
being without due cause, takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive
character or the repute of the trade mark.,,162
Thus, the optional proviston In the Trademark Directive, apparently giving dilution
protection.P'' was also incorporated into the UK Act as a mandatory provision. The
language of these provisions was taken almost verbatim from the Directive.l'" with the
result that some key language is both ambiguous and unfamiliar to English law.165 Some
162 Emphasis added. Compare this with s 4 of the 1938-Act where it had to be shown that the infringing
mark was "likely to deceive or cause confusion".
163 8aloch TA "Confused About Dilution? DaimlerChrysler v Alavi (Mere Case)" (2001) 9 European
Intellectual Property Review 427 at 433 suggests that s 10(3) can support dilution. See also Martino
(1996) 86. Neuberger J in the case of Premier Brands v Typhoon Europe Ltd, High Court of Justice,
Chancery Division, 21 January 2000 (2000) 23(5) IPD; [2000] F.S.R. 767 at 787 says: "While dilution
is a useful concept to bear in mind, it does not necessarily follow that every case of infringement under
section 10(3) will necessarily involve dilution, nor does it follow that the proprietor of a mark will
necessarily succeed in establishing infringement under section 10(3) in every case where he establishes
dilution."
164 Martino (1996) 86 quotes Lord Strathclyde, who was responsible for getting the Bill through the House
of Lords, as saying "we must stick with the directive's words and not amend them, since doing so
changes their meaning".
165 Welkowitz (2000) 74. Martino (1996) 86-120 discusses this section in a Chapter titled "Mirror, Mirror
on the Wall, What's the Meaning of It Ali?". His perspective is that, looking especially at the language
of s 10(3), there are more questions than answers. He says at 87: "Neither the theory of trademark
dilution, nor the language in which it is expressed is familiar to English law." Michaels A "Confusion
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writers hold the opinion that the inclusion of the phrase "likelihood of association" in
section 10(2)(b) would also give dilution protection to trade marks in the case of identical
or similar goods in the United Kingdom. Their opinion was based on the fact that the
Trademark Directive, which the UK Act followed, was based, to a certain extent, on the
Benelux Trademark Law, as explained above.l'" This law gives a very wide
interpretation to the phrase "likelihood of association" and protects a trade mark
"whenever the trade mark is called to mind".167 As will be seen, this wide interpretation
was not followed by the British courtS.168
5.7.2.2 THE PROPOSED INTERPRETATION OF SECTIONS 10(2) &(3)
With regard to the possible interpretation of section 10(2)(b) and 10(3), Kamperman
Sanders makes some interesting remarks in an article on the United Kingdom Trade
Marks Act, published in 1995.169 He clearly indicates the fallacy of interpreting "the
likelihood of association" as a direct replacement of confusion, as this will mean that the
two concepts can be used interchangeably. The result will be that the scope of section
10(2) will be limited to the source doctrine. Section 10(3), where the protection of non-
similar products is addressed, does not require confusion, thus the source doctrine does
not apply. This section undoubtedly recognises the advertising function of trade marks.
The justification for this protection depends on the value of the mark itself.17o
Kamperman Sanders then argues that if protection can be granted to non-similar goods in
the absence of confusion as to origin, it must also be possible in the case of similar
in and about Section 5(3) and 10(3) of the Trade Marks Act 1994" (2000) European Intellectual
Property Review 335 at 336 also rates the wording of these articles as "obscure" and the true scope of
protection as "uncertain".
166 Harris (1995 EIPR) 601; Kamperman Sanders (1995) 67. See also Martino (1996) 89-90 who stresses
that decisions of foreign courts are not binding on the English courts. He further explains that the
courts must construe the words of the Act itself and cannot rely on judicial statements. Decisions of
Irish and Scottish courts will carry weight and those of other common-law jurisdictions might be
"useful". After that, decisions from the CffiC and the OHIM might playa role. The Benelux example
is therefore not likely to be followed by the English courts.
167 Vuk (1998) 909; Gielen (1996 TW) 22-23; Harris (1995 TW) 13.
168 See Chapter 5.7.2.3 "Cases on Section 10(2)" infra.
169 Kamperman Sanders (1995) 69-74.
170 Carty (1997) 684.
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goods.l7l The association concept in section 10(2) leads, therefore, to an expansion of
the confusion concept, so that this section incorporates both the source and dilution
doctrines. This proposition is in line with the ruling in the Always/Regina case172 in the
Benelux and also the statements in the Council Minutes regarding the acceptance of the
Trademark Directive.173
Martino suggests that "association" is closely related to, but falls short of confusion. In
other words "likelihood of association" functions as a "less rigorous" likelihood of
confusion standard. He also recognises that association means a mental link between the
two marks and explains that if the junior mark calls to mind the senior mark and the
goods are the same or similar, "confusion is but a short step away".174 He also refers to
the Benelux interpretation and especially the Anti-Monopoly case.175
The protection given in section 10(3) is predominantly to protect the private interests of
the trade-mark owner, in contrast with section 10(2), where the public interest in not
being misled, still plays an important role. The nature of the interests protected in section
10(3) has also led to the criticism of many commentators that the dilution provisions
confer an unjustified monopoly on the trade-mark owner.176 For this reason, additional
grounds were inserted for the enforcement of this provision.l77 It must be noted that the
key phrases used in section 10(3) all require judicial interpretation.i"
171 Kamperman Sanders (1995) 70.
172 Regina v Procter & Gamble, Court of Appeal Brussels 27 May 1993, I.E.R. 1993, 112. See the
discussion in Chapter 5.7.l.6 "Influence of the Trademark Directive on Benelux Law" supra.
173 As to these statements, see the discussion in Chapter 5.5.5 "Meaning of 'Likelihood of Association"
supra and also the arguments in the Wagamamajudgment in Chapter 5.7.2.3 "Cases on Section 10(2)"
infra.
174 Martino (1996) 99-100.
175 Monopoly/Anti-Monopoly, Dutch Supreme Court (Hoge Raad), 24 June 1977 [1978] N.J. 83; [1978]
B.LE. 39. See the discussion in Chapter 5.7.1.3 '''Likelihood of Association' in the Benelux Law"
supra.
176 See the dilution debate discussed in Chapter 3.5.5.1 "The Fear of Monopoly" supra.
177 Kamperman Sanders (1995) 70.
178 Carty (1997) 685.
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In contrast with the interpretation proposed, the United Kingdom courts followed a rather
conservative approach as will be seen from the discussion of cases in the next two
sections.
5.7.2.3 CASES ON SECTION 10(2)
A few important issues arise from section 10(2), namely the interpretation of "likelihood
of association", the test for "likelihood of confusion" and the definition of "similar".
When the first English case in which the phrase "likelihood of association" in section
10(2)(b) was to be interpreted, the Wagamama case,179came to court, there were great
expectations that the "long awaited liberalisation of the English law" would now take
place and that the court would recognise the wider functionality of trade marks as had
occurred under Benelux law.180 The Chancery Division, however, decided that the
statute should not be construed expansively. Thus, this phrase does not extend trade-
mark protection to uses that do not result in confusion as to product origin. This
provision in the United Kingdom, contrary to the position in the Benelux law, does
therefore not provide dilution protection.i'"
At first sight the facts in the Wagamama case look quite like a classic infringement suit.
A Japanese restaurant chain, with the name WAGAMAMA, opened a restaurant in 1992
in England. The trade mark was registered in the class for restaurant services. This
restaurant was extremely successful and built up a very good reputation. Then in 1995 an
American restaurant, serving Indian food, also opened in England. They used the trade
name RAJAMAMA. The owner of the WAGAMAMA trade mark instituted action for
179 Wagamama Ltd v City Centre Restaurants pIc [1995] F.S.R. 713; [1996] E.T.M.R. 23. Vuk (1998)
909-912; Davies (1998) 579; Harris (1995 TW) 12-15; Kamperman Sanders (1996 EIPR) 3-5;
Kamperman Sanders (1996 EIPR) 521-525; Harris (1995 EIPR) 601-603; Prescott P "Think Before
You Waga Finger" (1996) 6 European Intellectual Property Review 317-321. It is interesting to note
that Paul Harris conducted the case for the plaintiff and that evidence for the plaintiff was also
submitted by Professor Charles Gielen, Professor of Law at Groningen University in the Netherlands,
who is also a well-known trade-mark practitioner, and who was involved in a number of leading
Benelux cases.
180 Harris (1995 EIPR) 601; but see the contrasting opinion of Prescott (1996) 317.
181 See Vuk (1998) 906; Marroletti (1999) 671-672; Welkowitz (2000) 78.
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trade-mark infringement. In response the owners of RAJAMAMA changed the name to
RAJA MAMA'S, but the plaintiff claimed that both marks were an infringement of its
trade mark and amounted to passing off.
The plaintiff gained evidence from a telephone survey that the first reaction of a
considerable amount of people on hearing the name RAJAMAMA was to associate it
with WAGAMAMA. There was also evidence of confusion as to origin.182 Counsel for
WAGAMAMA put forward the following arguments. Firstly, aside from classic
infringement, protection is also offered in the 1994 Trade Marks Act against the mere
association between the trade marks. They based this argument on the wording of section
lO(2)(b) which gives protection where the goods are similar to those for which the trade
mark is registered and there exists a likelihood of confusion, which includes the
likelihood of association with the trade mark. They thus argued that there could be
infringement in any case where the registered trade mark is called to mind by the public,
regardless of whether the customer was confused as to source of origin. This would
entail an expansion of the origin-based confusion rationale to a non-confusion-based
action, in line with modem trade-mark functions. Mere association between the two
marks can in this way be prevented. In this regard, they referred to the Benelux trade-
mark lawl83 where, as already explained, non-origin association had already for some
years been accepted as a form of trade-mark infringement.
Secondly, they referred to the "Statements for Entry in the Minutes of the Council
Meeting" in support of their case. Their third contention was that it was common
knowledge amongst European trade-mark practitioners that the words "likelihood of
association" refer to the Benelux interpretation. Fourthly, they argued that, as the
Directive aimed at trade-mark harmony between the different Member States, the United
182 Harris (1995 TW) 13; Harris (1995 EJPR) 602.
183 As set out above, slO of the UK Trade Marks Act is almost identical to the wording of art. 5 in the
Trademark Directive, which accepted the "likelihood of association" concept from the Uniform
Benelux Trademark Act. See also Kamperman Sanders (1996 EJPR) 3.
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Kingdom should also follow the Benelux pattern.184
The Court firstly mentioned that under the 1938 Trademarks Act the question to be
answered was whether the mark complained of was confusingly similar to the registered
mark. The confusion that was looked for was confusion as to source of origin. Thus, if it
appears that there are sufficient similarities between the registered trade mark and the
infringing trade mark, so as to give the impression to the public that the goods emanate
from the same source, they are confused and the court will find that there was
infringement. So, if there is an association made between the two marks, this association
must also lead to confusion as to the source of origin before there can be trade-mark
infringement. The type of infringement described here is known as classic infringement.
This classic infringement by confusion as to the source of origin of goods and services
can also constitute a cause of action under section 100f the 1994 United Kingdom Trade
Marks Act.
The court noted that there are two possible constructions of section 10(2). Firstly, it can
be limited to classic infringement, which will include association as to origin or secondly,
it can also cover non-origin association. The second construction is naturally the one
used by the Benelux countries. The court, comprising Justice Laddie, chose the first
interpretation and came to the conclusion that trade-mark rights cannot be extended to
situations where a likelihood of confusion was not present.l'" The court could not find
any reason why the Benelux view should be followed.186
Kamperman Sanders cannot find fault with the judge's rejection of the practice of tracing
the legislative intent from the words used in the provision. He, however, is of the opinion
that the intent of the legislature can be ascertained by looking at the logical internal
structure of section 10.187 He then goes on, first to look at the wording of section 10(3),
184 Harris (1995 TW) l3; Harris (1995 EJPR) 60l.
185 Prescott (1996) 317 agrees with this. He says that as the statute speaks of "confusion .... which includes
the likelihood of association ... ", it must be "that sort of association which involves confusion".
186 See also Welkowitz (2000) 78-79.
187 Kamperrnan Sanders (1996 EIPR) 4-5; Kamperman Sanders (1996 EJPR) 521, 523-4.
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from which it is clear that confusion plays no role, but that it must be proved instead that
the trade mark in question has a reputation. It is clear in this subsection that the
legislature has the non-origin dilution rationale in mind. He then draws the conclusion,
which he sees as logical, that this expansion must also be true for similar goods, where
the proximity of the products increases the harmful effect to the unique associative
strength of the mark.188 The drafting of this section thus emphasises this natural
progression, where the protection afforded to trade marks is described from the minimum
to the maximum extent. Prescott.l'" in contrast, sees article 5(3) of the Directive and thus
section 10(3), as a sui generis provision. Thus, it cannot throw any light on the
interpretation of section 10(2). He also shows that to succeed under section 10(3) the
mark needs to have a reputation and the test also requires unfair advantage or detriment.
Neither of these requirements is to be found in section 10(2).190 In his response to
Prescott, Kamperman Sanders specifically shows that there is nothing in the Directive
itself, nor in the preamble, nor in the working papers, nor in the Council Minutes to
support these statements.!"
The judge in Wagamama also felt that the intention to expand the confusion criterion to a
much wider non-confusion-based rationale was not made sufficiently clear in the
(preamble to the) Trademark Directive. In relation to the argument that it is apparent
from the Statements that the European Commission chose the Benelux interpretation,
Justice Laddie could, on the evidence provided, not conclusively find that the statements
had been incorporated into the Minutes. The European Commission was also unable to
188 Prescott (1996) 321 believes that s 10(3) was not extended to similar goods because it was not thought
to be necessary to do so. He says that in cases where the registered mark has a reputation, the goods are
similar and if the defendant's mark is close enough to the plaintiffs to cause detriment or to take an
unfair advantage, there will be confusion of origin or at least the likelihood of confusion. Thus, there
will be infringement under s 10(2) and no need to expand s 10(3). See also Prescott (1997) 101-102.
189 Prescott (1996) 318. Prescott wrote this whole article as a reply to the one of Kamperman Sanders in
(1996 EIPR) 3-5. Prescott came with a rather cutting personal attack on Kamperman Sanders. He
writes at 317: "A person may do a valuable service, not by being right, but by being wrong.
Kamperman Sanders' article is particularly valuable because not only does he embrace a series of
propositions, every one of which is wrong, but does so with great clarity. This is a combination which
is rare, and very instructive."
190 Prescott (1996) 319. Prescott (1997) 101 again says that these two subsections "are so mutually
different that the one is hardly any guide to the interpretation of the other".
191 Kamperman Sanders (1996 EIPR) 523-524.
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assist the judge in this regard. Relying on a number of CJEC cases, the judge concluded
that the Council Minutes were not available as evidence on the ground that they were
confidential. This was in spite of evidence that the Minutes were widely known.192
Prescott supports the finding of Justice Laddie. He states that the primary document is
the text of the legislation, here the Directive. If ambiguous, recourse can be had to
secondary aids, such as the Council Minutes, but these must be freely accessible, which
the Minutes were not at this stage.l'" Although these Council Minutes were at the outset
privileged, they were eventually published by OHIM.194.
The third argument of Counsel of the plaintiff, that it was common knowledge that the
words "likelihood of association" refer to the Benelux interpretation, was briefly dealt
with by the court, declaring that it would be "wrong and dangerous to rely on Chinese
whispers". With regard to the final argument, the court took notice of the decision in the
Always/Regina-case by a Benelux court, where it was concluded that the Directive did
not affect their law. He, however, found that there is not enough reason to follow that
decision just because that court expressed its view first.195
The Court was moreover afraid that any extension of trade-mark rights to situations
where no confusion was present, could lead to the creation of a new kind of monopoly in
a trade mark, that could be likened to a quasi-copyright with no fixed duration.
Kamperman Sanders criticises this opinion of the court.196 Firstly, he states that the judge
confused the economic life span of a trade mark with that of an author and his heirs and
secondly, this argument disregards the fact that trade marks need continual investment
and management to stay in competition. Furthermore the application of the association
192 See Harris (1995 TW) 13; Kamperman Sanders (1996 EIPR) 3; Kamperman Sanders (1996 EIPR) 525;
Harris (1995 EIPR) 602-603. See also Chapter 5.5.5 "Meaning of 'Likelihood of Association'" supra.
Prescott (1996) 318 agrees with the judge that the Council Minutes cannot be used. He refers to the
"curious device of the leaking of Council Minutes" which he calls "a rather unorthodox method of
legislative fiat".
193 Prescott (1997) 100.
194 [1996] O.J. O.HJ.M. 607.
195 Harris (1995 TW) 13; Harris (1995 EIPR) 603. See Regina v Procter & Gamble, Court of Appeal
Brussels 27 May 1993, IER 1993, 112, discussed in Chapter 5.7.1.6 "Influence of the Trademark
Directive on Benelux Law" supra.
196 Kamperman Sanders (1996 EIPR) 4.
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criterion In a specific case does not automatically secure victory for the trade-mark
proprietor. Other factors, such as the similarity of the goods and reputation of the mark,
still have to be taken into account. Prescott supports Justice Laddie's position. He feels
that valid monopolies can only be derived from the "will of the legislators, clearly
expressed', which is not so in the case of section 10(2).197 He emphasises the burden on
companies in selecting a mark, which is not only non-confusing, but is also without any
associations with an existing mark.
With this judgment the court also rejected any notion that a trade mark can serve any
other function than that of an indicator of the source of origin. In this regard the judge
also referred with approval to the opinion of the Advocate General in the Hag II case,198
where it was stated that the primary function of a trade mark was as an indicator of the
origin of the goods. That might indeed be the primary function, but does not mean that it
is necessarily the only function of a trade mark.199 The judge, in spite of the words "in
particular" in the tenth recital to the Trademark Directive concerning the function of a
trade mark, also used this in support of his contention that a trade mark only has an origin
function.
The judge, then proceeded to consider the facts along the traditional lines of "classic
infringement" and found that there had indeed been a substantial likelihood of confusion
in the minds of the public in view of the similarity between the marks WAGAMAMA
and RAJAMAMA. He therefore found that there was trade-mark infringement and also
passing off.
Although the Wagamama case was correctly decided in the sense that protection was
given to the WAGAMAMA trade mark, much criticism has been levelled against the way
in which the court handled the "likelihood of association" concept.200 This decision
197 Prescott (1996) 317-318. He states that if the legislators wanted to introduce a monopoly, they should
have drafted the section as "confusion on the part of the public or the likelihood of association".
198 SA eNL Sucal N. V v Hag GF A.G. [1990] 3 C.M.L.R. 571.
199 See also Kamperman Sanders (1996 EIPR) 4.
200 Vuk (1998) 926-927; Kamperman Sanders (1996 EIPR) 3 who titled his article on the case "Back to
the Dark Ages of Trade Mark Law". Kamperman Sanders (1996 EJPR) 521.
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limited the scope of the 1994 United Kingdom Act and put it back within the frame of the
traditional origin-based confusion rationale as under the 1938 Act.201 It furthermore
frustrates the aim of the Trademark Directive to approximate the laws of the Member
States_2°2
In British Sugar pic v James Robertson & Sons Ltd.,203 often referred to as the Treat case,
Justice Jacob formulated a test for the "likelihood of confusion". The plaintiff was the
owner of the trade mark TREAT for dessert sauces and syrups in class 30 and used its
mark on SILVER SPOON TREAT, a sweet ice-cream syrup. The defendant then started
to use ROBERTSON'S TOFFEE TREAT for a sweet spread in its range of jams and
preserves, which would fall in class 29. The court decided that a toffee spread was not
similar to a dessert sauce or syrup even though the spread was occasionally used as such.
Justice Jacob set out a three-part test for assessing infringement under section 10(2):
1. compare the registered mark with the sign;
2. determine whether the goods or services are identical or similar; and
3. determine whether there is a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public,
including a likelihood of association.
This was an objective and very stringent test.204 He intended the three parts to this test to
be separate and distinct. To determine the similarity of the goods, Justice Jacob set out
the following factors: the respective uses of the respective goods or services; the
respective users of the respective goods or services; the respective physical nature of the
goods or acts of service; the respective trade channels through which the goods or
services reach the market; in the case of self-serve consumer items, where in practice
they are respectively found in supermarkets, in particular whether they are found on the
201 Harris (1995 EIPR) 601, 603.
202 Kamperman Sanders (1996 EIPR) 5.
203 British Sugar plc v James Robertson & Sons Ltd., [1996] R.P.C. 281.
204 See Montagnon R '''Strong' Marks Make More Goods 'Similar'" (1998) 11 European Intellectual
Property Review 401 at 402.
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same or different shelves and the extent to which the respective goods compete.i'" The
court reasoned that if the question of the likelihood of confusion had to be addressed in
order to decide whether goods or services were similar, there would be no purpose in
requiring such similarity. The court concluded that the goods of the two companies were
not similar and therefore there was no infringement.v'" This judgment is viewed as a
"very strict analysis of whether goods were similar"_2°7
Justice Jacob also applied the same criteria in the case of Baywatch.208 The first cause of
action in this case was section 10(2). Justice Jacob stated that there are two questions to
be answered in terms of section 10(2). The first question is whether there is similarity
between the sign and registered trade mark and whether the goods on which the sign is
used are similar to that for which the trade mark is registered; and, if so, the second
question will be "is there a likelihood of confusion,,?209 He thus found it important to
separate confusion from similarity. When applied to the BAYWA TCH scenario, the
court concluded that the series BA YW ATCH and BABEW ATCH were not goods of a
similar nature210 and therefore the second question regarding the likelihood of confusion
did not arise. The court also made it clear that there must be confusion as to source of
origin and not just a likelihood of association.
205 Essentially the same factors were set out by the CJEC in Canon, discussed in Chapter 5.8.1 "The
Interpretation of Articles 4(1)(b) and 5(1)(b)" infra, in assessing the similarity of goods. See Casey S
"Infringement Under the UK Trade Marks Act 1994 Part 1" (May 2000) Trademark World 19 at 25.
206 Similarity of goods was a question wholly independent of the question of the similarity of the mark and
sign. Similarity of goods was also a separate issue and must be established before the likelihood of
confusion can be assessed. See Briggs (2000) 429.
207 Briggs (2000) 430.
208 Baywatch Productions Co. Inc. v Home Video Channel Ltd., [1997] F.S.R. 22. This case primarily
considered s 10(3) and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.7.2.4 "Cases on Section 10(3)"
infra.
209 This step-wise approach used by the English courts is in contrast with the single test of "global
appreciation" applied by the CJEC which also take into account the strength of the trade mark. See
Case C-251/95, SABEL B.V v Puma A.G., Rudolf Dassier Sport [1998] R.P.C. 199; E.T.M.R. 1 and
Case C-39/97, Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. (Formerly Pathe
Communications Corporation) [1999] R.P.C. 117, discussed in Chapter 5.8 "Judgments of The Court of
Justice of the European Communities (CJEC)" infra.
210 See the explanation in fn 246 infra.
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The next notable English decision in this regard was Pfizer v Eurofoodr" Pfizer claimed
that their well-known trade mark VIAGRA for a blue, lozenge-shaped drug would be
infringed by Eurofood's proposed use of the mark VIAGRENE on a non-alcoholic drink
marketed as an aphrodisiac. It was a blue liquid, presented in a blue bottle labeled with
the name VIAGRENE and a diamond device. This was a landmark case in United
Kingdom trade-mark law. The court turned away from the step-by-step approach used by
Justice Jacob in previous English decisions and followed the "global appreciation" test
laid down by the CJEC in the SABEL and Canon cases.212 The judge said that the
distinctiveness of the mark must be taken into account. The greater the distinctiveness,
the greater the likelihood of confusion. There was clearly a likelihood of confusion and
therefore a section 10(2) infringement.
Then followed the decision in Premier Brands v Typhoon Europe Ltd.213 Plaintiff owned
the well-known TY.PHOO mark for tea in class 30, for hand tools and implements for
domestic use, including cutlery in class 8 and for domestic utensils and containers in
class 21.214 The defendants had registered the mark TYPHOON in class 21 and used it to
market (upmarket) kitchen hardware. Both marks appear in similar typography: capital
letters with a larger capital T, white lettering on a red background. It was not in dispute
that the marks and at least some of the goods were similar.i" One of the issues before
the court was the likelihood of confusion in section 10(2).
In his preliminary observations, the judge referred with approval to the Treat case and
said that the question of similarity of the mark was a distinct question from likelihood of
confusion. But then he said that the greater the similarity between the marks, the greater
the likelihood of confusion.i'" He then accepted the ruling of the CJEC in the SABEL
211 Pfizer Ltd. & Another v Eurofood Link (UK) Ltd., High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, 10
December 1999.
212 See fn 209 supra.
213 Premier Brands UK Ltd. v Typhoon Europe Ltd., High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, 21 January
2000 (2000) 23(5) IPD; [2000] F.S.R. 767.
214 The class 8 and 21 registrations were defensive registrations made under s 27 of the 1938 Trade Marks
Act.
215 Except for the tea mark which fall under s 10(3). The action brought under s 10(3) will be discussed in
Chapter 5.7.2.4 "Cases on Section 10(3)" infra.
216 Premier Brands v Typhoon Europe Ltd., [2000] F.S.R. 767 at 776.
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and Canon cases, namely that the correct test for the likelihood of confusion was the test
of global appreciation.i'" On the evidence, however, after finding similarity of marks,218
similarity of at least some of the goods and inherent distinctiveness of the TY.PHOO
mark, he found that the average consumer for kitchenware would not experience a
likelihood of (origin) confusion.i'" Justice Neuberger also said that "association" and
"confusion" are different concepts. He conceded that "confusion could be said to be a
particular type of association",22o which reverses the CffiC's conclusion in SABEL that
association is a particular type of confusion.r"
The test of global appreciation for the likelihood of confusion as to origin of goods was
also accepted by Justice Pumfrey in the DaimlerChrysler v Alavi case222to determine the
similarity of marks. He also remarked that likelihood of association is an explanation of
the kind of confusion as to origin. He founds no likelihood of confusion between the
marks in this case and also no similarity of marks_223Further more he cast doubt on the
presumption that the more distinctive the mark the greater the likelihood of confusion.
According to him it is normally easier to distinguish a well-known word mark from
others close to it. Baloch224comments that for comparison of the marks a well-known
abbreviation of the registered mark can be used - in this case MERC for MERCEDES or
MERCEDES-BENZ. Thus there was "abbreviation similarity". This contention is
however not supported by European case law.
217 Premier Brands v Typhoon Europe Ltd., [2000] F.S.R. 767 at 778. See Chapter 5.8 "Judgments of The
Court of Justice of the European Communities (CJEC)" infra for a discussion of the SABEL and Canon
cases.
218 Premier Brands v Typhoon Europe Ltd., [2000] F.S.R. 767 at 780-781. The judge found considerable
aural similarity between the mark and the sign. The visual similarity is "not quite as significant".
Concerning conceptual features, there is "much less similarity", TYPHOON being a word used in
common speech and TY.PHOO being an invented word.
219 Premier Brands v Typhoon Europe Ltd., [2000] F.S.R. 767 at 785.
220 Premier Brands v Typhoon Europe Ltd., [2000] F.S.R. 767 at 793.
221 See Michaels (2000) 338.
222 DaimlerChrysler A.G. v Javid Alavi (tla Mere), [2001] R.P.C. 813 at 838. For the facts and more detail
on this case, see Chapter 5.7.2.5 "The Key Concepts of Section 10(3) (iii) Unfair Advantage or
Detriment" infra. See also Miles S "When is a Mere not a Mercedes-Benz?" (April 2001) Trademark
World26 at 31.
223 The respective marks were MERC for clothing and MERCEDES and MERCEDES-BENZ for motor
cars and clothing.
224 Baloch (2001) 430.
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It seems clear that the test for infringement in section 10(2) is now one of global
appreciation, as also supported by the CJEC. It is generally accepted that the more
distinctive the mark, the greater the likelihood of confusion, despite Justice Pumfrey's
remarks in the Mere case. Confusion, however, must still relate to origin, not just
association.i'" The interpretation of the courts on the similarity of goods has also
changed from a very narrow one in the Treat case to a quite liberal one in the Pfizer case.
Another question which is relevant in the context of section 10(2), is whether this section
also covers infringement with respect to dissimilar goods. In Pfizer v EurofooJ226 the
court stated that there is "no automatic bar to a finding of infringement under section
10(2) merely because the goods ... are in some respects dissimilar. ... " This was said in
the context of the interdependence of the factors in the global assessment test. The court
found that the goods "whilst superficially different, have similarities". VIAGRA is used
on a tablet and VIAGRENE on a soft drink. Although the goods appear to be dissimilar,
both products are used to stimulate the libido. The lesser degree of similarity between the
goods is offset by the high degree of similarity between the mark and the sign, as well as
the distinctive character and reputation of the registered mark.227 Thus, one can conclude
that the protection offered by section 10(2) depends on how one defines. "similar" .228 In
the light of the uncertainty regarding section 10(3) and its unfamiliarity, section 10(2)
appears to some as a much safer and simpler choice, if "similar" can be defined in broad
terms. This seems also to be the result of the Canon case decided by the CJEC.229 In
other words, there could be infringement of a particularly well-known mark within the
terms of section 10(2) even where the goods were quite dissimilar, as long as there was a
225 See Briggs (2000) 431.
226 Pfizer Ltd & Another v Eurofood Link (UK) Ltd, High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, 10
December 1999, discussed supra in this section.
227 Casey (May 2000) 26.
228 See Welkowitz (2000) 94.
229 For a discussion of this case see Chapter 5.8.1 "The Interpretation of Articles 4(1 )(b) and 5(1)(b)" infra.
239
likelihood of confusion=" and "confusion" includes a fairly broad range of conduct.
5.7.2.4 CASES ON SECTION 10(3)
One of the first English cases where section 10(3) was raised, is BASFv CEP (UK) plc?31
Concern was expressed by Justice Knox that as section 10(3) could be used to prevent
use of a similar sign on any class of goods, much of the effect of having classes of goods
for trade-mark registration would disappear. Furthermore, he considered that neither the
distinctive character nor the repute of a mark would be adversely affected if there were
no risk of confusion.
Then in 1997 the Chancery Division had to give judgment on section 10(3) in the
Baywatch case_232 The question whether section 10(3) requires confusion or not, was
quite controversial, because, if not, it was believed, that there would be a lower standard
for infringement in the case of dissimilar goods compared to the situation for similar
goods. The court found that even this section offers no protection to a trade mark in the
absence of a likelihood of confusion.233
BAYWATCH is one of the most popular television series in the United Kingdom. It is
produced and marketed by an American company. The story centres around a team of
lifeguards wearing red jackets and red bathing suits. Sometime during each episode these
lifeguards run along the beach together, normally in order to save a drowning victim.
The Adult Channel is a television network that broadcasts erotic adult entertainment to
subscribers. During May and June 1996 they broadcast episodes of a pornographic film
entitled BABEWATCH. It appeared that this programme also started with a beach scene,
where actresses wearing red swimming costumes and carrying floatation devices, ran
down a beach. But shortly after this, they were engaged in sexual acts.
230 See Michaels (2000) 338.
231 BASF V CEP (UK) pIc. [1996] E.T.M.R. 51. See also Michaels (2000) 336.
232 Baywatch Productions Co. Inc. v Home Video Channel Ltd., [1997] F.S.R. 22.
233 Vuk (1998) 912-915; Davies (1998) 584; Marroletti (1999) 673.
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The owners of the BAYWATCH trade mark then sought an interlocutory injunction to
prevent any rebroadcast of BABEWA TCH until the end of a full hearing. They admitted
that there was no likelihood of confusion between the two programmes. The three causes
of action were section 10(2) and 10(3) of the Trade Marks Act of 1994 and passing off.
BAYWATCH contended "that the defendant's use of BABEWATCH, a similar trade
mark to the registered trade mark, BAYWATCH, in connection with a television
programme, was clearly intended to take advantage of the reputation and distinctive
character of the plaintiffs trade mark". They went even further by saying that the
BABEWATCH programme tarnished BAYWATCH's reputation.
Regarding the cause of action based on section 10(3), the court held that the applicant's
arguments were not well founded. BAYWATCH, the applicant, interpreted section 10(3)
so as to give protection whenever there is the possibility that another person is
appropriating the trade-mark's goodwill or is using the infringing trade mark in a way
which tarnishes the registered trade-mark's reputation. It also contended that this could
even be the case where there is no likelihood of confusion. The court disagreed. The
court concluded that the use of the concept of similarity in section 10(3) has the effect of
bringing the concept of likelihood of confusion in as a requirement for trade-mark
infringement.t'" Thus, trade-mark infringement under this section can only be found
when an unauthorised user uses a trade mark which is similar to a registered trade mark,
so that there is a likelihood of confusion, on goods that are dissimilar to the trade-marked
goods. Further, he must use a trade mark that has a reputation in the United Kingdom
and the use of the trade mark must take unfair advantage of or be detrimental to the
distinctive character or repute of the trade mark.235 The court came to this conclusion in
234 The judge adopted the observations of Knox J in the case of BASF pic v CEP (UK) pic. [1996] LP.D.
19(4), that the distinctive character or the repute of a mark is not adversely affected when there is no
risk of relevant confusion. See Black R "Baywatch: Sour Grapes or Justice?" (1997) 2 European
Intellectual Property Review 39 at 40. Another reason cited by Welkowitz (2000) 85 is that the court
found it simply illogical to give greater protection where the goods are not similar than where they are
similar.
235 This decision is in line with the obiter comment of Jacob J in the Treat case, discussed in Chapter
5.7.2.3 "Cases on Section 10(2)" supra, where he said that s 10(3) would apply where there was no
similarity between the goods, but still confusion.
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the absence of evidence of actual confusion.r" For this reason the court found that there
was no use of a sign similar to the mark BAYWATCH so as to create a likelihood of
confusion on the part of the public. The court based its decision on a determination that
neither the Trademark Directive, nor the White Paper on the Trade Marks Act, supported
giving a greater amount of protection where a similar trade mark is used on dissimilar
goods.237
Many commentators believe that this case was wrongly decided, but if confusion were
not required then it could lead to the situation that less has to be proved in respect of
dissimilar goods and services than in the case of similar goods and services_238 In the
SABEL case239the CJEC held that a likelihood of confusion is not a requirement when
dealing with article 5(2) of the Directive, which is equivalent to section 10(3), thereby
indirectly confirming that the Baywatch case was wrongly decided. However, in the
Marks & Spencer case240the court found itself unable to accept this opinion of the CJEC
unreservedly.
VUk241also holds the opinion that the Baywatch case was wrongly decided. In his words
the Chancery Division's interpretation of section 10(3) of the 1994 United Kingdom
Trade Marks Act242 is "erroneous because there is no support for its conclusion that a
likelihood of confusion is mandated by this paragraph". He reasoned that if the European
Commission intended paragraph 2 of article 5 to be interpreted in the same light as
paragraph lea) and (b), they would have named it paragraph l(c). According to him it is
quite clear that the BABEWATCH series was based on the BAYWATCH series, for the
236 Black (1997) 40,justly remarks that it will always be difficult, ifnot impossible, to "expect members of
the public to volunteer that they watch pornography even in the privacy of their own homes".
237 See Vuk (1998) 914-5. This is because s 10(2) only grants protection for use of a similar sign on
similar goods or services where there exists a likelihood of confusion.
238 Davies (1998) 7; Welkowitz (2000) 85.
239 Case C-251/95,SABEL B. V v Puma A.G. [1998] E.T.M.R. 1 par 20. See the discussion in Chapter 5.8
"Judgments of The Court of Justice of the European Communities (CffiC)" infra. This was an obiter
comment, but still carried some weight. See Briggs (2000) 432.
240 Marks & Spencer plc. v One In A Million [1998] F.S.R. 265, 272-273. The court indicated that
Baywatch and SABEL had left the law under s 10(3) unsettled on the issue of dilution and confusion.
See Welkewitz (2000) 87.
241 Vuk (1998) 928-929.
242 Which corresponds to art. 5(2) of the Trademark Directive.
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sole purpose of utilising some of the goodwill of the last-mentioned trade mark. By
doing so, the reputation of the BAYWATCH trade mark was definitely tarnished. He
also reasoned that dilution protection for BA YWA TCH would not confer a monopoly to
them, because the makers of BABEWA TCH did not need to use a similar trade mark to
compete effectively in the marketplace. They would still be able to produce
hi . 743pornograp IC movies."
Black, counsel for the plaintiff, gives some interesting background information on this
case.244 Baywatch's claim for interlocutory relief was set down for hearing two days
before the end of the last term and was eventually heard before a Deputy Judge. His
main field of expertise was insolvency law. He even admitted during the hearing that this
area of trade-mark law was foreign to him. To make matters worse it later appeared that
the Senior Patents Judge could have heard the application and was not unavailable as at
first thought. Except for the outcome of the case, which could have been totally different
if decided by a more experienced judge in this field, some other issues arise from this
judgment. One of these is extra costs incurred by the plaintiffs, inter alia, because a lot
of time had to be spent explaining the basics of trade-mark law to the Deputy Judge
during the hearing.245
In his commentary on the case Black also submits that if the drafters of the Act intended
a likelihood of confusion to be part of section 10(3), they could easily have included it.
In sharp contrast, they expressly wrote the requirement of a likelihood of confusion in
section 10(2). Another aspect of the decision open to criticism is the judge's conclusion
that BA YWATCH and BABEWATCH are not similar marks. Black rightly asks whether
this can be supported.i''"
243 Vuk (1998) 929-930.
244 Black (1997) 39.
245 See Black (1997) 39-42 for his detailed version on this case.
246 Black (1997) 41. Welkowitz (2000) 85 fn 114 explains this point further. The court had said that
television shows with "adult content" were not similar to the type of show represented by
BAYWATCH. Welkowitz gives a more technical explanation: BAYWATCH was not registered for
television programmes, but for "video tapes and video discs". S 10(2) applies where the second use is
"in relation to goods or services similar to those for which the trade mark is registered'. The court
found that video tapes were not similar to television programmes.
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Another interesting case was that of Audi-Med Trade Mark,247which concerned opposed
proceedings for a trade-mark registration under section 5(3), which is the counterpart of
section 10(3) in the registration context of the Act. Application was brought by the
maker of hearing aids and associated products to register the mark AUDI-MED. The
German manufacturer of AUDI motor vehicles objected. The examiner stated that he
believed that opposition to a registration can be brought on the ground of dilution,
without regard to confusion.f'" The contention of the car manufacturer that the
registration of AUDI-MED would cause confusion, was however rejected. The examiner
found that the AUDI-MED mark would not be detrimental to AUDI or take unfair
advantage of the AUDI mark. He took into account the narrow and disparate markets
each occupied and the different outlets of sale.
In the same year an objection was raised to the registration of EVEREADY for
contraceptives and condoms by the well-known manufacturer of batteries in Oasis Stores
Ltd's Trade Mark Application.249 The Hearing Officer concluded that section 5(3) was
aimed at preventing the illegitimate exploitation of an existing trade-mark's reputation.P"
He mentioned the uncertainty about whether confusion is a requirement under section
10(3) and 5(3) and in this context referred to the Marks & Spencer case/51 which in tum
referred to BASF v CEP and Baywatch where confusion was required.252 He said that he
did not think that confusion as to origin was a necessity for a finding of unfair advantage
or detriment. The objection failed, because the Hearing Officer reached the conclusion
that normal and fair use of the mark on contraceptives and condoms would not lead to
detriment to the reputation of EVER READY batteries in any material fashion.253
247 Audi-Med Trade Mark [1998] R.P.D. & T.M. 863. See the short discussion in Welkowitz (2000) 87.
248 Audi-Med Trade Mark [1998] R.P.D. & T.M. 863 at 871-872.
249 Oasis Stores Ltd's Trade MarkApplication [1998] R.P.C. 631.
250 Oasis Stores Ltd's Trade Mark Application [1998] R.P.C. 631 at 647.
251 Marks & Spencer pic. v One InA Million [1998] F.S.R. 265, 272-273.
252 Oasis Stores Ltd's Trade Mark Application [1998] R.P.C. 631 at 646.
253 Oasis Stores Ltd's Trade MarkApplication [1998] R.P.C. 631at 651. The judge reached this conclusion
on the assumption that the use of condoms is now "widely promoted and encouraged" and that "the
stigma previously associated them is much reduced, ifnot eliminated".
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More clarity on the situation in the United Kingdom was given by the judge in the Pfizer
case_254 He felt bound by the SABEL case, decided by the CffiC, and concluded that
"proof of likelihood of confusion is not a requirement of proving infringement pursuant
to s 10(3)". This was also the conclusion of Justice Neuberger in Premier Brands.i" "It
appears tolerably clear to me from the terms of section 10, that confusion is not a
necessary ingredient to establishing infringement under section 10(3)". Some evidence
that there is an association in the mind of the public between the two marks is necessary
to show unfair advantage or detriment. This is, however, not the same as confusion in the
sense of section 10(2).256 Also Justice Pumfrey in the DaimlerChrysler case agreed that
section 10(3) did not require proof of confusion.i'" This was also concluded in two
registry cases, Corgi TM and CA Sheimer's Trade Mark Application.258
Justice Neuberger however stated in Premier Brands that the existence of confusion can
indicate detriment and in the absence of confusion it will be necessary for the claimant to
find some other detriment to succeed on an infringement claim under section 10(3)_259
254 Pfizer v Eurofood, High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, 10 December 1999. See Chapter 5.7.2.3
"Cases on Section 10(2)" supra for the facts. As the court found a likelihood of confusion and therefore
s 10(2) infringement, his remarks on s 10(3) were obiter.
255 Premier Brands v Typhoon Europe Ltd., High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, 21 January 2000
(2000) 23(5) IPD; [2000] F.S.R. 767 at 788. See also Chapter 5.7.2.3 "Cases on Section 10(2)" supra
for the facts. With regard to the s 10(3) claim, the following elements were addressed by Neuberger J:
"without due cause"; the burden of proof; "detriment" and "unfair advantage". See the discussion in
Chapter 5.7.2.5 "The Key Concepts of Section 10(3)" infra.
256 Briggs (2000) 432.
257 DaimlerChrysler A.G. v Javid Alavi (tla Mere), [2001] R.P.C. 813 at 841, discussed in Chapter 5.7.2.5
"The Key Concepts of Section 10(3) (iii) Unfair Advantage or Detriment" infra. The judge (at 842),
however, sees two different applications for s 10(3): one where the defendant's sign is sufficiently
similar to the registered mark so that the public are deceived into the belief that the goods are associated
with the proprietor and the other where the public is not confused. See also Miles (2001) 32.
258 Corgi TM[1999] R.P.C. 549; CA Sheimer (M) SDN BHD's Trade Mark Application [2000] R.P.C. 484
at 504. Both were decided by Geoffrey Hobbs, Q.C. under s 5(3), which is substantially identical to s
10(3), requiring the refusal of an application to register as a trade mark any sign which would clash with
an earlier registered trade mark.
259 Premier Brands v Typhoon Europe Ltd., [2000] F.S.R. 767 at 803. See also Chaudri A "Case
Comment: Premier Brands UK Ltd v Typhoon Europe Ltd' (April 2000) Trademark World 12;
Chaudri A "United Kingdom: Trademark Infringement Cases 2000" (May 200 I) Trademark World 34
at 36.
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Baloch believes that the courts will still continue to grapple with this notion of confusion
in section 10(3)_26o
Section 10(3) requires that the mark and sign must be identical or similar. The Appointed
Person, Thorley Q.C., in Inlima's Applicationï" stated that the purpose of requiring
similarity is so that "the possibility of detriment or unfair advantage might arise". He
then concludes that the "same global appreciation test as is required under section 5(2)
(or section 10(2)) is likewise to be applied to the changed circumstances of section
5(3)" _262
Section 10(3) on its plain wording, is further only applicable in the case of non-similar
goods. In the cases of Davidoff v Gojkid and Adidas v Fitnessworldi'" the CJEC,
however, interpreted article 5(2) of the Directive, as also applicable in the case of
identical or similar goods. Article 5(2) is not mandatory, but Member States had the
option to introduce its protection in their national laws, which was what the United
Kingdom did in section 10(3). In the Adidas v Fitnessworld case the United Kingdom
Government contended that it was for the national courts to interpret a provision
transposing article 5(2) in relation to the protection which a Member State intended to
confer on proprietors of marks with a reputation. The CJEC however stated that the
Member State's option only relates to the principle of granting greater protection to
marks with a reputation.i'" but not to the situations covered by that protection. The
national courts must interpret their national laws in the light of the wording and the
purpose of the Directive. The United Kingdom must therefor grant protection in terms of
260 See Baloch (2001) 431. He sees this in the approach of Pumfrey J in the DaimlerChrysler case at 842
and even in Neuberger J's handling of the Typhoon case, the case which gave the most recognition to
dilution in English law thus far.
261 Infima's Application [2000] E.T.M.R. 325; [2000] R.P.C. 661 at 664. See Chapter 5.7.2.5 "The Key
Concepts of Section 10(3) (iii) Unfair Advantage or Detriment" infra.
262 He found at 665 that the similarity ofInlima's mark to the ADIDAS trade mark is obvious.
263 Case C-292/00, Davidoff & Cie and Zino Davidoff SA v Gofkid Ltd., 9 January 2003; Case C-408/01,
Adidas-Salomon A.G., formerly Adidas A.G., Adidas Benelux BV v Fitnessworld Trading Ltd, 23
October 2003. See the discussion in Chapter 5.8.2 "The Interpretation of Article 5(2)" infra and also
Morcom (2003) 281.
264 As stated above, art. 5(2) of the Directive was optional, thus Member States could decide whether or not
they wanted to include this provision in their national laws. The United Kingdom included this
provision as s 10(3) of the 1994 United Kingdom Trademarks Act.
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section 10(3), which is "at least as extensive for identical or similar goods or services as
for non-similar goods or services".265
It is however, very unlikely that the drafters of the United Kingdom Act would have
understood the provisions of article 5(2) so as also to include identical or similar goods.
Had they understood it in that way, would they have wanted to confer the full range of
protection as now permitted by the CJEC?266
5.7.2.5 THE KEY CONCEPTS OF SECTION 10(3)
Section 10(3) brings several concepts, some new to trade-mark infringement law, into
being. The 1994 Act fails to define these key expressions. These concepts are "uses in
the course of trade", "without due cause", "unfair advantage", detriment", "reputation"
and "distinctive character".
(i) "Use in the Course of Trade"
As a preliminary issue, it must be determined whether the defendant's use of the sign
must be "use as a trade mark", in other words use as an indicator of commercial origin.
This phrase does not appear in the 1994 Act. Although there are different opinions
amongst commentators, it seems that "use as a trade mark" will be required, especially in
the light of the wide infringement provisions in the 1994 Act.267 That means use in a
manner that distinguishes the goods and services of the user of the mark from those of
others268 or use so as to indicate a connection in the course of trade with the goods or
services in relation to which it is used_269
265 Case C-408/0 1, Adidas-Salomon A. Go, formerly Adidas AoGo, Adidas Benelux BoV v Fitnessworld
Trading Ltd., 23 October 2003 par 20-22.
266 Morcom (2003) 281.
267 Carty (1997) 685.
268 Welkowitz (2000) 88.
269 Martino (1996) 91.
247
If "use as a trade mark" is not a requirement it will imply that use in a non-trade mark
sense of a word, which happens to be a trade mark, will be an infringement. Martino
quotes the example of a hypothetical trade mark "Crocodile" for shoes. Another
manufacturer would then be unable to describe his shoes as "made of crocodile skin".27o
From another viewpoint, if trade-mark use is abandoned, it would have the result that
"commercial copyright" in that word will be conferred on the proprietor.
The phrase "use in the course of trade", although not defined in the 1994 Act also
appeared in the 1938 Trade Marks Act. It has been explained as "use in the course of
business or professional enterprise or any other non-private activity intended to produce
economic benefit".271 Another description is that it "comprehend[s] any dealing with
goods or services up to the time of their ultimate sale or delivery to consumers, but would
appear to exclude dealing[ s] of a purely private or domestic nature" .272
(ii) "Without Due Cause"
This requirement leaves open the possibility that it can, in some cases, be unreasonable to
require the alleged infringer to stop the use of the sign. This would be where the use of
the sign is in due cause, thus where there is a need to use the mark or where the defendant
cannot honestly be asked to refrain from doing so regardless of the damages the owner of
the mark would suffer from such use.273 This criterion also makes it possible for a court
to weigh up the interests of the parties, thus conferring judicial discretion.v'" Prior use
can, for example, be taken into considerarion.i" Comparative advertising and spare part
advertising would normally be viewed as due cause use in the case of similar goods.i"
270 See Martino (1996) 92, 118.
271 Kamperman Sanders (1995) 71. "Trade" is defined in the Act in s 103(1) as "including any business or
profession" .
272 See Martino (1996) 91.
273 See Chaudri (2000) 13.
274 Martino (1996) 103.
275 Briggs (2000) 433; Chaudri (2000) 13.
276 Kamperman Sanders (1995) 70-71. See Chapter 5.7.2.6 "Comparative Advertising in the UK" infra.
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This phrase was for the first time explained in any detail in English case law in the case
of Premier Brands v Typhoon Europe+" Justice Neuberger saw this phrase as a defence
on which a defendant might rely to avoid liability. Therefore, he felt that the burden of
proof lies with the defendant, which has to show that his use of the mark was with due
cause and also that any advantage or detriment is not without due cause. The defendants
argued that "without due cause" has the same meaning as "in good faith", or "for good
and honest commercial reasons". These contentions were rejected by the court, for the
following reasons. First, it could lead to unpredictable and, in some cases, very unfair
results if innocence was going to be a defence; secondly, it also applied to the words
"unfair advantage" and "detriment"; and thirdly, the same contention was also rejected by
the Benelux Court of Justice.278 Justice Neuberger stated that the purpose of section
10(3) is to protect the value and goodwill of trade marks. He also said that use of the sign
might be prevented even where the sign was innocently adopted, as he found in this case.
The judge then found that the defendants did use their sign without due cause.
(iii) "Unfair Advantage or Detriment"
According to Kamperman Sanders279 this criterion is an expansion of the association
criterion of section 10(2). A heavier burden of proof is, however, placed on the plaintiff
to show that there was infringement. In the first place unfair advantage or detriment must
be proved and then, secondly, also that the plaintiffs mark has a reputation.
277 Premier Brands v Typhoon Europe Ltd., High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, 21 January 2000;
(2000) 23(5) IPD; [2000] F.S.R. 767 at 789-792. Casparie-Kerdel (2001) 192 fn 47 is of the opinion
that this case gives a "very good overview of dilution in Art 5(2)". See Chapter 5.7.2.3 "Cases on
Section 10(2)" infra for the facts. See further Chaudri (2001) 36.
278 In Lucas Bois v Colgate-Palmolive [1976] 7 LI.C. 420. The court, in that case, explained that the
phrase "without justifiable reason" means that "the user of the mark is under such a compulsion to use
this very mark that he cannot honestly be asked to refrain from doing so regardless of the damages the
owner of the mark would suffer .... "
279 Kamperman Sanders (1995) 71.
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To prove unfair advantage or detriment it would probably be sufficient to show that there
was damage. In the Claeryn/Klarein decision28othe Benelux Court of Justice held that
damage could consist of a dilution of the drawing power of the mark, harm to the
capacity of the mark to promote sales and loss of exclusivity. Under Benelux law the
registered trade mark did, at that stage, not need to have a reputation, although the
reputation of the mark could play a role in the assessment of the damage. In CA
Sheimer's TM Applicationt" the Appointed Person, Geoffrey Hobbs Q.C., noted that to
establish unfair advantage or detriment the applicant needed to show that there was either
a positive or negative exploitation of his mark_282 A positive exploitation is then
described as a calculated, parasitic use of the mark, especially where the court feels that
there is an element of injustice in that use. In Inlima's Application283 it was held that
section 5(3) was intended to prevent the sort of "parasitic use" evident on the facts of the
case.284 "Parasitic use" is defined as use "which unjustly draws upon the recollection of
the opponent's trade mark in the course of trade in goods bearing the applicant's trade
mark". The Appointed Person, Thorley Q.C., found that the three-stripe device depicted
on Inlima's football shape container is likely to bring about an association between
beverages and ADIDAS boots. This association could bring benefit to Inlima by way of
280 Colgate-Palmolive B. V vNV Koninklijke Distileerderijen Erven Lucas Bols, BCl IMarch 1975 [1975]
N.J.472. See Chapter 5.7.1.5 "Section 13A(2) of the Uniform Benelux Trade Marks Act" supra for a
discussion of this case.
281 CA Sheimer (M) SDN BHD 's Trade Mark Application [2000] R.P.C. 484 at 505. This is known as the
VISA case. The defendant, Sheimer, wanted to use VISA, a well-known registered trade mark of the
provider of financial services on condoms. Hobbs Q.C. found that Sheimer's mark would trigger
recollections of the earlier mark. He found that VISA for condoms was chosen to gain attention
through the fame of the earlier mark, but that there was no unfair advantage "of the kind contemplated
by section 5(3)". He, however, found that the association which could be made between the marks
would be detrimental to the repute or distinctive character of the earlier VISA mark. Carty H
"Registered Trade Marks and Permissible Comparative Advertising" (2002) 6 European Intellectual
Property Review 294 at 298; Michaels (2000) 337.
282 This was also his conclusion in the hearing of an earlier application, Corgi TM [1999] R.P.C. 549. In
casu there was no evidence of unfair advantage taken of or detriment caused to the applicant's well-
known mark for model cars by the use of the mark CORGI on clothing. The application of the
proprietor of the earlier mark for a declaration of invalidity was rejected.
283 Inlima's Application [2000] E.T.M.R. 325; [2000] R.P.C. 661 at 666. Michaels (2000) 337.
284 Adidas opposed Inlima's application to register a three-dimensional container in the form of a football
boot with three stripes on the side as a mark for a variety of alcoholic and non-alcoholic drinks.
ADIDAS owns registrations for a three-stripes device trade mark in respect of footwear and sports
shoes for casual wear.
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the favourable association with ADIDAS and could also in the case of alcoholic
beverages bring detriment to ADIDAS' three-stripes device trade mark.285
Justice Pumfrey in the case of DaimlerChrysler v Alav/86 held the opinion that actual
unfair advantage or detriment is required for an infringement of section 10(3) and not just
the likelihood of this happening.i'" Alavi, the defendant, had owned a shop under the
name Mere in London since 1967, where he sold clothing and shoes, some carrying the
MERC label. DaimlerChrysler owns the Mercedes-Benz business and they have several
registered UK trade marks, inter alia MERCEDES and MERCEDES-BENZ for clothing
and also for vehicles.i'" Infringement of sections 10(2)(b) and 10(3) and of the
Community trade marks, as well as passing off were claimed. The judge found against
the claimant on each of these claims.
Unfair advantage and detriment are stated in the alternative, which might probably mean
that these two concepts are supposed to have different meanings.i'" Even so, it is clear
that they cannot stand apart from the remainder of the subsection.
Briggs assumes that a plaintiff must show intention on the part of the defendant to
succeed on an unfair advantage claim_29o This is not easily proved and therefore he
suggests that the court should make inferences from the evidence before the court. The
285 Infima's Application [2000] E.T.M.R. 325; [2000] R.P.C. 661 at 666.
286 DaimlerChrysler A.G. v Javid Alavi (tla Mere), [2001] R.P.c. 813 at 842. See discussions of this case
by Baloch (2001) 427-433; Miles (2001) 26-35.
287 "The section ... is concerned with actual effects, not risks or likelihoods". The judge found that the
marks were not similar, but even if they were, he thought that the claimants could not prove
infringement under s 10(3). See Chapter 4.10.4 "Likelihood of Dilution vs Actual Dilution" supra for a
detailed discussion of this debate in United States law. See also Miles (2001) 32 and Baloch (2001)
432-433, who points out the difficulties of the actual harm standard, also with reference to the United
States law.
288 They also have two Community trade marks, MERCEDES-BENZ for all classes and MERC for
vehicles and vehicle parts. They claimed that the marks have a sufficient reputation, because of their
general notoriety among the public. Their CTM claims failed, because there was no recorded used by
the claimant of the CTMs and also their reputation was not sufficient. See in general Chapter 5.6 "The
Community Trade Mark" supra.
289 See, for example, Martino (1996) 103, 116-7.
290 Briggs (2000) 433. He infers this from the fact that the parties in the Premier case abandoned their case
on this point. There was evidence that the defendant adopted their sign without any intention to benefit
from the plaintiffs mark.
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evidence he has in mind, is the same that is used in a passing-off action, namely that the
defendant is misrepresentingf" that his goods are somehow connected to those of the
trade-mark proprietor. The only difference is that in the case of unfair advantage there
must be knowledge on the side of the defendant, or mens rea. He suggests the
reasonable-man test to determine whether the misrepresentation was made with the
intention to deceive. The problem with the concept of misrepresentation as used in
passing-off cases is just this: there must be deception or confusion, which is normally
present in same or similar goods situations. The dilution concept is intended particularly
for situations where deception or confusion is absent, the goods are dissimilar, but there
still exists some connection between them_292
Another possibility is to equate "unfair advantage" with misappropriation, which is a
form of unfair competition. There is however no general cause of action for unfair
competition/misappropriation in English law. In the Pfizer case293 it was noted that
"unfair advantage" requires an enquiry into the benefit to be gained by the defendant
from the use of the mark complained of. Justice Thorley accepted that the defendant was
keen to establish an association with VIAGRA to enhance the sales of his product.
According to Casey,294 the court's analysis was based primarily on the intention of the
defendant to establish an association with and to trade on the goodwill associated with
VIAGRA. Justice Neuberger, in the Premier Brands case,295 defined (obiter) "unfair
advantage" by quoting from a German case,296 as follows:
291 Martino (1996) 108 believes misrepresentation is just one form of unfair advantage. Or as he explains,
unfair advantage might be "misrepresentation in all of its variant forms (whether now known or
hereafter invented)".
292 See also Martino (1996) 108-109
293 Pfizer v Eurofood, High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, 10 December 1999. See Chapter 5.7.2.3
"Cases on Section 10(2)" supra for the facts.
294 Casey S "Infringement Under the UK Trade Marks Act 1994 Part 2" (June/July 2000) Trademark
World 10 at 14.
295 Premier Brands v Typhoon Europe Ltd., High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, 21 January 2000
(2000) 23(5) !PD; [2000] F.S.R. 767 at 788. See also Chapter 5.7.2.3 "Cases on Section 10(2)" supra
for the facts.
296 Dimple, 1985 GRUR 550.
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"[I]t constitutes an act of unfair competition to associate the quality of one's goods or services
with that of prestigious competitive products for the purpose of exploiting the good reputation of a
competitor's goods or services in order to enhance one's promotional efforts."
The question can reasonably be asked, whether use of another's better-known mark
simply to catch the consumer's eye, is unfair?297
Martino feels that the word "unfair" is intended to confer a judicial discretion, which is
seemingly a wide one.298 The statement "which takes unfair advantage of' is so vague
that it leaves room for human inventiveness. What may not be actionable today may
become actionable in future. This statement thus leaves room for individual judges to
make individual decisions when asked_299 Martino also noted that "unfair advantage" can
refer to the defendant's requisite state of mind in adopting the plaintiffs mark. His state
of mind can be inferred from his motives and actions.30o
Detriment, according to Justice Thorley in the Pfizer case, requires an enquiry into the
damage to the goodwill accruing to the business in the goods sold under the trade
mark.301 The judge found that "the potential damage to that reputation by the sale of a
beverage purporting to be an aphrodisiac in circumstances which, ... is calculated to call
to mind the name VIAGRA, is obvious". According to Briggs,302 detriment can occur in
two ways, namely blurring or tamishing.t'" This was also the view of Justice Pumfrey in
the DaimlerChrysler case304 and Justice Neuberger in Premier Brands.305
297 Carty (1997) 686. There can thus be uses that take advantage, but not necessarily unfair advantage.
See also Martino 109.
298 Martino (1996) 105.
299 Martino (1996) 105.
300 Martino (1996) 109-110.
301 Casey (June/July 2000) 14 submits that damage to reputation of the trade mark is sufficient for the
purposes of s 10(3). Damage to the goodwill accruing to a business is therefore not required.
302 Briggs (2000) 433.
303 It is submitted that the more appropriate term in the context is tamishment, as used in this dissertation.
304 DaimlerChrysler A.G. v Javid Alavi (t/a Mere), [2001] R.P.C. 813 at 842. He said that detriment can
either make the mark "less attractive" (tamishment) or "less distinctive" (blurring).
305 Premier Brands v Typhoon Europe Ltd., High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, 21 January 2000;
(2000) 23(5) !PD; [2000] F.S.R. 767 at 798.
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Justice Neuberger stated that an association between the two marks is a prerequisite for a
finding of detriment.ê'" In this case he found that in the minds of some consumers there
would be a degree of association between the mark and the sign, given the similarities
between TYPHOON and TY.PHOO and the result of a survey. He, however, found that
the association would only occur in below five percent of customers and would not be
particularly strong. According to the court, blurring occurs where the distinctiveness of a
mark is eroded or the uniqueness of the mark reduced. The public must make an
association between the two marks in such a way that they will not exclusively call to
mind the product of the plaintiff when they see his mark. On the facts of the case, Justice
Neuberger found that there had been no blurring.l'" He warned, however, against the
concept of dilution being applied to section 10(3). He said that "if the fact that a sign is
associated with a mark by a small but not insignificant proportion of members of the
public and only to a limited and verbal extent, is enough to amount to dilution of the
mark, then I consider that dilution is a concept which goes further than section 10(3)".
Briggs submits that "the English courts are going to be cautious in finding infringement
on the basis of blurring, particularly as this was imported into UK law in the 1994 Act for
the first time". 308
Examples of tarnishment can be found in the Claeryn/Klarein case where the Benelux
Court of Justice found infringement on the basis that detergents were an unattractive
association for gin.309 United Kingdom examples can be found in the VISA case and in
Premier Brands. In the VISA case310 Sheimer applied for the registration of VISA in
relation to condoms and contraceptives. Visa International, which has a registration for
306 Premier Brands v Typhoon Europe Ltd., [2000] F.S.R. 767 at 793-798.
307 Premier Brands v Typhoon Europe Ltd., [2000] F.S.R. 767 at 801-803. The judge referred to the
concept of dilution in the United States law and to the Quick judgment of the German Federal Supreme
Court, 1959 GRUR 182. He also found no tarnishment in this case after discussing the concept at 798-
801.
308 Briggs (2000) 434. Baloch (2001) 431 also refers to the "reluctance" of United Kingdom courts to
accept that s 10(3) supports a dilution by blurring claim. The Appointed Person in the VISA case,
Hobbs Q.C. (at 506), also preferred not to use the word dilution, describing it as "a word of uncertain
meaning" which may go further than the wording of the Act intends. Justice Pumfrey in
DaimlerChrysler found the dilution concept "somewhat fugitive" and Justice Neuberger also warned
against "applying it too blindly".
309 See Chapter 5.7.1.5 "Section 13(2)A of the Uniform Benelux Trade Marks Act" supra.
310 CA Sheimer (MJ SDN BHD's Trade Mark Application [2000] R.P.C. 484.
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VISA for financial services, objected. Hobbs Q.C. decided that Sheimer's use of the
word VISA would be detrimental to the distinctive character of Visa International's
earlier mark, as it carries connotations of birth control and sexual hygiene that would
alter perceptions of Visa International's mark as a provider of financial services
negatively."! In the Premier Brands case the argument was that some people would
associate the unattractive features inherent in the word Typhoon, namely connotations of
the destructive power of tropical cyclones, with the mark TY.PHOO.312 The judge
dismissed this argument, given the success of the TY.PHOO brand in the United
Kingdom. Daimlerf.hrysler'l ' also pleaded tarnishment of the high quality image of their
marks, as the defendant's sign, MERC, was heavily associated with "Mods, Skinheads
and casuals". Defendant's website also contained links to Skinhead sites which were
described as distasteful. This argument was rejected, as the judge did not think that
anyone would associate the MERC mark on the website with DaimlerChrysler's marks.
He said that for tarnishment one needs to show that the negative association "actually
rubs off on the sign MERC itself or on MERCEDES, or on DaimlerChrysler".
Martino also lists other uses that might be detrimental to a mark, namely generic use of a
trade mark314 and use ofa trade mark in parodles.i'"
(iv) "Reputation"
Except for the likelihood of association concept, the reputation criterion is the one most
likely to cause interpretation problems. In the Trademark Directive alone, three different
levels of reputation can be found in the words "distinctiveness", "reputation" and "well-
known". From the White Paper on the Reform of Trade Marks Law316 it was clear that
311 CA Sheimer (M) SDN BHD 's Trade Mark Application [2000] R.P.e. 484 at 505-506.
312 Premier Brands v Typhoon Europe Ltd., [2000] F.S.R. 767 at 798-801. This was almost the converse
argument to that in most other cases, where it was argued that the goods for which the allegedly
infringing sign were used, would tarnish the value of the registered marks. See also Chaudri (2000) 14;
Chaudri (2001) 36.
313 DaimlerChrysler A.G. v Javid Alavi (tla Mere), [2001] R.P.e. 813 at 842-844.
314 This includes use of a trade mark as the name of a genus of products as well as the use of a trade mark
in a dictionary, encyclopedia or other collective or reference work.
315 Martino (1996) 116.
316 Cm 1203; par 3.17 to 3.19.
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the United Kingdom Government intended to incorporate article 5(2) of the Trademark
Directive, as well as article 4(4)(a)_317 In both sections there are references to marks with
a reputation, but the White Paper refers to them as well-known marks. This may lead to
the conclusion that "reputation" in the corresponding sections of the United Kingdom
Trade Marks Act, has the same meaning as "well-known" as used in article 6bis of the
Paris Convention.318 Some people, however, argue that "reputation" involves something
less than "well-known", as used in article 6bis.319 Support for this argument can be found
in the various drafts of the Directive and also in the fact that "well-known" is used in
some other articles of the Directive.i'" There is another way in which to distinguish
between renown and repute. Renown focuses on the quantity of consumer knowledge,
while reputation apparently entails the commercial or advertising value of the mark.321
This means that even a mark with a low degree of renown, but with an attractive, strongly
associative image, can have a reputation.
If reputation then entails something less than fame or renown, it contemplates that in
theory dilution protection under the United Kingdom Act is much wider than in most of
Europe and the United States. Martino argues that reputation in section 10(3) can be
equated to distinctiveness.F' He then concludes that this means de facto distinctiveness;
in other words, section 10(3) does not extend to unused marks.
Reputation is a matter of fact. 323 To ascertain whether a trade mark has a reputation, one
must thus look at the relevant sector of the public and also take into account the
specialisation of the market.324 It is important to see whether the trade-mark owner has
added any value to the trade mark aside from registering it. The only way to do this is by
317 Martino (1996) 93.
318 Kamperman Sanders (1995) 72.
319 Davies (1998) 41-42 and fn 26, 158 and fn 58. Reputation would refer to the word "known" ("bekend"
in Dutch and Afrikaans).
320 See art. 4(2)( d) of the Directive, where there is a reference to trade marks which are well-known in the
sense of art. 6bis of the Paris Convention.
321 Carty (1997) 685. Renown in Germany, for example, requires that at least 70 to 80 percent of the
buying public must know the mark.
322 Martino (1996) 93-95.
323 Martino (1996) 93.
324 Davies (1998) 41-42; 158. See also Welkowitz (2000) 90.
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use of the mark as a trade mark. This can be measured by looking at the goodwill created
by the mark. The requirements for the existence of goodwill in passing-off cases can be
very useful to establish whether a mark has the reputation required under section 10(3) of
the Trademarks Act.325 Passing off is fundamentally concerned with reputation in the
sense of distinctiveness.Y" Thus, Martino argues, a mark can only become distinctive
and consequently have a reputation through use.327
Another question that comes to mind is how geographically widespread the reputation
must be. Section 10(3) states that the trade mark must have "a reputation in the United
Kingdom". The United Kingdom consists of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
According to section 108 this includes England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and
subject to certain exceptions also the Isle of Man.328 In CA Sheimer's Trade Mark
Application,329 the Appointed Person, Hobbs Q.e., accepted the ruling of the CJEC in the
General Motors case330 on "reputation" as the law on this subject. The CJEC decided
that the requirement of "reputation" calls for a reputation amongst a "significant part of
the public concerned by the products or services" covered by the earlier trade mark "in a
substantial part of the territory" of the Member State.
Martino also concludes that registration In terms of the Act bestows the necessary
proprietary right, thus requiring neither a business in the United Kingdom nor
goodwill. 33l
325 Kamperman Sanders (1995) 74.
326 Martino (1996) 93.
327 Martino (1996) 93-94. This is a radical departure from prior statutory law, which merely required
registration to qualify for relief.
328 Martino (1996) 101.
329 CA Sheimer (Mj SDN BHD's Trade Mark Application [2000] R.P.C. 484 at 504.
330 Case C-375/97, General Motors Corp. v Yplon SA, [1998] E.C.R. 1-5421; [2000] R.P.C. 572 at 578.
See Chapter 5.8.2 "The Interpretation of Article 5(2)" infra.
331 Martino (1996) 102.
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(v) "Distinctive Character or Repute"
Nothing new is added to the subsection by these words, as "distinctive character" is a
prerequisite for a mark to be registered as a trade mark. Only registered marks are
protected by section 10(3). This phrase presumably covers invented or arbitrary marks,
as well as marks that gained distinctiveness through a secondary meaning.332
Martino states that what precisely is meant by "repute" "is anyone's guess". He suggests
that it means that the mark must be factually distinctive. It appears, in his view, to denote
"perceived high quality". 333
5.7.2.6 COMPARATIVE ADVERTISING IN THE UK
Comparative advertising is advertising or promotion that in some way, either explicitly or
by implication, refers to or identifies a competitor or their product or services.
Comparative advertising can be to the advantage of the public, as it can help them to
make more rational choices and at the same time stimulates competition. But in cases of
serious misinformation or false disparagement trade-mark law should offer protection.
This is the traditional common-law approach.t'"
Comparative advertising in the United Kingdom+" IS statutorily addressed In section
10(6) of the 1994 Act:
(6) "Nothing in the preceding provisions of this section shall be construed as preventing the use
of a registered trade mark by any person for the purpose of identifying goods or services as
those of the proprietor or a licensee.
JJ2 Martino (1996) 120.
JJJ Martino (1996) 120.
334 Compare Carty (2002) 294-300.
335 In the United States of America, the Federal Trademark Dilution Act specifically exempts truthful
comparative advertising from the dilution law. See Chapter 4.7.3 "Exceptions to Liability under the
Act" supra. The European Union has also issued a Directive on Comparative Advertising 97/55/EC
(amending Directive 84/450/EEC). See Welkowitz (2000) 92 fn 155 for a short outline of the relevant
articles of the Directive.
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But any such use otherwise than in accordance with honest practices in industrial or
commercial matters shall be treated as infringing the registered trade mark if the use without
due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of
the trade mark."!"
This section thus permits the use of a registered trade mark in advertising material to
identify a competing product as long as the use is in accordance "with honest practices in
industrial or commercial matters". If the use, however, is "without due cause and takes
unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the trade
mark", there will be infringement of the trade mark.
Although the first sentence thus appears to provide a general exemption for comparative
advertising, much of this protection is removed by the second sentence.337 According to
Welkowitz, it apparently eliminates the right to use a mark in comparative advertising if
it is used contrary to "honest practices in industrial or commercial matters" and the use
"takes unfair advantage of' or is "detrimental to the distinctive character or repute of the
trade mark". The last part of this section corresponds to section 10(3), the apparent
dilution provision. Thus, diluting uses of a mark in comparative advertising will be
allowed if the use was honest, but if dishonest will subject the user to an infringement
claim. It is not clear what the legislature intended with the phrase "honest practices" and
the scope of this exemption in practice remains to be seen.
Carty338 pleads for a broad approach in line with the Directive and section 10(6). Any
use that is not "honest", including use which in effect dilutes the mark should be
prevented. This is also in line with the modem function of trade marks as advertising or
promotional tools, "assets in their own right", as she calls them. Thus only truthful and
informative advertising that draws on a comparison should be allowed.
336 This section is not derived from the Directive referred to in the previous footnote.
337 See Welkowitz (2000) 91 for the interpretation of s 10(6).
338 Carty (2002) 297-299.
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5.7.2.7 LOOKALIKES IN THE UK
Lookalike products normally not only concern the trade mark, but the whole trade dress,
which is the overall visual appearance of the product.r" Two types of lookalike products
are normally found in the market, namely products put on the market by rival
manufacturers and retailers' own-brand lookalikes. The single purpose of putting a
lookalike on the market is mostly to trade on the reputation of the well-known trade
dress.34o The signs used are usually slightly different from the registered marks. Only
certain images are taken and used together with retailers' own logos or names, or both.341
Thus, although there are differences in appearance the distinctive character and overall
combination of the unique appearance of the original product, normally the brand leader,
are in most cases slavishly copied.342 Still there is most often no confusion with the
genuine product. However, because of their similarity the public buy the lookalike
products on the assumption that they will have the same properties as the genuine goods.
The association made by the public dilutes the integrity of the genuine marks343 and
damages the distinctiveness and commercial magnetism of the famous trade dress. This
loss of distinctiveness is permanent and irretrievable.
Passing off is the form of action most often relied upon in connection with 100kalikes.344
This protection is, however, inadequate and even rendered meaningless, because of the
requirement of relevant confusion.I" the cost and unpredictability of the action, difficulty
to prove reputation and damage and fear of retaliation by the offending retailers against
339 Mostert FW "Famous Trade Dress: Dilution on Competing Products" (March 1997) Trademark World
20.
340 Mostert (1997) 24.
341 Annand (1996) 155 describes these own-brand lookalikes as "sly copies of brand leaders".
342 See Mostert (1997) 2l.
343 Johnson C "Case Comment: European Court of Justice: Marca Mode v Adidas: A Trademark
Loophole" (August 2000) Trademark World 6.
344 See the Jij Lemon case: Reckitt & Colman Products Ltd. v Borden Inc., [1990] R.P.e. 341, where the
passing-off claim was upheld on the basis of a likelihood of confusion.
345 Mostert (1997) 22. "The traditional touchstone of liability in trademark and trade dress cases,
likelihood of confusion, may have become inadequate to provide an appropriate level of sufficient
protection with the passage of time."
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the aggrieved party's product(s).346 Campaigns for the inclusion in the 1994 Act of
specific protection against lookalikes, were rejected.347
Mostert is strongly of the view that the traditional likelihood of confusion standard has
become insufficient to protect the distinctiveness and commercial magnetism of famous
trade dress. As the dilution action basically protects the distinctiveness and commercial
magnetism of a trade mark, he sees it as the most appropriate means of protecting trade
dress in lookalike cases.348 He is in favour of recognising a dilution action in respect of
competing goods as this is in keeping with the reality of the marketplace. He says that "a
famous mark can be as detrimentally affected by damage to its distinctiveness and
commercial magnetism on competing products as it may be on non-competing goods or
services".349
The only relevant infringement provision in the 1994 Trademarks Act is section 10(2)(b),
as lookalikes by definition involve the use of a similar mark on the same or similar
goods. The widest interpretation of similarity is necessary to have effective trade-mark
protection against own-brand lookalikes. As there is rarely confusion between the
lookalike products, the interpretation given to "likelihood of association" in the
Wagamama case as requiring origin-based confusion, led to the situation that brand
owners have no statutory protection against such use of their trade marks.35o But if the
judgments of the CJEC in Davidoffv Gojkid and Adidas v Fitnessworld351 are accepted as
law in the UK, which will probably happen as the United Kingdom has no choice,
protection against lookalikes will fall under section 10(3).
346 Annand (1996) 161, 167, 172.
347 Annand (1996) 143.
348 Mostert (1997) 20, 22-23.
349 Mostert (1997) 23. See also Sunbeam Products Inc. v. West Beach Co., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545 (S.D.
Miss. 1996) and Clinique Laboratories Inc. v. DEP Corporation d/b/a Basique Labs Inc., (S.D.N.Y.
1996), two US cases dealing with the dilution of famous trade dress on competing products.
350 See also Mostert (1997) 25.
351 Case C-292/00, Davidoff & Cie and Zino Davidoff SA v Gojkid Ltd, 9 January 2003; Case C-408/01,
Adidas-Salomon A.G., formerly Adidas A.G., Adidas Benelux B. V v Fitnessworld Trading Ltd, 23
October 2003. See further Chapter 5.7.2.4 "Cases on Section 10(3)" supra and Chapter 5.8.2 "The
Interpretation of Article 5(2)" infra.
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5.8 JUDGMENTS OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES (CJEC)
5.8.1 THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 4(1)(b) AND 5(1)(b)
The interpretation of article 5( I)(b)352 of the European Directive led to much debate. Its
wording is regarded as illogical because the likelihood of association, which is a broader
concept than likelihood of confusion, is referred to as being contained within the concept
of likelihood of confusion.Y' It was believed that, given the background to the inclusion
of this wording in the Directive, the Benelux interpretation would be relevant.354 As seen
above, the English Chancery Division in the Wagamama case refused to accept that
likelihood of association could be present where there is no confusion as to origin. The
interpretation of this phrase by the CJEC would therefore be very important and it was
hoped that the CffiC would resolve the debate in European law as to what "likelihood of
association" means.355 The CJEC, as will be seen, has decided not to apply the concept
as broadly as the Benelux Court tends to do.356
In the case of SABEL B. V v Puma A.G.357 the CffiC was asked by the German Federal
Court of Justice to interpret the phrase "likelihood of association". It was seen as an
attempt to establish a uniform interpretation of the notions of similarity and likelihood of
confusion within the meaning of the Directive.358 The Directive was implemented in
352 See Chapter 5.5.3 "Dilution Provisions" supra for the wording of art. 5 of the Directive. A similar
provision is found in art. 4( I)(b), which deals with refusal of registration of a trade mark by reason of a
prior registration. Art. 5( 1)(b) describes the exclusive rights of a registered trade-mark owner. The
CffiC stated in the Adidas case, discussed infra in this section, that its interpretation of art. 4(1 )(b) also
applies to art. 5( 1)(b).
353 Davies (1998) 5. Schmidt (2002) 463 finds it "logical enough", as it means that something more is
needed to establish "likelihood of confusion" than "likelihood of association" in the strict sense. He
believes that the mere association of two marks cannot in itself constitute infringement.
354 See Chapter 5.5.4 "Influence of the Benelux Law" supra.
355 The concept of "association" is subjective, meaning that every consumer associates different things with
each other. See Schmidt (2002) 463.
356 Schmidt (2002) 463.
357 Case C-251195, SABEL B. V. v Puma A.G., Rudolf Dassier Sport [1997] E.C.R. 1-6191; [1998] E.T.M.R.
1. (Judgment of 11 November 1997). See also Davies (1998) 580-582 for a discussion of the case.
358 Morgan R "Recent Trademark Decisions of the European Court of Justice" (May/June 1998)
Trademark World 42 at 45. .
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Germany by the Gesetz uber den Schutz von Marken und sonstigen Kennzeichen'Ï' in
1994. Although the case particularly concerned article 4(l)(b) of the Directive (section
9(1)(2) of the German Act) stating the grounds for refusal or invalidity ofa registration, it
makes no difference as it contains the same wording as article 5(1)(b) dealing with rights
conferred by a trade mark.36o
The facts of the case were as follows. PUMA was the registered owner in Germany of
two trade marks for, inter alia, leather and imitation leather goods and clothes, consisting
of device marks of the silhouettes of, respectively, a bounding puma and a leaping puma.
SABEL, a Dutch company, then applied for the registration of their trade mark in
Germany. Their trade mark consisted of a spotted cat-like animal, probably a cheetah,
also bounding towards the right, with the word "SABEL" written underneath. The
application was in a number of classes, but included both the classes for leather products
and clothing. PUMA naturally opposed SABEL's application. The German Patent
Office (Deutsches Patentamt) concluded that there was no similarity between the two
marks and thus rejected the objection. PUMA appealed to the German Federal Patent
Court (Bundespatentgericht), where it was held that there was a resemblance between the
two marks and that the goods were also identical or similar. SABEL then appealed to the
Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshoj), which provisionally ruled that there was no
risk of confusion between the two rnarks.l'"
The court applied the following criteria, being established principles of German trade-
mark law, in order to reach their decision: The court must focus on the overall impression
of the signs. Although it is possible to take particular distinctive characters into account,
it is not permissible to isolate an element of the signs or marks. The more distinctive the
character of the mark, the greater the likelihood of confusion. Strict criteria must be
359 Law on the Protection of Trade Marks and Other Signs of 25 October 1994 (BOB1 I, p3082) art.
4(1)(b).
360 Essentially identical provisions are found in art. 8(1)(b) and art. 9( 1)(b) of Council Regulation (EC)
N040/94 of20 December 1993 on the Community Trade Mark (OJ 1994 L Il, pl),
361 Case C-251195, SABEL B. V v Puma A.G., Rudolf Dassier Sport [1997] E.C.R. 1-6191; [1998] E.T.M.R.
1. (Judgment of 11 November 1997) par 4-5.
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applied with respect to the likelihood of confusion between pictorial components, which
are basically descriptive and have little imaginative content.362
The court, however, decided to stay the proceedings and referred the following two
questions to the CJEC for a preliminary ruling in order to establish a uniform
interpretation of the European Directive:
1. "[I]s it sufficient for a finding that there is a likelihood of confusion between a sign
composed of text and picture and a sign consisting merely of a picture, which is registered
for identical and similar goods and is not especially well known to the public, that the two
signs coincide as to their semantic content (in this case, a bounding feline)?
2. What is the significance in this connection of the wording of the Directive, in terms of which
the likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood that a mark may be associated with an
earlier mark?,,363
The questions were interpreted by the court as to be whether the mere association, which
the public might make between the two marks, can be a sufficient ground for concluding
that there exists a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of the relevant provision.
Advocate General FG Jacobs came to the following conclusion in his Opinion, presented
to the court.364 The likelihood of association with an earlier mark is afactor to be taken
into account, but registration of a mark cannot be refused unless "it is established that
there is a genuine and properly substantiated likelihood of confusion about the origin of
the goods ... ".365 The mere fact that the one mark will bring the other to mind and that
the public will thus associate the two marks, is not enough reason to refuse a registration.
The idea behind a trade mark can, therefore only be protected, according to the Advocate-
362Par 6 of the SABEL case.
363Par 100f the SABEL case.
364Opinion of the AG in Case C-251195, SABEL B. V v Puma A.G. at the sitting of the Full Court on 29
April 1997, [1997] E.T.M.R. 283. According to Carboni A "Confusion Clarified" (1998) 3 European
Intellectual Property Review 108, he relied, inter alia, on the Wagamama decision discussed in Chapter
5.7.2.3 "Cases on Section 10(2)" supra for this conclusion.
365Emphasis added.
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General, if a likelihood of confusion about the origin can be established.
The Benelux countries, as expected, claimed in their submissions that the term
"likelihood of association" must be construed in the same manner as article 13A of the
Uniform Benelux Law on Trade Marks, as this phrase was included in the Directive on
their initiative. That would mean that the court must use the concept of resemblance
between marks. A resemblance is found if there is aurally, visually or conceptually a
similarity between a mark and a sign such as to establish an association between them.366
In the SABEL judgment the court referred to the Benelux interpretation of "likelihood of
association" which can arise in three different situations:
1. Likelihood of direct association, where the public confuses the sign and the mark
in question;
2. Likelihood of indirect confusion or association, where the public will not confuse
the mark and the sign as such, but makes a connectiorr " between the proprietors
of the sign and those of the mark and confuses them; and
3. Likelihood of association in the strict sense, where the public considers,
sometimes subconsciously, the sign to be similar to the mark and their perception
of the sign calls to mind the memory of the mark, although the two are not
confused. 368
It is this last situation, which is accepted as a likelihood of association by the Benelux
Court of Justice, which posed a problem for the CJEC. The Court, like the Wagamama
court, ruled against this possibility and thus a broad reading of the provision. It stated
that "likelihood of confusion" and "likelihood of association" in article 4(1)(b) are not
366 See Jullien v Verschuere Case A 82/520 May 1983, Jur.1983 vol IV 36 and discussion of the Benelux
law in Chapter 5.7.1.3 '''Likelihood of Association' in the Benelux Law" supra. See also Carboni
(1998) 108; Norman (1998) 310.
367 Gielen (1996 TW) 22 describes this connection as some kind of relationship, such as a licence, a
merchandising or franchising agreement or a relation of sponsorship.
368 Case C-251/95, SABEL BY v Puma A.G., Rudolf Dassier Sport [1997] E.C.R. 1-6191; [1998] E.T.M.R.
1. (Judgment of II November 1997) par 16 (emphasis added). See also Gielen (1996 TW) 21-22;
Carboni (1998) 108.
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drafted in the alternative. Likelihood of association just served to define the scope of the
likelihood of confusion and therefore likelihood of confusion is indispensable. The court
did not however explain the way in which the scope of the likelihood of confusion is
defined.369 They merely found that "(tjhe terms of the provision itself exclude its
application where there is no likelihood of confusion on the part of the public".37o This
refers to confusion as to origin. The Benelux concept of non-origin association in
interpreting confusion was rejected."!
The CJEC on the other hand, did indicate that the concept of confusion itself might be
broadly interpreted. The court referred to the tenth recital in the Preamble to the
Directive372 from which it is clear that the appreciation of the likelihood of confusion
rested on various factors and must be appreciated globally.373 The court then noted that
the perception in the mind of the average consumer of the type of goods or services in
question plays a decisive role in the global appreciation of a mark. The average
consumer will normally look at the mark as a whole and pay less attention to its various
details. With regard to the distinctiveness of a mark, the court then stated that the more
distinctive the earlier mark, the greater the likelihood of confusion.Ï" Thus, more well-
known marks deserve stronger protection. On this point it then ruled that as the PUMA
mark is not especially well known to the public and the image has little imaginative
content, there is on that ground also not a possibility of confusion.Ï"
369 Gielen (1998) 109. ,
370 Case C-251/95, SABEL B. V v Puma A.G., Rudolf Dassier Sport [1997] E.C.R. 1-6191; [1998] E.T.M.R.
I.(Judgment of II November 1997) par 18.
371 It was also rejected by Advocate-General Jacobs in his Opinion on this case. See also Briggs (2000)
430; Welkowitz (2000) 80.
372 "[W]hereas the likelihood of confusion, the appreciation of which depends on numerous elements and,
in particular, on the recognition of the trade mark on the market, of the association which can be made
with the used or registered sign, of the degree of similarity between the trade mark and the sign and
between the goods or services identified, constitutes the specific condition for such protection ... ".
373 This was in sharp contrast with the stage-by-stage approach followed by the English courts in the Treat
case and also in Baywateh. See Chapter 5.7.2.3 "Cases on Section 10(2)" supra. See further Davies
(1998) 7; Carboni (1998) 109; Briggs (2000) 430.
374 This was also a well-established rule in Benelux law, but the UK courts warned against it in the Treat
case. See Gielen (1998) 110; Brigs (2000) 430; Welkowitz (2000) 80.
375 Case C-251/95, SABEL B. V v Puma A.G., Rudolf Dassier Sport [1997] E.C.R. 1-6191; [1998] E.T.M.R.
I. (Judgment of Il November 1997) par 24,25. The CJEC relied on the German court's finding of fact
that the PUMA mark was not particularly strong. See Norman (1998) 311.
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The CJEC also concluded that its interpretation of article 4(l)(b) is not inconsistent with
articles 4(3), 4(4)(a) and 5(2) of the Directive.Ï" This last statement might be
controversial. Where the registered mark has a reputation and the marks and or goods are
identical or similar, confusion as to origin is a requirement in terms of article 5(1)(b), as
interpreted, but if the gootïs are dissimilar, the action can be based on section 5(2) and
confusion is not a requirement. The CJEC states that there is no contlict, because the
mentioned articles give the proprietor of a mark with a reputation protection against the
use of an identical or similar mark, even when there is no similarity between the goods.
According to Davies this suggests that dilution can also apply under these articles where
the goods are similar, but the word "even" is not included in the wording of the UK Act
or the Directive, which makes this interpretation unlikely. Gielen, though, sees this
remark of the Court as an indication that the CJEC would probably afford protection
against dilution in a case of a reputed mark if an identical sign is used for similar goods
or services.377 From other judgments of the CJEC it can also be seen that the court feels
strongly about the protection of the reputation of a trade mark against detriment. 378
The CJEC in the SABEL case proceeded to answer the questions of the Bundesgerichtshof
by stating in summary that "the mere association which the public might make between
two trade marks as a result of their analogous semantic content is not in itself a sufficient
ground for concluding that there is likelihood of confusion within the meaning of that
provision".379 This conclusion is then against the background that the PUMA mark does
not have any distinguishing power. According to Gielen, given the facts, this would
376 Par 20, 21 of the SABEL case.
377 Davies (1998) 583; Gielen (1998) Ill. See Case C-292/00, Davidoff & eie and Zino Davidoff SA v
Gojkid Ltd., 9 January 2003 (unreported), discussed in Chapter 5.8.2 "The Interpretation of Article
5(2)" infra.
378 Case C-337/95, Dior v Evora and Case C-349/95, Loendersloot v Ballantine, quoted by Gielen (1998)
II O. Both cases dealt with the exhaustion rule and thus concerned identical goods. See Chapter 2.1
"Origin or Source Function" and especially fn 51 and accompanying text supra for a description of the
exhaustion rule.
379 Case C-251195, SABEL B. V v Puma A.G., Rudolf Dassier Sport [1997] E.C.R. 1-6191; [1998] E.T.M.R.
1. (Judgment of Il November 1997) par 26. See also Vuk (1998) 864-865 fn 16; Casey (May 2000)
24.
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probably also has been the finding of the BCJ.38o
The CJEC's interpretation of the concept of "likelihood of association" is therefore that it
forms part of the likelihood of confusion. Mere association is not a criterion for
infringement.Y' However, the concept of likelihood of confusion can be seen as a broad
one. The CJEC did not follow the very narrow interpretation of Justice Laddie In
Wagamama and Advocate-General Jacobs, which both referred to confusion as to
origin.382 Their interpretation goes beyond this traditional view and even leaves room to
take into account other functions of a trade mark.383 This acceptance of a broader
concept of confusion can be seen in the fact that the court makes no reference to origin
and also does not mention direct or indirect confusion.Y" The similarity between the
marks mainly depends on their appearance, but there can also sometimes be phonetic
similarity in which case the pronunciation in all languages in the Union must be taken
into account. To judge the similarity of the goods, the following factors may be relevant:
the sources of production, the sales and distribution channels, the market and customers,
as well as the use and interchangeability of the products. The likelihood of confusion
must thus be appreciated globally, taking into account all factors relevant to the specific
case. This seems to be in line with the famous judgment of the BCJ in the Union Soleure
case.385
According to Davies386 the ruling of the court was less clear than was hoped for. This
notion is also echoed by Norman,387 who sees the case as a disappointment, in the sense
of what was left unsaid. The court, for example, did not comment on whether the
380 Gielen (1998) 110.
381 See Gielen (1998) 110 who indicated that mere association was also not sufficient under the Benelux
law, as other circumstances of the case, such as the distinctive power, meaning the repute of the mark,
must also be taken into account.
382 Gielen (1998) 109.
383 Davies (1998) 41,153.
384 According to Norman (1998) 311 the court "does not say that likelihood of confusion means only origin
confusion".
385 See Gielen (1998) 110 and also the discussion of the Benelux law in Chapter 5.7.1.3 "'Likelihood of
Association' in the Benelux Law" supra.
386 Davies (1998) 7.
387 Norman (1998) 306, 311-312.
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Benelux law is in line with the Directive or not. These weaknesses will definitely hamper
the Union's plans for harmonisation.rf As the decision lends credibility to both the
Benelux and UK view, different countries can interpret the judgment differently in a
manner consistent with their own view as to the functions of a trade mark. This could
lead to the situation where the United Kingdom continues to use the test formulated in
British Sugar v James Robertson for section 10(2) cases, while the German courts, as
well as the Benelux courts, would follow the global approach to similarity formulated in
the SABEL case.389 The UK courts, however, in the Pfizer case also turned to the global
.. 390appreciatron test.
Carboni sees the outcome of the case as a victory for the United Kingdom.I" but also
noted at the same time that the court left the door open for owners of famous or otherwise
very distinctive marks to obtain protection under this provision. Gielen seems to be even
more positive and sees this case as offering quite a few starting points for the future
protection of trade marks.392 His summary of the judgment is that mere conceptual
similarity will not be enough to find likelihood of confusion in the case of less reputed
marks, but that the court left room for far-reaching protection of reputed marks.393 This
he views as "a fair protection of trade marks".
The next significant case before the CJEC on this subject was Canon v Pathe.394 The
case concerned the use of the mark CANON on video film recorders compared to the use
of the sign CANNON on video film cassettes. The German court assumed that the mark
388 As explained in Chapter 5.4.2 "Composition and Functions" supra, the role of the CffiC is to give
guidance as to the interpretation of the Treaty, but it is then left to the national court to apply such an
interpretation to the specific case before it. The CffiC did, therefore, not act in breach of its
responsibilities.
389 Norman (1998) 312. The British Sugar (or Treat) case is discussed in Chapter 5.7.2.3 "Cases on
Section 10(2)" supra.
390 Also discussed in Chapter 5.7.2.3 "Cases on Section 10(2)" supra.
391 Carboni (1998) 109. Norman (1998) 311 also noted that this seems to be the first impression that one
gets from the case.
392 Gielen (1998) 109, 111.
393 Gielen (1998) 109, Ill. See also the conclusion of Norman (1998) 311.
394 Case C-39/97, Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. (Formerly Pathe
Communications Corporation) [1998] E.C.R. 1-5507; [1999] R.P.C. 117. Like the SABEL case, this
was also an opposition case, but the issues are analogous to s 10(2) of the UK Act.
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and the sign were identical, but that the goods were not identical. The question before the
German court was whether the goods were similar. The question referred to the effie
was whether in assessing similarity of goods, account should be taken of the distinctive
character of the mark.
The opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs was that the distinctiveness and reputation of an
earlier mark can be taken into account in determining whether goods or services are
similar. He further said that the more well-known a trade mark, the more likely it is that
consumers might be confused into believing that there is a connection in trade between
the goods and services which bear the same or similar mark.395 Thus the likelihood of
confusion should be taken into account when considering whether the goods or services
are similar, rather than judging these two elements separately.
The court followed the Advocate-General's opinion and confirmed its ruling in the
SABEL case as regards the interpretation of article 4(l)(b).396 The court further decided
that the distinctive character of the mark, and in particular its reputation, must be taken
into account when determining whether similarity between goods covered by the two
trade marks is sufficient to give rise to the likelihood of confusion.i'" Thus, the court
here again used the single test of "global appreciation", in sharp contrast to the triple test
of Justice Jacob in the Treat and Baywatch decisions.i'" The court confirmed that even
where there was a lesser degree of similarity between the marks, there could still be
confusion of the public if the earlier mark has a reputation. Thus the stronger the
reputation, the wider the ambit of protection will be.399 The court also confirmed the
interdependence of all the relevant factors. Accordingly, a lesser degree of similarity
between the goods may be offset by a greater degree of similarity between the marks, and
vice versa.400
395 See Montagnon (1998) 401.
396 Turner-Kerr (2001) 49; Montagnon (1998) 401; Welkowitz (2000) 80 fn 79.
397 The court cited with approval the decision in the SABEL case and also the tenth Recital to the Directive,
quoted supra in the SABEL case.
398 Discussed in Chapter 5.7.2.3 "Cases on Section 10(2)" supra.
399 Montagnon (1998) 401.
400 In this regard the CffiC, like Jacob J in British Sugar, referred to the tenth Recital of the Preamble of
the Trademark Directive to support their position.
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According to Casparie-Kerdel the cases discussed above "may have appeared to embrace
a vague notion of dilution". She infers this from the fact that the courts recognised that
marks with a greater distinctiveness and repute, should be given a broader scope of
protection, as this is at the basis of the dilution theory. But the Adidas case, according to
her, confirmed that "confusion is still at the heart of the action of articles 4 and 5 where
similar goods are concerned'V''" Another perspective on the "dissimilar goods"
provisions is that the more restrictive the approach of a country towards determining
similarity, the more restrictive the approach to the "dilution" requirements will be.402
Although some "softening of the hard-line approach" of Justice Jacob in British Sugar is
to be welcomed, a point of criticism against this test of global appreciation as applied in
the Canon case, is that there will be little certainty or harmonisation between the member
states. As the test of similarity is linked to evidence of confusion or its likelihood,
variation in what is considered as similar goods and therefore as registrable or
enforceable could develop.Ï"
In Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co GmbH v Klijsen Handel ByA°4 the question before the
CJEC was whether it is sufficient for there to be a likelihood of confusion based solely on
the aural similarity between the mark LOINT's and LLOYD, both used on shoes. Here
again, based on its SABEL and Canon decisions, the court said that the likelihood of
confusion must be appreciated globally taking into account all factors relevant to the
circumstances of the case. A lesser degree of similarity between the goods may be offset
by a greater degree of similarity between the marks and vice versa.405 The court referred
in this context to the tenth recital in the preamble to the Directive. Furthermore, the more
distinctive the earlier mark, the greater will be the likelihood of confusion. Thus, there
401 Casparie-Kerdel (2001) 192. Case C-425/98, Marea Mode C. V v Adidas A.G. and Adidas Benelux
B. V, [2000] E.C.R. 1-4861. (Judgment of22 June 2000).
402 Montagnon (1998) 403.
403 Montagnon (1998) 403, 404. She founds Jacob's approach, "although extremely strict", much more
practical.
404 Case C-342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co GmbH v Klijsen Handel B. V [1999] E.C.R. 1-3819;
[1999] E.T.M.R. 690.
405 Par 17-21 of the Lloyd Schuhfabrik case.
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may be a likelihood of confusion, notwithstanding a lesser degree of similarity between
the marks, where the goods covered by them are very similar and the earlier mark is
highly distinctive. The court came to the conclusion that it is possible that mere aural
similarity between the trade marks may create a likelihood of confusion within the
meaning of article 5(1 )(b ).406
The CJEC yet again ruled on the issue of confusion in Marca Mode CV v Adidas AG and
Adidas Benelux BI.407 Some of the statements made by the court in SABEL were
explained in more detail and put in context. The case was referred to the CJEC by the
Dutch Court. Marca started to sell T-shirts in its sports clothes collection, with three
black vertical stripes running parallel down the entire front of the garments. On some
garments it is broken by a medallion comprising a cat and the word TIM. Also a number
of items bore two parallel stripes running longitudinally on the sides. Adidas, owner of a
registered figurative mark comprising three parallel stripes for sports clothes and articles
connected with sport, objected and sought interim relief to restrain Marca Mode from
using the signs. The products can thus be classified as lookalike products.l'" The
Regional Court of Appeal upheld and confirmed Adidas's application. Marca Mode
appealed to the Supreme Court of the Netherlands, relying on the SABEL judgment of the
CJEC.
The Supreme Court upheld the Regional Court of Appeal's decision. It held that where
the risk of confusion could not be excluded because a mark had a particularly distinctive
character, either per se or because of the reputation it enjoyed with the public, there may
be justifiable reasons for concluding that a finding of a risk of association may be
sufficient to justify a prohibition on the use of the signs in question.409 The Regional
406 Par 28 of the Lloyd Schuhfabrik case. The role of the CJEC is limited to providing the national court
with the guidance on interpretation necessary to resolve the case before it. The national court must
apply the rules of Community law, as interpreted by the CJEC to the facts of the case under
consideration. It follows that the national court must rule on the question whether there exists between
the two marks at issue a likelihood of confusion within the meaning of the Directive. See par Il of the
Lloyd Schuhfabrik case.
407 Case C-425/98, Marca Mode C. V. v Adidas A.G. and Adidas Benelux B. v., [2000] E.C.R. 1-4861.
(Judgment of 22 June 2000) See further the discussion of this case by Turner-Kerr (2001) 49-51.
408 Johnson (2000) 8. See also discussion in Chapter 5.7.2.7 "Lookalikes in the UK" supra.
409 Turner-Kerr (2001) 50; Welkowitz (2000) 80-81.
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Court found that there was a possibility of association between the mark and the sign and
that Adidas's mark had a reputation. The Supreme Court held that this possibility of
association might give rise to confusion.
For clarification of the interpretation of article 5(1)(b) the Supreme Court referred a
question to the CIEC. The question, in short, was whether, in the case of an especially
strong mark, if the risk of association was such that the likelihood of confusion "cannot
be ruled out", was article 5(1)(b) then contravened'F''"
Advocate-General Jacobs stated in his opinion"! I that, according to earlier judgments, the
distinctive character of the earlier mark must be taken into account when assessing
confusion. This has the result that the more well-known the mark, the greater the
protection. Distinctive or well-known marks thus enjoy greater protection than less well-
known marks. He however declared that there must be a "genuine and properly
substantiated risk of confusion" before protection should be granted in terms of article
5(1)(b).412 He gave the following two policy reasons for rejecting the Supreme Court's
judgment. Firstly, interference with the free-trade principle of the EC treaty, and
secondly, the essential function of a trade mark, namely to distinguish the origin of
goods.
The CIEC followed the opinion of the Advocate-General. The court said that "likelihood
of association" was not an alternative to "likelihood of confusion", but served to define
the scope of the latter concept.l':' As in the SABEL and Canon cases, the Court noted that
the likelihood of confusion must be appreciated globally, taking into account all relevant
factors. The distinctive character of the earlier mark may thus increase the likelihood of
confusion and the conceptual similarity between the mark and the sign may contribute to
the creation of such a likelihood, but it "in no way implies a presumption of likelihood of
410 Put in other words, if answered positively, it would mean that the likelihood of association means that a
likelihood of confusion is assumed.
411 Opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs delivered on 27 January 2000.
412 Thus following the interpretation of the SABEL and Canon cases.
413 Case C-425/98, Marea Mode C. V v Adidas A.G. and Adidas Benelux B. V, [2000] E.C.R.1-4861 par 34.
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confusion resulting from the existence of a likelihood of association in the strict
sense"."!" The Court's answer to the question posed, is that the reputation of the mark
did not give grounds for presuming the existence of a likelihood of confusion simply
because of the existence of a likelihood of association.i"
The CJEC in the Adidas case therefore rejected the approach of the Benelux case law that
the mere association between marks is sufficient for a finding of a likelihood of confusion
in terms of the equivalent to article 5(l)(b). Likelihood of confusion can thus never be
assumed. It must always be proved using the global appreciation test.
A loophole thus arises. When a third party uses the same or a similar sign on the same or
similar goods and no likelihood of confusion can be proved, there is no protection under
either article 5(1)(b) or article 5(2).416 This situation was only to change through the
2003 decisions on article 5(2) in Davidoff v Gojkid and Adidas v Fitnessworld. 417
5.8.2 THE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 5(2)
The CJEC has only recently interpreted article 5(2) of the Trademark Directive in the
cases of Davidoff & eie and Zino Davidoff SA v Gojkid ur" and Adidas v
Fitnessworld.419 Formerly, the Court has made some obiter remarks on this section. In
SABEL420 and Marca Mode v Adidas421 the CJEC stated that article 5(2) did not require
the existence of a likelihood of confusion.
414 Par 39 of the Marca Mode case.
415 Par 42 of the Marca Mode case. Turner-Kerr (2001) 50; Welkowitz (2000) 82.
416 Johnson (2000) 6.
417 Cases discussed in Chapter 5.8.2 "The Interpretation of Article 5(2)" infra.
418 Case C-292/00, Davidoff & eie and Zino Davidoff SA v Gofkid Ltd., 9 January 2003.
419 Case C-408/01, Adidas-Salomon A.G., formerly Adidas A.G., Adidas Benelux B.V v Fitnessworld
Trading Ltd., 23 October 2003.
420 Case C-251/95, SABEL BY v Puma A.G., Rudolf DassIer Sport [1997] E.C.R. 1-6191; [1998] E.T.M.R.
1. (Judgment of 11 November 1997) par 20.
421 Case C-425/98, Marca Mode C. V v Adidas A.G. and Adidas Benelux BY, [2000] E.C.R. 1-4861.
(Judgment of22 June 2000).
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Schmidt submits that although a likelihood of confusion need not to be proved under
article 5(2), "some signs of its existence" must be there to show "unfair advantage". In
his view, one can only take "unfair advantage" of another trade mark if "one causes a part
of the public to associate the two trademarks with each other, make a connection between
the two marks to such a degree that the public is puzzled of the origin or simply mistake
one brand with another".422 Furthermore he suggests that the term "unfair advantage"
should be interpreted narrowly and with caution in order not to take the protection of
marks with a reputation too far.423
In the case of Adidas v FitnessworZd'24 the CJEC gave clarity on the question of
confusion in article 5(2). One of the questions referred by the Hoge Raad der
Nederlanden to the CJEC in this case was basically whether a likelihood of confusion
was necessary for a finding of a sufficient degree of similarity between the mark and the
sign. The court first stated that article 5(2) does not require the existence of a likelihood
of confusion. With reference to the Lloyd case,425 the court repeated that "elements of
visual, aural or conceptual similarity" are necessary for a finding of a degree of similarity
between the mark and the sign. What is needed is that "the relevant section of the public
makes a connection" between the mark and the sign or put in other words "establishes a
link between them even though it does not confuse them". The court then said that this
"link" must also be appreciated globally taking into account all factors relevant to the
circumstances of the case.
The CJEC was also asked if the fact that the sign is viewed as an embellishment by the
relevant sector of the public, would be an obstacle to the protection conferred by article
5(2). The Advocate-General, in his opinion on the case, said that if the public perceives a
sign as doing no more that embellishing goods, and in no way as identifying their origin,
that sign cannot be regarded as used for the purpose of distinguishing those goods. "Use
422 Schmidt (2002) 464.
423 Schmidt (2002) 465. Schmidt wrote his article before the decision on article 5(2) in the Davidoffcase.
424 Case C-408/01, Adidas-Salomon A.G., formerly Adidas A.G., Adidas Benelux B.V v Fitnessworld
Trading Ltd., 23 October 2003 par 24-31. The facts are set out infra.
425 Case C-342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co GmbH v Klijsen Handel BY [1999] E.C.R. 1-3819;
[1999] E.T.M.R. 690 par 25, 27.
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as a trade mark", thus for distinguishing goods or services is a prerequisite for a sign to
infringe article 5(2). Therefore, according to the Advocate-General the sign was only
used as embellishment or decoration and did not infringe the Adidas trade mark. This
decision left the well-known Adidas brand exposed.426 The CJEC answered the question
differently. They stated that the fact that the sign is viewed as an embellishment by the
relevant sector of the public is not in itself an obstacle, as long as the relevant sector of
the public establishes a link between the sign and the mark. If, however, the national
court finds as a fact that the public views the sign purely as an embellishment and does
not establish any link with the registered mark, one of the conditions of the protection
conferred by article 5(2) is not satisfied.427 The question is how to establish "a link"?
Carboni suggests that evidence of the type that is generally used to establish confusion
will often still be necessary in cases under article 5(2), but it need not be "as
comprehensive or as persuasive" as in cases under article 5(1)(b).428
The CJEC was asked to give a ruling on the meaning of the expression "has a reputation"
in article 5(2) in the General Motors case.429 The court concluded that "reputation"
means that the mark must be known by a "significant part of the public concerned in a
substantial part of that territory". In this case "that territory" refers to the Benelux
territory, meaning that the reputation may be in a part of one of the Benelux countries.
General Motors had a registration for the trade mark CHEVY in particular for motor
vehicles. Yplon registered the identical mark for detergents and various cleaning
products. General Motors claimed dilution of their trade mark by the defendant and
damage to the mark's advertising function. The CffiC said that a sufficient degree of
knowledge of the mark by the public is necessary.Y" The public is those concerned by
426 Opinion of Advocate-General Jacobs delivered on 10 July 2003. See also McLeod C "Three Stripes
and You're Out?" (October 2003) Trademark World 18 at 19; Clark R & Collins N "Striping
Similarity" (December 2003/January2004) Trademark World 18 at 19.
427 Case C-408/01, Adidas-Salomon A.G., formerly Adidas A.G., Adidas Benelux B. V v Fitnessworld
Trading Ltd., 23 October 2003 par 39-4l.
428 Carboni A "Two Stripes and You're Out!" (2004) 5 European Intellectual Property Review 229 at 233.
429 Case C-375/97, General Motors Corp. v Yplon SA, [1998] E.C.R. 1-5421; [2000] R.P.C. 572 at 578.
See also Schmidt (2002) 464; Casey (June/July 2000) 12.
430 They referred to the different language versions of the word "reputation" - "bekannt ist" (German);
"bekend is" (Dutch); "reputation" (English); etc. The CffiC came to the conclusion that "a knowledge
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the trade mark, either the public at large or a more specialised public, depending on the
product. The degree of knowledge is reached when a significant part of the public
concerned may possibly make "an association" between the two marks.431 A
reputation 432 in a substantial part of a Member State was then stated as to be sufficient.
Protection for the reputation of a trade mark, albeit in principle, was also recognised in
other cases before the effie. In the case of Dior vEvora, 433 the effie recognised that
damage done to the reputation of a trade mark could be a valid reason for the proprietor
to oppose further dealings with the mark. Evora, operating a chain of cut-price
pharmacies in the Netherlands, sold DIOR perfumes which were obtained by means of
parallel imports. They advertised these perfumes alongside other products being sold in
their shops, such as disposable nappies. Dior sued Evora for, inter alia, trade-mark
infringement, because it was of the opinion that these advertisements did not correspond
to the luxurious and prestigious image of its trade marks.
In Davidoff v Gojki~34 the effie gave a wider than expected scope to article 5(2) of the
Directive. Davidoff used the prestigious and high-value trade mark DAVIDOFF on inter
alia gentlemen's cosmetics, cognac, ties, cigars, cigarettes, pipes, tobacco, related
accessories and leather goods. Gofkid, a Hong Kong-based company, used the trademark
DURFFEE on precious metals and their alloys and goods made from it, such as ashtrays,
cigar and cigarette cases and holders and jewelry. Davidoff claimed that there was a
threshold requirement emerges from a comparison of all the language versions of the Directive", and is
also indicated by the "general scheme and purpose of the Directive".
431 Case C-375/97, General Motors Corp. v Yplon SA, [1998] E.C.R. 1-5421; [2000] R.P.C. 572 at 578.
Michaels (2000) 337 comments that "association" is a concept used in art. 5(1)(b). In SABEL the CffiC
defines "likelihood of association" as defining the scope of "likelihood of confusion". If association is
thus required by the court to assess the extent of reputation, it means bringing in confusion as part of the
test. It is thus not clear from the General Motors decision whether or not confusion is a necessary part
of the enquiry.
432 Casparie-Kerdel (2001) 192 describes "reputation" as an ambiguous term which further diluted the
dilution concept. The effect of this term is that in the case of competing goods (art. 5(1)) the scope of
protection is much more restricted that in the US, but in the case of non-competing goods (art. 5(2)) the
scope is much wider that in the US. She cannot think that this was the intention of the drafters of the
Directive.
433 Case C-337/95, Parfums Christian Dior vEvora B. v., 4 November 1997 [1998] R.P.C. 166. See the
discussion in Norman (1998) 306-308; Morgan (1998) 42-44.
434 Case C-292/00, Davidoff & eie and Zino Davidoff SA v Gojkid Ltd., 9 January 2003. See Morcom
(2003) 279.
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likelihood of confusion between the marks as Gotkid used the same script for its sign and
the letters "DOOand "ff' were written in the same distinctive manner as the DAVIDOFF
mark. They further alleged that Gofkid deliberately took advantage of the reputation and
advertising appeal of the DA VIDOFF mark and that the use of the DURFFEE mark was
detrimental to the reputation of the DAVIDOFF mark, as the public does not tend to
associate China with high-quality, exclusive products.
The questions referred by the Bundesgerichtshof to the CJEC were (1) whether the
protection of article 5(2) is also available where the goods or services are identical or
similar;435 and (2) whether the grounds in article 5(2) are exhaustive or whether this
article may be supplemented by national rules protecting well-known marks used in
respect of identical or similar goods. Advocate-General Jacobs436 concluded that
according to the plain meaning of the words of the article, the protection of article 5(2)
was not available in respect of goods or services which are identical or similar to those
covered by the registration. In reliance on the seventh Recital of the Directive437 he also
declared that the grounds are listed in an exhaustive manner. He thus answered both
questions in the negative.l'"
The CJEC basically rejected the opinion of the Advocate-General. The court said that in
interpreting article 5(2), the overall scheme and objectives of the system of which it is a
part should be taken into account, and not only its wording.439 The court, however,
interpreted the two questions in isolation, ignoring the seventh Recital, referred to by the
435 This question was also posed to the CffiC in Marca Mode vAdidas, but the court then refused to answer
it, as the case did not appear to involve an infringement claim within art. 5(2). See Chaudri (2001) 36.
In this case the goods were partly identical and partly similar.
436 Opinion delivered on 21 March 2002; [2002] E.T.M.R. 99.
437 The seventh Recital states that "the grounds for refusal or invalidity ... are to be listed in an exhaustive
manner, even if some of those grounds are listed as an option for the Member States which will
therefore be able to maintain or introduce those grounds in their legislation".
438 The opposite view was expressed by another Advocate-General, although in a totally unrelated case.
See Morcom (2003) 280.
439 Case C-292/00, Davidoff & eie and Zino Davidoff SA v Gojkid Ltd., 9 January 2003 par 24. This was
also suggested by Kamperman Sanders. He also believes that if protection can be granted to non-
similar goods in the absence of confusion as to origin, it must also be possible in the case of similar
goods. See Kamperman Sanders (1995) 70. See also Chapter 5.7.2.2 "The Proposed Interpretation of
Sections 10(2) & 10(3)" supra.
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Advocate-Genera1.44o The court concluded that well-known marks could not be given
less protection in the case of identical or similar goods than in the case of non-similar
goods. Well-known marks44I used on identical or similar goods must therefore enjoy
protection at least as extensive as where a sign is used for non-similar goods.442
Morcom questioned the conclusion reached by the court on the first question. He submits
that the" clear and well-reasoned approach of Advocate-General Jacobs to the expressed
words of the Directive was preferable and ought to have been followed".443
The CJEC subsequently confirmed its interpretation of article 5(2) on this point in the
case of Adidas v Fitnessworld.444 Adidas, as stated above, is the proprietor of a device
mark for a number of clothing items consisting of three vertical stripes of equal width,
running parallel, that appear on the side and down the whole length of the clothing
article. Fitnessworld markets fitness clothing under the name PERFETTO. On some
articles a motif of two parallel stripes of equal width is applied to the side seams of the
clothing. Adidas claimed that this might create a likelihood of confusion on the part of
the public, since they might associate Fitnessworld's clothing with Adidas and that
Fitnessworld was thus taking advantage of the repute of the Adidas mark, which could
impair the exclusivity of the Adidas mark.
The question referred by the Hoge Raad der Nederlanden (Supreme Court of the
Netherlands) to the CffiC was whether article 5(2) was restricted to the case of non-
440 This approach was criticised by Morcom (2003) 280.
441 Carboni (2004) 231 notes that it is interesting and rather confusing that the court referred to "well-
known marks" instead of marks with "a reputation" used in art. 5(2). It is accepted that "well-known"
marks require a higher threshold of public recognition than those said merely to have a reputation. See
Chapter 5.7.2.5 "The Key Concepts of Section 10(3) (iv) Reputation" supra. However, in Case C-
408/01, Adidas-Salomon A.G., formerly Adidas A. G., Adidas Benelux B. V v Fitnessworld Trading Ltd.,
23 October 2003 discussed infra the court avoided the term "well-known" and stuck to the phrase
"registered mark with a reputation".
442 Case C-292/00, Davidoff & eie and Zino Davidoff SA v Gojkid Ltd., 9 January 2003 par 25, 26. The
second question was not answered on the basis that it was asked by the German Court only in the event
that the first question was answered in the negative.
443 Morcom (2003) 280.
444 Case C-408/01, Adidas-Salomon A.G., formerly Adidas A.G., Adidas Benelux B. V v Fitnessworld
Trading Ltd., 23 October 2003. It is interesting to note that professor Gielen appeared on behalf of
Adidas.
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similar goods or whether this article could also be used in the case of similar goods where
the mark's reputation was at stake. As already stated, article 5(2) refers expressly only to
use of a sign "in relation to goods or services which are not similar". After the question
was referred by the Hoge Raad to the eJEe, the eJEe answered the question in the
affirmative in the case of Davidoff,445 discussed above. The United Kingdom
Government, however, proposed a negative answer. They submitted that a Member State
is free to adopt the provision of article 5(2), which is expressly applicable where the
goods and services are not similar, but that the Member State is not bound to grant the
same protection also in relation to goods or services which are identical or similar.446
Furthermore, they contended that it is for the national courts to interpret a provision
transposing article 5(2) as they wish. Thus Member States are permitted to give
protection in the case of identical or similar goods, but are not required to do so.
In this case Advocate-General Jacobs, contrary to his decision in the Davidoff case, held
that article 5(2) should always be interpreted to mean that a trade-mark owner could
oppose the use of an identical or similar sign not only in relation to goods and services
that are not similar, but also in relation to goods and services that are identical or similar
to those for which the trade mark was registered.447
The eJEe repeated what it said in the Davidoff case,448namely that the overall scheme
and objectives of the system of which article 5(2) is a part should be taken into account.
Thus, marks with a reputation could not be given less protection in the case of identical
or similar goods than in the case of non-similar goods. Marks with a reputation used on
identical or similar goods must therefore enjoy protection at least as extensive as where a
sign is used for non-similar goods. In answer to the submissions of the United Kingdom,
445 Case C-292/00, Davidoff & Cie and Zino Davidoff SA v Gofkid Ltd., 9 January 2003. See Case C-
408/01; Adidas-Salomon A.G., formerly Adidas A.G., Adidas Benelux B. V v Fitnessworld Trading Ltd.,
23 October 2003 par 14.
446 Adidas-Salomon A.G., formerly Adidas A.G., Adidas Benelux B. V v Fitnessworld Trading Ltd., 23
October 2003 par 17.
447 See McLeod (2003) 18.
448 Case C-292/00, Davidoff & Cie and Zino Davidoff SA v Gofkid Ltd., 9 January 2003 par 24 -26. See
Adidas-Salomon A.G., formerly Adidas A.G., Adidas Benelux B. V v Fitnessworld Trading Ltd., 23
October 2003 par 19.
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the court ruled that the Member State's option "relates to the principle itself of granting
greater protection to marks with a reputation, but not to the situations covered by that
protection when the Member State grants it". The national court must interpret its
national law "in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive".449
Although the interpretation of the CJEC of article 5(2) fills a gap in the protection of
marks with a reputation, by expanding the protection offered in the case of non-similar
goods to identical as well as similar goods, the implementation of this decision by
national courts will not necessarily be that easy. As Carboni indicated,450 it can be quite
difficult for a judge used to construing ambiguities in legislation, to insert added matter
which was clearly not intended or understood to be there by Parliament when the
legislation was enacted.
Article 9(l)(c) of the Community Trade Mark Regulation uses identical wording to
article 5(2), with the difference that the Regulation has direct effect in the Member States.
Thus, in the case of a trade mark registered as a community trade mark the CJEC will
definitely have to apply the Davidoff and Adidas decisions.
5.9 SYNOPSIS
The first traces of dilution protection in Europe are found in the ODOL case decided in
1924 in Germany.f" while the first statutory dilution protection is found in the 1971
Uniform Benelux Trade Marks Act passed by the Benelux Countries.452
The European Economic Community, now the European Union, was formed in 1957 with
the purpose of furthering political and economic integration of the Member States.
449 Adidas-Salomon A.G., formerly Adidas A.G., Adidas Benelux B. V v Fitnessworld Trading Ltd., 23
October 2003 par 20-21.
450 Carboni (2004) 232.
451 Civil Court, Elberfield, 25 Juristische Wochemscrifl 502; XXV Markenshutz Und Wettbewerb 264, Il
September 1925 (Germany). See Chapter 5.3 "Early Origins of Dilution in Europe" supra.
452 See Chapter 5.7.1 "Benelux Law" supra.
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Directives such as the Trademark Directive are issued and then integrated by Member
States in their national laws. The Trademark Directive was finally adopted on 21
December 1989. Member States must give protection against infringing uses of a trade
mark that cause a likelihood of confusion directly or through a likelihood of association.
Furthermore, they may provide protection against infringing uses which take unfair
advantage of, or are detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the trade
mark.453 It is clear that these provisions were heavily influenced by Benelux law. From
1 April 1996 it is also possible to register a Community trade mark in terms of the
Community Trade Mark Regulation. In effect an exclusive right covering the whole
territory of the European Union can be obtained on the basis of one registration. The
optional provision in the Trademark Directive mentioned above was included as
mandatory in the Community Trade Mark Regulation.Y"
In the Benelux countries protection against dilution has been granted since 1971 under
article 13A of the Uniform Benelux Trade Marks Act.455 The concept of "risk of
association" was born in the famous Union v Union Soleure case.456 The court decided
that similarity of marks can be determined by taking into account the particular
circumstances of a case, for example the distinctive power of the mark, whether the mark
and the sign, compared as a whole and in correlation, show such a resemblance
phonetically, visually or conceptually that by this resemblance alone associations
between the sign and the mark arise. Both articles 13A( 1) and (2) were believed to give
protection against dilution. Article 13A(1) was applicable in the case of "any use" in
relation to identical or similar goods and article 13A(2) in the case of "any other use",
interpreted to mean use of an identical or similar sign for dissimilar goods, also use for
purposes other than to distinguish the goods, for example use in comparative advertising,
or use of a trade name or slogan or use in the media. The most famous case decided
453 Art. 5(1) & (2). See Chapter 5.5.3 "Dilution Provisions" supra.
454 Art. 8(5). See Chapter 5.6 "The Community Trade Mark" supra.
455 See Chapter 5.7.1 "Benelux Law" supra.
456 Union/Union Soleure, Benelux Court of Justice, 20 May 1983 [1984] N.J. 72; [1984] B.I.E. 137. See
Chapter 5.7.1.3 '''Likelihood of Association' in the Benelux Law" supra.
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under article 13A(2) was the Claeryn/Klarein case,457 where the court found that the use
of the KLAREIN trade mark for all-purpose cleanser diluted the CLAERYN mark for
gin.
The Benelux law was not really altered by the Trademark Directive. In the
Always/Regina case458 it was confirmed that in cases involving similar products, the
association criterion remains part of Benelux law. In cases concerning dissimilar
products some change was needed as the Directive requires a mark to have a reputation
and damage was described as occurring through uses that damage the distinctive
character or repute of the mark.
The Benelux law, therefore, considered to be one of the most modern trade-mark laws in
the world, offers a broad infringement criterion, which is based on the modern approach
to the functioning of trade marks.
The United Kingdom adopted a new Trade Marks Act in 1994 in compliance with the
Trademark Directive. Section 10(2) and (3) of the Act corresponds to article 5(1)(b) and
(2) of the Directive. In section 10(2) the issues which have arisen concern the
interpretation of "likelihood of association", the test for "likelihood of confusion" and the
definition of "similar". "Likelihood of association" was first interpreted in the
Wagamama case.459 The court found that protection could not be extended to situations
where confusion as to source of origin is not present and thus denied dilution protection
on the wording of section 10(2). The test for "likelihood of confusion" was formulated in
the Treat case460 as a three-stage test where the similarity of marks and likelihood of
confusion were seen as separate and distinct questions. However, in the Pfizer case461 the
457 Colgate-Palmolive B. V. v NV Koninklijke Distileerderijen Erven Lucas Bols, BCJ 1March 1975 [1975]
N.J.472. See Chapter 5.7.1.5 "Section 13A(2) of the Uniform Benelux Trade Marks Act" supra.
458 Regina v Procter & Gamble, Court of Appeal Brussels 27 May 1993, I.E.R. 1993, 112. See Chapter
5.7.1.6 "Influence of the Trademark Directive on Benelux Law" supra.
459 Wagamama Ltdv City Centre Restaurants pic., [1995] F.S.R. 713; [1996] E.T.M.R. 23. See Chapter
5.7.2.3 "Cases on Section 10(2)" supra.
460 British Sugar pic. v James Robertson & Sons Ltd., [1996] R.P.C. 281. See Chapter 5.7.2.3 "Cases on
Section 10(2)" supra.
461 Pfizer Ltd. & Another v Eurofood Link (UK) Ltd., High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, lO
December 1999. See also Premier Brands v Typhoon Europe Ltd., High Court of Justice, Chancery
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court turned away from this approach and followed the "global appreciation" test laid
down by the CJEC in the SABEL and Canon cases. It seems generally accepted that the
more distinctive the mark, the greater the likelihood of confusion. It also appears that the
protection of section 10(2) can be stretched to cover even situations where the goods are
quite dissimilar, as long as there is a likelihood of confusion, which includes a broad
range of conduct.
In section 10(3) there are also a few key concepts that need to be interpreted. In one of
the first cases on section 10(3), Baywatch,462 the court found that this provision offered
no protection to a mark in the absence of a likelihood of confusion. This decision was
not followed in the Pfizer and Premier Brands cases,463 where it was concluded that
proof of a "likelihood of confusion" was not necessary under section 10(3). Section
10(3), on its plain wording, is only applicable in the case of non-similar goods. However,
the CJEC interpreted the corresponding article in the Trademark Directive as also
applicable in the case of identical or similar goods. In terms of the Adidas v Fitnessworld
case464 the United Kingdom must give protection "at least as extensive for identical or
similar goods or services as for non-similar goods or services". Other key concepts, such
as "use in the course of trade", "without due cause", "unfair advantage or detriment",
"reputation" and "distinctive character or repute" were also discussed above in this
chapter.465
The CJEC has interpreted article 5( 1)(b) and 5(2) of the Trademark Directive, which, as
stated above, corresponds to section 10(2) and 10(3) of the United Kingdom Act. In the
Division, 21 January 2000 (2000) 23(5) IPD; [2000] F.S.R. 767; DaimlerChrysler A.G. v Javid Alavi
(tla Mere), [2001] R.P.C. 813 at 838.
462 Baywatch Productions Co. Inc. v Home Video Channel Ltd., [1997] F.S.R. 22. See Chapter 5.7.2.4
"Cases on Section 10(3)" supra.
463 Pfizer Ltd. & Another v Eurofood Link (UK) Ltd., High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, 10
December 1999; Premier Brands v Typhoon Europe Ltd., High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, 21
January 2000 (2000) 23(5) IPD; [2000] F.S.R. 767. See also DaimlerChrysler A.G. v Javid Alavi (tla
Mere), [2001] R.P.C. 813 at 838; Corgi TM [1999] R.P.C. 549; CA Sheimer (M) SDN BHD's Trade
Mark Application [2000] R.P.C. 484 at 504.
464 Case C-408/01, Adidas-Salomon A.G., formerly Adidas A.G., Adidas Benelux B. V v Fitnessworld
Trading Ltd., 23 October 2003 par 20-22.
465 See Chapter 5.7.2.5 "The Key Concepts of Section 10(3)" supra.
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SABEL case466 the court concluded that the phrase "likelihood of association" just served
to define the scope of the likelihood of confusion, which in turn must be appreciated
globally. The mere association which the public might make between two marks, is not
in itself a sufficient ground for concluding that there is a likelihood of confusion. The
court thus rejected the Benelux point of view. The global appreciation test was also
accepted by the CJEC in the Canon case.467 The court stated that the distinctive character
and reputation of a mark must be taken into account when determining whether similarity
between goods covered by the two trade marks in issue is sufficient to give rise to the
likelihood of confusion.468
The CJEC decided two important cases on article 5(2). In Adidas v Fitnessworld'69 the
court stated that article 5(2) does not require the existence of a likelihood of confusion.
The relevant public must however establish a link between the mark and the sign for a
finding of similarity. This link must be appreciated globally. The meaning of reputation
was addressed in the General Motors case,470 where the court concluded that reputation
means that the mark must be known by a significant part of the public concerned in a
substantial part of a Member State.
The most significant ruling of the CJEC was on the scope of article 5(2). In Davidoff v
Gofkicf71 the court concluded that in the light of the overall scheme and objectives of that
part of the Directive, marks with a reputation used on identical or similar goods must
466 Case C-251195, SABEL B. V v Puma A.G., Rudolf DassIer Sport [1997] E.C.R. 1-6191; [1998] E.T.M.R.
l. (Judgment of Il November 1997). See Chapter 5.8.1 "The Interpretation of Articles 4(l)(b) and
5(l)(b)" supra.
467 Case C-39/97, Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. (Formerly Pathe
Communications Corporation) [1998] E.C.R. 1-5507; [1999] R.P.C. 117.
468 See also Case C-342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co GmbH v Klijsen Handel B. V [1999] E.C.R. 1-
3819; [1999] E.T.M.R. 690; Case C-425/98, Marea Mode C. V v Adidas A.G. and Adidas Benelux B. V,
[2000] E.C.R. 1-4861.
469 Case C-408/0 1, Adidas-Salomon A.G., formerly Adidas A.G., Adidas Benelux B. V v Fitnessworld
Trading Ltd., 23 October 2003. See Chapter 5.8.2 "The Interpretation of Article 5(2)" supra.
470 Case C-375/97, General Motors Corp. v Yplon SA, [1998] E.C.R. 1-5421; [2000] R.P.C. 572.
471 Case C-292/00, Davidoff & Cie and Zino Davidoff SA v Gofkid Ltd., 9 January 2003.
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enjoy protection at least as extensive as where a sign is used for non-similar goods. The
same conclusion was reached in the case of Adidas v Fitnessworld.472
The position in the European Union is thus that a very broad scope of protection against
trade-mark dilution is given to marks with a reputation, regardless of confusion and
whether the mark is used on identical, similar or non-similar goods. The phrase "takes
unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute of the mark"
has not yet been interpreted by the ClEC.
472 Case C-408/01, Adidas-Salomon A.G., formerly Adidas A.G., Adidas Benelux BY v Fitnessworld
Trading Ltd., 23 October 2003.
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CHAPTER6
THE SOUTH AFRICAN SITUATION
6.1 HISTORY OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN TRADE-MARK LEGIS LATION
Statutory developments in South Africa closely followed those in the United Kingdom.
Legislation for the establishment of a Register of Trade Marks, modelled on the 1875 Act
of the United Kingdom, was introduced in the Cape Colony in 1877, Natal in 1885 and in
the Transvaal (South African Republic) in 1892. In the Orange Free State a Register of
Trade Marks was also created by legislation.'
After the formation of the Union of South Africa, the provincial enactments were
replaced by The Patents, Designs, Trade Marks and Copyright Act 9 of 1916. This Act
was in essence identical to the British Act of 1905. A central Trade Marks Office and
Register of Trade Marks were introduced. Amendments, making provision for registered
users and permitting assignments without goodwill were introduced in 1947.2 After
recommendations by the Chowies Committee, the Trade Marks Act of 1963 was
enacted.' Many of its recommendations were incorporated into the Act. In accordance
with the 1938 Act of the United Kingdom, the Register was divided into Parts A and B
and provision was made for defensive registrations. Further amendments were
introduced by the Trade Marks Amendment Act of 1971, which inter alia provided for
the registration of service marks and the adaptation of a few other provisions.'
See Webster CE & Morley GE Webster & Page South African Law of Trade Marks, Unlawful
Competition, Company Names and Trading Styles 4th ed (1997) Butterworths Durban par 1.3 for more
detail on the different colonial and pre-colonial statutes. No date is given for the legislation that created
a Register of Trade Marks in the Orange Free State. There was however an amendment of that
legislation in 1893.
The Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Amendment Act 19 of 1947. These amendments corresponded
to those in the British Act of 1938. See Webster & Page (J 997) par 1.3.
3 Act 62 of 1963.
4 This Act incorporated recommendations by the Schoeman Committee and came into operation on 1
January 1972. See Webster & Page (J 997) par 1.3 for more detail.
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International trends, such as developments in the European Unions and the
implementation of the TRIPS agreernent/' necessitated some amendments to statutory
trade-mark law in South Africa. Trade-mark legislation was also considered to have
fallen behind the requirements of trade and industry, especially when viewed in the light
of the increasing recognition of trade marks as commercial assets of considerable
importance and value.Ï After recommendations from interested parties, the Advisory
Committee on Patents, Trade Marks, Copyright and Designs in 1991 drafted a new Trade
Marks Bill. After further representations and revisions, the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993
was passed by Parliament in December 1993. After the regulations were approved In
April 1995, the Act came into force on 1May 1995.8
The Act broadly followed the principles contained In the European Directive and
European Regulations relating to a Community Trade Mark.9 The most important
deviations from the previous legislation were the abolition of the distinction between
parts A and B of the Register':' and of the possibility to register trade marks defensively.
Statutory provisions for the protection of well-known foreign trade marks were
introduced. The infringement provisions were broadened considerably, also to include
protection against the dilution of a trade mark, II which forms the subject of this
dissertation. This Act has since been amended by the Intellectual Property Laws
Amendment Act 38 of 1997.12
5 See Chapter 6.3.3 "The Influence of the United Kingdom and European Law" infra.
6 Trade-Related Aspects oflntellectual Property Rights. See Chapter 6.3.4.2 "The GATT Agreement on
the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights" infra for a discussion of this agreement
ratified by South Africa on 5 April 1995.
7 Memorandum on the Objects of the Draft Trade Marks Bill, 1992 § 5l.1 at 101, Government Gazette,
30 August 1991. See also Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24.
8 The regulations were proclaimed in the Government Gazette No 16373 dated 21 April 1995.
9 Webster & Page (1997) par 1.3. See Chapter 5 "European Union Law" supra for a discussion of the
law of the European Union.
10 Trade marks registered in Part B of the Register will now enjoy the same status as marks formerly
registered in Part A of the Register.
II See s 34(1 )(c) dealing with infringement, as well as s 10(17), which provides that a trade mark diluting
another trade mark is unregistrable. See the discussion of these sections in Chapter 6.4.2 "The Dilution
Provisions" infra.
12 There was a rather insignificant amendment to s 10(17). A phrase was added to make it possible for the
proprietor of a registered trade mark to consent to the registration of a mark, which would probably
dilute the registered mark. See also Webster & Page (1997) par 1.7 where the major amendments are
briefly explained.
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6.2 REGISTRATION OF TRADE MARKS IN SOUTH AFRICA
6.2.1 THE REGISTRATION PROCESS
Initially the aim of trade-mark legislation in South Africa, and throughout the world, was
to create a registration system for the recording of existing rights and the facilitation of
their enforcement.13 Inadequacies in common law necessitated trade-mark legislation. In
the absence of legislation, proprietors had to go through a long and expensive process to
prove their title to a trade mark and third parties experienced immense difficulties to
determine whether or not there were already vested rights relating to trade marks they
wished to use.14
The Register of Trade Marks, under control of the Registrar of Trade Marks,15 is kept in
The Trade Marks Office, established in Pretoria. All applications for registrations and
actual registrations, together with other important particulars, must be entered in the
Register." In terms of the 1993 Act there is now a single Register.l" which comprises all
the marks registered or deemed to be registered under both the old and the new Act. An
application for registration must be made in triplicate on the prescribed form and must
contain a representation of the mark.l" A separate application is required for each class
of goods or services and also for each separate mark.i" In terms of the Nice agreement of
1957 an international classification system for trademarks, which is now adhered to by
most countries in the world, including South Africa, was created.i" Traditionally a trade-
13 Webster & Page (1997) par l.I.
14 Webster & Page (1997) par 1.1, 1.2.
15 See s 6 of the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993.
16 Webster & Page (1997) par 2.1,2.2; s 22(1) of the Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993 and reg 21 of the
Trade Marks Regulations, 1995.
17 Under the repealed Act 62 of 1963 the Register was divided into Parts A and B. Under the new Act
marks formerly registered in Part Bofthe Register are now handled in the same way as marks formerly
registered in Part A. See Webster & Page (1997) par 3.24.
18 S 16(1); reg 11, 13 of the Trade Mark Regulations, 1995. A specified fee must also be paid by the
applicant. See sch 1 of the Trade Mark Regulations, 1995 as amended by GN 17812 published in the
Government Gazette dated 28 February 1997; Webster & Page (1997) Appendix 2-20.
19 S 11(1). See also reg 11; sch 2 in Webster & Page (1997) Appendix 2-30.
20 Wheeldon R "Trade Mark Dilution - What is it?" Lecture notes I at 6. This classification is revised
from time to time. The latest version is the sixth edition, published by the World Intellectual Property
Organisation in 1992. See Webster & Page (1997) Sch 3 Appendix 2-37 - 2-41 for this version.
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mark right was protected only for the class in which it was registered and only for the
goods covered by the registration. This was changed by the possibility to register a mark
defensively" and even more so by the introduction of the so-called dilution provisions in
the 1993 Act.
If an applicant for registration has already applied for registration of the same trade mark
in a convention country,22 priority for registration may be claimed under section 63(3) of
the Act. The application for registration in the Republic must be made within six months
after the date on which the application was made in the convention country" and the
eventual registration must be allocated the same date as the date of the first application in
h . 24t e convention country.
After receipt of an application for registration, a search must be done by the Registrar
amongst all registered marks and all pending applications to ascertain whether there are
any marks for goods or services which may conflict with the trade mark applied for. This
is done in terms of section 10, which give a list of absolute as well as relative grounds for
refusal of the registration of a mark.25 After consideration of the application, the
Registrar can accept the application, accept it subject to certain amendments,
modifications, conditions" or limitations he may deem fit, provisionally refuse it or
refuse it.27 After acceptance, the applicant must advertise the application as accepted
once in the Patent Joumal.28 Any interested person may oppose the registration within a
21 See the discussion in Chapter 6.2.2 "Defensive Registrations" infra.
22 A list of convention countries appeared in GN 1559 of 1996 published in the Government Gazette. See
also Webster & Page (1997) Appendix 7.
23 S 63(3)(a).
24 S 63(3). In accordance with reg 12 the applicant must within three months after application in the
Republic, lodge with the Registrar a copy of the application in the convention country. This copy must
be duly certified by the Trade Marks Office of that country.
25 Reg 15(2). S 10(17) prohibits the registration of a mark that will cause the dilution of another mark.
See Chapter 6.4.2 "The Dilution Provisions" infra for a discussion of this section.
26 See, for example, s 15 "Registration subject to disclaimer" discussed in the following paragraph.
27 S 16(2)-(4); reg 15(3). Written grounds for his decision can be requested ifhe accepted the application
subject to certain amendments or conditions or refused it. The applicant has three months within which
to object to the decision of the Registrar - reg 15(4), (5).
28 S 17, read with reg 18(1).
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period of three months from the date of the advertisement/" If the application has not
been opposed and the time for notice of opposition has expired or the application has
been opposed and has been granted, the Registrar must register the trade mark. The date
of the lodging of the application for registration is then deemed to be the date of
registration.i" The applicant is then provided with a certificate of the registration." The
registration of a trade mark is valid for a period of 10 years, but may be renewed from
time to time.32
If a trade mark contains matter which is not capable of distinguishing, the Registrar may
accept the registration subject to certain conditions. He may in terms of section 15
require a disclaimer from the proprietor of any right to the exclusive use of such matter.
It is also possible for the proprietor of a trade mark to request any time after registration
that the Registrar enter a disclaimer or memorandum against the registration of the trade
mark. 33 The purpose of a disclaimer is to define or limit the rights of the proprietor and
cannot be used to enlarge the rights of the proprietor. The proprietor can for instance
limit his rights to a particular area, manner of use, or use of the mark in particular
colours.t" It is also possible to waive the right of exclusive use of a certain word or
words contained in the trade mark.
Certain amendments to the Register by the Registrar are allowed in terms of section 23.35
This section however does not relate to discretionary decisions. These are dealt with in
section 24.36 Furthermore, the Registrar may reduce the scope of the registration in terms
29 S 2l. See also reg 19.
30 S 29(1); reg 21(1), (2).
31 S 29(2); reg 23. See Webster and Page (1997) Sch 2 Appendix 2-24 for an example of the specified
certificate.
32 S 37; reg 24, 25-30. See Webster & Page (1997) Sch 2 Appendix 2-34.
33 See s 23(2)( e).
34 See Webster & Page (1997) par 2.4.
35 Read with reg 44 (1) - (3), which lay down the procedure to be followed for an application to amend
the Register.
36 S 24 deals with the general discretionary power of the court and the Registrar, on application, to rectify
entries in the Register.
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of section 23, but cannot widen or extend it. Section 2537 creates the possibility of
additions or alterations to the trade mark at the request of the registered proprietor. The
scope of this section is however limited as the additions or alterations must not have a
substantial effect on the identity of the trade mark. Webster and Page submit that the
effect of the alteration must therefore not be to broaden the scope of the registrationr"
6.2.2 DEFENSIVE REGISTRATIONS
The possibility of registering a trade mark defensively was created in the United
Kingdom Trade Marks Act of 1938.39 A trade-mark proprietor of a mark comprising an
invented word was hereby permitted to obtain a wider range of protection for his mark
compared to the situation before the introduction of this possibility. He could therefore
register his mark defensively in respect of goods in relation to which he did not himself
intend to use it. The mark had to be so well known in respect of the goods for which it
had been registered and was used that its use in relation to other goods would be likely to
cause confusion. This section was introduced on the recommendation of the Goshen
Departmental Committee.4o The committee saw it as a way to provide a statutory remedy
for a situation such as that in the Eastman Photographic v Kodak Cycle case." This case,
as stated above, is viewed by some as the origin of the dilution rationale. The plaintiffs
mark KODAK used on cameras was found to have a wide repute and the court restrained
the defendant from using the mark KODAK on bicycles. Another probable reason for the
introduction of defensive registrations was to protect the trade-mark owner against the
37 Read with reg 45 which prescribes the form of the application.
38 Webster & Page (1997) par 2.9.
39 I and 2 Geo 6 c 22 s 27. See Webster & Page (1997) par 1.2, 10.11; Blakeney M "'Well-known'
Marks" (1994) 11 European Intellectual Property Review 481; Martino T Trademark Dilution (1996)
Clarendon Press Oxford 96.
40 Webster & Page (1997) par 1.2, 10.11 especially fn 1; Martino (1996) 96.
41 Eastman Photographic Material Co. Ltd. v. John Griffiths Cycle Corporation and Kodak Cycle Co. Ltd.
(1898) 15 R.P.C. 105. See Chapter 3.1 "The Development of Dilution as a Legal Concept" supra.
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risk of confusion of sponsorship.f Strict requirements for defensive registrations and
conservative application resulted however in limited success for this measure.Y
Defensive registration was also introduced in South Africa by the Trade Marks Act 62 of
1963.44 Section 53(1) provided as follows:
"[Wjhere the registrar is of the opinion that a trade mark registered in part A, if used in relation to
goods or services other than the goods or services in respect of which it is registered, be likely to
be taken as indicating a connection in the course of trade between these other goods or services
and the registered proprietor, the trade mark may be registered defensively in his name for these
other goods or services."
This section does not require use or proposed use.
Defensive registrations were abandoned by the United Kingdom Trade Marks Act of
1994. It was apparent from the White Paper on the Reform of Trade Marks Law45 that
the defensive registration provisions were inconsistent with the European Trademark
Directive and that the British Government intended to implement article 5(2)46 of the
Directive as a substitute for defensive registrations. Trade marks that will qualify for this
protection, are described as trade marks of wide repute.
There is also no provision for defensive registrations in the South African Trade Marks
Act of 1993. It is generally accepted that the need for defensive registrations fell away
with the introduction of sections 34(1 )(b) and, especially 34(1)( c), the dilution
42 Mostert FW "Trade Mark Dilution and Confusion of Sponsorship in United States, German and English
Law" (1986) 17 International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law 80 at 85.
43 Mostert (1986 1IC) 85. Blakeney (1994) 481 also mentions the very few registrations which were made
in the United Kingdom and makes the inference that this was due to the fact that defensive registrations
were not popular with trade-mark owners. See also Martino (1996) 96 who comments that "the burden
on the defensive applicant was even heavier than the language of section 27 suggested".
44 A good example is COCA COLA which was registered in all forty-two classes. See Schwartz D &
Morfesi D "Dilution Comes of Age: the United States, Europe and South Africa" (1997) 87 The
Trademark Reporter 436 at 457.
45 Cm 1203 September 1990 par 3.17 to 3.19. See also Blakeney (1994) 482.
46 This is the so-called dilution provision. See Chapter 5.5.3 "Dilution Provisions" supra for the wording
of this subsection.
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provision.V In terms of section 70(2), the savings provision, a trade mark registered in
terms of section 53 of the 1963 Act is deemed to be a trade mark registered in terms of
the 1993 Act. The effect of this section is to convert all defensive registrations to
ordinary registrations. These registrations are vulnerable to being expunged after 1 May
2005 on the grounds of non-use, except where the proprietor started to use then for the
goods or services registered." It is submitted by Webster and Page that in instances
where protection under section 53 was available to a trade mark proprietor, it should in
principle be possible to obtain relief in terms of section 10(17),49 which allows the
registration to be refused if this would be detrimental to a registered well-known mark,
even in the absence of deception or confusion.
The abandonment of defensive registrations has certain advantages, as well as
disadvantages. One advantage is that the proprietor does not have to register his trade
mark defensively, as section 10(17) automatically grants such protection. However, the
disadvantage lies in the fact that he must first prove that his trade mark is well known in
the Republic.i" Another advantage is that the proprietor does not have to prove any link
between the goods for which his trade mark is well known and the goods covered by the
alleged infringing mark, as there is no requirement of confusion or deception. But this
also emphasises another disadvantage, namely that the search process before registration
will be much more intensive and costly.
6.2.3 REGISTRABILITY UNDER THE 1993 ACT
The requirements to which a trade mark must answer before it can be registered under the
1993 Act are contained in sections 9 and 10. These sections represent a major departure
47 Naturally also its counterpart, s 10(17). See Webster & Page (1997) par 10.11, 6.26. See also Mars Inc
v Cadbury (Swaziland) (Pty) Ltd and Another 2000 4 SA 1010 (SCA) 1014C-D.
48 In terms of the savings clause in s 70(2) a defensive registration shall not be removed from the Register
in terms of the provisions s 1O(4) or s 27 within a period of ten years from the date of commencement
of the 1993 Act, which was 1 May 1995.
49 Webster & Page (1997) par 6.26. See Chapter 6.4.2 "The Dilution Provision" infra regarding s 10(17).
50 Webster & Page (1997) par 6.26.
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from the requirements for registrability under the previous Trade Marks ACt.51 The
threshold for the registrability of a trade mark is established in section 9, whereas section
10 specifies those marks which cannot be registered.Y Section 9 will be discussed in this
part, while section 10 will be dealt with in Chapter 6.4.2 "The Dilution Provisions" infra.
Section 9 provides that:
"(1) In order to be registrable, a trade mark shall be capable of distinguishing the goods or
services of a person in respect of which it is registered or proposed to be registered from
the goods or services of another person either generally or, where the trade mark is
registered or proposed to be registered subject to limitations, in relation to use within
those limitations.
(2) A mark shall be considered to be capable of distinguishing within the meaning of
subsection I if, at the date of application for registration, it is inherently capable of so
distinguishing or is capable of distinguishing by reason of prior use thereof."
This section thus requires a mark to be "capable of distinguishing". This concept is
therefore fundamental to the registrability of a trade mark. It is clear from section 9(2)
that the test for registrability under the 1993 Act is a two-fold test in the alternative.f
The mark should either have an inherent quality which makes it capable of
distinguishing." or the mark should in fact be capable of distinguishing by reason of use
prior to the application for registration.f The onus rests upon the applicant to prove that
the mark is capable of distinguishing. "Capable of distinguishing" means having the
51 Morley G "South Africa: When is a Trademark Capable of Distinguishing?" (1998) Trademark World
23 at 24. See Webster & Page (1997) par 3.26 - par 3.38 for a discussion of registrability under the
1963 South African Trade Marks Act.
52 This is a comprehensive departure as previous Acts specified what can be registered as a trade mark.
Webster & Page (1997) par 3.39.
53 This two-fold test was endorsed in Beecham Group pIc. v Triomed (Ply) Ltd. [2002] 4 All SA 193
(SCA); 2003 3 SA 639 (SCA) 650A.
54 A mark is inherently capable of distinguishing when it can do the job of distinguishing without the need
to educate the public that the sign is a trade mark. See Triomed (Ply) Ltd. v Beecham Group pIc. [2001]
2 All SA 126 (T) 133d-f; 2001 2 SA 522 (T) 533D.
55 This means that a mark which is 100% distinctive in fact will qualify for registration, although it would
not be "adapted to distinguish" as required by the 1963 Act. "Adapted to distinguish" means that the
mark has an inherent capacity to distinguish. See Webster & Page (1997) par 3.25, 3.29 for the
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"ability, fitness or necessary quality" to "treat as different; differentiate".56 The
distinctiveness'" of a mark depends upon the message conveyed to the public and the
public's perception and understanding of that message.i" The test is a purely factual
one.59 The capacity of the mark must therefore be determined having regard to all the
relevant circumstances in a specific case.60 Although the court a quo in Cadbury (Pty)
Ltd v Beacon Sweets & Chocolates (Pty) Lt~l held that the meaning of the phrase
"capable of distinguishing" can be determined by referring to the interpretation by the
courts of the phrase "adapted to distinguish" as used in section 12(1) of the 1963 Act,62
this notion was in effect rejected by the Supreme Court of Appeal.l" It resolved the issue
by asking whether the mark (LIQUORICE ALLSORTS) "is the name of the product (a
type of confectionery) or whether it is the name of [the manufacturer's] product'v'" Or as
Webster and Page put it: "Does the mark ... indicate that the goods or services in
relation to which the mark is used or proposed to be used are distinct from the goods or
distinction between "adapted to distinguish" and "capable of distinguishing". See also par 3.29 & 3.40;
Morley (1998) 24.
56 Concise Oxford Dictionary 9th ed 192 (definition of capable); 393 (definition of distinguish).
57 Webster & Page (1997) par 3.40.1 suggest that the terms "distinctive character" and "capable of
distinguishing" are synonymous. This submission is based on the Beecham judgment in which there is
no distinction between the two terms. For this reason Webster & Page suggest that when determining
whether or not a mark is "capable of distinguishing" for purposes of registration under the South
African Act, guidance may be sought from UK cases determining whether or not a mark has a
distinctive character under their 1994 Act.
58 See Webster & Page (1997) par 3.40.2; Koninklijke Philips Electronics N. V v Remington Consumer
Products Ltd., [2003] R.P.C. 2 14 (EC1); Beecham Group pic. v Triomed (Pty.) Ltd. [2002] 4 All SA
193 (SCA); 20033 SA 639 (SCA) 65ID-E, quoting from the Philips case.
59 Beecham Group plc. v Triomed (Pty.) Ltd. [2002] 4 All SA 193 (SCA); 2003 3 SA 639 (SCA) 649J;
Webster & Page (1997) par 3.25; Morley (1998) 24.
60 Webster & Page (1997) par 3.40.2.
61 Cadbury (Pty.) Ltd. v Beacon Sweets & Chocolates (Pty.) Ltd. 1998 1 SA 59 (T). The court found the
phrase LIQUORICE ALLSORTS to be inherently capable of distinguishing, since it is "an original
descriptive epithet which is not in ordinary linguistic use" (74D). Morley (1998) 25 questions the
correctness of the court's decision on this point. The court in any event also found that the mark was
capable of distinguishing through extensive use (751).
62 Cadbury (Ply.) Ltd. v Beacon Sweets & Chocolates (Pty.) Ltd. 1998 1 SA 59 (T) 69G-H.
63 Cadbury (Ply.) Ltd. v Beacon Sweets & Chocolates (Pty.) Ltd. [2000] 2 All SA I (A) 5d-f; 2000 2 SA
771 (SCA) 778G-H. Criticism against the court a quo's reference to the concept "adapted to
distinguish" was also expressed by Morley (1998) 24-25.
64 The court (778H) referred to The Oxford English Dictionary 2nd ed (1989) sv "ali", which defines the
word "all-sorts" as a species of confectionery (in full liquorice all-sorts) ... ". The court (7781-1) also
referred to confectionery manufacturing books, which denote liquorice allsorts as a product type. The
respondent could also not submit an alternative name for the product. The court concluded (779D) that
the manufacturer could not by advertising and selling the product under its generic name render that
name capable of distinguishing in terms of s 9. The name was also used by others in the trade to
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services of the same kind which do not bear the mark, or does the mark only tell the
customer what the goods or services are?,,65
There are degrees of inherent capacity to distinguish.i? Purely descriptive marks, for
example, are factually incapable of distinguishing and even through use cannot qualify
for registration." Section 10(2)(a) precludes the registration of a mark, which is so
descriptive that it can never perform the function of a trade mark because it is for all
practical purposes devoid of any distinctive character.f Section 10(2) is, however,
qualified by the proviso that if the mark (having no inherent capacity to distinguish), at
the time of application for registration has in fact become capable of distinguishing as a
result of use, it will be registrable. Laudatory epithets are not normally inherently
capable of distinguishing, but may be proved distinctive in fact through use.69 So are
descriptive marks, such as KWIKFIT in relation to an exhaust fitment centre.70 Invented
words on the contrary, are factually inherently capable of distinguishing," even before
use. Another category is those marks, where in the absence of use there is doubt as to the
inherent factual capacity to distinguish.f
describe the product and not to distinguish it (780F). The appeal succeeded. See also Triomed (Pty.)
Ltd. v Beecham Group pic. [2001] 2 All SA 126 (T) 133b-d; 2001 2 SA 522 (T) 533B-C.
65 Webster & Page (1997) par 3.40.2.
66 Webster & Page (1997) par 3.25; 3.41 - 3.49; Morley (1998) 24.
67 See s lO (1), which precludes the registration ofa mark "which does not constitute a trade mark". See
also Beecham Group pic. v Triomed (Pty.) Ltd. [2002] 4 All SA 193 (SCA); 2003 3 SA 639 (SCA),
which concerned the oval, bi-convex shape of an AUGMENTIN tablet. The court found that it is an
ordinary shape and one of the most common in the pharmaceutical industry and was therefore not
inherently capable of distinguishing (650G). Moreover, the shape did not become distinctive through
use (6501). See further Webster & Page (1997) par 3.25,3.40.2. Morley (1998) 24 gives the examples
of TREA T for sweets and SOAP for soap.
68 See Webster & Page (1997) par 3.43,3.51.2 & 3.51.3. S 10(2)(a) reads as follows: "a mark which is
not capable of distinguishing within the meaning of section 9". In Pleasure Foods (Pty.) Ltd. v TMl
Foods CC tla Mega Burger 2000 4 SA 181 (WLD) 190B the court found that the mark
MEGABURGER was liable to be removed from the register in terms of s 10(2)(a), (b) and (c) as not
being capable of distinguishing. The court said that the mark was merely descriptive of size and
reasonable required for use in the trade.
69 See First National Bank of SA Ltd. v Barelays Bank pIc. and another [2003] 2 All SA I (SCA) 6a, dealt
with under the 1963 Act, where Harms JA held that a laudatory epithet can be registered as a trade mark
if it had become distinctive through use. The court found that the trade mark PREMIER was entitled to
registration in part B (9g), but then found that in terms of s IO(IA) it was reasonably required for use in
the trade and therefore not registrable (IOc). There is also the possibility that a mark consisting entirely
of a laudatory epithet can offend against one or more of the provisions of s 10(2) of the 1993 Act.
70 Morley (1998) 24.
71 Webster & Page (1997) par 3.42. The most quoted example is KODAK.
72 Webster & Page (1997) par 3.25.
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6.3 BACKGROUND TO THE DILUTION PROVISIONS OF THE 1993 ACT
6.3.1 COMMON-LAW POSITION
Misappropriation of the advertising value must in the first place be distinguished from
passing off. Passing off takes place where there is a likelihood of confusion or deception
as to the origin of the products and therefore passing off protects the origin function of a
trade mark. Misappropriation can however happen inside or outside a competitive
situation and will lead to trade mark dilution. By preventing misappropriation the
advertising function of a trade mark is protected."
Rutherford distinguishes between two forms of misappropriation of the advertising value,
or what is known today as trade-mark dilution. He calls it unconcealed and concealed
misappropriation.Ï" Unconcealed misappropriation normallyf takes place when an
identical or similar trade mark is used in relation to competing products. Examples are in
cases of comparative advertising" and generic use of a trade mark. Both blurring and
tarnishment can occur." Concealed misappropriation can take place in the traditional
trade-mark infringement or passing-off situation. But it can also occur when an identical
or similar trade mark is used on non-competing products."
73 Rutherford BR "Misappropriation of the Advertising Value of Trade Marks, Trade Names and Service
Marks" (1990) 2 SA Mere LJ 151 at 153.
74 Rutherford (1990) 153-158.
75 It can according to Rutherford (1990) 154 also takes place in a non-competitive situation. He uses the
example of a trader who states that his kitchen appliances are made with the same precision as a Rolls
Royce or an Omega.
76 As there is no likelihood of confusion between the two products in this situation, there is no traditional
infringement or passing off. Blurring however takes place and the trade mark becomes diluted.
77 Rutherford (1990) 155 does not use the terms "blurring" or "tarnishment", but his descriptions
correspond to those which are generally used for these two forms of dilution.
78 See the discussion of the Dallas case (Lorimor Productions Inc. & others v Sterling Clothing
Manufacturers (Ply.) Ltd. 1981 3 SA 1129 (T» in Rutherford (1990) 156-157 for an example.
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Where the unauthorised use is on non-competing, but related products, an injury named
"confusion of sponsorship'f" can be caused." As there is no competitive situation,
passing off or traditional trade-mark infringement cannot take place.i' In this situation
the trade-mark owner is also prevented from using his own mark if he intends to expand
his line of business.Y Another injury that can occur in the case of unauthorised use of a
trade mark on non-competing goods is the dilution of the advertising value of the trade
mark.83
It is clear that the common law afforded limited protection to misappropriation of the
advertising value of a trade mark. Protection is only given "in so far as the right to
goodwill of the proprietor is infringed, and then only where such misappropriation is
accompanied by a likelihood of confusion as to origin or sponsorship't." The courts were
also reluctant to accord judicial recognition to the advertising function of a trade mark."
Furthermore, no protection was available under previous legislation against the
unauthorised use on non-competing, unrelated products. Mostert argues that the
exploitation of the commercial magnetism of a trade mark on non-competing goods
constitutes an independent form of prejudice, apart from confusion of sponsorship and
trade-mark dilution. This form of damage is nowhere protected in our common law.
79 See Mostert (1986 lIC) 81-85 for a discussion of "confusion of sponsorship". This topic will not be
discussed in any detail in this dissertation.
80 The reasonable person will believe that there is some connection, affiliation or sponsorship between the
products. The more well known a trade mark, the greater the likelihood of confusion of sponsorship.
See Mostert FW "The Parasitic Use of Commercial Magnetism of a Trade Mark on Non-competing
Goods" (1986) Il European Intellectual Property Review 342.
81 See Rutherford (1990) 156-166 regarding how this was dealt with in case law. Mostert (198611C) 83
sets out the two basic objectives of a claim for confusion of sponsorship: "It serves to protect the
reputation and goodwill of the goods of the trade-mark owner. Secondly, it serves to prevent deception
of the purchasing public."
82 Mostert (1986 lIC) 83.
83 Mostert (1986 lIC) 80-95 & (1986 EJPR) 342 draws a clear distinction between these two forms of
injury. Trade-mark dilution occurs when the respective goods of the plaintiff and defendant are not
closely related.
84 Rutherford (1990) 158.
85 Rutherford (1990) 162.
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According to Mostert this form of prejudice should be afforded legal protection as an
independent interest. 86
6.3.2 PREVIOUS LEGISLATION
Both the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 and the Designs Act 57 of 1967 provide incidental
protection against the misappropriation of the advertising value of a trade rnark" The
Trade Marks Act 62 of 1963 provided statutory protection under section 44 in the
following cases: Section 44(1)(a) prevents the unauthorised use as a trade mark of the
same or a confusingly similar trade mark in relation to the goods for which the mark is
registered and section 44(1)(b) prevents any use in the course of trade, otherwise than as
a trade mark, of the same or confusingly similar trade mark in relation to the goods for
which the mark is registered and which is likely to cause the proprietor injury or
prejudice. The phrase "use ... otherwise than as a trade mark" in section 44(1)(b) will
cover comparative advertising and generic use, both examples of unconcealed
misappropriation.f The possibility of defensive registrations'" created by section 53 of
the Trade Marks Act of 1963 provided some protection in the case of non-competing, but
related products.
6.3.3 THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM AND EUROPEAN LAW
As stated above, South African trade-mark law has traditionally been closely linked to
that of the United Kingdom. The first South African legislation in this field was to a
great extent based on its English counterpart. As member of the European Union since
1971, the United Kingdom's trade-mark legislation has to comply with the European
Directive on the Harmonisation of Trade Mark Laws of 1988.90 The United Kingdom
86 See Mostert (1986 EIPR) 342-348 for a well-considered, comparative discussion on this topic. A
discussion of this form of injury goes beyond the scope of this dissertation.
87 See the discussion in Rutherford (1990) 158-159.
88 Rutherford (1990) 160.
89 See Chapter 6.2.2 "Defensive Registrations" supra.
90 See Chapter 5.5.2 "Final Adoption and Aim" supra.
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Trade Marks Act of 1994 complied with its obligations under the Directive.91 The South
African legislature in the South African Trade Marks Act of 1993 also adopted a number
of principles and definitions from the European Directive. The South African Act thus
shows a substantial degree of harmony with legislation in the United Kingdom and other
European countries. There are, however, also several differences.92 In Beecham v
Triomed." the court stressed that judgments of the United Kingdom and the Court of
Justice of the European Communities all have "persuasive force", but that the South
African courts are not bound by these authorities. The South African Act should be
"interpreted and applied in the light of our law and circumstances". Policy considerations
in South Africa and Europe may also be different.
More specifically, the definition of a trade mark and the requirements for registration in
the European Directive, had a substantial influence on the current South African
legislation on these matters." There is however one difference between the European
Directive and United Kingdom Act on the one hand and the South African Act on the
other hand regarding the definition of a trade mark and registration requirements. The
two first mentioned used the phrase "capable of distinguishing" in the definition of a
trade mark, whereas in the South African Act this phrase is used when dealing with the
basic requirements for registration of a trade mark." According to Webster and Page
care must therefore be exercised when considering cases decided under the European
Directive or United Kingdom Act on this aspect." The United Kingdom's legislation
actually has a two-fold test. Section 3(1)(a) requires the mark to be "capable of
distinguishing", thus preventing registration of a mark which is so descriptive that it
cannot be registered. The threshold for section 3(1)(a) was extremely low and "capable
of distinguishing" was interpreted to mean "not incapable of distinguishing't'" This is
91 This Act came into force on 30 October 1994.
92 Webster & Page (1997) par 1.2.
93 Beecham Group plc. v Triomed (Pty.) Ltd. [2002] 4 All SA 193 (SCA); 2003 3 SA 639 (SCA) 645A-D.
94 This was acknowledged in the explanatory memorandum which accompanied the Trade Marks Bill,
namely the Memorandum on the Objects of the Trade Marks Bill, 1993 [B174B-93(GA) 50]. See
Webster & Page (1997) par 3.40.1 for a more comprehensive discussion.
95 The definition of "trade mark" in s 2 instead defines a trade mark as "a mark used ... for the purpose of
distinguishing goods or services ... ",
96 Webster & Page (1997) par 3.40.1.
97 See Webster & Page (1997) par 3.40.1.
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followed by section 3(1)(b), which prevents registration of trade marks "devoid of
distinctive character".· This phrase refers to trade marks, which lack a distinctive
character in the absence of appropriate use." Cases decided under section 3(l)(b) of the
1994 United Kingdom Act in which the distinctive character of a trade mark was
determined, may be of assistance to South African courts when determining whether a
mark is "capable of distinguishing" or not for purposes of section 9 of the South African
Act.99
6.3.4 SOUTH AFRICA'S INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS
6.3.4.1 THE PARIS CONVENTION
The Paris Convention 100 has long been the principal international treaty in the field of
trade-mark law. This Convention is administered by the World Intellectual Property
Organisation (WlPO). The Convention was concluded in Paris in 1883 and has been
revised from time to time. The last revision was in Stockholm on 14 July 1967. South
Africa has been a member since 1947.101 In short, member countries promise national
treatment for citizens of other member states and also agree to maintain at least a
specified minimum level of trade-mark protection. As the Paris Convention is not a
statute, but an agreement between contracting nations, it cannot confer rights on trade-
mark proprietors.l'f A further Act of domestic legislation is required to create
98 The controversy around this dual test was referred to the Court ofJustice of the European Communities
by the English Court of Appeal in the case of Philips Electronics N. V v Remington Consumer Products
Ltd, [1999] R.P.C. 809 (CA). The question before the CffiC in Koninklijke Philips Electronics N. V v
Remington Consumer Products Ltd, [2003] R.P.C. 2 14 (ECJ) was: "Is there a category of marks which
is not excluded from registration by Articles 3(1)(b)-(d) and Article 3(3) of the Council Directive
89/1 04/EEC, which is nonetheless excluded from registration by Article 3(1 )(a) of the Directive ... ?"
The question was answered in the negative as the respective articles have the same purpose. For a
detailed discussion of this case, see Webster & Page (1997) par 3.40.1. The Philips case greatly
influenced the judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Beecham Group pic. v Triomed (Pty.) Ltd
[2002] 4 All SA 193 (SCA); 2003 3 SA 639 (SCA).
99 See Chapter 6.2.3 "Registrability under the 1993 Act" supra for a discussion of s 9.
100 The Convention of Paris for the Protection of Industrial Property. See Webster & Page (1997)
Appendix 6 for the text. See also Rangel-Ortiz H "Well-Known Trademarks Under International
Treaties: Paris Convention and TRIPS - Part 1" (1997) Trademark World 14-16.
101 Webster & Page (1997) par 8.47.
102 Blakeney (1994) 481.
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enforceable rights. Article 6bis( 1) of the Convention makes provision for the protection
of famous or well-known marksl03 from infringement, but only when used on identical or
similar goods and thus not in the case of dilution.l'"
The Madrid Protocol and the Trademark Law Treaty were two more recent initiatives to
create a system for foreign registrations and to harmonise trade-mark registration
procedures, respectively. lOS
The latest initiative by WIPO, relevant for this study, is the Joint Recommendation
Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks, adopted by the
Assembly of the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Property and the General
Assembly of WIPO.106 It is recommended that each Member State, meaning a State
member of the Paris Convention and/or WIPO, may consider the use of any of the
provisions contained in the Joint Recommendation as guidelines'l" for the protection of
well-known marks in that Member State. This recommendation is inter alia applicable in
the case of so-called dilution of a well-known mark.108
Article 2(1)(a) states that "any circumstances from which it may be inferred that the mark
is well known" can be taken into account. Article 2(1 )(b) then lists certain factors which
in particular can be considered, although none of these factors may be relevant and "the
decision may be based on additional factors that are not listed .... ,,109 The factorsIlO are
103 The term "well-known mark" is not defined in the Paris Convention. See Webster & Page (1997) par
8.5l.
104 See Marro1etti W "Dilution, Confusion, or Delusion? The Need for a Clear International Standard to
Determine Trademark Dilution" (1999) 25 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 659 at 668 fn 63;
Rangel-Ortiz (1997) 15; Kaufman IJ "The Impact of the Trade Related Aspects oflntellectual Property
Rights Agreement on Trademarks" (1997) Trademark World 30 at 34.
lOS Denicola RC "Some Thoughts on the Dynamics of Federal Trademark Legislation and the Trademark
Dilution Act of 1995" (1996) 59 Law and Contemporary Problems 75 at 81.
106 Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the Protection of Well-Known Marks adopted by the
Assembly of the Paris Union for the Protection of Industrial Property and the General Assembly of the
WIPO at the Thirty-Fourth Series of Meetings of the Assemblies of the Member States of WIPO 20 to
29 September 1999, WIPO Geneva 2000 (r:\intranet\www\eng\infbroch\833(e).doc).
107 See Joint Recommendation p4 & art. 2(1)(c).
108 See Joint Recommendation art. 4(1)(b)(i) & (ii).
109 Art. 2(1 )(c) of the Joint Recommendation.
IlO In art. 2(1 )(b) of the Joint Recommendation.
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the degree of knowledge or recognition of the mark amongst the relevant sector of the
public; the duration, extent and geographical area of any use of the mark; the duration,
extent and geographical area of any promotion of the mark; the duration and geographical
area of any registrations and/or applications for registration of the mark; the extent to
which the mark was recognised as well known by the competent authorities; and the
value associated with the mark. I I I The "relevant sector of the public" is defined as actual
and/or potential consumers of the type of goods, persons involved in channels of
distribution and business circles.112 The Joint Recommendation, however, determine that
in the case of dilution, a Member State may require that the well-known mark be well
II'known "by the public at large". ~
6.3.4.2 THE GATT AGREEMENT ON THE TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
GATTI14 was created in 1947 at the Bretton Woods Conference. This conference
established inter alia the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.lls GATT
was an attempt to remove barriers to free trade by lowering tariffs. At the end of the
eighth round of negotiations to revise GATT, called the Uruguay round, the WTO was
established in 1994 to replace GATT.116 South Africa became a member of the World
Trade Organisation (WTO) with effect from 31 January 1995, the date of its
establishment. South Africa also became a party to TRIPS, the agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.1I7 This agreement was ratified by the
III Compare the eight factors listed in the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of the United States. See
Chapter 4.7.1 "Definition of Dilution in the Act" & Chapter 4.7.2 "Discussion of the Different Factors"
supra.
112 Art. 2(2)(a) of the Joint Recommendation. If a mark is determined to be well known in at least one
relevant sector of the public in a Member State, the mark shall be considered to be a well-known mark.
See art. 2(2)(b).
113 Art. 4(l)(c) read together with art. 4(1)(b)(ii) & (iii).
114 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
115 Kaufman (1997) 30.
116 Kaufinan (1997) 30, 31. This round began in 1986. Negotiations progressed slowly and after
intervention from Dunkel, the Director General of GATT, negotiations were concluded and ratified in
1994 in Marrakesh. The WTO was established by the Marrakesh Agreement or the World Trade
Organisation Agreement.
117 Text in Webster & Page (1997) Appendix 8.
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South African parliament on 5 April 1995.118 South Africa is thus bound by the TRIPS
agreement, which is one of a number of multilateral agreements on trade entered into
under the Final Act of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in 1994.119
The TRIPS agreement was the first effort to address intellectual property rights within the
context of a worldwide trade agreemenr.V" The increase in international trade and
growing recognition of intellectual property rights in this context, as well as the growth in
infringements of these rights made this agreement necessary. The main aim of this
agreement is to prevent obstacles to international trade being created because of a
perceived need to protect intellectual property rights, by stipulating minimum levels of
protection for such rights that must be provided by Member States in their domestic
I . I' 121egis anon. A further aim of the TRIPS agreement is to promote technological
innovation and the transfer and dissemination of technology. The TRIPS agreement is
considered to be a major breakthrough in the international protection of intellectual
property, both because of its substance and the wide degree of international
acceptance.l'"
Trade marks are covered in articles 15 to 24 of the TRIPS agreement which is contained
in Part II named "Standards Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of Intellectual
Property Rights". Other parts of the agreement deal with the acquisition, maintenance
and enforcement of intellectual property rights, dispute prevention and settlement
procedures, transitional arrangements and a few miscellaneous provisions.l'"
118 Webster & Page (1997) par 1.5.
119 See Davies 1M (general editor) Sweet & Maxwell's European Trade Mark Litigation Handbook (1998)
Sweet & Maxwell London 27. There are 130 member countries, listed in Webster & Page (1997)
Appendix 9.
120 Kaufman (1997) 30.
121 Davies (1998) 28; Rangel-Ortiz (1997) 16.
122 Worthy J "Intellectual Property Protection after GATT' (1994) 5 European Intellectual Property
Review 195.
123 See Kaufman (1997) 32-34.
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(i) Three Basic Principles
The TRlPS agreement rests on three basic principles. Firstly, Member States are required
to introduce minimum levels of protection and enforcement of intellectual property
rights. Secondly, each Member State should protect nationals of other states by granting
them the rights set out in the TRlPS agreement. This is known as the principle of
national treatment. Thirdly, the nationals of other Member States must be treated no less
favourably than a Member State's own nationals. Furthermore, advantages given to
nationals of one Member State must be extended to the nationals of all other Member
States, even if this treatment is more favourable than that which is offered to its own
nationals. This is known as the "most favoured nation" principle.l'" The appropriate
method of implementation is left to the discretion of the Member States, but will be
monitored by the WTO.125
(ii) Specific Provisions Regarding Trade Marks
The definition of a trade mark in the TRlPS agreement is very similar to the one found in
the Trademark Directive and the United Kingdom's Trade Marks Act of 1994.
According to Daviesl26 it is generally thought that no changes are required by the United
Kingdom to comply with the TRlPS agreement. The minimum rights, which must be
conferred on trade-mark owners are defined. In this regard it must be noted that well-
known marks are given greater protection.l'" Concerning the enforcement of intellectual
property rights, Member States are obliged to provide domestic procedures and remedies
that can be used by non-nationals of that state.128
124 Worthy (1994) 195.
125 Davies (1998) 28-29; Kaufman (1997) 33. A Council for TRIPS will monitor the operation of the
TRIPS agreement, as well as the Member States' compliance with its terms.
126 Davies (1998) 29. One exception is, however, noted by her.
127 See Worthy (1994) 196.
128 See Davies (1998) 29-30 for a list of more specific requirements in this regard.
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(iii) Dilution Protection in the TRIPS Agreement
It is believed that article 16(3) of the TRIPS agreement specifically encompasses the
dilution doctrine.129 This article is worded as follows:
"Article 6bis of the Paris Convention (1967) shall apply, mutatis mutandis, to goods or services
which are not similar to those in respect of which a trademark is registered, provided that use of
that trademark in relation to those goods or services would indicate a connection between those
goods or services and the owner of the registered trademark and provided that the interests of the
owner of the registered mark are likely to be damaged by such use."
The protection against imitations of well-known marks on identical or similar'f" goods is
thus extended to dissimilar goods or services under the above mentioned conditions. The
fact that this article refers to "goods or services which are not similar" suggests that it is
aimed at protecting against dilution. It is, however, not clear whether this article requires
enactment of dilution statutes or whether protection against confusing uses on dissimilar
goods would suffice.l3l There is a limitation built into this provision, namely the
requirement that the well-known mark must be registered. Protection is, however, often
needed in the absence of registration.V''
To determine whether a mark is well-known in the context of Article 6bis of the Paris
Convention, article 16(2) determines that the knowledge of the trade mark in the relevant
sector of the public, including knowledge in the country where protection is sought,
obtained as a result of the promotion if the trade mark, must be taken into account.l33 It
is, however, uncertain whether this definition will be accepted for the purposes of article
16(3) as well.
129 Gilson (1999) § 5.12.1.b; Denicola (1996) 84; Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24 fn 11; Kaufman
(1997) 34; Mostert FW "Well-known and Famous Marks: is Harmony Possible in the Global Village?"
(1996) 86 The Trademark Reporter 103 at 130.
130 A synonym for "similar" goods is "related" goods. See Mostert (1996) l30.
131 Denicola (1996) 84 fn 40.
132 Mostert (1996) 130.
133 Rangel-Ortiz (1997) 16; Worthy (1994) 196.
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6.4 DISCUSSION OF THE DILUTION PROVISIONS AND CASES
6.4.1 INTRODUCTION
As stated above, a new South African Trade Marks Act134 took effect on the I May 1995.
This Act for the first time introduced protection against the misappropriation of the
advertising value135 or dilution of trade marks.136 Although this was done to bring our
legislation into line with that of South Africa's most important trading partners,
especially those in the European Union, it was also in accord with proposals for
legislative reform by important role-players within the South African trade-mark law
environrnent.Y'
Section 9138 of the Act sets out the grounds for registrability. Although a mark may be
capable of distinguishing, thus satisfying the requirement for registrability set in section 9
of the 1993 Act, it may be unregisterable in terms of section l O, Section lO sets out
absolute and relative grounds for the refusal of registration of a trade mark.139 These
grounds can also be used to remove a mark, already registered, from the register.l'" Two
new grounds for objection were introduced by the 1993 Act, namely section 10(6),
dealing with the protection of well-known foreign trade marks, and section 10(17) the so-
called dilution provision. In the following paragraph section 10(17), one of the relative
grounds, will be discussed. The counterpart of this section, section 34( 1)(c), dealing with
infringement by way of dilution, will also be discussed.
134 The Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993.
135 In the words of Rutherford (1990) 151.
136 See Bata Ltd. v Face Fashions CC 2001 1 SA 844 (SCA) 851E, where Melunsky AlA said "The
section was introduced ... to provide protection against the dilution of a registered trade mark .... "
137 See the proposal of Rutherford (1990) 162-163.
138 See Chapter 6.2.3 "Registrability under the 1993 Act" supra.
139 S 10(1), (2)(a)-(c), (3), (4), (5), (7), (8), (9), (10), (II) and (13) constitute absolute grounds for refusal.
These prohibitions arise out of the inherent nature of the particular mark. See Webster & Page (1997)
par 3.51 - 3.57. The grounds contained in s 10(6), (12), (14), (15), (16) and (17) relate to a conflict
with the prior rights of others and are therefore relative grounds for refusal. Webster & Page (1997) par
6.1 - 6.28. The terms absolute and relative are the terms used in the United Kingdom Act of 1994.
140 See the introductory portion of slO.
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6.4.2 THE DILUTION PROVISIONS
Section 10 deals with unregistrable trade marks and provides that certain categories of
marks shall not be registered as trade marks or, if registered, shall, subject to the
provisions of sections 3 and 70, be liable to be removed from the register.l'" One such
category is defined in subsection (17) as:
"[A] mark which is identical or similar to a trade mark which is already registered and which is
well-known in the Republic, if the use of the mark sought to be registered would be likely to take
unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the registered
trade mark, notwithstanding the absence of deception or confusion, unless the proprietor of such
trade mark consents to the registration of such mark."
Section 34 describes the different ways of infringing a registered trade mark.142 One of
these is contained in section 34( 1)(c), which refers to -
"the unauthorized use in the course of trade in relation to any goods or services of a mark which is
identical or similar to a trade mark registered, if such trade mark is well known in the Republic
and the use of the said mark would be likely to take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the
distinctive character or the repute of the registered trade mark, notwithstanding the absence of
confusion or deception: Provided that the provisions of this paragraph shall not apply to a trade
mark referred to in section 70(2)."
Webster and Page state that these two provisions describe what are "commonly known as
the dilution provisions'V'" Unluckily no definition for the term "dilution" was provided
in the Act.
141 S 3 deals with application of the Act of 1993 to marks registered under the repealed Act and s 70
contains transitional provisions.
142 S 33 provides that no one shall be entitled to institute any proceedings under s 34 in relation to a trade
mark not registered under the Act. This implies that only registered marks are protected under the Act.
See Webster & Page par 12.1. However, in the light of the dilution provisions it is no longer necessary
to have a trade mark registered in respect of the goods or services to which the alleged infringement
relates to qualify for protection. Section 34(1 )(c) refers to "any goods or services".
143 Webster & Page (1997) par 6.25.1.
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Although the interpretation of most of the important phrases in the sections quoted above
is quite clear, the phrases "well known" and "likely to take unfair advantage of, or be
detrimental to, the distinctive character or repute" are open to interpretation by the courts.
In this Chapter the dilution provisions will mainly be discussed as used and already
interpreted in South African law. The main comparison between the South African
provisions and their counterparts in the United States Law and European Union Law,
including that of the United Kingdom, will be made in the next chapter.
(i) Use in the Course of Trade
"Use in the course of trade" in section 34(l)(c) is comparable with the phrase
"commercial use" in the United States. Thus it exempts any non-commercial uses, such
as news reporting and literary works, from enforcement. 144
As section 34(1)(c) clearly applies to use in relation to any goods or services
notwithstanding the absence of confusion or deception, "use in the course of trade" must
mean "in the course of any trade".145 This may have far-reaching implications, but this is
the aim of section 34( 1)( c) compared to the traditional infringement provisions.
(ii) Use ... .in Relation to Any Goods or Services
The phrase "any goods or services" certainly includes goods and services that are not
similar, but most probably also includes similar goods and services.l'" This can
potentially mean that section 34(1)(c) can apply concurrently with section 34(1)(a) and
34(l)(b) of the South African Act. Nevertheless, as reasoned below in par (v) the
dilution provisions are not intended to be used concurrently with either section 34(1)(a)
or (b), because it would negate the basic difference between traditional infringement and
144 Schwartz & Morfesi (1997) 458.
145 See Webster & Page (1997) par 12.29.
146 See Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24.
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dilution.147 It can, however, be used in the alternative as an aggrieved party under section
34(l)(c) does not have to establish confusion. In Triomed v Beecham148 the court stated
that section 34(l)(c) is meant to prevent the use of a well-known mark on goods "other
than those for which the mark registered". The court went on to say that this subsection
is not intended to protect a proprietor who cannot prove the requirements of section
34(l)(a) or 34(1)(b) in respect of the same or similar goods.
(iii) Use of the Registered Mark or a Mark Similar Thereto
This phrase entails a comparison between the two marks. This comparison is limited to a
comparison of the marks alone.149 If the offending mark is identical to the registered
mark, there is no difficulty. In the case of similar marks objective similarity between the
two marks must be proved. The term "similar mark" is however open to judicial
interpretation. The ordinary dictionary meaning of the phrase is "showing resemblance
in qualities, characteristics, or appearance; alike but not identical,,15oor "having a marked
resemblance or likeness".151
In case law there are three South African cases that can be referred to in this context. The
first is National Brands Limited v Blue Lion Manufacturing Limited,152 where the
following approach was approved and followed. It was stated that the offending mark
should immediately bring to mind the well-known trade mark.153 Secondly, in the case of
Bata Ltd v Face Fashions CC,154the court had to compare the marks POWERHOUSE
and POWER in the context of section 34(l)(c). The Supreme Court of Appeal stated the
147 See Chapter 3.3 "Traditional Infringement Contrasted with Dilution" supra for a complete discussion of
the difference between the two concepts.
148 Triomed (Pty) Ltd. v Beecham Group pic. [2001] 2 All SA 126 (T) 153-154; 2001 2 SA 522 (T) 555D.
149 Webster & Page (J 997) par 12.26.
150 Collins Dictionary of the English Language I st ed 1979.
151 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 3 ed vol II.
152 National Brands Ltd. v Blue Lion Manufacturing Ltd. unreported judgment TPD II May 1999 case
98/23751.
153 See Webster & Page (1997) par 12.26.
154 Bata Ltd. v Face Fashions CC 2001 1 SA 844 (SCA). The following facts were relevant in the context
of the s 34(1)(c) enquiry. The appellant was the registered owner of the name POWER in respect of all
footwear. The respondent used the marks POWER HOUSE and POWERHOUSE on articles of
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word "similar" should not be given too wide an interpretation to prevent creating an
unacceptable monopoly to the proprietor of a trade mark and thus unduly stultifying
freedom of trade. If the marks, therefore, only contain features of the same kind or bear a
slight resemblance, they will not be considered to be "similar". The court chose the
meaning given to the term in The Oxford English Dictionary, namely "having a marked
(easy to recognise) resemblance or likeness". Applying this to the facts, the court
decided that the two marks might possibly have "a slight or superficial resemblance", but
that "the likeness between the two is not sufficiently close or marked to enable this Court
to hold that they are similar for the purposes of section 34(l)(c)".155 The third case, SAB
v Laugh It Off Promotionsl " also followed the approach in Bata v Face Fashions.
(iv) Well known
The phrase "well known" is not defined in the South African Trade Marks Act. It is the
same term as that used in article 6bis of the Paris Convention, which also left the concept
undefined. The only other places in the South African Act where the phrase is used is in
sections 10(6) and 35, both dealing with the protection of well-known trade marks. This
phrase was interpreted in the Mclionald's case157in the context of section 35. The court
interpreted it against the background of the common law on passing Of[.158It was clear
from the application of the passing-off action that owners of foreign trade marks who did
not have a goodwill within the country were not protected. It was accepted that section
35 was to remedy this position.l'" The court then stated "that a mark is well known in the
Republic if it is well known to persons interested in the goods or services to which the
clothing. (The appellant's contentions regarding its other cause of action based on s 34(1 )(a) was
rejected by the court.)
ISS Bata Ltd. v Face Fashions CC 2001 1 SA 844 (SCA) 852B-E. The appeal was therefore dismissed with
costs.
IS6 SAB International tla Sabmark International v Laugh It Off Promotions [2003] 2 All SA 454 (C) 458d-
g. The requirement was referred to but not discussed in the judgment on appeal Laugh It Off
Promotions CC v SA Breweries International (Finance) BV tla Sabmark International [2004] 4 All SA
151 (SCA). See the detailed discussion in Chapter 6.4.4. "Cases" infra.
IS7 McDonald's Corporation v Joburgers Drive-inn Restaurant (Pty.) Ltd. and another; McDonald's
Corporation v Dax Prop CC and another; McDonald's Corporation v Joburgers Drive-Inn Restaurant
(Pty.) Ltd and Dax Prop CC 1997 I SA I (A); [1996] 4 All SA 1 (A).
IS8 Webster & Page (1997) par 12.27.
IS9 McDonalds Case 19D-E.
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mark relates".160 The court went on to state that the degree of knowledge within the
relevant sector is that of a "substantial number of persons'v" Section 35 of the Act was
amended by the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment Act 38 of 1997 by the insertion
of subsection (lA):
"In determining for the purposes of subsection (I) whether a trade mark is well known in the
Republic, due regard shall be given to the knowledge of the trade mark in the relevant sector of the
public, including knowledge which has been obtained as a result of the promotion of the mark."
This definition corresponds closely to the definition In section 16(2) of the TRIPS
agreement.l'f
There is a presumption in the law that the same expression in every part of a statute bears
the same meaning, except if there are clear indications to the contrary.l'" This means that
"well known" in section 34(1)(c) should in principle have the same meaning as in section
35. However, the view of Webster and Page that there are clear indications to the
contrary appears to be correct.i'" The fact that the legislature specifically mentions that
section 35(lA) should apply "in determining for the purposes of subsection (l)", may
indicate that the legislature attempted to distinguish between the meanings of "well
known" for the purposes of section 35 and section 34(1)(c).165 This would mean that the
interpretation given to "well known" in section 35 and the McDonalds case should not
necessarily be used in determining the meaning of the same phrase in section 34( I)(c).
Another fact, which reinforces this proposition, is that the purpose of section 35 was to
overrule the requirement of the common law on passing off that goodwill in South Africa
is necessary for relief. The remedy against passing off is aimed at protecting the origin
function of a trade mark and takes place in a competitive situation where there is a
likelihood of confusion or deception. This factor is therefore not relevant in the context
160 McDonalds Case 20E.
161 McDonalds Case 210.
162 See Chapter 6.3.4.2 "The GATT Agreement on the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (iii) Dilution Protection in the TRIPS Agreement" supra.
163 Du Plessis, LM Interpretation of Statutes (1986) Butterworths Durban 127.
164 Webster & Page (1997) par 12.27.
165 See Webster & Page (1997) par 12.27 fn 1.
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of section 34(1)(C).166This would mean that "well known" in the "dilution" provisions of
the South African Act could be interpreted more like the term "famous" in the United
States Law. The knowledge of the public at large or of non-consumers may then be
relevant to determine whether the commercial magnetism of the mark has been
misappropriated.l'" This stricter definition can be justified in the light of the fact that the
protection of trade marks is extended to non-competing goods by the dilution rationale.
However, in Triomed (Pty) Ltd v Beecham Group plcl68 the court adopted the
McDonald's interpretation of "well known" in the context of section 34(1)(c), stating:
"In my view the interpretation given to the expression [well known] in the context ofs 35 of the
Act in the McDonald's case could appropriately be applied to the interpretation of 'well known in
the Republic' as this expression appears in s 34(1)(c) of the Act."
This notion was also followed in SAB v Laugh It Off Promotions.169
It is accepted that a well-known trade mark is a mark that is widely or generally known.
Mostert'Ï" defines it as a mark "which is known to a substantial segment of the relevant
public in the sense of being associated with the particular goods or services". A well-
known mark clearly has a reputation. Marks with a reputation, on the other hand, are not
necessarily well known.171 There is also an even higher degree of prominence, namely
famous marks.l72 These famous marks deserve a broader scope of protection against
unauthorised uses.!" In the French Intellectual Property Code174 the following
166 Webster & Page (1997) par 12.27 especially fn 4.
167 See Mostert (1996) 119.
168 Triomed (Pty.) Ltd. v Beecham Group pic. [2001] 2 All SA 126 (T) 154; 2001 2 SA 522 (T) 556C-D;
[2001] FSR 34, 618 par 132.
169 SAB International tla Sabmark International v Laugh It Off Promotions [2003] 2 All SA 454 (C) 458i-
459b. See Chapter 6.4.4 "Cases" infra.
170 Mostert (1996) 115.
171 The United Kingdom Trade Marks Act s 10(3) uses the phrase "marks with a reputation" instead of
"well known". See Chapter 5.7.2.1 "General" supra.
172 The Federal Trademark Dilution Act 1995, Lanham Act § 43(c), 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c). See Chapter 4.7
"The Federal Trade Mark Dilution Act of 1995" supra.
173 Mostert (1996) 115,116-117. The higher the degree of reputation or commercial magnetism, the
broader its scope of protection should be, irrespective of whether it is a well-known or a famous mark.
174 Art. 16 of the Act of4 January 1991. See also Blakeney (1994) 482.
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distinction IS drawn between "well known" and "famous". Well-known marks are
defined as a mark "recognised by a large fraction of the circles concerned with the
production, sale or use of the goods in question and which is clearly perceived as
indicating a particular origin of these products". A famous mark is a mark "known
internationally or worldwidev.i" It is therefore presumed that the term "well known" as
used in the South African Act implies a lesser degree of fame than those famous marks
posses.
In the case of Safari SUl1 Shop CC v Heavywater'l" the trade mark SPIDER came under
scrutiny. For purposes of section 34(1)(c) the enquiry centered on the interpretation of
"well known". The SPIDER trade mark was only known in coastal areas in which the
surfboards on which it was used, were available. The court found that the mark was well
known throughout surfing circles in the Republic of South Africa and that this was
sufficient for the purposes of section 34(1)(c). The court formulated the test as follows:
"Ifthe trade mark is well known in that part of the Republic of South Africa in which the
goods in relation to which it is used, are available, then that, in my opinion, is
sufficient".177 However, in this case it is important to remember that the respondent used
the device of a spider on the same products, surfboards, in the same geographical area as
the applicant.i"
175 The World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) in its Draft Trademark Law Treaty Art. 103(2)
(June 1990) draws the distinction between "well-known marks" and "exceptionally well-known marks".
176 Safari Surf Shop CC v Heavywater [1996] 4 All SA 316 (D). Both parties carried on business as
manufacturers of surfboards. The applicant was the registered proprietor of the SPIDER trade mark.
The respondent then started to use a device of a spider. The applicant succeeded with a claim under s
34( 1)(a), as the court found that the defendant's mark so nearly resembled the applicant's mark as to be
likely to deceive or cause confusion (327e-f, 328d). In the alternative, action was instituted under s
34(1)( c).
177 Safari Surf Shop CC v Heavywater [1996] 4 All SA 316 (D) 327e-g.
178 Webster & Page (1997) par 12.27 agree with this judgment on the facts of the case. They, however,
note that if the respondent used its device on another product throughout the country, the outcome ought
to be different.
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(v) Likely to Take Unfair Advantage of, or be Detrimental to, the Distinctive
Character or Repute
It is clear that the phrases "unfair advantage" and "detrimental to" both qualify "the
distinctive character or the repute" of the trade mark. The commercial magnetism and
selling power of a trade mark flow from its distinctive character or repute and these
characteristics are protected by the dilution provisions.l " Schwartz and Morfesi 180
contended that this phrase requires a showing of likelihood of dilution, which can be
proved by either blurring of tarnishment. The South African courts had the opportunity
to interpret the phrases "unfair advantage" and "detrimental to" in Triomed (Pty) Ltd v
Beecham Group plcl81 and SAB v Laugh It Off Promotions.182 In Triomed the court
referred to the English Premier Brands case,183 which in turn quotes from two German
decisions. In the first German case of Dimple'[' the concept "to take unfair advantage
of' was explained as follows:
"The Courts have repeatedly held that it constitutes an act of unfair competition to associate the
quality of one's goods or services with that of prestigious competitive products for the purpose of
exploiting the good reputation of a competitor's goods or services in order to enhance one's
promotional efforts".
In relation to the meaning of the phrase "detrimental to", the court quoted from another
German case, Quick: 185
179 Webster & Page (1997) par 12.28.
180 Schwartz & Morfesi (1997) 458.
181 Triomed (Pty) Ltd. v Beecham Group pic. [2001] 2 All SA 126 (T); 2001 2 SA 522 (T) 556H-557B;
[2001] F.S.R. 34, 619 par 135-136.
182 SAB International tla Sabmark International v Laugh It Off Promotions [2003] 2 All SA 454 (C) 459f-
461e; Laugh lt Off Promotions CC v SA Breweries International (Finance) B V tla Sabmark
International [2004] 4 All SA 151 (SCA) 160e-161j.
183 Premier Brands UK Ltd. v Typhoon Europe Ltd., High Court ofJustice, Chancery Division, 21 January
2000 (2000) 23(5) IPD; [2000] F.S.R. 767 at 786, discussed in. Chapter 5.7.2.3 "Cases on Section
10(2)"and Chapter 5.7.2.4 "Cases on Section 10(3)" supra.
184 Dimple, 1985 GRUR 550.
185 Quick, 1959 GRUR 182.
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"The owner of ... a distinctive mark has a legitimate interest in continuing to maintain the position
of exclusivity he acquired through large expenditures of time and money and that everything
which could impair the originality and distinctive character of his distinctive mark, as well as the
advertising effectiveness derived from its uniqueness, is to be avoided .... Its basic purpose is not
to prevent any form of confusion but to protect an acquired asset against impairment".
"Unfair advantage" and "detriment" normally take the form of blurring or tarnishrnent.l'"
In the one South African case thus far, the court found dilution by tarnishment. This was
in the case of SAB v Laugh It Off Promotions, followed by the appeal case, Laugh It Off
Promotions v SAB.187 The respondent used the words BLACK LABOUR, together with
the slogan AFRICA'S LUSTY, LIVELY EXPLOITATION, on T-shirts. The court said
that this was likely to take unfair advantage or cause detriment to the applicant's
registered trade marks BLACK LABEL, AMERICA'S LUSTY, LIVELY BEER.188 The
appeal court explained that "detriment" encompasses "any detriment" and that detriment,
in order to be actionable, has to be unfair. Furthermore, insubstantial prejudice is not
enough.189
Webster and Page suggest that the following factors could play a role to determine
whether the distinctive character or repute of a mark was affected detrimentally by the
defendant's use: 190
"(a) whether the mark is inherently distinctive (such as an invented mark) or whether
it has acquired distinctiveness through use;
(b) the nature and extent of use of the same or a similar mark by third parties;
186 See Chapter 3.4.1 "Blurring" and Chapter 3.4.2 "Tarnishment" supra for conceptualisation of these
terms.
187 SAB International tla Sabmark International v Laugh It Off Promotions [2003] 2 All SA 454 (C) 461 e;
Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SA Breweries International (Finance) BV tla Sabmark International
[2004] 4 All SA 151 (SCA) 153f, 157d and 161e, where the court said that the message created by the
appellant is "particularly unwholesome, unsavoury, or degrading".
188 See the discussion in Chapter 6.4.4 "Cases" infra.
189 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SA Breweries International (Finance) BV tla Sabmark International
[2004] 4 All SA 151 (SCA) 160c-d.
190 Webster & Page (1997) par 12.28.
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(c) the degree of recognition of the proprietor's mark In its and the defendant's
channels of trade."
In the Spider casel91 the court decided that defendant's use of the SPIDER device would
be likely to take unfair advantage of, and be detrimental to the repute of the applicant's
registered SPIDER trade mark. Both the SPIDER device and SPIDER trade mark were
used in connection with surfboards in the same geographical area. The court also found
trade-mark infringement in terms of section 34(1)(a) and also a prima facie case of
passing off. In this case there was thus clearly a likelihood of confusion and deception.
Webster and Page reason that where there was a likelihood of confusion and deception,
the use complained of would take unfair advantage of and be detrimental to the repute of
the plaintiff's trade mark and may thus still play an important role in dilution cases.l92
It is clear from the wording of the Act that only a likelihood of dilution is required and
not actual dilution. This was also confirmed in Laugh It Off v SAB, where it is said that
section 34(1)(c) "does not require proof of actual loss but only the likelihood of loss" .193
In Laugh It Off Promotions v SAB the court made it clear that the phrases "unfair
advantage" and "detrimental to" must also be interpreted in the light of the Constitution.
Their application must thus not unduly restrict another party's freedom of expression.
This, the court said, "requires a weighing-up of the freedom of expression and the trade-
mark owner's rights of property and freedom of trade, occupation or profession.t'{"
191 Safari Surf Shop CC v Heavywater [1996] 4 All SA 316 (D) 327.
192 Webster & Page (1997) par 12.28,6.27.
193 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SA Breweries International (Finance) BV t/a Sabmark International
[2004] 4 All SA 151 (SCA) 161f. See also Webster & Page (1997) par 12.28. Th is is different from the
requirement of actual loss under the US Federal Trade Mark Dilution Act as established in Moseley v. V
Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. ) lIS (2003). But see the proposed Trademark Dilution Revision Act
of 2005, discussed in Chapter 4.10.4 "Likelihood of Dilution vs Actual Dilution" supra, where only a
likelihood of dilution is required.
194 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SA Breweries International (Finance) BV tla Sabmark International
[2004] 4 All SA lSI (SCA) 159f, 160d. See also Chapter 6.4.4 "Cases" infra.
318
(vi) Notwithstanding the Absence of Confusion or Deception
Traditionally it was accepted that dilution could only occur in the absence of confusion or
deception. Webster & Page reasons that "while dilution is usually referred to in the
context of use on non-competing goods in the absence of a likelihood of confusion or
deception there is no reason, In principle, why dilution cannot occur with use on
competing goods where there is a likelihood of confusion or deceptionr'Ï? It is
submitted that this statement negates the clear difference that exists between traditional
infringement and dilution. As previously said,l96 dilution can in fact only occur when
confusion as to source or origin is absent. If someone is confused, the mark remains the
sole identifier of the senior user's product in his mind. He thus perceives the two marks
as representing the same source. Dilution, on the other hand, occurs when the awareness
that a specific mark signifies a single product from a single source, changes to an
unmistakable awareness that the same mark signifies various things from various
sources."? In Triomed v Beecham Group198 it was stated that section 34(l)(c) is not
intended to protect a proprietor who cannot prove the requirements of section 34(1)(a) or
34( I)(b) of the Act in respect of the same or similar goods, as those for which a trade
mark is registered. It is submitted that this statement is correct, notwithstanding the fact
that on the face of its wording "any goods or services", it may at first appear that section
34(l)(c) was also intended to cover this situation.
195 Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24 (emphasis added). They refer to the case of Safari Surf Shop CC v
Heavywater [1996] 4 All SA 316 (D) for authority.
196 See Chapter 3.3 "Traditional Infringement Contrasted with Dilution" supra.
197 Patti shall BW "Dawning Acceptance of the Dilution Rationale for Trade Mark - Trade Identity
Protection" (1984) 74 The Trademark Reporter 289 at 300, 308; McCarthy IT "The 1996 Federal Anti
Dilution Statute" (1998) 16 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 587 at 592; McCarthy IT
McCarthy on Trademarks 4th ed (1996) West Group St Paul Minnesota § 24:70.
198 Triomed (Pty.) Ltd. v Beecham Group plc. [2001] 2 All SA 126 (T) 153-154; 2001 2 SA 522 (T) 555D,
quoted by Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24.
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(vii) Remedies
The remedies for the infringement of a trade mark, set out in section 34(3), include an
interdict, an order to remove the infringing mark from all materials.l'" damages, or in lieu
of damages and at the option of the proprietor, a reasonable royalty.2oo The last
mentioned remedy will simplify the courts' task of quantifying damages in dilution cases
to a great extent.?"
6.4.3 COMP ARATIVE ADVERTISING
Comparative advertising is advertising where a party advertises his goods or services by
comparing them to the goods or services of another, normally his competitor and often
brand leader.202 Trade-mark law concerns itself with comparative brand advertising,
where the trade mark of the other party is used for this purpose. The question is whether
comparative brand advertising constitutes trade-mark infringement. If the requirements
of the infringement provisions are met, there will be infringement. In the United
Kingdom section 10(6) of the Trade Marks Act of 1994 defines what is acceptable
comparative advertising, but there is no equivalent of this section in our Act.203
Most decided cases on comparative brand advertising fall under section 34(1)(a), because
the respective goods are identical.204 A number of South African authors support the
view that section 34(l)(a) can be used to prevent comparative advertising.Y'
199 Where the infringing mark is incapable of being removed from the material the court may direct that all
such material should be delivered to the proprietor of the mark.
200 S 34(3)(d) provides for a reasonable royalty which would have been payable by a licensee for use of the
trade mark.
201 See Schwartz & Morfesi (1997) 460.
202 Webster & Page (1997) par 12.18.2. See also Chapter 5.7.2.6 "Comparative Advertising in the UK"
supra.
203 See Chapter 5.7.2.6 "Comparative Advertising in the UK" supra.
204 See for example Abbot Laboratories v UAP Crop Care (Pty.) Ltd. [1999] 1 All SA 502 (C); 1999 3 624
(C), where the respondent produced a brochure for internal use comparing its PERLAN product with
the applicant's PROMALIN product, both agricultural chemicals used in the apple farming sector, and
concluding that its product was better. The court found comparative advertising within the ambit of s
34(1)(a).
205 See Abbot Laboratories v UAP Crop Care (Pty.) Ltd. [1999] 1 All SA 502 (C) 509h-51 Oh; 19993 624
(C) 632C-633C, where the following authors are cited: OH Dean, CK Job, T Woker and Webster &
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Comparative advertising can also be used in relation to similar goods and even dissimilar
goods. In the last mentioned situation, trade-mark dilution can occur and thus
infringement of section 34(l)(c). Webster and Page use the example of "XYZ shoes, the
ROLLS ROYCE of shoes". Although shoes and motor vehicles fall in totally different
classes of goods, there can be infringement in terms of section 34(l)(c), which refers to
"any goods", if the other requirements are met.
6.4.4 CASES
Since the commencement of the current South African Trademarks Act on 1 May 1995
and until the end of2003206 there was only one major trade-mark dilution case decided by
a South African court. This was the case of SAB v Laugh It Off Promotions and the
subsequent decision on appeal,207which will be discussed here in detail. The only other
notable case on the interpretation of section 34(1)(c) was Bata v Face Fashions,208which
only identified the basic elements of a dilution case and clarified the court's interpretation
of "similar" .209
The SAB case has been described as South Africa's highest profile trade-mark case
ever.210 The reason can be found in the background to the case. The owner of Laugh It
Off Promotions, a close corporation, was Justin Nurse, a former journalism student. He
started in 2001 to sell T-shirts bearing disparaging representations of well-known trade
marks. His intention was clear - to undermine the value and impact of brands and to use
Page. The only author holding a contrary view, is R Wheeldon, who relies on the right of freedom of
speech and expression in the South African Constitution.
206 The 31 December 2003 was chosen as the cut-off date for this dissertation. However, on 16 Septem ber
2004 the judgment in the appeal case of SAB and Laugh It Off Promotions was delivered. In the light of
its importance for dilution in the South African context, it was decided to incorporate references to this
case in the dissertation.
207 SAB International tla Sabmark International v Laugh It Off Promotions [2003] 2 All SA 454 (C),
Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SA Breweries International (Finance) BV tla Sabmark International
[2004] 4 All SA 151 (SCA).
208 Bata Ltd. v Face Fashions CC 2001 1 SA 844 (SCA). See Chapter 6.4.2 "The Dilution Provisions (iii)
Use of the Registered Mark or a Mark Similar Thereto" supra for more detail.
209 Smith A "No Laughing Matter: Free Speech, Race Hate and Trademark Politics" (July/August 2003)
Trademark World 18 at 19.
210 Smith (2003) 18.
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them in political rhetoric. He also threatened to use the media against any trade-mark
proprietor who want to take action against him?ll
The facts can be summed up as follows. SABMiller Finance BV and its predecessors
used the CARLING BLACK LABEL trade mark for alcoholic beverages in South Africa
through The South African Breweries Limited (SAB). Itwas widely known that BLACK
LABEL beer was largely marketed to the black mass market.2l2 The respondent offered
for sale T-shirts bearing a mark similar to the applicant's trade mark. The words BLACK
LABEL had been replaced by the words BLACK LABOUR. The words CARLING and
BEER above and below the mark, were respectively replaced by the words WHITE and
GUILT. At the top of the mark the words AMERICA'S LUSTY, LIVELY BEER were
replaced with AFRICA'S LUSTY. LIVELY EXPLOITA TION SINCE 1652. The words
BREWED IN SOUTH AFRICA at the foot of the mark had been replaced by NO
REGARD GIVEN WORLDWIDE. The letter type and colours used in both marks, were
similar. Applicant applied for an interdict based on the infringement of section
34(1)(c).213
The court a quo referred to the justification given by professor Rutherford for the
introduction of "anti-dilution,,2l4 provisions.t'' The only South African cases referred to
were Bata Fashions and Triomed v Beecham for the requirements of section 34(1)(c),
211 Smith (2003) 18. The only other proprietor who dared to take action was Kirkbi AIS, proprietor of the
LEGO trade mark. Laugh It Off did not submit a defence and there was a very quick surrender
resulting in the offending products being removed from the market. The SAB case was a test case and
Nurse certainly made use of the media.
212 SAB international tla Sabmarkinternational v Laugh it Off Promotions [2003] 2 All SA 454 (C) 460i-j.
213 The facts of this case are comparable to those of one of the most well-known cases of tamishment,
namely Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, inc., 346 F.Supp. 1183, 175 U.S.P.Q. 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1972),
where the court had enjoined the use of the slogan ENJOY COCAINE on T-shirts in the same colour
and script as the famous, registered ENJOY COCA-COLA trademarked slogan. Another case in the
same genre was Anheuser-Busch, inc., v. Andy's Sportswear, inc., 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1542 (N.D. Cal.
1996), where the well-known brewing company succeeded in a tamishment case against the
manufacturer of sportswear. The plaintiff averred that the BUTTWISER T-shirts sold by the defendant
diluted its BUDWEISER trade mark.
214 It is submitted that the term "anti-dilution" used by Cleaver J throughout the judgment has become
obsolete in modem trade-mark law. See for example the comment by Gilson (1999) § 5.l2[1][b]. In
the Appeal case Harms JA also used the term "anti-dilution".
215 This passage is quoted in Chapter 3.5.2.3 "Policies Underlying Trade-Mark Law" supra.
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Rata Fashions for the interpretation of "similar" and McDonalds for the interpretation of
well-known" .
The court a quo held that the following requirements must be met:
(a) the defendant's mark must be identical or similar to the plaintiff's mark;
(b) the use must be unauthorised, in the course of trade and likely to take unfair
advantage of or be detrimental to the distinctive character or repute of the
plaintiff's mark; and
(c) the plaintiff's registered mark must be well known in the Republic.
Regarding the first requirement, Justice Cleaver followed the interpretation given in Bata
Fashions to the term "similar".216 In casu he found that there was a "marked
resemblance or likeness" between the two marks. He said that the respondent's mark
referred directly to the applicant's mark - the colouring, lettering and overall effect were
similar.217
Use of the mark was furthermore clearly unauthorised and respondent used the mark in
the course of trade, namely in order to promote the sale of its T_shirts218 and thus for
commercial gain.
The third requirement, namely that the mark, must be well known, was considered with
reference to the interpretation of "well known" in the McDonalds case_219 This case
concerned the interpretation of "well known" in the context of section 35, but in the
Triomed case it was accepted that the same test could be used to determine "well known"
in section 34(1)( c). Evidence of considerable advertising was placed before the court.
216 SAB International tla Sabmark International v Laugh It Off Promotions [2003] 2 All SA 454 (C) 458d-
g.
217 Respondent did not deny that the mark used had a marked resemblance or likeness to applicant's mark.
218 SAB International tla Sabmark International v Laugh It Off Promotions [2003] 2 All SA 454 (C) 458h-
i,461h.
219 SAB International tla Sabmark International v Laugh It Off Promotions [2003] 2 All SA 454 (C) 458i-
459f.
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From this information the court inferred that the applicant had proved that its marks are
well known.
The main issue220 to be considered was whether respondent's use of the mark was likely
to take unfair advantage of or be detrimental to the distinctive character or repute of the
I· iff' k 221P amti . s mar . The court a quo referred to two types of dilution, blurring and
tamishing_222 No direct evidence was given by the applicant as to the likelihood of
dilution, but counsel for the applicant averred that tarnishment of applicant's mark was
likely to occur. It was submitted that respondent's T-shirts conveyed the message that
the applicant had exploited and continued deliberately to exploit black labour and was
guilty of racial discrirnination.I" The appeal court also emphasised the importance of the
message that is conveyed. The issue is not what was intended by the appellant, but "what
he in fact said or did".224 The court then found that the message conveyed is that "since
time immemorial SAB has exploited and is still exploiting black labour".225 The court,
furthermore, declared that in the Iight of the history of the country, this message could be
seriously damaging to the respondent's trade marks.
The court a quo referred to Webster and Page, who in their discussion oftamishment, say
that "it ought to be relatively easy to identify dilution by tamishment where the use is
obviously offensive". They refer back to their discussion of section 10(12) where the
words "likely to give offence to any class of persons" are interpreted.F" Justice Cleaver
220 The Supreme Court of Appeal accepted that all the other requirements have been established and that
this issue was the only one that remained. See Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SA Breweries
International (Finance) BV tla Sabmark International [2004] 4 All SA 151 (SCA) 160e.
221 SAB International tla Sabmark International v Laugh It Off Promotions [2003] 2 All SA 454 (C) 459f-
461e.
222 In referring to "tarnishing" the court adopted the terminology used in the Triomed judgment. It is
submitted that the term should be "tarnishment" as used internationally in handbooks, reference articles,
cases, etc. and also in Webster & Page. In the judgment on appeal the SCA used the correct
terminology and referred to "tarnishment".
223 SAB International tla Sabmark International v Laugh It Off Promotions [2003] 2 All SA 454 (C) 460f-
g.
224 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SA Breweries International (Finance) BV tla Sabmark International
[2004] 4 All SA 151 (SCA) 161b.
225 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SA Breweries International (Finance) BV tla Sabmark International
[2004] 4 All SA 151 (SCA) 161c, 160.
226 Webster & Page (1997) par 6.9.
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In the SAB case came to the conclusion that "from a comparison of the marks and
respondent's understanding of as well as its purpose in using the applicant's marks, ...
the applicant has established that such use would be likely to take unfair advantage or be
detrimental to the distinctive character or repute of the plaintiffs registered marks".227
A constitutional defence was, however, raised by the respondent in the lower court. It
relied on its right to freedom of artistic activity contained in the right to freedom of
speech and expression conferred by section 16 of the Republic of South Africa
Constitution Act 108 of 1996.228 This was the first time that a constitutional defence was
raised in a major trade-mark dispute in South Africa.z29 The judge acknowledged that
"the dividing line between freedom of speech and the statutory protection afforded the
applicant is a thin one". He however concluded that the respondent transgressed this
line.23o He found inter alia that respondent's conduct borders on hate speech and was
aggravated by using the race factor.r"
The constitutional defence was also raised in the Supreme Court of Appeal. The court
first stated that intellectual property rights are not immune to constitutional challenge.
The question is to what extent guarantees of freedom of expression affect intellectual
property rights.z32 The court in the first place gave examples of free speech that do not
impinge on the trade-mark owner's rights.233 The court then found that "unfair or
unjustified racial slurs" should not be endorsed, especially in South Africa. Predatory
227 SAB International tla Sabmark International v Laugh It Off Promotions [2003] 2 All SA 454 (C) 461 e.
228 SAB International tja Sabmark International v Laugh It Off Promotions [2003] 2 All SA 454 (C) 462h-
i. This defence was also raised in the appeal case, Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SA Breweries
International (Finance) BV tja Sabmark International [2004] 4 All SA 151 (SCA) 162a-166f.
229 Alberts W "Who's Laughing Now? Dilution and the Constitution in South Africa" (July/August 2003)
Trademark World20. See also Webster & Page (1997) par 1.9.
230 See the reasons for this conclusion at SAB International tja Sabmark International v Laugh It Off
Promotions [2003] 2 All SA 454 (C) 462j-463e.
231 SAB led evidence to show that it had gone to substantial lengths to avoid racial discrimination and that
it have a strong equal opportunity employment policy. See Smith (2003) 18.
232 Laugh lt Off Promotions CC v SA Breweries International (Finance) BV tja Sabmark International
[2004] 4 All SA 151 (SCA) 156d.
233 Laugh lt Off Promotions CC v SA Breweries International (Finance) BV tja Sabmark International
[2004] 4 All SA 151 (SCA) 162c-f.
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intent was also a factor taken into account by the court_234 The appellant further
submitted that the message on the T-shirts was a parodi3s of SAB's trade marks. After
studying examples from other jurisdictions, the court decided that "appellant's reliance
on the freedom of expression is misplaced. It did not exercise its freedom, it abused
it. ,,236
Smith considers the judgment in the lower court to be a landmark in South African trade-
mark law with regard to the dilution of well-known trade marks. He pointed out that the
court did not preclude parody or fair social statement, but did indicate that one cannot
freely trade on another's well-known trade mark.237
With reference to trade-mark law in the United States, Justice Cleaver said that "the
question of confusion in the minds of the public also plays a role in the anti-dilution
proceedings in the US, something which does not apply in this country".238 This is not
entirely true. Although, even after acceptance of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act in
the US, courts still struggle to keep the notion of dilution apart from infringement, a few
recent court decisions recognised that dilution requires a different state of mind.239
6.5 THE NEED FOR DILUTION PROTECTION
When looking at the different kinds of damages flowing from dilution described below, it
is clear that it is essential that the law provide protection against dilution.24o
1. If a junior user started to use or even registered a well-known trade mark in a
specific jurisdiction, entry of the owner of the well-known mark in that
234 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SA Breweries International (Finance) BV tla Sabmark International
[2004] 4 All SA 151 (SCA) 163c.
235 Parody per se is not a defence to section 34( 1)(c). See Webster & Page (1997) par 1.9.
236 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SA Breweries International (Finance) BV tla Sabmark International
[2004] 4 All SA 151 (SCA) 163f-166f.
237 Smith (2003) 19.
238 SAB International tla Sabmark International v Laugh It Off Promotions [2003] 2 All SA 454 (C) 462e-
f.
239 See Chapter 4.10.5 "'Confusion' Under The Federal Act" supra.
240 Mostert (1996) 138-139.
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jurisdiction is blocked. It will make it impossible for him to use and exploit his
own trade mark within that jurisdiction. Another possibility is that someone
without authority starts to use the well-known mark on non-competing goods, he
in that way prevents the owner from expanding his line of business under his own
well-known trade mark.
2. Where an imitator uses a well-known trade mark on non-competing, but related
goods, consumers can wrongly assume that there is a business connection
between the imitator and the owner of the well-known trade mark or that the
goods are sponsored by the owner of the well-known mark.
3. Dilution of the famous mark can occur, in the absence of any likelihood of
confusion.
4. Damages may also be caused in the form oflost licence fees.241
The challenge is to find the most effective, least confusing description of the harm caused
by dilution, so that the courts can interpret and apply it in a clear and consistent way. In
the final Chapter a comparison between the different legal systems that were examined in
this dissertation will be made. In the light of this comparison guidelines will be
suggested in order to promote the protection of registered trade marks against dilution.
241 Mostert (1996) 138-139.
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CHAPTER 7
REFINING STATUTORY DILUTION PROTECTION IN THE
LIGHT OF THE COMPARATIVE SURVEY
7.1 INTRODUCTION
Although trade-mark law historically has been very territorially orientated, protection
from dilution has become a well-recognised and accepted doctrine internationally.' The
traditions of each country, however, result in somewhat different approaches to
protection.' The aim is to reward the creativeness and effort required to make a trade
mark famous over a period of time. It protects the symbol of goodwill that the trade mark
has come to represent.' However, to prohibit all junior uses of a mark would be
intolerably harsh. Indiscriminate application by courts and lawyers who tag dilution
counts onto every infringement claim, discredited the dilution doctrine. This need not,
however, compel one to reject totally any form of dilution protection, for reasonable
limits can be imposed on the doctrine." Furthermore, the dilution theory addresses a real
injury, but, as has been seen, the doctrine is conceptually difficult to apply. The injury
caused by dilution is also difficult to measure and therefore the extent of the injury is
difficult to quantify or prove. This Chapter will compare the current situation regarding
Dilution statutes commenced in the different jurisdictions discussed, within a period of less than 2
years. The United Kingdom Trade Marks Act came into force on 31 October 1994, the South African
Trade Marks Act took effect on 1 May 1995, the new Benelux Trade Marks Act became effective on 1
January 1996 and the Federal Trademark Dilution Act was enacted on 16 January 1996. The
Trademark Directive, however, dated back to 21 December 1989 and the Regulation on the Community
Trade Mark was adopted on 20 December 1993. It should also be remembered that dilution protection
in the Benelux countries dated back to 1 January 1971, when the Uniform Benelux Trade Marks Act
came into effect.
2 Welkowitz DS "Protection against Trademark Dilution in the U.K. and Canada: Inexorable Trend or
will Tradition Triumph?" (2000) 24 Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 63 at 64.
Cultural and legal historical norms also playa role in determining the extent oftrade-mark protection in
the different countries. See Welkowitz (2000) 69.
3 Casparie-Kerdel S "Dilution Disguised: Has the Concept of Trade Mark Dilution Made its Way into
the Laws of Europe?" (2001) 4 European Intellectual Property Review 185 at 193.
4 Compare Note "Dilution: Trade Mark Infringement or Will-o'-The-Wisp?" (1964) 77 Harvard Law
Review 520; reprinted in (1964) 54 The Trademark Reporter 184, 196.
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the interpretation and application of the dilution doctrine in South African law with the
United States law and then with the law of the European Union. Recommendations will
then be made to aid South African courts in the future interpretation and application of
the dilution provisions. Minor amendments to the legislation will also be proposed, with
a view to promoting greater clarity.
7.2 SOUTH AFRICA'S DILUTION PROVISIONS COMPARED TO THOSE OF
US FEDERAL LAW
7.2.1 INTRODUCTION
One commendable point of the US trade-mark system is that in legal doctrine dilution has
always been clearly distinguished from traditional infringement based on consumer
confusion. The portion of the Lanham Act which caters for traditional infringement
requires a showing of confusion, regardless of the similarity or lack thereof between the
goods of the parties. The dilution section also does not require that the offending goods
be either similar or dissimilar. In traditional trade-mark infringement law, based on fraud
and deceit, the public is protected from mistaken consumer choices and the trade-mark
owner is protected from loss of business to competitors and harm to the goodwill of his
business. Dilution law is there to protect the uniqueness of the trade mark, by preserving
the distinctive nature and commercial goodwill of the mark itself.s Therefore, there are
two different rationales for the protection of the two different types of infringement, each
with its own conditions and restrictions. Dilution protection is deliberately incorporated
in a separate provision of the Lanham Act, added by the Federal Trademark Dilution Act,
from those dealing with traditional infringement."
In contrast, protection against traditional confusion-based trade-mark infringement and
protection against dilution are both incorporated in the same infringement section in the
5 Casparie-Kerdel (2001) 185, 188, 194.
6 The dilution provisions are recorded in The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-
98,109 Stat. 985 (1995) (codified as amended at 15 USC § 1125, 1127 (West 1996». It is incorporated
in the Lanham Act as § 43(c). The infringement provisions are found in § 43(a) of the Lanham Act.
329
South African Trademarks Act.7 Although the internal structure of the section follows
quite logically from narrow protection to much wider protection, two different categories
with separate standards for infringement are created. Firstly, infringement where there is
deception or confusion and secondly, infringement notwithstanding the absence of
deception or confusion. Although confusion is expressly not required for a finding of
dilution, the fact that both provisions are incorporated in the same section will definitely
hamper the development of dilution as a remedy in its own right. Therefore it is
suggested that dilution must clearly be distinguished from traditional infringement based
on consumer confusion. It would thus be more logical to divide the protection against
infringement into separate sections based on this distinction.
7.2.2 THE DILUTION PROVISIONS
The basic characteristics of a dilution claim under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act''
are the following:
I. The protection is available for both registered and unregistered marks.
2. The mark must be famous to qualify for protection.
3. Defendant must make commercial use of plaintiffs mark in commerce, which means
that defendant must use the mark as a trade mark.
4. Dilution covers blurring, tarnishment, disparagement and diminishment of the
distinctive quality of the mark.
5. Dilution protection is provided regardless of the presence or absence of competition.
6. Dilution protection is provided regardless of the presence or absence of confusion,
mistake or deception.
7. There are certain statutory exceptions to or limitations of liability for dilution.
7 S 34(1) of Act 194 of 1993.
8 See The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98,109 Stat. 985 (1995) (codified as
amended at 15 USC § 1125, 1127 (West 1996» and Chapter 4.7 "The Federal Trademark Dilution Act
of 1995" supra.
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The requirements of a dilution claim under the South African Trademarks Act can be
summed up as follows:"
I. The mark must be registered to qualify for dilution protection.
2. The other mark must be identical or similar.
3. Protection applies against the use of the other mark In relation to "any goods or
services".
4. The registered mark must be well known in the Republic.
5. The use complained of must be likely to take unfair advantage of or be detrimental to
the distinctive character or repute of the mark.
6. The use complained of must be in the course of trade.
7. That use must be unauthorised.
8. Protection is available notwithstanding the absence of confusion or deception.
While there seem to be quite a few points of resemblance between the Federal Act and
the South African Act, in spite of the completely different ways in which the dilution
provisions are written, there are nevertheless important substantive differences. The
principal differences between the provisions are in the first place that the Federal Act
explicitly refers to the dilution of a mark and also contains a definition of dilution,
whereas the South African Act never uses the term "dilution". Dilution in the South
African context is inferred from the way in which the harm is described. Secondly, the
Federal Act only protects famous marks, while the requirement in the South African Act
is that the mark must be well known to qualify for protection. Thirdly, no specific
exceptions are listed in the South African Act.
(i) Well known/famous
In many commentaries on and discussions of dilution as a concept, there is a reluctance to
apply the concept freely to all marks. This emerges from a fear of granting a monopoly
in the language, which will inhibit free commercial use. This fear is largely absent in
9 See s 17(10) & 34( 1)(c) and Chapter 6.4.2 "The Dilution Provisions" supra.
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traditional infringement cases, as a likelihood of confusion is required, which prevents
excessive protection of trade marks. The dilution provisions are potentially limitless in
scope as they can be used in a non-competitive situation and in the absence of confusion
or deception. The requirement of a certain degree of fame or repute is one logical way to
limit the application of the dilution doctrine."
US State Dilution laws, mostly based on the Model State Trademark Bill, merely refer to
"dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark ...", thereby only requiring a mark to be
distinctive to qualify for protection against dilution. The Federal Trademark Dilution
Act, however, requires fame as prerequisite for protection and even gives a list of factors
to consider in the determination of whether a mark is famous or not.
The dilution provisions in the South African Act, namely sections 10(17) and 34(1)( c),
require a mark to be well known. There is however no definition of the concept or
guidelines for its interpretation. The only indication as to what is meant by the concept
"well known" is found in section 35(1 A), but as explained above, II there are good
reasons why this description should not be applied to determine the meaning of "well
known" in the context of the dilution provisions. However, in the Tri0111ed casel2 the
court adopted the interpretation given to the term "well known" in the McDonald's casel3
in the context of section 35 for purposes of section 34(1)(c) as well. This approach was
also followed in SAB v Laugh It Off14 This test may be too lenient in the light of the far-
10 "In order to combat the possibility of virtual trade-mark monopolies, commentators have stressed the
need for strict adherence to the fame requirement embodied in the FTDA." See Belongia HL "Why is
Fame Still Confusing? Misuse of the 'Niche Market Theory' Under the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act" (2002) 51 DePaul Law Review I159 at 1161.
II See Chapter 6.4.2 "The Dilution Provisions (iv) Well known" supra.
12 Triomed (Pty.) Ltd. v Beecham Group pic. [2001] 2 All SA 126 (T) 154; 20012 SA 522 (T) 556C-D;
[2001] F.S.R. 34, 618 par 132. See Chapter 6.4.2 "The Dilution Provisions (iv) Well known" supra.
13 McDonald's Corporation v Joburgers Drive-inn Restaurant (Pty.) Ltd. and another; McDonald's
Corporation v Dax Prop CC and another; McDonald's Corporation v Joburgers Drive-inn Restaurant
(Pty.) Ltd. and Dax Prop CC 1997 1 SA 1 (A); [1996] 4 All SA 1 (A). See Chapter 6.4.2 "The
Dilution Provisions (iv) Well known" supra.
14 SAB international tla Sabmark international v Laugh It Off Promotions [2003] 2 All SA 454 (C) 458i-
459b. See Chapter 6.4.2 "The Dilution Provisions (iv) Well known" & Chapter 6.4.4 "Cases" supra.
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reaching implications of a dilution action as appears from the discussion above. IS
It is submitted that although the term "famous" as used in the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act requires a greater reputation than "well known" used in section 34( 1)(c), the eight-
factor test set out in the Federal Trademark Dilution Act" can be applied with great
success in the South African law in determining the concept of "well known" for
purposes of the dilution provisions.l"
These factors are: 18
a) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness. Although
distinctiveness is already a requirement for registration as a trade mark
and only registered marks are protected in terms of the South African Act,
this factor could still be relevant. A higher degree of acquired
distinctiveness will have more probative value than mere inherent
distinctiveness.l"
b) The extent to which the mark is used and the duration of the use.
c) The duration and extent of advertising and publicity. Where the mark for
which protection is sought, has not yet been used in a specific market,
"spillover advertising" in the form of television broadcasts, televised
sporting events sponsored by the trade-mark owner, international
magazines, in-flight magazines and advertisements in international films
15 See the first paragraph of this section supra.
16 This test is practically the same as the practice guidelines for determining reputation for the purposes of
s 10(3) of the United Kingdom Act of 1994 suggested by the International Trademark Association to the
United Kingdom Government. These factors are listed in Webster CE & Morley GE Webster & Page
South African Law of Trade Marks, Unlawful Competition, Company Names and Trading Styles 4th ed
(1997) Butterworths Durban par 12.27. For a discussion see Chapter 4.7.2 "Discussion of the Different
Factors" supra. These factors are also similar to the relevant factors in a passing-off action.
17 This is also the subm iss ion of Webster & Page (1997) par 12.27.
18 Most of these factors are also listed in the Joint Recommendation Concerning Provisions on the
Protection of Well-Known Marks adopted by the Assembly of the Paris Union for the Protection of
Industrial Property and the General Assembly of the WIPO at the Thirty-Fourth Series of Meetings of
the Assemblies of the Member States of WIPO 20 to 29 September 1999, WIPO Geneva 2000
(r:\intranet\www\eng\infbroch\833(e).doc). See the discussion in Chapter 6.3.4.1 "The Paris
Convention" supra.
19 Mostert FW "Well-known and Famous Marks: is Harmony Possible in the Global Village?" (1996) 86
The Trademark Reporter 103 at 112.
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can be taken into account/" Presentation of the goods to which the mark
applies at fairs and exhibitions can also be taken into account."
d) The geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is used.
Use in a substantial portion of the Republic may be required, but there
could be exceptions. A good example of exceptional circumstances is to
be found in Safari Surf Shop, where the mark was only well known
throughout surfing circles in the Republic and the court found it sufficient
for the purposes of section 34(1)(C).22 The applicant and respondent
however used their marks on the same goods in the same geographical
areas. Had the other factors in the test been considered as well, the court
would still have reached the same result.
e) The channels of trade for the goods or services for which the mark is used.
f) The degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and channels of
trade of both parties. The greater the recognition of the plaintiff s mark in
the defendant's trading areas, the greater the likelihood that the distinctive
quality of the mark will be negatively affected. Direct evidence from
licensees, distributors and consumers is best, but indirect evidence can be
obtained through surveys and opinion polls."
g) The nature and extent of use of the same or a similar mark by third
parties. Where the same mark is used by several people, it is unlikely that
it will become more diluted by the conduct of another third-party user.
h) The existence of federal registration. This factor is not relevant in the
South African context, as the Act only applies to registered marks.
Mostert adds another three factors:
a) The nature of the goods.
20 Mostert (1996) 112.
21 See art. 2(1)(b)(3) of the Joint Recommendation.
22 Safari Surf Shop CC v Heavywater [1996] 4 All SA 316 (D). See Chapter 6.4.2 "The Dilution
Provisions (iv) Well known" supra.
23 See Joint Recommendation p14 par 2.3.
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bj The degree to which the reputation of the mark symbolises quality of class.
Quality is especially important in tarnishing cases.
cj The extent of the commercial valui4 attributed to the mark.
He submits that all these factors can be of value to assist trade-mark authorities and
courts in determining whether a mark is well-known."
Whether a mark is well-known or not remains a question of fact and therefore each case
should be considered on its own facts, taking into account any special circumstances.
Not anyone of the listed factors should be decisive on its own, although certain factors
will be more important depending on the circumstances of each case." This list of
factors is non-exhaustive and only serves as a guideline. They are however of great
importance in the light of international trade and the need for effective recognition and
protection of well-known marks.
Mostert asserts that if clarity existed as to what is protected by a claim for trade-mark
dilution, it would become clear that requirements such as fame and related concepts are
redundant and that they in fact hinder the operation of the dilution doctrine." He
contends that a claim for trade-mark dilution protects the advertising value of a trade
mark. Therefore, a plaintiff has to prove that his trade mark possesses commercial
magnetism and advertising value and that these values were blurred or tarnished by
defendant's unauthorised use. Even a lesser known trade mark possesses commercial
magnetism and advertising value and therefore it is unnecessary to require a certain
degree of fame."
24 The value associated with the mark is also one of the factors listed in the Joint Recommendation to
determine whether a mark is well known.
25 Mostert (1996) 111-113. Mostert examined the following statutes, agreements and other sources as
authority for this proposition: § 43(c)(1) of the Lanham Act, the Cartagena Agreement, the Industrial
Property Code of Brazil, the Canadian Trade-marks Act, cases in Colombia, France and Mexico,
practice procedures of the Trade Mark Offices in China and the Report of WIPO's Committee of
Experts of Well-Known Marks.
26 Mostert (J 996) 113, 114.
27 Mostert FW "Trade Mark Dilution and Confusion of Sponsorship in United States, German and English
Law" (1986) 17 International Review of Industrial Property and Copyright Law 80 at 91.
28 Mostert admits that the more renowned a mark is, the easier it would be to prove that such mark
possesses commercial magnetism and advertising value. Mostert (1986 lIC) 91-92. He relies on the
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Martino suggests that marks which are candidates for dilution relief ought to be
registered, possibly In a separate "dilution register".29 Registration would enhance
visibility making it easier to identify these marks and to challenge or to enter into
transactions with their owners. It would also ward off potential competitors. This option
is however not viable in the South African context. Firstly, a set of guidelines to
determine which marks qualify to be registered in this special register would still be
needed. Secondly, every application for the entry of a mark in the special register will
have to be examined according to the guidelines. The administrative burden would be
Immense. Finally, it could take several months and even years from the date of
application to registration and in the meanwhile the marks will not be protected from
dilution.
(ii) Unfair advantage or detriment to distinctive quality or repute/dilution of
distinctive quality
The quality of a trade mark that is protected by the dilution provisions is its commercial
magnetism and selling power. These attributes flow from the distinctive character or
repute of the mark. Unfair advantage or detriment normally takes the form of blurring or
tarnishment. Blurring and tarnishment basically protect two separable but related
components of advertising value. The product identification or image may become
blurred, while the positive associations of a mark can be tarnished. Blurring has been
defined in different ways. It can best be described as the whittling away of an established
trademark's selling power and value or damage to the uniqueness or distinctiveness of the
trade mark and its capacity to identify source or loss of its ability to serve as a unique
idcntifier.i" Tarnishment occurs where the quality which one associates with a trade
mark is impaired. This can happen where the trade mark is linked to products of shoddy
following statement made by the court in Wedgewood Homes Inc v. Lund 659 P.2d 377, 381; 222
U.S.P.Q. 446, 450 (Or. Sup. Ct. 1983): "in summary, it is not the manner by which distinctiveness is
acquired nor the span of a mark's notoriety but rather the degree of advertising value the mark has
gained which determines the applicability ofORS 647.107 [the Oregon dilution statute]."
29 Martino T Trademark Dilution (1996) Clarendon Press Oxford (1996) 85.
JO See Chapter 3.4.1 "Blurring" supra.
336
quality, or is portrayed in an unwholesome or unsavory context, or linked with obscenity
or sexual or illegal activity, which all give rise to unflattering thoughts about the
plaintiffs product. The senior trade mark's reputation and commercial value are
diminished in this way."
To date, only one South African case has considered the phrase "likely to take unfair
advantage of or be detrimental to the distinctive character or repute of the plaintiffs
mark".32 This was clearly a case oftarnishment. The court refers to use that is obviously
offensive. The court a quo basically took two factors into account for a finding of a
likelihood of dilution, the similarity of the marks and predatory intent. Predatory intent
also played an important role in the decision of the appeal court.
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act has been criticised, amongst other grounds, for its
lack of an appropriate standard by which to measure dilution. The interpretation of the
words "causes dilution" in the Act was also an issue in United States law. Some circuit
courts required proof of actual dilution (or actual harm to the mark's selling power),
while others found a likelihood of dilution sufficient. In 2003 the whole debate was then
brought to a head by the Supreme Court's decision of Moseley v V Secret Catalogue/"
The court held that the Federal Trademark Dilution Act unambiguously requires a
showing of actual dilution.34 Mere mental association between the junior user's mark and
the famous mark is not a sufficient ground to establish actionable dilution. The Supreme
Court though failed to provide guidance on what proof must be offered to show actual
dilution. In 2005 the Trademark Dilution Revision Act was submitted to Congress."
This Act explicitly defines dilution as use of a mark "likely to cause dilution by blurring
or dilution by tarnishment". Actual harm is therefore not a prerequisite to injunctive
relief.
31 See Chapter 3.4.2 "Tarnishrnent" supra.
32 SAB International tla Sabmark International v Laugh It Off Promotions [2003] 2 All SA 454 (c);
Laugh lt Off Promotions CC v SA Breweries International (Finance) BV tla Sabmark International
[2004] 4 All SA 151 (SCA). See Chapter 6.4.4 "Cases" supra.
33 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003). See Chapter 4.10.4 "Likelihood of
Dilution vs Actual Dilution" supra.
34 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. IllS at 1124 (2003).
35 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of2005 HR Rep No 683, (9 February 2005).
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It is submitted that the likelihood of dilution standard, as followed in the Nabisco
decision'? and proposed in the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, is the better
interpretation. Dilution has been described as an infection, which, if allowed to spread
would inevitably destroy the advertising value of the mark.37 In other words, dilution
causes a gradual type of harm. It is submitted that to wait for actual harm to occur, will
be too late, as by then the advertising value of the mark could already have suffered
irreparable harm. Using the actual dilution standard will also in most cases leave the
senior user without the possibility of compensation as the statute only provides for
injunctive relief, if there was no intent on the part of the junior user. The junior user will
also be prejudiced as he will have to invest huge amounts of money to launch and put his
product on the market, not knowing whether his use will be prevented by an injunction at
a later stage.
The South African Act uses the words "would be likely to take unfair advantage", thus
referring expressly to a likelihood of dilution and not actual dilution. It is submitted that
the interpretation of this phrase ought not to become an issue in South African law. As
has been reasoned above, regarding the interpretation of the words "causes dilution" in
the US law, the "likelihood of dilution standard" is more in line with the nature of
dilution and should be followed.
To measure the likelihood of dilution different tests are used in the United States." In a
few cases the Sweet test" is still used, in Nabisco an expansive multi-factor test was
formulated, while others use only some of these factors. The Sweet test and the Nabisco
factors have both been criticised for bringing confusion factors into the dilution theory,
thus frustrating the inquiry. Dilution and traditional infringement require two different
36 Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 20786, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1882 (2nd Cir. 1999). See Chapter 4.10.4 "Likelihood of Dilution vs Actual Dilution" supra.
37 H.R. Rep. No. 104-374 at 3 (1995).
38 See Chapter 4.10.4 "Likelihood of Dilution vs Actual Dilution" supra.
39 See the case of Mead Data Central, Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc 875 F.2d 1026, 1032, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d 1961 (2nd Cir. 1989) in Chapter 4.3.3.1 "Second Circuit Cases" supra for the formulation of
the Sweet test.
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mind sets, as it is impossible to cause both confusion and dilution in the mind of anyone
person at the same time.40 Again and again courts in the US tried to formulate a
workable test for trade-mark dilution, but all their attempts were criticised. In the
proposed Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, six factors are listed that may be
considered to determine "dilution by blurting"." This Act was introduced after the
completion of this dissertation.f but is interesting to note that these are the exact factors
proposed by the author to determine a likelihood of dilution.
It is suggested that the following factors should, in principle.f be used to determine the
likelihood of dilution: mental association, fame, distinctiveness, similarity of marks and
third-party use. Predatory intent may also in some cases playa role. The other factors
used in the Sweet and Nabisco tests are only relevant for a traditional trade-mark
infringement inquiry and are therefore not appropriate in a dilution inquiry. The factors
which are relevant for determining likelihood of dilution in the South African context,
will now be briefly considered.
1. Mental association: This factor should be the most significant in measunng
dilution. A mental association can be determined by assessing the relationship
created in the mind of the public between the two marks. The question can be
asked whether consumers, when seeing the junior mark, will be reminded of the
senior mark.44 If consumers associate the two marks, the strength of the senior
mark is weakened. If there is no mental association between the marks, there is
40 See Chapter 3.3 "Traditional Infringement Contrasted with Dilution" supra.
41 These factors are (i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous mark;
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous mark; (iii) The extent to which the
owner of the famous mark is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark, [ie third-party usage];
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark, [ie fame]; (v) Whether the user of the mark or trade
name intended to create an association with the famous mark, [ie intent]; and (vi) Any actual
association between the mark or trade name and the famous mark. The court may still consider other
"relevant factors".
42 The dissertation was submitted for examination on 1 October 2004.
43 As appears from the discussion infra, not all these factors are relevant in the South African context.
44 Some commentators interpret the decision of the Supreme Court of the USA in the Moseley case as
saying that the mental association must run in the other direction: the question is not whether people
associate the junior mark with the famous mark, but whether the senior mark reminds people also about
the junior mark. See Chapter 4.10.4 "Likelihood of Dilution vs Actual Dilution" supra. This was said
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de facto no dilution and therefore no claim. The more sophisticated the
consumer, the more likely the consumer will make the mental leap between the
marks. Therefore in this sense consumer sophistication could also play a role.
Well-constructed consumer surveys could be used to determine a likelihood of
mental association, but the court should not hesitate to act upon their own reaction
when viewing the two marks." If actual association can be proven, it will surely
carry much weight in the dilution enquiry." This though should not be the
criterion for association.
2. Renown of the senior mark: The Federal Trademark Dilution Act requires a mark
to be famous, while its South African counterpart requires the senior mark to be
well known.47
3. Distinctiveness: Distinctiveness reflects the inherent strength or weakness of a
mark. Distinctiveness can be inherent or acquired through a secondary meaning.
In the United States this is a separate and important requirement in a dilution
claim." In South Africa, however, the Act only protects distinctive marks, thus
making this inquiry unnecessary.
4. Similarity of the marks: The likelihood that consumers will perceive the junior
mark to be similar to the senior mark can be determined. Although the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act does not specifically require similarity of marks, it is
evident from the case law that the marks must be identical or similar for dilution
to occur.49 It seems if "substantial" similarity will be required. The South
in the context of actual dilution - the standard for dilution set by the Supreme Court - and therefore it is
submitted that the test is too strict for a likelihood of dilution enquiry.
45 See the discussion of Ringling Bros-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Division of
Travel Development 935 F.Supp. 763,1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13304,40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1303 (E.D.
Va. 1996); 955 F.Supp. 605, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2116, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (E.D. Va. 1997);
affd. 170 F.3d 449,1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 4179, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1065 (41h Cir. 1999) in Chapter4.10.4
"Likelihood of Dilution vs Actual Dilution" supra.
46 See § (c)(2)(B) factor (vi) of the proposed Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005, which refers to
"actual association".
47 See Chapter 7.2.2 "The Dilution Provisions (i) Well known/famous" supra. The proposed Trademark
Dilution Revision Act refers to "degree of recognition of the famous mark".
48 See Chapter 4.10.2 "Distinctiveness" supra.
49 In the proposed Trademark Dilution Revision Act § (c)(2)(B)(i), the degree of similarity between the
junior mark and the famous mark can be taken into account to determine whether there was dilution by
blurring.
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African Act speaks expressly of "a mark which is identical or similar". It is thus a
separate inquiry from the likelihood of dilution.
5. Third-party usage. This is also an important factor, as the more the identical or
similar trade mark is used by different third-party users, the smaller is the chance
that the mark will be diluted by the use of the junior user.
6. Predatory intent: If the defendant purposely chose the senior user's mark to
benefit from its goodwill, it can be empirical evidence of a mental association
between the two marks. It is evidence that the defendant sees a likelihood of
association between the marks.
As has been indicated factors two, three and four - renown of the sernor mark,
distinctiveness and similarity of the marks - in the South African context are all three
normally decided before the court comes to the question of the likelihood of dilution.i" It
is submitted that mental association and third party usage are the only factors which are
primarily relevant to determine the likelihood of dilution. Consumer sophistication and
predatory intent can be taken into account, but as subordinate questions. When using
these factors, excessive protection need not to be feared." Only those marks which truly
suffer from dilution, will be protected.
(iii) Exceptions
The first exception in United States law is quite important as it brings certainty to the area
of comparative advertising. Fair use of a famous mark in comparative advertising is non-
actionable. This means that fair, non-confusing, truthful use of another's trade mark in,
for example product comparisons, will be allowed. Comparative advertising used in
relation to dissimilar goods will fall under section 34(l)(c) of the South African ACt.52
Thus, comparative advertising under this section will be allowed if it does not take unfair
SO See SAB International tla Sabmark International v Laugh It Off Promotions [2003] 2 All SA 454 (C).
See Chapter 6.4.4 "Cases" supra.
SI Compare Chapter 3.5.3 "Role of the Status of the Trade-Mark Proprietor's Right in the Dilution
Debate" supra, regarding the fear that the recognition of di lution protection in US law would amount to
the "granting of property rights in gross".
52 See Chapter 6.4.3 "Comparative Advertising" supra.
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advantage or cause detriment to the distinctive character or repute of the mark. This also
ensures that fair and truthful comparative advertising will be allowed.
7.3 SOUTH AFRICA'S DILUTION PROVISIONS COMPARED TO THOSE OF
EUROPEAN UNION LAW
7.3.1 INTRODUCTION
In European law, in contrast with that of the United States, the dilution concept is part of
the traditional trade-mark infringement section. This makes it difficult to distinguish the
dilution rationale from the confusion rationale. The result is that the theory of dilution
has never had the chance to develop in its own right. As stated above, the same is true
for the South African law.53
The companson JI1 this part will primarily focus on dilution law as set out in the
Trademark Directive and applied by the Court of Justice of the European Communities
(hereafter CJEC), but with some references to the Benelux and United Kingdom law.
The reason for this focus is that all the Member States have to conform to the provisions
of the Trademark Directive and that each Member States is moreover bound to interpret
its national law in the light of the wording and purpose of the directive.i"
Judgments of the CJEC and the courts of the United Kingdom have persuasive force in
South Africa, although the South African courts are not bound by these authorities.f In
the case of Cowbell v JCS Holdings" the Supreme Court of Appeal for example referred
to the judgment of the CJEC in the Canon case," in deciding what the essential function
53 See Chapter 7.2.1 "Introduction" supra.
54 Case C-408/01, Adidas-Salomon A.G .. formerly Adidas A.G., Adidas Benelux B.V v Fitnessworld
Trading Ltd., 23 October 2003 par 20-22.
55 See Beecham Group pIc. v Triomed (Pty.) Ltd. [2002] 4 All SA 193 (SCA); 2003 3 SA 639 (SCA)
645A-D.
56 Cowbell A.G. v ICS Holdings (Pty.) Ltd. 2001 3 SA 941 (SCA) 948A-C.
57 Case C-39/97, Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. (Formerly Pathe
Communications Corporation) [1998] E.C.R. 1-5507; [1999] R.P.C. 117, 133; [1999] F.S.R. 332, 350-
351.
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of a trade mark is. The fact that the Supreme Court refers to recent decisions by the
CJEC decided in terms of current European law can be highly commended. This
suggests that South African courts will recognise the roots of our current trade-mark law
in European law and will be open to seeking guidance from European decisions when
developing South African law on dilution.58
7.3.2 THE DILUTION PROVISIONS
As discussed above, 59 there are two provisions in the Trademark Directive and also the
United Kingdom Act which appear to provide dilution protection for trade marks.ï"
Article 5(l)(b) of the Directive and section 10(2) of the United Kingdom Act apply where
the marks are identical or similar, the goods are identical or similar and there exists "a
likelihood of confusion on the part of the public, which includes the likelihood of
association between the sign and the trade rnark.?' In the SABEL casé2 this article was
interpreted as follows. The concept of "likelihood of association" forms part of the
likelihood of confusion. Mere association is thus not a criterion for infringement.
However, the concept of likelihood of confusion must be interpreted broadly using the
global appreciation test. A lesser degree of similarity of goods may be offset by a greater
degree of similarity of marks. A stronger reputation can also lead to wider protection.f
The Benelux countries, where it is averred that the concept "likelihood of association"
originated, have interpreted this phrase much more widely,64 while the English courts'
interpretation is much narrower than that of the CJEC.65 As can be detected from the
58 Webster & Page (1997) par 3.16.
59 See Chapter 5.5.3 "Dilution Provisions" supra and also Chapter 5.7.2.1 "General" supra.
60 Art. 5(1)(b) and 5(2); S 10(2) and 10(3).
61 Emphasis added.
62 Case C-251195, SABEL B. V v Puma A.G., Rudolf Dassier Sport [1997] E.C.R. 1-6191; [1998] E.T.M.R.
I. (Judgment of Il November 1997). See Chapter 5.8.1 "The Interpretation of Articles 4( I)(b) and
S( I )(b)" supra.
63 See also Case C-39/97, Canon Kabushiki Kaisha v Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. (Formerly Pathe
Communications Corporation) [1998] E.C.R. 1-5507; [1999] R.P.C. 117; Case C-425/98, Marca Mode
CV v Adidas A.G. and Adidas Benelux B. V, [2000] E.C.R. 1-4861. (Judgment of 22 June 2000); both
discussed in Chapter 5.8.1 "The Interpretation of Articles 4(1)(b) and 5(1)(b)" supra.
64 They accepted non-origin, non-confusion based association.
65 In Wagamama Ltd. v City Centre Restaurants pIc. [1995] F.S.R. 713; [1996] E.T.M.R. 23 the English
Chancery Division decided that the phrase "likelihood of association" does not extend trade-mark
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case law and academic commentaries, the concept of "likelihood of association" in the
European Union remains a nebulous concept with no certain interpretation and
application. Moreover, the effect of its current interpretation by the CJEC is such that
this article does not provide dilution protection.
The South African counterpart of this provision gives protection against the unauthorised
use of an identical or similar mark on goods that are so similar "that in such use there
exists the likelihood of deception or confusion't." The concept of "likelihood of
association" is thus absent from the South African statutory infringement provision
dealing with confusion. It is submitted that this deviation from the European law is to be
welcomed and should not be changed. A lot of controversy and interpretation problems
are avoided. Furthermore, there is a clearer distinction in the South African Act, when
compared to the Trademark Directive and United Kingdom Act, between the traditional
infringement provisions and the dilution provision. Section 34(1)(a) protects against
infringement of an identical mark or a mark so nearly resembling it on identical goods
and where there is deception or confusion. Section 34( 1)(b), although wider in ambit,
still protects against the likelihood of deception or confusion. Section 34(1)(c), the
dilution provision, then protects well-known marks against unfair advantage and
detriment to their distinctive character or repute, notwithstanding the absence of
confusion. Despite the fact that there is a dearer distinction in the South African statute
between the traditional infringement sections and dilution section, it is suggested that the
protection against infringement should be divided into separate sections as in United
States law.67
The basic characteristics of article 5(2) of the Trademark Directive68 and section 34(1)( c)
of the South African Act69 can be compared as follows:
protection to uses that do not result in confusion as to product origin and therefore does not provide
dilution protection.
66 S 34(1 )(b) of the South African Trademarks Act 194 of 1993.
67 See discussion and suggestion in Chapter 7.2.1 "Introduction" infra.
68 See Chapter 5.5.3 "Dilution Provisions" supra for the text of this provision.
69 See Chapter 6.4.2 "The Dilution Provisions" supra.
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Article 5(2):
l. The provision applies to use of the mark without the proprietor's consent.
2. It is restricted to use in the course of trade.
3. The other mark must consist of an identical or similar sign.
4. The other mark must be used in relation to goods or services which are not similar to
those for which the mark is registered.
5. The senior mark must have a reputation in the Member State where protection IS
sought.
6. The use must be without due cause.
7. Such use must take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive character
or the repute of the trade mark.
Section 34(1)(c):
1. The use must be unauthorised.
2. The provision is restricted to use in the course of trade.
3. The other mark must be identical or similar.
4. The other mark can be used in relation to any goods or services.
5. The senior mark must be well known in the Republic.
6. The use complained of must be likely to take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to,
the distinctive character or the repute of the trade mark.
7. The provision applies notwithstanding the absence of confusion or deception.
The first three requirements of each provision listed above are the same. The differences
will first be summed up and then discussed. The Directive refers to goods or services
that are "not similar". The South African provision refers to "any goods or services",
thus including both similar and not similar goods. The counterpart of a mark with a
reputation in the Member States is a mark which is well known in the Republic. The
phrase "without due cause" does not appear in the South African provision. There is a
slight, but meaningful difference in the description of the harm. The Directive uses the
words "takes unfair advantage of ... ", while the South African Act reads "likely to take
unfair advantage ... ". Furthermore, the South African Act makes it clear that confusion
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or deception is not relevant in the context of this section. No such indication is found in
the European Directive.
(i) Identical or similar mark/sign
The concept of "similarity of marks" has required some interpretation. In Adidas v
Fitnessworld7o the CJEC had to answer the question whether a likelihood of confusion
was necessary for a finding of a sufficient degree of similarity between the mark and the
sign. The court stated that elements of visual, aural or conceptual similarity are necessary
for a finding of similarity of marks. 71 The public must make a link between the mark and
the sign. This link must be appreciated globally taking into account all factors relevant to
the circumstances of the case. Basically the same conclusion was reached in Inlima's
Application'[ in the United Kingdom.
The Benelux Court" has given a broad interpretation to the phrase "similarity of marks".
Different factors such as the distinctive power of the mark should be taken into account.
The mark and the sign must be compared as a whole and any phonetic, visual or
conceptual resemblance that evoke associations between the mark and sign should be
taken into account. In this comparison more attention is paid to similarities than to
differences, as it is mainly through similarities that associations are made.
In South Africa, the courts have decided that the offending mark should immediately
bring to mind the well-known trade mark. The Supreme Court of Appeal warned against
too wide an interpretation to prevent creating an unacceptable monopoly. The court said
70 Case C-408/01, Adidas-Salomon A.G., formerly Adidas A.G., Adidas Benelux B. V v Fitnessworld
Trading Ltd., 23 October 2003 par 24-31.
71 With reference to Case C-342/97, Lloyd Schuhfabrik Meyer & Co GmbH v Klijsen Handel B. V [1999]
E.C.R. 1-3819; [1999] E.T.M.R. 690.
72 Intima's Application [2000] E.T.M.R. 325; [2000] R.P.C. 661 at 664.
73 Union/Union Soleure, Benelux Court of Justice, 20 May 1983 [1984] N.J. 72; [1984] B.l.E. 137.
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that the marks must have "a marked (easy to recognise) resemblance or likeness" and not
only a slight resemblance."
It is submitted that the Benelux method of determining similarity of marks may well be
too lenient with the result that it would in fact be very difficult not to find similarity of
marks.75 As can be seen from the South African case law, a quite narrow interpretation
has been chosen. This interpretation may be too narrow and could deprive certain marks
of adequate protection. It is thus submitted that the definition of "having a marked
resemblance or likeness" should still be used, but that elements of visual, aural and
conceptual similarity should be taken into account. Furthermore, the public must make a
subconscious connection or association or link between the mark and the sign based on
the resemblance between them, but without being confused.
(ii) Any goods or services/non-similar goods/services
On the face of it, it seems that the South African provision is broader than its European
counterpart. The Trademark Directive refers to "goods or services which are not
similar", while the South African Act refers to "any goods or services", thus including
identical, similar and non-similar goods. However the CJEC in Davidoff and Adidas"
gave a broad interpretation to the words of the Directive in the light of its overall scheme
and the objectives of the system of which it is a part. The court concluded that marks
with a reputation used on identical or similar goods must enjoy at least as extensive
protection as where a sign is used for non-similar goods. Thus, in spite of the clear
wording of the Directive the dilution protection in article 5(2) pertains to "any goods".
74 Bata Ltd. v Face Fashions CC 200 I I SA 844 (SCA) 852B-E. See also SAB International tla Sabmark
International v Laugh It Off Promotions [2003] 2 All SA 454 (C) 458d-g; National Brands Ltd. v Blue
Lion Manufacturing Ltd. unreported judgment TPD 11 May 1999 case 98/23751.
75 See for example the Always/Regina case, where similarity was found based on the overall similarity of
the products, despite the fact that the word marks were completely different. Regina v Procter &
Gamble, Court of Appeal Brussels 27 May 1993, LE.R. 1993, 112 is discussed in Chapter 5.7.1.6
"Influence of the Trademark Directive on Benelux Law" supra.
76 Case C-292/00, Davidoff & Cie and Zino Davidoff SA v Gofldd Ltd., 9 January 2003; Case C-408/01,
Adidas-Salomon A.G., formerly Adidas A.G., Adidas Benelux B. V v Fitnessworld Trading Ltd., 23
October 2003.
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As discussed, the South African dilution provision certainly includes goods and services
that are not similar, but can also apparently include identical or similar goods and
services. This can potentially mean that section 34(1)(c) can be applied concurrently
with section 34(1)(a) and 34(1)(b) of the South African Act.77 As reasoned above," the
dilution provisions are not intended to be used concurrently with either section 34(l)(a)
or (b), because this would negate the basic difference between traditional infringement
and dilution." It can, however, be used in the alternative as a person who makes an
association between marks for purposes of dilution, cannot be confused, and where there
is confusion the traditional infringement provisions apply.
This broader application of the dilution doctrine to similar goods and services is to be
welcomed. If it were not applicable in the case of identical or similar goods, it would
leave a lacuna in the Act where well-known marks used in the context of dissimilar goods
are protected against dilution, but would not be in the context of identical or similar
goods. Webster and Page are therefore correct in supporting this broader application of
the South African dilution provision, but preferring the English position, where the
dilution provision and the other traditional infringement provisions are treated as
rnutually exclusive/"
(iii) Without due cause
In the Benelux countries, this phrase was interpreted in the Claeryn case." The court
found that "due cause" could only be assumed if there was such a necessity on the part of
the alleged infringer to use the mark, that he could not reasonably be required to abstain
from such use. There is thus a limitation built into the concept of due cause, but the
courts are very reluctant to find "due cause" in the case of unauthorised use. Also in the
77 Triomed (Ply.) Ltd. v Beecham Group pic. [2001] 2 All SA 126 (T) 153-154; 20012 SA 522 (T) 555D.
78 See Chapter 6.4.2 "The Dilution Provisions (ii) Use ... .in Relation to Any Goods or Services" supra.
79 See Chapter 3.3 "Traditional Infringement Contrasted with Dilution" supra for a complete discussion of
the differences between the two concepts.
80 Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24.2 fn 1.
81 Colgate-Palmolive B. V v NV Koninklijke Distileerderijen Erven Lucas Bols, BCI IMarch 1975 [1975]
N.J.472.
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United Kingdom this phrase is very cautiously applied. But it still gives a judicial
discretion to the courts and prior use can for example be taken into account. In Premier
Brandi2 the court said that it is a defence that could be relied on by the defendant, who
has to show that his use of the mark was with due cause and also that any advantage or
detriment is not without due cause. The court made it clear that "without due cause" does
not mean "in good faith"; innocence by itself is therefore not a defence.
It is submitted that a "due cause" clause should be added to the South African dilution
provision. It should nevertheless be interpreted cautiously, as in the Benelux countries
and the United Kingdom. The benefit of such a provision is that it will give the
defendant a fair chance to raise a defence, which, if deserving, will succeed. Although
this modification may seem meaningless, it will give ajudicial discretion to the courts.
(iv) Well known/reputation
It is generally accepted that reputation refers to a lower standard of renown compared to
well known. A well-known trade mark is widely or generally known, thus clearly having
a reputation. Reputation only means known. Or as put in the General Motors83 case by
the CJEC, reputation means that the mark must be known by a significant part of the
public concerned in a substantial part of a Member State. This viewpoint was accepted in
the United Kingdom."
Article 16(2) of the TRIPS agreement states that in determining whether a trade mark is
well known, "account shall be taken of the knowledge of the trade mark in the relevant
sector of the public". The knowledge of the trade mark in the relevant sector can,
according to article 16(2) of the TRIPS agreement, also be obtained as "a result of the
promotion of the trademark". This means that the amount of expenditure in advertising
82 Premier Brands v Typhoon Europe Ltd., High Court of Justice, Chancery Division, 21 January 2000;
(2000) 23(5) IPD; [2000] F.S.R. 767 at 789-792.
83 Case C-375/97, General Motors Corp. v Yplon SA, [1998] E.C.R.I-5421; [2000] R.P.C. 572.
84 CA Sheimer (MJ SDN BHD's Trade Mark Application [2000] R.P.C. 484 at 504. See Chapter 5.7.2.5
"The Key Concepts of Section 10(3) (iv) Reputation" supra.
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and the extent of dissemination amongst the public can also be taken into account when
determining renown. Market survey evidence can further typically be used to
demonstrate repute amongst the relevant public. The definition in the TRIPS agreement
corresponds closely to section 35(lA) of the South African ACt.85
In the Triomed and SAB cases the interpretation given to "well known" in the
McDonald's case in the context of section 35 was also accepted as the standard for
section 34(1)(c).86 As has been explained above,87 there are good reasons why this
interpretation should not be used in the context of section 34(1)( c). The criterion used by
the CJEC to determine reputation, which is a lesser standard of renown, is basically the
same as the criterion used by the South African courts to determine "well known". It is
therefore submitted that a stricter standard should be applied in South African law to
determine "well known" in the context of section 34(1)(c).
(v) Likely to take/takes unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the distinctive
character or repute
Although this requirement looks basically the same in the Trademark Directive, the
United Kingdom Act of 1994 and the South African Act, there is one significant
difference. The European version uses the words "takes unfair advantage", while the
South African Act reads "likely to take unfair advantage". In the English case of
DaimlerChrysler v Alavi88 it was held that the words "takes unfair advantage" means that
actual unfair advantage or detriment is required for a finding under section 10(3) of the
United Kingdom Act and not just the likelihood of this happening. As debated in the
United States case law the requirement of actual harm makes it practically impossible to
establish dilution in all but the most extreme cases.89 The standard of dilution has not
85 See Chapter 6.4.2 "The Dilution Provisions (iv) Well known" supra.
86 Triomed (Pty.) Ltd. Beecham Group pic. [200 I] 2 All SA 126 (T) 153-154; 200 I 2 SA 522 (T) 556C-D;
SAB International tla Sabmark International v Laugh It Off Promotions [2003] 2 All SA 454 (C)458i-
459b.
87 See Chapter 6.4.2 "The Dilution Provisions (iv) Well known" supra.
88 DaimlerChrysler A.G. v Javid Alavi (tla Mere), [2001] R.P.C. 813 at 842.
89 See Chapter 4.10.4 "Likelihood of Dilution vs Actual Dilution" supra.
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been discussed by the South African courts thus far and it is submitted that the words of
the statute in this regard should be taken at their face value. The standard should thus be
a likelihood of dilution, which is also in line with the gradual harm caused by dilution.9o
Another question relates to the interpretation of the terms "unfair advantage" and
"detriment". As the concepts of unfair advantage and detriment are stated in the
alternative, it may mean that they are intended to have different meanings. The South
African courts, when confronted with these two concepts, referred back to an English
case, which in turn quotes from two German decisions." There is no exact way of
defining these two concepts and there is no conclusive test to apply.
Unfair advantage has been described as occurring where someone associates the quality
of his goods with another's prestigious goods with the purpose of exploiting the good
reputation of the other person and to enhance his own promotional effort. Or it can be
determined by asking what benefit the defendant gained from the use of the mark
complained of. Unfair advantage can also refer to the defendant's state of mind, which
can be inferred from his motives and actions."
Detriment occurs when the use of one's mark impairs the originality and distinctive
character of another mark, as well as the advertising effectiveness derived from its
uniqueness. In the English case of Premier Brands the court stated that the existence of
confusion could indicate detriment and that in the absence of confusion some other form
of detriment has to be found."
90 This is also in line with the proposed Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005 in the USA.
91 Triomed (Ply.) Ltd. v Beecham Group pic. [2001] 2 All SA 126 (T); 2001 2 SA 522 (T) 556H-557B;
[2001] F.S.R. 34, 619 par 135-136; Premier Brands UK Ltd. v Typhoon Europe Ltd. [2000] All ER (D) .
52, discussed in Chapter 5.7.2.3 "Cases on Section 10(2)"and Chapter 5.7.2.4 "Cases on Section 10(3)"
supra.
92 See Chapter 5.7.2.5 "The Key Concepts of Section 10(3) (iii) Unfair Advantage or Detriment" supra
and also Chapter 6.4.2 "The Dilution Provisions (v) Likely to Take Unfair Advantage of, or be
Detrimental to, the Distinctive Character or Repute" supra.
93 See Chapter 5.7.2.5 "The Key Concepts of Section 10(3) (iii) Unfair Advantage or Detriment" supra
and also Chapter 6.4.2 "The Dilution Provisions (v) Likely to Take Unfair Advantage of, or be
Detrimental to, the Distinctive Character or Repute" supra.
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To prove unfair advantage or detriment it would probably be sufficient to show damage
in the form of a positive or negative exploitation of the mark." It can also be said that
there must be blurring or tarnishment. In the SAB case95 the court said that that where the
use of the mark is "obviously offensive", dilution by tarnishment may occur. The words
"use likely to give offence to any class of persons" is interpreted by Webster and Page in
the context of section 10(12).96 They indicate that the wording of the section is extremely
wide. They submit that the words refer to marks which ex facie offend because of their
own content. Furthermore they suggest that the offensive mark should be such as would
occasion offence to a reasonable person. Thus, the meaning and content of the words
"likely to offend" is far from clear in our law. It is therefore submitted that to bring these
words into the dilution inquiry merely brings more uncertainty instead of clarity to this
area of the law.
There are advantages in keeping the wording of this part of the section as it is. One
reason is that it corresponds with that of the Directive applying to Member States of the
European Union. In this event it is submitted that the terms "unfair advantage" and
"detriment" should be seen in the alternative and interpreted in the light of the
paraphrases above.
However, to give more clarity to this part of the provision, it is proposed that the wording
should be changed to the following:
"likely to cause dilution [to take uAfuir advaAtage of, or Be detrimeAtal to,] of the distinctive
character or the repute of the registered mark, .... "
"Dilution" should then be defined in section 2 (the definitions section) as dilution by
blurring or dilution by tarnishment, the primary theories as to how dilution occurs. These
two concepts should then also be defined. It is suggested that the definitions used in the
94 CA Sheimer (MJ SDN BHD's Trade Mark Application [2000] R.P.C. 484 at 505.
95 SAB International tla Sabmark International v Laugh It Off Promotions [2003] 2 All SA 454 (C).
96 Webster & Page (1997) par 6.9.
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proposed Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 200597 be followed. The definitions will
then be as follows:
"Dilution by blurring" is association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and
a well-known" mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the well-known mark.
"Dilution by tarnishment" is association arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name
and a well-known mark that harms the reputation of the well-known mark.
It is possible to fit most other recognized types of dilution under either blurring or
tarnishment. Use of a trade mark in a generic sense can be classified under blurring, as
some commentators already do.99 Disparagement or imitative dilution could possibly fit
under tarnishment.
(vi) Notwithstanding the absence of confusion or deception
As has been seen, the Trademark Directive and United Kingdom Act contain no reference
in article 5(2) and section 10(3) respectively to confusion. This had led to considerable
interpretation problems. In the first English decision on section 10(3), it was held that the
application of the dilution section requires that there must be a likelihood of deception or
confusion through the use of the offending mark.loo As stated above.l'" dilution can in
fact only occur when confusion as to source or origin is absent. If someone is confused,
the mark remains the sole identifier of the senior user's product in his mind. He thus
perceives the two marks as representing the same source. Dilution, on the other hand,
occurs when the awareness that a specific mark signifies a single product from a single
97 Trademark Dilution Revision Act of2005 HR Rep No 683, (9 February 2005).
98 The Trademark Dilution Revision Act uses the term "famous mark", but it is recommended infra that
the term well-known should be retained in the South African Act.
99 See Chapter 3.4.3 "Genericism/Genericisation" and especially Chapter 3 fn 123 supra.
100 See Chapter 5.7.2.4 "Cases on Section 10(3)" and Baywatch Productions Co. Inc. v Home Video
Channel Ltd., [1997] F.S.R. 22. But see for example Pfizer v Eurofood, High Court of Justice,
Chancery Division, 10 December 1999 and Premier Brands v Typhoon Europe Ltd., High Court of
Justice, Chancery Division, 21 January 2000 (2000) 23(5) !PD; [2000] F.S.R. 767 at 788, where it was
accepted by the English courts that confusion is not a requirement of s 10(3).
101 See especially Chapter 3.3 "Traditional Infringement Contrasted with Dilution" supra.
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source changes to an unmistakable awareness that the same or a similar mark signifies
various things from various sources.I02
The CJEC stated in SABEL and Marca Mode that article 5(2) does not require the
existence of a likelihood of confusion. This was confirmed in Adidas v Fitnessworld.103
As discussed above and in the previous Chapter'?" the existence of confusion and dilution
is mutually exclusive. To avoid any fundamental problems in the interpretation of this
part of the section, it is suggested that the wording in the interests of avoiding any
ambiguity should be changed to:
"i!1 {net1l'ithsttmd-i/1g} the absence of confusion or deception."
One question then remains. In which category would cases of a well-known mark and a
sign on non-similar goods causing confusion fall? The fact that there is some confusion
indicates that the goods cannot be too dissimilar. It has been seen that when using the
test of global appreciation to determine similarity of marks in article 5( I )(b) of the
Trademark Directive, confusion is also taken into account, along with other factors. The
result is that a lesser degree of similarity between the goods, can be offset by a greater
degree of similarity between the marks. The definition of similar goods is thus stretched.
These cases will thus presumably be covered by section 34(1)(b) of the South African
Act.
The proposed amendments to section 34(l)(c) should, in the interests of consistency, also
be implemented in section 1O( 17). 105
102 Pattishall BW "Dawning Acceptance of the Dilution Rationale for Trade Mark - Trade Identity
Protection" (1984) 74 The Trademark Reporter 289 at 300, 308; McCarthy JT "The 1996 Federal Anti
Dilution Statute" (1998) 16 Cardozo Arts and Entertainment Law Journal 587 at 592; McCarthy JT
McCarthy on Trademarks 4th ed (1996) West Group St Paul Minnesota §24:70.
103 See Chapter 5.8.2 "The Interpretation of Article 5(2)" supra.
104 Chapter 6.4.2 "The Dilution Provisions (vi) Notwithstanding the Absence of Confusion or Deception"
supra.
105 See Chapter 6.4.2 "The Dilution Provisions" supra for the provisions as currently phrased.
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7.4 SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations made in this chapter can be summed up as follows. The dilution
provision should be separated from the other (traditional) infringement provisions. The
infringement provisions would then be contained in section 34(1)(a) and (b) and the
dilution provision in section 34(2),106 for example.
Similarity of marks should be interpreted more widely than at present. The definition of
"having a marked resemblance or likeness" should still be used, but elements of visual,
aural or conceptual similarity should be taken into account. Furthermore, the public must
make a subconscious connection or association or link between the mark and the sign
based on the resemblance between them, but not be confused.
The phrase "any goods or services" should be kept as is, but the dilution provision must
be interpreted as mutually exclusive of the other infringement provisions. The phrase
"without due cause" should be added to the existing provision as it will give the
defendant a fair chance to raise a defence.
The concept of "well-known marks" must be retained, with the reservations referred to
above.l'" It is submitted that the eight-factor test contained in the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act, can essentially be applied with great success in South African law in
determining the concept of "well known" for purposes of the dilution provisions,
although it is used in United States federal law to determine fame.108 As indicated, the
eighth factor is not relevant in the South African context, while there may be other factors
as set out by Mostert and in the Joint Recommendation that can also be useful.l'"
106 This will have the effect that the remainder of the provisions in section 34 must also be renumbered.
107 See Chapter 7.3.2 "The Dilution Provisions (iv) Well known/reputation" supra.
108 See discussion of the factors in Chapter 7.2.2 "The Dilutions Provisions (i) Well known/famous" supra.
109 In the proposed Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005 HR Rep No 683, (9 February 2005) the
threshold of fame is expanded, thereby denying protection for marks that are only famous in a niche
market. Only three fame factors are listed in the new Act. However, "all relevant factors" may still be
considered by a court and therefore this legislation will not affect the conclusion reached here. See
Chapter 4.10.3 "Famous Marks" supra.
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The phrase "likely to take unfair advantage of or be detrimental to the distinctive
character or repute of the registered mark" should be changed to "likely to cause dilution
of the distinctive character of the registered mark". "Dilution" should then be defined as
dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment. These two concepts should then in turn
also be defined. It is suggested that the definitions used in the proposed Trademark
Dilution Revision Act of 2005 be followed. It is possible to fit most other recognized
types of dilution under either blurring or tarnishment.
Courts should then use the following factors to determine the likelihood of dilution. The
two most important factors are a mental association'I" between the registered mark and
the sign and third party usage. I I I Predatory intent and consumer sophistication could be
used as subordinate factors.
Finally, the phrase "notwithstanding the absence of confusion or deception" should be
changed to "in the absence or confusion or deception", to emphasise that dilution and
confusion are mutually exclusive concepts.
7.5 CONCLUSION
Webster and Page state that "while the introduction of the dilution provisions is to be
welcomed it is submitted that great care must be taken by our courts in interpreting
section 34(1 )(c) to ensure that the parameters of this new form of trade mark protection
are defined in such a manner that the legitimate interests of proprietors of well-known
trade marks are protected while, at the same time, not creating an absolute monopoly or a
form of copyright in a trade mark". 112 The sentiment expressed by Rutherford is that
"protection should be available for all trade marks which have acquired an advertising
value, irrespective of the nature of the mark or the source of its selling power. Not only
110 This is also evident from the definitions of "dilution by blurring" and "dilution by tarnishment".
111 Both factors are included in the list of factors in the proposed Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005
to determine dilution by blurring. See Chapter 4.10.6 "Cases on Blurring" supra for a list of the
proposed factors.
112 Webster & Page (1997) par 12.24.
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marks which are inherently distinctive but also marks which have acquired a selling
power through extensive advertising should enjoy protection't.i "
It is submitted that both these sentiments are addressed by the conclusion to this
dissertation. Dilution protection should pick up where the infringement remedy leaves
off and not merely provide an easier way for the proprietor to establish an infringement
claim in circumstances where a traditional infringement has possibly occurred, while
being difficult to prove. This will give trade marks and their proprietors the necessary
protection, as well as protecting the interests of consumers and other competitors.
113 Rutherford BR "Misappropriation of the Advertising Value of Trade Marks, Trade Names and Service
Marks" (1990) 2 SA Mere U 151 at 162.
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ADDENDUM
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
LAUGH IT OFF PROMOTIONS CC v SOUTH AFRICAN
BREWERIES INTERNATIONAL (FINANCE) B.V. tla SABMARK
INTERNATIONAL and FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION INSTITUTE
CASE CCT 42/04 - 27 MAY 2005
1. INTRODUCTION
The decision of the Constitutional Court (CC) brings to a close the saga between Laugh It
Off and SAB that started in 2001. The High Court decision was handed down in 2003,1
followed by the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) delivered on 16
September 20042 and followed finally by the judgment of the Constitutional Court on 27
May 2005.
Initially, only the judgment of the High Court was discussed in this dissertation as the
SCA judgment was not available in time for it to be included in the version submitted for
examination. Comments on this judgment were, however, included in Chapters 6 and 7
during the final editing of the dissertation. It must be noted that the SCA judgment
substantially confirmed that of the court a quo and therefore did not require substantial
changes to the dissertation. Subsequently, after the examiners had completed their
reports, the Constitutional Court overturned the judgment of the SCA. It was then
I SAB International tla Sabmark International v Laugh It Off Promotions [2003] 2 All SA 454 (C).
Laugh lt Off Promotions CC v SA Breweries International (Finance) BV tla Sabmark International
[2004] 4 All SA 151 (SCA); 2005 2 SA 46 (SCA).
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decided, in the light of the importance of the CC judgment, to deal with it In an
addendum.
2. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The facts of the case are set out in Chapter 6 of the dissertation and are therefore not
repeated here.3
3. THE ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT
The CC sees this case as a "matter of the proper interface between the guarantee of free
expression enshrined in section 16(1) of the Constitution and the protection of intellectual
property rights attaching to registered trade marks as envisaged by section 34(1)(c) of the
Trade Marks Act 194 of 1993.,,4
4. THE JUDGMENT
The CC in the light of concessions made by the applicant noted that in relation to section
34(l)(c) the only part that remained in dispute, is whether the respondent had properly
demonstrated the likelihood of detriment to the repute of the marks in question.' To
ascertain the purpose of the section, the court considered different opinions and came to
the conclusion that it "strives to protect the unique identity and reputation" of a trade
mark. These characteristics support the economic value that resides in the mark's selling
power.
In paragraph 43 Moseneke J then spelt out the way in which the court contemplated to
reconcile dilution protection (in section 34(1)(c)) and freedom of expression (in section
3 Chapter 6.4.4 "Cases".
Par 1 of the judgment.
sPar 35. In par 41 Moseneke J explains that where the repute ofa trade mark is at stake, it is a case of
tarnishment. The SCA already found that this case was concerned with tarnishment of the BLACK
LABEL marks.
359
16 of the Constitution). He said that "under our constitutional democracy, the
requirements of the section ought to be understood through the prism of the Constitution
and specifically that of the free expression guarantee." He then found that the approach
of the SCA was flawed as it first found an infringement under section 34 and only
thereafter determined whether the infringement could be excused by an assertion of
freedom of expression.
In the next paragraph Moseneke J continued to explain how the court should approach the
current matter. "A finding of unfair use or likelihood of detriment to the repute of the
marks hinges on whether the offending expression is protected under section 16(1) of the
Constitution or not." He also stressed the importance of the right to free expression.
The court felt obliged to delineate the bounds of the constitutional guarantee of free
expression "generously". The court explained that section 16 of the Constitution has two
parts: Firstly, the section sets out expression protected under the Constitution and
secondly, lists three categories of expression which are expressly excluded from
constitutional protection' The court then took section 34(1)(c) under scrutiny. It found
that this section in effect limits the right to free expression. The court then said that this
section must be constructed in a manner "most compatible with the right to free
expression"." The dilution section must "bear a meaning which is the least destructive of
other entrenched rights."
The sentiment of the court is clear: no absolute monopoly or form of copyright in a trade
mark must be created. The court accepted that section 34(1)(c) has internallimitations.8
The court then had to decide whether there was the likelihood of detriment. It referred to
the SCA and High Court judgments, which found a likelihood of detriment "on the
footing that the message on the T-shirts would probably create in the minds of consumers
Par 47.
Par 48.
8 There must be "unfair advantage" or "unfair detriment" and there must be substantial harm to the
uniqueness and repute of the mark (see par 49).
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a particularly unwholesome, unsavoury and degrading association". However the CC
held that "probability is a matter of inference to be made from facts consistent with the
inference". The court said that no such facts had been pleaded. The court said further
that "the constitutional guarantee of free expression is available to ali", "even where
others may deem the expression unsavoury, unwholesome or degrading"."
The court then came to the following conclusion: "[I]n a claim under section 34(l)(c), a
party that seeks to oust an expressive conduct protected under the Constitution must, on
the facts, establish a likelihood of substantial economic detriment to the claimant's
mark."lo The claim of infringement of the respondent's marks was therefore dismissed,
because no likelihood of economic prejudice had been established. For this reason,
Moseneke J decided that "the fairness of parody or satire or lampooning does not fall for
consideration". II
The appeal against the judgment of the SCA thus succeeded.
Sachs J delivered a concurring opinion. Although he agreed with the order made by
Moseneke J, he believed that the appeal should be upheld "on more substantial
grounds'v' He focused his opinion on free expression in the form of parody. At the
outset he declared that from his research it is clear that internationally "court decisions on
the topic have been as variable as judicial humour itself,.13
Sachs J first went into a lengthy, but illuminating, discussion of what parody entails. He
then declared that there are parodies that cause unfair detriment and parodies that do not.
"Everything will depend on the context"." Therefore, each case must be decided on its
own merits, by balancing the objectives ("ends") of trade-mark law on the one hand and
Par 55.
10 Par 56. Emphasis added.
II Par 66.
12 Par 73 and 74.
13 Par 70.
14 Par8!.
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the values of free speech on the other. He then set out the factors that should be taken
into account when balancing these two rights.
After considering the facts, Sachs J concluded: "The only possible sting as far as trade-
mark protection is concerned relates to the possible negative impact of the sale of the T-
shirts on the image of Carling Black Label. It could be said that the imputation of racist
labour practices in the past would tarnish the goodwill associated with the trademark
thereby creating unfair detriment." But he found that there was no proof that these
imputations "would in any way affect the eagerness of present day customers to down
another glass of Carling Black Label".15 Thus, according to Sachs J, there was virtually
no harm to the marketability of the beer.16 Furthermore, he believed that parodies serve
an important public function, which should not easily be suppressed and that humour is
one of the great solvents of democracy.l
5. COMMENTS ON THE JUDGMENT
As the writer comes from a commercial law background, the comments expressed on this
judgment must be read subject to one qualification, namely that the writer does not
profess to have any specialist knowledge in the field of constitutional law.
The writer believes that believe that the interplay between free expression and intellectual
property in the form of trade marks has important implications for the workings of our
economy and is of concern to the broader public. Moseneke J stated in the first
paragraph of the judgment that the role of the court in this case was to find the proper
balance between the guarantee of free expression and the protection of intellectual
property rights. The writer agrees and also accepts, as the judgment further explains, that
section 34(l)(c) must be construed in the light of the Constitution and applied in a
manner that does not unduly trample upon freedom of expression. But it is clear from the
15. Par 97,98.
16 Par 101.
17 Par 109.
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outset that the court ranked the constitutional right of freedom of expression as almost an
absolute right and then construed section 34(1)(c) to be subordinate to this conviction.
The writer considers the approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal," namely to first find
an infringement under section 34(1)(c) and only thereafter to determine whether the
infringement is excused by an assertion of freedom of expression, to be correct. This is
also the approach in the United States. In the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
infringement by dilution is first described and then three exceptions to liability are
listed." The second one is "non-commercial use of a mark". As a result of this provision
the use of a famous trade mark in non-commercial speech, will be absolutely legal, thus
constitutionally protected. In certain instances parodies can qualify as non-commercial
speech. Therefore, the question in each case will be whether the parody can be seen as
non-commercial speech or not.20
5.1 "SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIC DETRIMENT"
Moseneke J, with whom the other members of the CC concurred, declared in paragraph
56 of the judgment that to succeed on a claim in terms of section 34(1)(c), a party that
"seeks to oust an expressive conduct protected under the Constitution" must establish on
the facts "a likelihood of substantial economic detrimenr'/" The CC thus brings into the
South African law on trade-mark dilution a new threshold for the finding of an
infringement based on use "likely to be detrimental" to the repute of a registered mark.
This standard is not required in any of the other jurisdictions reviewed in this dissertation.
The probability of economic or commercial harm is not a requirement under UK law or
the law of the European Union. Even in the Moseley case22 in the United States, which
required a showing of actual dilution, the court made it clear that actual economic injury
18 Laugh It Off Promotions CC v SA Breweries International (Finance) BV tla Sabmark international
[2004] 4 All SA 151 (SCA).
19 See Chapter 4.7.3 "Exceptions to Liability Under the Act".
20 Compare however the views expressed by Sachs J in par 102 of his judgment.
21 In par 51 this conclusion was expressed in other words. See next paragraph.
22 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003). See Chapter 4.10.4 "Likelihood of
Dilution vs Actual Dilution".
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is not required. Also the proposed Trademark Dilution Revision Act in the USA, which
set the standard for dilution as "a likelihood of dilution", states explicitly that the
"presence or absence ... of actual economic injury" makes no difference when deciding
the dilution question.
In paragraph 51 Moseneke J said that "seen through the lens of the Constitution, the
likely prejudice or detriment required by the section must be restricted to material harm
in the commercial sense" and in paragraph 56 that "in an open democracy valuable
expressive acts in public ought not to be lightly trampled upon by marginal detriment or
harm unrelated to the commercial value that vests in the mark itself'. The implication of
this and other statements in the judgment, could be that "material harm in the commercial
sense" is only required in dilution claims when the protection of Constitutional values is
at stake. It is submitted that this was not the intention of the court. In paragraph 54
Moseneke J said that "it is clear that even without reference to the dictates of the
Constitution our courts rightly tend to determine likelihood of detriment to the selling
appeal of a mark in the light of established facts and not bald allegations." It is submitted
that the CC in the present case set a general requirement of "economic detriment" that
will in future pertain to all trade-mark dilution cases. This appears to create an untenable
situation for the owners of trade marks as the criterion for a finding of dilution will be too
high to reach.
The judgment is also unclear on how "a likelihood of substantial economic detriment"
must be proved. The CC found that there were no facts on which to establish the
probability of trade or commercial harm or the likelihood of future commercial detriment.
The court repeatedly referred to "economic and trade harm". The only indication of the
type of proof required by the court is given in paragraph 58 where the court said that "no
evidence, direct or inferential, was adduced to establish likelihood either in the sense of
unfavourable associations that have been created between the registered marks and the
illustration on the T-shirts, or in the context of a likelihood of loss of sales by virtue of
the reduced commercial magnetism of the mark". To prove "unfavourable associations"
consumer surveys could probably be used, but it is generally known that the acceptance
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of these surveys by a court is problematic. A "likelihood of loss of sales" can then
arguably only be proved by financial statements, but "a loss of sales" will only show after
dilution has actually taken place and this is not the standard for dilution. The requirement
imposed by the CC will defeat the purpose of the dilution provision.
5.2 TARNISHMENT
It is true that the qualities of a trade mark that are protected by the dilution provisions are
its commercial magnetism and selling power. Both the SCA and the CC found that the
form of dilution that was in issue in the case was tamishment.v' Tamishment occurs
where the quality which one associates with a trade mark is impaired. This can happen,
in the context of this case, where the trade mark is portrayed in an unwholesome or
un savoury way, which gives rise to unflattering thoughts about the plaintiffs product and
thus a diminishment of the reputation and commercial value of the trade mark. From all
the definitions of tamishment it is clear that tamishment occurs the moment that the
positive associations attached to the mark are degraded. The harm caused by tamishment
is also more immediate than the gradual type of harm associated with blurring. It is
therefore important to protect a mark from tarnishrnent before the harm is done.
The Laugh It Off scenario brings to mind one of the most well-known cases on
tarnishment, namely Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc.,24where the court enjoined the
use of the slogan ENJOY COCAINE on a poster in the same colour and script as the
famous, registered ENJOY COCA-COLA trade-marked slogan. A freedom of expression
defence was also raised by the defendant in this case, but was rejected by the court.
23 See par42 of the CCjudgment.
24 Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F.Supp. 1183, 175 U.S.P.Q. 56 (ED.N.Y. 1972). See
Chapter 3.4.2 "Tarnishrnent". The court found that the plaintiff "has made a sufficiently clear showing
of need for immediate protection of its trademark and business reputation to warrant preliminary
injunctive relief." To obtain injunctive relief pendente lite in a trade-mark case a plaintiff must show a
reasonable probability of success at the subsequent trial.
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Another example, even more appropriate to the case under discussion, is provided by the
case of Anheuser-Busch, Inc., v. Andy's Sportswear, Inc.25 The plaintiff, also a brewing
company, averred that the T-shirts sold by the defendant, a sportswear manufacturer,
diluted its BUDWEISER trade mark. The defendant manufactured and distributed
BUTTWISER T-shirts. The court recognised that plaintiff's trade mark was
"unquestionably famous". The court accepted that the plaintiff had at least raised serious
questions about the negative effect of the defendant's T-shirts on its trade mark and then
granted a temporary restraining order.i"
5.3 LIKELIHOOD OF DILUTION VS ACTUAL DILUTION
The CC correctly interpreted section 34(l)(c) as to require only the likelihood of loss and
not actual loss.27 The court, however, stated that this is in contrast to the position in the
UK, European Union and under the US Federal Law. This statement is not completely
correct.
It is true that actual dilution was required in the UK in the case of Daimlertlhrysler v
Alavi.28 The court held the opinion that actual unfair advantage or detriment is required
for an infringement of section 10(3) of the UK Act.29 However, this is not completely
true for the European Union. Although article 5(2) uses the words "takes unfair
advantage of, or is detrimental to", the case referred to by the CC in support of its
argument that actual dilution is required, namely General Motors v Yplon,3o concerned
the interpretation of "reputation" and not the dilution standard. The only place in this
judgment where reference was made to actual dilution was in the submission of the
United Kingdom Government in paragraph 18 of the judgment. 31 No other cases decided
25 Anheuser-Busch, Inc., v. Andy's Sportswear, Inc, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d 1542 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
26 A temporary restraining order is issued pending a preliminary injunction hearing.
27 Par 54.
28 DaimlerChrysler A.G. v Javid Alavi (tla Mere), [2001] R.P.C. 813 at 842. See discussion in Chapter
5.7.2.5 "The Key Concepts of Section 10(3) (iii) Unfair Advantage or Detriment".
29 "The section ... is concerned with actual effects, not risks or likelihoods".
30 Case C-375197, General Motors Corp. v Yplon SA, [1998] E.C.R. 1-5421; [2000] R.P.C. 572.
31 The point received brief consideration in the Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs on this case. He
interpreted article 5(2) as to require actual dilution.
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by the Court of Justice of the European Communities have yet interpreted the standard
for dilution set in article 5(2).
With regard to the position in the United States the CC referred to the decision in
'2Moseley v V Secret Catalogue,' lt is true that the Supreme Court held that the Federal
Trademark Dilution Act unambiguously requires a showing of actual dilution, but
subsequently in February 2005 the Trademark Dilution Revision Act was introduced in
the House of Representatives. This Act explicitly defines dilution as use of a mark
"likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tamishment". Although not yet
enacted, the indications are that it will be enacted soon.33
5.4 EXCLUSIONS IN SECTION 16
In section 16 of the Constitution three categories of expression which are expressly
excluded from constitutional protection are set out. Section 16(2)( c) states that the free
expression right does not extend to
"advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes
incitement to cause harm."
Although the court referred in paragraph 47 of the decision to the fact that the free
expression right is limited by the instances set out in section 16(2), the court did not
elaborate on this subsection. Cleaver J, in the High Court decision found that the conduct
of Laugh It Off borders on hate speech and was aggravated by using the race factor." It
is submitted that even if the CC followed the procedure regarding the balancing of
interests set out in paragraph 44 of its judgment, it should have discussed, in the light of
the finding of Cleaver J, the exception referred to above. It is submitted that the conduct
32 Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 123 S. Ct. 1115 (2003). See Chapter 4.10.4 "Likelihood of
Dilution vs Actual Dilution" for a discussion of this case.
33 See Chapter 4.10.4 "Likelihood of Dilution vs Actual Dilution".
34 SAB International tla Sabmark International v Laugh It Off Promotions [2003] 2 All SA 454 (C) 462j-
463e. The words used by the applicant are "Black Labour", "White Guilt", "Africa's lusty lively
exploitation since 1652" and "No regard given worldwide".
367
of Laugh It Off falls within section 16(2)( c) and the case against it should therefore have
been dismissed."
5.5 PARODY
Parodies of famous trade marks are today quite common. The question is how to deal
with parodies, especially in the light of trade-mark dilution law vs freedom of expression.
Although, in the United States of America, editorial or artistic parodies of famous trade
marks are today frequently allowed, the First Amendment is less protective of parodies
that identify a commercial product, such as clothing."
Some conditions have been identified before a parody may be validly accepted as a
defence to trade-mark infringementr" There must not be any risk of confusion with the
parodied trade mark, but the parodying sign must create a link with the parodied trade
mark. This link must, however, be subtle and must make the consumer laugh or at least
react. The parodied mark must have a certain degree of fame. The conduct of the author
of the parody must not be aimed exclusively at making a profit. This condition is
arguably the only justifiable "excuse" for the conduct of Laugh It Off.
Morel-Chevillet came to the conclusion, after a comparative review of case law in
various jurisdictions, that there is an "extremely limited space accorded, in the context of
trademarks, to freedom of speech'v" It is submitted that the judgment of the CC in
Laugh It Off, opens up this space too widely and that freedom of speech too easily got the
upper hand.
Examples from other jurisdictions where courts found that parody constituted trade-mark
infringement include the following. In Italy the famous AGIP trade mark was used on T-
35 Compare however par 98 of the judgment of Sachs J.
36 The second exception identified in the Federal Trademark Dilution Act is "non-commercial use of a
mark". See the discussion on how it is interpreted in Chapter 4.7.3 "Exceptions to Liability under the
Act", especially in the BARBIE case, Mattei, Inc. v. MeA Records, Inc. 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
37 Morel-Chevillet L "Can Humour Survive?" (June 2004) Trademark World 38-42.
38 Morel-Chevillet (2004) 39.
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shirts. The slogan ACID SELF AREA together with the six-legged Agip dog were
used." The author of the parody had used the phonetic and visual aspects of the famous
mark to refer not to combustibles, but to drugs. The Court found trade-mark
infringement as the parodying sign was likely to affect the Agip Company's reputation
adversely.
Other examples where the parody was found to infringe on a trade mark, are ENJOY
COCAINEIENJOY COCA COLA; GENITAL ELECTRIC/GENERAL ELECTRIC;
JUST DID IT/JUST DO IT; and ONETELFUCKIONETEL.4o
Reverting to the "non-commercial use" exception, in all the cases that the writer could
trace where the parody was reproduced on T-shirts, the court found that the author of the
parody had a commercial aim. Examples are BUDWEISERIBUTTWISER; HARD
RAIN CAFÉ/HARD ROCK CAFÉ; MUTANT OF OMAHA/MUTUAL OF OMAHA
and the use of the MONSIEUR PROPRE character.t' Trade-mark parodies are however
lawful when it can be shown that they were not used for commercial gain.
In the Laugh It Of! case the respondent contended that the objective of its enterprise was
to get a message across and that the sale of the T-shirts was only necessary for
sustainability. That was also the finding of Sachs ].42 That may be true, but the close
corporation in the writer's view was still definitely founded with the intention of
commercial gain. To hold otherwise, sounds just too noble.
39 Trib. Milan, Agip Petroli s.p.a. v. Dig.it. International s.r./., 4 March 1999, Giur,Ann.Dir.lnd. 1999.
40 See Morel-Chevillet (2004) 40.
41 See Morel-Chevillet (2004) 41.
42 Par 102.
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